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Abstract 
A novel approach to knowledge extraction from neural network classifiers when 
applied to payment card fraud detection is proposed.  Existing Fraud Management 
Systems (FMS) use neural network classifiers but do not have the ability to explain 
their learnt patterns of fraud.  Rule extraction from such classifiers with a high level 
of abstraction and linguistic simplicity is proposed.  Decompositional knowledge 
extraction methods are found to be too reliant on the architecture of the fraud 
classifer and current pedagogical rule extraction methods produce rules that are not 
sufficiently comprehensible.  In this thesis the Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive Rule 
(SOAR) pedagogical extraction algorithm is proposed to extract generalising rules 
that explain patterns of fraud.  SOAR uses sensitivity analysis to avoid the exhaustive 
searches of other pedagogical methods.  By projecting into discretised space, 
polytopes are formed by SOAR covering the class convex hull of the classifier 
surface.  A methodological and verifiable empirical evaluation on publicly available 
datasets in various domains is undertaken.  These results show that SOAR extracts 
comprehensible rules that are sound from a deep learning neural network.  When 
SOAR is applied to large datasets provided by payment card issuers it discovered 
new fraud types that were of key interest to payment risk/fraud analysts.  SOAR 
provides an improved understanding of fraud vectors that will lead to a more secure 
payment process through informed payment fraud prevention steps and this work 
could therefore alter how fraud management is undertaken in the future. 
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Notation 
Consistent notation is used in this thesis and in general is based on (Bishop, 2006b).  
Scalar values are denoted by an italic typeface, e.g. 𝑎, 𝑏.  Vectors are denoted by 
lower case bold Roman letters, e.g. 𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳 and are column vectors.  The ‘Blackboard 
bold’ font denotes a complete finite set, e.g. ℝ.  Matrices are denoted by upper case 
bold Roman letters, e.g. 𝐗,𝐕.  A matrix with 𝑚 rows and 𝑛 columns of elements is 
called a 𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix.  A 3 x 3 matrix is written 𝐗 = 𝑥!,! 𝑥!,! 𝑥!,!𝑥!,! 𝑥!,! 𝑥!,!𝑥!,! 𝑥!,! 𝑥!,! .  So that 𝑥!,! ∈ ℝ!".  The superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix or vector. 
[a, b] denotes a closed interval from 𝑎 to 𝑏 that includes 𝑎 and 𝑏.  a, b  denotes a set 
with the elements a and b that are unordered.  The elements a and b each represent 
a symbol.  The relationship between the elements is not known.  A range is denoted 
using ellipses, e.g. 1…n is a range of values from 1 to n.  The Landau notation (Big-𝑂 notation) describes the limiting behaviour of a function as its argument tends 
towards infinity (Landau, 1909). 
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 GLOSSARY  
 PAYMENT 
NOMENCLATURE 
and 
ACRONYMS 
 
A glossary of terms and their abbreviations in common use in the payments and 
banking community are provided below for convenience as each term is defined 
when first introduced within the text in context.  
Term Acronym Description 
 # A prefix of  # indicates the number of transactions for that variable.   
 $ A prefix of $ indicates the USA dollar value for that variable. 
 bn 1bn = One billion (1x109). 
 m 1m = One million (1x106). 
 tn 1tn = One trillion (1x1012). 
 k 1k = One thousand (1x103). 
 x 10x = multiply by ten, 25x = multiply by 25. 
Acquirer  
An acquiring bank or processor enters into a 
contract with a merchant for both card present 
and card not present transactions to process 
card payments using the Card Schemes.  The 
acquirer provides the merchant with credit.  
The acquirer takes on the risk that the 
merchant will be solvent and of their card 
refunds/chargebacks.  Typically an acquirer 
will accept payments from a range of Card 
Schemes, for example Visa, MasterCard, 
Discover, American Express, Diners Club, etc. 
Address Verification 
System AVS 
Process used by e-commerce to verify the 
cardholders’ address. 
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Term Acronym Description 
Alert  
An Alert is the indication that the related 
transaction is suspicious and could indicate 
fraud. 
American Express Amex See Card Scheme.   
Annual Fees  A fee charged by some issuers to the cardholder per year for the use of the payment card. 
Assessment Fee $𝑪 A fee paid by the acquirer to the Card Schemes. 
Authorisation  
To ensure the payment card balance is 
acceptable and the card has not been listed as 
stolen before a transaction is accepted an 
authorisation process is undertaken.  Other 
checks may be made. 
Back-Office  
The back office is the technology and services 
required to manage payments. Back office 
includes systems as the IT, human teams and 
accounting functions. The back office is 
supported by a back end system. 
Bad Debt  
This is the value of a write-off due to those that 
legitimately owe money as a debt but are 
unable to pay and where there is no reasonable 
prospect of recovering it. 
Bank Authorisation 
System Experiential BASE I 
Early computer system that processed 
authorisations. 
Bankruptcy  
A legal status involving an individual or 
business that is unable to repay outstanding 
debts.   
Barclaycard  See Card Scheme. 
Basis Points BP This is a value calculated per $100 of $CEV.  Typically reported in USA cents. 
Bricks and Mortar 
Merchant  
A merchant that has a physical store/shop that 
a customer visits to make their transactions. 
Card Scheme  
A scheme linked to a specific payment card that 
an issuer or acquirer could become a member 
allowing them access to the network for that 
card scheme.  Where the issuer and acquirer 
are the same, this is known as a three-party 
scheme and examples include Diners Club, 
American Express and Discover Card.  Where 
the issuer and acquirer are different institutions 
this is known as a four-party scheme and 
examples include Visa, MasterCard and 
UnionPay. 
Card Verification 
Value CVV 
Process used by e-commerce for additional 
security a 3 or 4 digit code is printed on the 
payment card. 
Cardholder  
An individual who is legitimately linked to a 
payment card and whom is liable for any 
transactions undertaken on that payment card. 
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Term Acronym Description 
Cardholder Data CHD 
The cardholders’ details that is sufficient for 
undertaking payment card fraud, i.e. PAN, 
expiry date, CVV name, address, telephone, 
email, PIN. 
Cardholder 
Expenditure Volume 
CEV, 
$CEV 
The aggregate amount in USD of all 
cardholder transactions over a specified period. 
Cardholder Not 
Present CNP 
Ordering goods or services where the 
cardholder is not physically present at the 
merchant.  Such as IMOTO transactions. 
Cardholder Present CP The cardholder is present at the point of the transaction with the Merchant. 
Cardholders 
Account  
A single cardholder or authorised individuals 
may hold one or more payment cards from a 
single issuer.  The account is the total of all 
these transactions. 
Carding  Criminal activity to convert stolen CHD into cash or cash equivalent 
Cash Advance Fee  A fee charged to the cardholder if cash is withdrawn using the cardholders’ account. 
Charg-It  Arguably the first general credit Card Scheme.  No longer operates.  See Card Scheme. 
Charge Card  
A Charge Card is used to purchase items by 
charging them to the charge card and at the 
end of a billing period a statement is produced 
and the cardholder is required to pay the whole 
amount. 
Charge-Back  
The cardholder can request a charge-back 
when they do not recognise a transaction.  A 
sequence of operations is carried out to credit 
the cardholder and typically debit the acquirer. 
Charge-Back Fee  A fee charged to the Merchant when a charge-back request is made. 
Chip-and-Pin  See Eurocard-MasterCard-Visa (EMV). 
Clear text  Data that can be read as text without the need to decrypt. 
Compound Annual 
Growth Rates CAGR 
CAGR is used throughout this thesis given by: 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑!"#𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑!"#$" !!"#!!"#$" − 1  
 
Compromised 
payment card  
A payment card or CHD that has been 
obtained by anyone other than the legitimate 
cardholder. 
Consequential Loss  
All associated costs, fees, losses, fines and 
chargebacks for the participant held liable in 
the processing of that transaction.   
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Term Acronym Description 
Credit Card  
A credit card allows the cardholder not to have 
to pay the entire balance each month.  The 
outstanding amount typically accrues 
compound interest and some charge a monthly 
fee. 
Cyber-crime  
Crime undertaken using technical skills to 
illegitimately access payment computer systems 
to undertake fraud. 
Cyber-Hack  Cyber-crime undertaken where large amounts of CHDs are typically stolen. 
Delinquent  
This is where the party is unable to make the 
required payment and there is no prospect of 
them doing so – such as bad debt or 
bankruptcy. 
Diners Club  First payment card started in 1950.  See Card Scheme. 
Direct Loss  The write-off value of a transaction that is fraudulent. 
Discover  Payment card scheme in the USA.  See Card Scheme. 
E-commerce  
Ordering goods or services using the Internet.  
This is a Cardholder Not Present (CNP) 
transaction. 
Electronic Recording 
Method of 
Accounting 
ERMA First computer to be used by a bank that was in 1956. 
EMV 
Shift/Migration  
The uptake in an economic region/country of 
the EMV standard where the liability for fraud 
is changed by the Card Schemes. 
Eurocard- 
MasterCard-Visa EMV 
Physical payment card technology that includes 
a microprocessor and memory on a physical 
payment card to enhance security. 
External Fraud  
This is fraud that is committed against the 
issuer or acquirer by using stolen payment card 
or the information available on a payment card. 
Finance Charges  
Charged to the cardholder where interest on 
any outstanding balance is typically accrued 
daily until the balance is zero. 
Financial Institution  
The prime activities are focused on dealing with 
financial transactions from investments, loans, 
deposits, insurance, etc. 
Fraud Liability  
The party that must pay for the fraudulent 
transaction value and possible other charges 
and fees. 
Fraud Management 
System FMS 
Computer software that uses a combination of 
techniques for Fraud Detection to determine if 
a payment transaction is accepted or passed for 
review. 
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Term Acronym Description 
Fraud Prevention  
A range of methods that are designed to reduce 
fraud in payments prior and during the 
transaction. 
Fraud Report  
An early computer generated report, typically 
printed that listed either transactions or 
Merchants that had triggered a simple break. 
Fraud Vector  
A fraud vector consists of a specific sequence of 
operations to undertake payment card fraud 
that have been subsequently recognised or 
detected by law enforcement or fraud experts 
and reported.   
Fraud-lifecycle  A set of steps that define how payment card fraud is undertaken and managed. 
Gross Fraud  The direct value of a fraud write-off. 
Inner Fraud/ 
Internal Fraud  
This fraud is committed by the merchant or in 
collusion with a merchant. 
InterBank Card 
Association ICA 
Payment card scheme started in 1966 to later 
become MasterCard.  See Card Scheme.   
Interchange Fee IV 
A fee paid by the merchants’ acquirer to the 
issuing bank or payment processor of the 
cardholder. 
Internet, Mail 
Order, Telephone 
Order 
IMOTO Ordering goods or services as MOTO or using the Internet.   
Issuer  
An issuer issues a payment card or store-card 
directly to an individual or business and 
provides credit.  The issuer has the liability of 
non-payment by their customer.  
JCB  See Card Scheme.  Payment card scheme in the USA. 
Mail Order, 
Telephone Order MOTO 
Ordering goods or services through completing 
a mail order form with payment card details or 
placing an order over the telephone.  This is a 
Cardholder Not Present (CNP) transaction. 
MasterCard  See InterBank Card Association. 
Merchant  
A business such as a retailer or individual trader 
that accepts a payment card in return for the 
sale of goods or services. 
Merchant Service 
Charge MSC 
A fee paid by the merchant to its acquirer for 
providing debit and credit card services. 
Monetisation  
Generating cash by purchasing commodities 
using stolen payment card information that can 
be exchanged for cash. 
Money Laundering   The origin of money that is illegally obtained is obfuscated. 
National 
BankAmericard NBI 
See Card Scheme.  Payment card started in 
1958 to later become Visa. 
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Term Acronym Description 
Near Field 
Communication NFC 
A RFID technology that uses electromagnetic 
radio waves to transmit data. 
Net Fraud  The value of gross fraud less any moneys recovered. 
Network Fee  See Assessment Fee. 
Non-Bank Processors  
Any entity involved in the provision of retail 
payment services whose main business is not 
related to taking deposits from the public and 
using these deposits to make loans (BIS, 2014). 
Operational Costs  The costs associated with preventing and detecting payment card fraud. 
Threshold  
Vendor FMS solutions sometimes refer to a 
Threshold as a value that is used to determine 
when the classifier generates an Alert.  This is 
the same as a threshold. 
Organised Crime 
Group OCG 
A group of criminals that work together to 
commit serious crime through planning and 
coordination. 
Payment Card  A physical card with a unique ID. 
Payment Card 
Association  
A network of acquirers and issuers that accept 
payment cards from a card scheme. 
Payment Card fraud  
The criminal act of deception using a physical 
plastic card or card information without the 
knowledge of the cardholder. 
Payment Card 
Industry PCI Payment card Industry body. 
Payment Card 
Industry Data 
Security Standards 
PCI DSS A standard to provide improved protection of sensitive payments data.  
Payment Gateway  
Provides online authorisation for a payment.  
This is equivalent to a physical Point Of Sale 
terminal located within a physical retailer.  The 
Payment Gateway accepts the payment card 
details, ensures that these are secure between 
the cardholder and the merchant and between 
the merchant and the PSP or acquirer typically 
using encryption. 
Payment Service 
Provider/Processor PSP 
Provides an online or physical merchant a 
method to accept payment cards (and other 
cashless methods) based on an online payment 
gateway.  A PSP will connect to multiple 
acquirers and payment networks and manages 
these connections and relationships.  PSPs may 
offer other services such as fraud management 
and reporting. 
Penalty Fee  
A fee charged to the cardholder for late 
payment or non-payment of a specified 
minimum balance. 
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Term Acronym Description 
Personal 
Cardholders  
Payment cards that are issued to individuals for 
their exclusive use.  The liability for payment is 
with the individual. 
Personal 
Identification 
Number 
PIN 
A number that is only known only to the 
cardholder that must be kept confidential and is 
entered using a PED before a payment card 
transaction can be authorised.  The number is 
typically four digits. 
PIN Entry Device PED A PED is a physical numeric keypad that the cardholder can (securely) use to enter their PIN. 
Point-to-point 
encryption P2PE 
All data is encrypted from the point of the 
transaction to all payment processors so that 
there is no possibility of clear text. 
Primary Account 
Number PAN 
A 16-digit number that uniquely identifies the 
payment card to the cardholder f 
Radio-Frequency 
Identification  RFID 
A hardware technology that wirelessly transmits 
data when near a suitable receiver. 
Ratio of Genuine to 
Fraud transactions RGF 
The number of genuine transactions per 
fraudulent transaction defined in Eq. (8-7), page 
393.  This value indicates how sparse fraud 
examples are in a set of transactions over a 
period.  It is estimated that an average 
worldwide RGF for all transactions was 1,400, 
200, 5,600 and 4,800 in 1971, 1982, 1993 and 
2013. 
Revolving Debt  
An outstanding balance that accrues interest 
and other fees that can be credited at any time 
or further debited. 
Smartcard  A physical payment card with a built-in microprocessor and storage. 
Three-domain 
secure 3D Secure 
Process used by e-commerce that requests a 
password to be entered by the user during a 
web based transaction. 
True Fraud Cost  
The true fraud cost includes the underreported 
associated costs for all participants in the 
processing of a fraudulent transaction and are 
estimated using a range of payments industry 
reports. 
Visa  See National BankAmericard. 
Write-off  
A business reduces their earnings by the 
amount of the loss where there is no reasonable 
prospect of recovering it. 
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 QUICK REFERENCE  
 DEFINITIONS  
Notation commonly used in machine learning literature is used in this thesis and is 
from (Bishop, 1995a).  Definitions are provided below as a quick reference only as 
each is defined where first introduced within the text on the page indicated. This 
notation is found to vary in the reviewed research literature. 
Symbol Page Summary definition 𝐱 33 A vector of input values to the classifier, 𝐱 = x!, x!, ,… x! ! denotes a single vector (row or record) 
of 𝑑 input variables.  𝑥!,! 33 𝑥!,!  is a single input value. 
𝑦  33 
Output value of the classifier for a single input record.  A 
real value that indicates the probability of a class 𝑝 𝒞! . 
Some classifiers that return a value that may not be a true 
probability; these are treated as probabilistic classifiers as an 
uncalibrated function can be usually converted to a 
probability.  Sometimes called a score. 
𝑟 33 𝑟 is the decision result from the classifier where,  𝑟 𝑦 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 <  𝜃. 𝑛 33 𝑛 denotes the number of rows of 𝑥 (records) in a set.   𝑑 34 𝑑 denotes the number of input fields (input dimensions or columns). 
𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  33 A classifier is defined as 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  where 𝒪 is some classifier function (Oracle) that provides a mapping from the input variables x to a single output variable y governed by a 
number of adjustable parameters w that denotes a vector of 
parameters called weights.   
𝒍𝒋 34 A literal field column is defined as 𝑙! = 𝑋!,! where 𝑖 = 1− 𝑛, 𝑗 = 1− 𝑑.  Literals can be integer, real values or a set of unordered or ordered symbolic variables ′𝑆1′, ′𝑆2′, ′𝑆3′… . 
to 
| Quick Reference to Definitions | 
 | 22 |  
Symbol Page Summary definition 
𝒍! 34 
𝑙! is transformed into a number of binary digits using one-
hot encoding (Oerlemans & Theeuwen, 1987), 𝑙!  =𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!  where 𝑏 𝜖 1,0  and 𝑏! = 1!!! .  So that 𝑙! 𝒻 𝑙!, 
where the preprocessing transformation is denoted as 𝒻 . .  
For example for a categorical symbolic field 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 =′𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙!, 𝑖! 𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒!, 𝑉! 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒!, 𝐼! 𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜!,  has 3 
unique symbol and is transformed to 1,0,0,0 ≡! 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙!, 0,1,0,0 ≡! 𝑖𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒!, 0,0,1,0 ≡! 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒!𝑎𝑛𝑑  0,0,0,1 ≡! 𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜′. 
𝜃 36 𝜃 is a threshold over which y is considered to indicate the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class.  Sometimes known as operating point 
(Japkowicz & Shah, 2011c). 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 33 Indicates the record represents a fraudulent transaction.   𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 33 Indicates the record represents a genuine transaction.   𝒞! 33 This is the fraud class where 𝒞! = 1. 𝒞! 33 This is the genuine class where 𝒞! = 0. 𝑚𝑎𝑥(.) - The maximum value in a vector. 𝑚𝑖𝑛(.) - The minimum value in a vector 
ℝ or ℝ!" 34 ℝ!" is a complete dataset of 𝑛 rows of 𝑥 from the original dataset.  ℝ!" is abbreviated to ℝ where there is no 
ambiguity.   .  34 This accent character is used to denote a variable after being transformed using preprocessing. 
ℝ 34 ℝ is the dataset ℝ which has been transformed using preprocessing so that ℝ 𝒻ℝ, where the preprocessing 
transformation is denoted as 𝒻 . .  𝑑 34 𝑑 denotes the number of input fields following preprocessing. 
dataset 48 
Each dataset is a 𝑛 × 𝑑 matrix of input values and a 
corresponding class 𝒞!drawn from ℝ so that it is exclusive 
and does not contain records from other datasets. 
TRAIN 48 
TRAIN dataset is used to train a classifier using a machine-
learning algorithm where the parameters within the 
classifier w are modified by the algorithm. 
TEST 48 
TEST dataset is used to measure the performance of the 
classifier once training is completed. 
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Symbol Page Summary definition 
VALIDATE 48 
VALIDATE dataset is optionally used to measure the 
performance of the classifier during training to help to 
reduce over-fitting. 
P 50 
The positive class in a confusion matrix that represents the 
class 𝒞!.  P denotes the number of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 examples. 
N 50 
The negative class in a confusion matrix that represents the 
class 𝒞!.  N denotes the number of 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 examples. 
Notation commonly used in rule extraction literature is used in this thesis and is from 
(Craven, 1996).  This notation is found to vary in the reviewed research literature. 
Symbol Page Summary definition 
𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 40 
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒! is a single propositional rule.  This is in the general 
form 𝑦 ← 𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣!  ∧  𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣! …∧  𝑙!  𝑜𝑝 𝑣! , where 𝑙! is 
a named input field, 𝑜𝑝 ∈ ≤,≥,=,≠ , 𝑣! is a value that can 
be can be an integer, real value or a set of unordered or 
ordered symbolic variables and 𝑦 is an evaluated logical 
result 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 . 
𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 40 A set of disjunctive rules in the general form 𝑦 ← 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!  ∨ 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!  ∨  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!…∨  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!  where 𝑛 is the number of rules and 𝑦 is an evaluated logical result of the entire 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 .  
 
Name Definition of literal values 
Continuous  
A continuous numeric value is defined as any range of numbers being 
between two limits within a set precision/intervals.  −3, 3  denotes 
integer values and −3.3, 2.123  donotes real values. 
Discrete 
numeric  
An unordered numeric value that is treated as a categorical symbolic 
as the relationship between the numeric values is not known 1,2,1234 . 
Ordered 
symbolic 
Discrete symbolic values that follow a known ordering, for example in 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑎,𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒  if sorting alphabetically 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑒 <  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑎. 
Categorical 
symbolic 
A set of symbols where only one can be present at the input using 
one-hot encoding (Oerlemans & Theeuwen, 1987).  For example, a 
list of possible payment terminals might be given by: 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙, 𝑖𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒,𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛, 𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜,𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒  where only one 
can be selected at a time. 
Date A value that represents the date in some known normalised format. 
Time A value that represents the time in some known normalised format. 
ID A value that indicates an identifier for the record.   

| Chapter 1 - Introduction | 
 | 25 |  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
“The White Rabbit put on his spectacles. 'Where shall I begin, please your Majesty?' he 
asked. 
'Begin at the beginning,' the King said gravely, 'and go on till you come to the end: then 
stop.'” 
Lewis Carroll, 4th July 1865, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
“.
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1.1 Introduction 
he key research hypothesis is that knowledge in symbolic form that captures 
general characteristics of payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on 
large-scale, imbalanced, high-dimensional transactional data.  This thesis proposes 
a new class of solution to the problem of reducing payment card fraud 
through machine learning that can explain criminal patterns and in doing so inform 
the entire payments ecosystem.  A method of knowledge extraction from neural 
networks using large-scale transactional and customer datasets is proposed.  The 
SOAR (Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive Rule extraction) algorithm will be shown to 
aid in the understanding of payment card fraud through a practical algorithmic 
approach that can be deployed within current fraud management systems.  
Payment card fraud is the criminal act of deception using a physical (plastic) card or 
card information without the knowledge of the genuine cardholder.  This thesis 
examines why worldwide reported payment card fraud losses have grown from 
$12.18m in 1971 to $16.3bn in 2014  (Nilson-Report, 2015a) and the 
relationship between fraud prevention and detection technologies.  It then assesses 
the “state of the art” payment card fraud detection that will be shown to be the 
combined use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the form of expert systems using rules 
and machine learning in the form of networks trained using past patterns of payment 
card transactions.  An examination of the historical context of the development of 
payment cards as a cashless method of payment, their processing systems and fraud 
detection is undertaken.  This establishes that current methods are under performing 
with new types of fraud and social imperatives.   
This thesis is distinctive from many machine learning works as it does not focus on 
increasing the accuracy of a classifier to detect fraud and nor does it propose a 
theoretical approach to symbolic extraction focused only on specific measures.  It 
will be argued that to practically reduce fraud it must first be understood so as to add 
to the knowledge of human experts.  As argued in (Ryman-Tubb, 1994) research 
must translate into a real-world deployed application to have impact.  To encourage 
uptake of SOAR it must be deployed alongside the incumbent fraud detection 
systems.  As will be shown vendor solutions often include a form of machine learning 
218,000,000,000$		 217,157,777,616$																	
T 
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(see 2.7, page 154).  The requirement is for SOAR to operate with these varying 
classifiers with as little imposition on their function to provide a symbolic method of 
the extraction of fraud knowledge from those systems.  
While this thesis concentrates on payment card fraud detection the method may be 
applicable in a wide range of applications such as credit-risk, insurance, computer 
gaming and medicine. 
1.2 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
§ Chapter 2 argues that there is a gap in current research through a review 
of literature on fraud detection methodologies and symbolic knowledge 
extraction.  
§ Chapter 3 starts to address this gap by presenting a novel method to 
understand payment card fraud through a proposed SOAR extraction 
algorithm.  
§ Chapter 4 evaluates the efficacy of SOAR extraction against small and 
published academic datasets.  It will be shown that SOAR extracted rules 
are more compact and that is superior or similar in eight out of ten 
datasets when compared to benchmark figures providing meaningful 
explanations of the dataset relationships while eschewing some accuracy 
due to the small size of the datasets.   
§ Chapter 5 is based on large, real-world datasets provided by two issuers 
to empirically evaluate SOAR and concludes that it out performs existing 
results to produce a compact explanation of payment card fraud, which 
payments industry experts have verified.   
§ Chapter 6 elaborates on the empirical research and examines the results 
further.   
§ Chapter 7 concludes that existing research and vendor solutions have not 
sufficiently kept pace with changes in the payment industry or the 
fraudsters.  They do not sufficiently address how human experts can 
understand fraud patterns.  The SOAR extraction algorithm provides 
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one solution to this problem.  Suggestions for future research directions 
are given. 
1.3 Thesis Contribution 
This thesis has three contributions: 
1. The hypothesis that knowledge in symbolic form that captures general characteristics of 
payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, imbalanced, 
high-dimensional transactional data is confirmed.  One solution to this difficult and 
compelling real-world problem is proposed. 
2. A novel symbolic rule extraction algorithm is presented to extract rules from 
exisiting classifiers in use in fraud detection systems.  This will aid knowledge 
of payment card fraud. 
3. An evaluation of the rule extraction algorithm using publicly available small 
datasets and large issuer provided, large-scale, real-world datasets. 
1.4 Motivation of Research 
This thesis was prompted by an identified gap in research in rule extraction from 
neural networks and the continuing growth of payment card fraud despite the 
measures already in place. 
1.4.1 Extracting rules from neural network 
classifiers 
The problem of extracting rules or symbolic knowledge from a neural network has 
attracted much interest because it provides a method to combine the knowledge-
intensive deductive learning and the knowledge-free method of inductive learning 
into a hybrid system.  Out of 351 papers between 1988 and 2015, 40 key rule 
extraction methods were identified from academic journals and conference 
proceedings.  It became clear that the decompositional methods that extract rules by 
decomposing the architecture and components of the trained classifier were not 
appropriate.  Pedagogical methods can ensure that the rules extracted from the 
neural network are equivalent (sound) but an exhaustive approach is not effective 
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when the size of input fields is large as with payment fraud classification.  There is a 
gap in research that combines fraud detection with symbolic knowledge extraction.  
The Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive Rule (SOAR) Extraction Algorithm presented in 
Chapter 3 is proposed as one method that can address this gap. 
1.4.2 Payment card fraud 
Public perceptions of fraud are often tempered by a belief that it is a “white-collar” 
crime, which targets the wealthy, government and big business.  It is therefore seen 
as less concerning as the effects are cushioned for the victim (Castle, 2008).  Violent 
criminals are increasingly involved with payment card fraud (2009a) so that payment 
card fraud can involve the threat of violence including murder.  Every individual act 
of fraud has a human cost.  In 2009 in the USA the fear of fraud superseded that of 
terrorism, computer, health issues and personal safety (2009b); although this may 
now be out of date with the growth in terrorism.  In the UK the Attorney General 
described fraud as, “Second only to drug trafficking in causing harm to the economy and society.” 
(Button et al., 2008).  Society is now dependent on the continued availability, 
accuracy and security of information stored, processed and communicated by 
computers to make cashless payments for goods or services.  The economic health, 
day-to-day government social and cultural existence of citizens now benefit from the 
advancement of payment technology and the ability to make rapid and secure 
cashless payments.  In 2013 there were 365.6bn global cashless transactions of which 
payment card transactions were 203bn (Lassignardie & Higgins, 2014) with 
worldwide spend at $16.3tn and is forecast to grow to $93.3tn in 2030 (Nilson-
Report, 2014a).  Nevertheless the same technology that has enabled cashless 
payments is fuelling growth in payment card fraud with direct fraud losses at 
$16.3bn in 2014 (Nilson-Report, 2015a).  This level of fraud loss impacts every part 
of society, including individuals, businesses and government and in some cases the 
most vulnerable citizens resulting in suicides (Palmer, 2009) and business failures 
(Bressler, 2009). There is a link between payment fraud and organised crime groups 
(OCGs) where the proceeds of payment fraud have been used to pay for terrorism, 
arms and drugs (Ryman-Tubb & Krause, 2011; Europol, 2012; Financial-Fraud-
Action-UK, 2014).  Payment cards and their processing systems have vulnerabilities 
that allow criminals to undertake such fraud.  Payment cards contain sensitive 
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information that uniquely relate to the cardholders account and it is this information 
in the form of alphanumeric codes that are used to identify and then authorise a 
payment without the knowledge of the genuine cardholder.  This data is vulnerable 
to being compromised by criminals who use it to undertake fraud.  One question 
that this thesis addresses is: why are payment card fraud detection methods not more effective? As 
will be discussed methods used to detect payment card fraud are based on machine 
learning and pattern recognition.  This thesis argues that there is a need for a new 
method to the detection and prevention of fraud that can explain the reasoning 
behind decisions by learning the patterns of fraud (fraud vectors) using large-scale 
transactional datasets.  It will be argued that it is only through understanding new 
fraud vectors that fraud can be prevented through informing the fraud-lifecycle 
(Wilhelm, 2004).  Appreciating the history of payment cards, fraud prevention 
methods and the automation of the detection of fraud is essential to be able to 
explain that a paradigm shift in fraud detection is required, due to an argued 
inflection point (Atkins, 2015).  There will be shown to be a pivotal event in 
payments, which is why this work is important.  In analysing this history it is 
established that for almost 65 years despite the rapid change in computing 
technology and the growth of the Internet, fraud vectors have only slowly evolved 
and the criminals modus operandi (MO) (Turvey, 2011) has remained mostly 
unsophisticated and static.  It will be shown that the methods used for the prevention 
and detection of payment card fraud has remained mostly unsophisticated and static.  
Fraud management has largely focused on the detection of fraud at or after the time 
of a transaction with the aim of stopping that transaction and thereby reducing 
write-offs due to fraud liability.  Those organisations that participate in payments 
have a legacy of accepting that the cost of fraud as an acceptable write-off cost of 
business.  This legacy has led to limited research into payment card fraud detection 
as the cost of fraud has become normative.  It remains heterodox for the payments 
industry to consider the wider societal effect of fraud write-offs where the proceeds 
support a range of criminal and anti-social activities.  It will be demonstrated that 
disruptive technologies such as smartphones, real-time mobile payments and 
contactless payments have emerged almost simultaneously.  Through this 
examination of historical processes and research it is evident that traditional forms of 
payment fraud are now giving way to Generation Z fraudsters who are highly 
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computer literate and who are living in an age of a high-tech communication with a 
technology driven lifestyle and with prolific use of social media.  Generation Z has 
led to a growth in sophisticated payment card fraud vectors so that the existing 
methods for detection or prevention will become increasingly ineffective.  As the 
underlying crime patterns are changing they need to be understood to not only 
detect and block the fraud but to lead to new prevention methods.  A review of the 
current methods to detect payment card fraud will establish that these sophisticated 
payment card fraud vectors are increasing (Jewkes, 2013) and necessitate a more 
dynamic and understandable fraud detection method.  The “state of the art” fraud 
detection methods use neural networks implemented as a black-box where their 
workings are mysterious; the inputs and its decision on fraud can be observed but 
how one becomes the other is opaque.  They cannot easily explain their decisions or 
reasoning so that humans can understand the new emerging fraud vectors.  It will be 
demonstrated that new transparent fraud detection systems are needed that can 
explain their decisions in English with logical and understandable reasoning.  It is 
through this rationale that emerging payment card fraud vectors can be understood 
so that action can be taken to pre-empt further fraud. 
Through a discursive examination in Appendix A it is established that there is a 
timely need for gaining a rapid understanding of fraud vectors: 
§ Fraud vectors have slowly evolved. 
§ The criminal MO has slowly evolved.  
§ Fraud detection methods have slowly evolved. 
§ Fraud is reflexive so preventative measures have an affect on fraud 
vectors but the criminals devise new methods to continue their crime.  
§ Industry has focused on fraud detection to block or stop payments, with 
merchants (25.7x) and issuers (1.2x) liable for the highest true cost of 
fraud. 
§ The cost of detecting fraud has exponentially reduced in real terms. 
§ Reported payment card fraud losses ($16.3bn in 2014) are normative.  
§ Criminals make use of weak security and target those that are the 
weakest-link. 
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§ Computing has become a commodity and is enabling innovative cashless 
payment methods.  
§ Innovation is now disrupting the payment industry and has created a 
pivotal event shown to be between 2010 and 2020. 
§ Innovation provides the criminal with new opportunities.  
§ Generation Z have led to a growth in innovation and sophisticated 
payment card fraud vectors.  
§ Existing methods for detection and prevention will become increasingly 
ineffective. 
§ The timely understanding of new fraud vectors is fundamental. 
§ Through understanding fraud vectors, the vulnerabilities in the payments 
systems can be identified and subsequently prevented.  
This leads to a need for new methods to manage fraud as each of the above contexts 
runs in parallel and has driven a transformation in fiscal, technological and social 
developments.  New methods must provide the adaptability of neural networks and 
the transparency of English-like rules. 
1.5 Fraud Detection Problem Definition 
A fraud detector separates fraudulent transactions into two classes denoted 𝒞! = 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  so that those processing a payment are alerted to a 
suspicious payment card, transaction or merchant.  The detector uses a classifier 
defined as 𝑦 = 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  where 𝒪 is some classifier (Oracle) that provides a mapping 
from the input variables 𝐱 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥! ! of 𝑑 input variables (dimensions) to a 
single output variable 𝑦 governed by a number of adjustable parameters 𝐰 that 
denotes a vector of parameters (in the case of a neural network called weights).  Each 
element 𝑥!,!  is known as a literal and can be an integer, real value or a set of 
unordered or ordered symbolic variables, e.g. ′𝑆1′, ′𝑆2′, ′𝑆3′… .  A decision 
denoted 𝑟 can be made to accept or decline a transaction based on the output 𝑦 of 
the classifier. 
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A list of desiderata for a payments fraud detection system is given in Table 1-1 (Al-
Khatib, 2012; Zareapoor et al., 2012). 
Table 1-1 – Payment fraud management system desiderata. 
Ref Desiderata 
R1. Support highly unbalanced/skewed datasets. 
R2. Support large-scale datasets. 
R3. Handle errors in the transactions/data (noise). 
R4. Identify fraudulent transactions accurately. 
R5. Minimise misclassification errors. 
R6. Detect and adapt to new fraud vectors as they are discovered. 
R7. Provide explanations as to the decision to decline or block.   
R8. 
Accounts for the costs associated with classification and 
misclassification. 
R9. Process transactions in real-time.   
To create a classifier known patterns and their class can be learnt from data using 
machine learning.  ℝ!" is defined as a complete set of 𝑛 rows of 𝑑 input variables of  𝐱 and is abbreviated to ℝ where there is no ambiguity.  Each row 𝐱 represents one 
known class where 𝒞! = 1 is the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class and 𝒞! = 0 is the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 class.  A 
dataset (sample) is defined as a matrix 𝐗 of such vectors and their corresponsing 
known class.  ℝ is preprocessed for machine learning so that ℝ 𝒻ℝ, where the 
preprocessing transformation is denoted as 𝒻 . .  The resulting number of 
preprocessed fields that are used as inputs to the classifier is denoted 𝑑.  In this work 
the preprocessing includes discreatation using one-hot encoding (Oerlemans & 
Theeuwen, 1987).  A single row 𝑖 of a field in dataset 𝐗 is given as 𝑙! = 𝐗!,! where 𝑖 = 1…𝑛, 𝑗 = 1…𝑑 Each 𝑙! is transformed into a number of binary digits 𝒍!  = (𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!) where 𝑏 𝜖 1,0  and 𝑏! = 1!!! .  For example for a categorical 
symbolic field 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = ′𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙′, ′𝑖𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒′, ′𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒′  which has 3 unique 
symbols and is transformed to 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏! that is 1,0,0 ≡! 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙!, 0,1,0 ≡! 𝑖𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒!, 0,0,1,0 ≡! 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒!.   
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The economic benefit to stop a series of fraudulent transactions on a single payment 
card at the earliest point in time is considerable.  Therefore a classifier is required to 
detect fraud at the earliest possible point in time.  There are three types of classifiers 
that are used for the detection fraud: 
1. Manual – known patterns are described as rules.  
2. Known patterns of fraud from the past are used to predict future patterns of 
fraud using a supervised classifier. 
3. A transaction deviates from other similar observations in the past so as to be 
suspicious using an anomaly classifier. 
These are each discussed in the following sections. 
1.5.1 Supervised classifier 
It is expected from what is known about fraud vectors and criminal MO that 
patterns of fraud follow certain patterns that have similarities (explained in detail in 
Appendix A).  There is a common sequence of events or arrangement of transactions 
that is undertaken by the criminals for a particular fraud vector.  Since human 
investigators have reported common fraud vectors it is reasonable to assume that 
each fraud vector has some common attributes – although some variables such as 
location or value may alter.  It follows that criminal will try to make their activities 
look as unsuspicious as possible – that is they attempt to look like a genuine 
cardholder and therefore they will lie close to the decision boundary and will likely 
overlap between the two classes.  It will be shown in Chapter 2 that fraud detection 
methods using a range of classifiers have been found to be effective.  For such fraud 
classifiers to be effective they need to generalise as the classifiers do not look for a 
precise pattern match but can operate on data that has not been previously seen and 
make a reasonable decision.  An operational definition of generalisation is 
introduced as being the number of expected errors made by a classifier on a set of 
unseen test samples (Hoekstra, 1998).  With machine learning a training algorithm is 
selected to create the classifier based on a dataset of examples.  In a payment card 
fraud detection system once the classifier has been trained a decision needs to be 
made using the output score.  The output 𝑦 from the classifier 𝒪 is compared to a 
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fixed value known as the 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 denoted 𝜃 and if it is greater or equal then it is 
considered 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑, the classifier decision is denoted 𝑟 𝑦  and is shown in Eq. (1-1).   
𝑟 𝑦 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 < 𝜃 where 𝜃 is a threshold in the range [l,u] (1-1) 
The probabilistic classifier and 𝜃 defines a binary classifier and by varying 𝜃 a range 
of individual classifiers is created as a function of 𝜃.  There is an optimal value(s) of 𝜃 
that can be determined based on a range of business factors.  The business can 
decide to reduce 𝜃, which will increase the number of alerts per day, denoted 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 and increase the number of fraudulent transactions correctly alerted.  A 
simple linear continuous decision boundary between two classes 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  
is illustrated in Figure 1-1 these are plotted using two fields from the transaction 𝒙, 
shown as x and y.  𝐷! is shown as one possible boundary that separates the two.  It 
can be seen that the boundary is close to one class and an improved boundary is 
given in 𝐷!.  Even in this simple case it is possible to select different boundary 
positions based on selected measures.  The two classes shown are linearly separable. 
 𝒞! and  𝒞! are shown above as the fraud and genuine classes enclosed within a space.   
Figure 1-1  – Diagram of example linear boundary in a fraud classifier (D1, D2) 
Cf Cg
D1 D2
y
x
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In Figure 1-2 there is no continuous straight line that can be placed which can 
separate the two classes.  The two classes illustrated are therefore non-linearly 
separable and a non-linear decision boundary 𝐷! that is non-continuous has been 
shown. 
 
Figure 1-2  – Diagram of example non-linear boundary in a fraud classifier (D3). 
In Figure 1-3 a “Crisp Decision Boundary” is illustrated as a best-fit separation of the 
underlying vector space (feature space) ℝ between the fraud class 𝒞! and the genuine 
class 𝒞!.   
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 𝒞! and  𝒞! are shown above as the fraud and genuine classes enclosed within a space.   
Figure 1-3  – Diagram of example probabilistic decision boundary in a fraud 
classifier. 
Transactions cannot be so simply separated as 𝑑 could be 100 fields that create a 100 
dimensional space in which the decision boundaries must be placed; in this case the 
boundary is now a decision surface (hypersurface).  𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  assigns transaction 𝒙 to 
class 𝒞!  by locating its position on a probabilistic boundary between the two classes 
as a density where the probability of misclassification is minimised by selecting the 
class 𝒞! having the smallest uncertainty 𝑝 𝒞!  that is given in Eq. (1-2). 
𝑝 𝐱 | 𝒞! = 𝑝 𝐱 | 𝒞! .𝑝 𝒞!𝑝 𝐱  (1-2) 
1.5.2 Anomaly Classifier 
Most humans develop habitual behaviours and this is true of their financial 
transactions so that any change in a cardholder’s behaviour may indicate a 
fraudulent event or at least an interesting event.  An anomaly or outlier detector 
indicates that a transaction deviates from other observations to be suspicious.  For 
example the transactions for a specific k cardholder, 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟! where the next 
transaction n on that card is compared, 𝑥! ≈  𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 where ≈ is defined as 
CfCg
Plausibility Range
Crisp Decision
Boundary
y
x
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“some measure of similarity”.  Figure 1-4 illustrates that a non-linear boundary 𝐷! 
can separate a cluster of atypical transactions that are then considered as fraud. 
 𝒞! and  𝒞! are shown above as the fraud and genuine classes enclosed within a space.   
Figure 1-4  – Diagram of example anomaly boundary in a fraud classifier (D2). 
Trying to model individual cardholder behaviour can lead to a high level of false 
alarms (Bolton & Hand, 2002).  Examples include: 
1. “Jam jarring” of payment cards where a cardholder restricts particular types 
of purchase to a specific card, for example for the purchase of petrol and then 
uses it to purchase something different. 
2. Different patterns of use for first time users of a payment card for example 
where some may only use it occasionally whereas those transferring a balance 
from one card to a new payment card do not or the sudden purchase of 
electrical items or jewellery over various locations – these may all trigger an 
alert of suspicious behaviour that is incorrect.  
1.6 Knowledge Extraction Problem Definition 
A fraud detection system is one method used in the detection of payment card fraud 
from 1970s to date.  Such a system uses a classifier 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  that is created from data 
| Chapter 1 - Introduction | 
 | 40 |  
using machine learning so that fraud vectors need not be first understood by human 
experts to detect fraud.  The means by which 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  detects fraud is not 
transparent.  𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  is described as a black-box if its workings are mysterious to 
those affected by it; the inputs and decisions can be observed but how one becomes 
the other is opaque.  That is 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰   is not in a human comprehensible form.  
There is a requirement to extract understanding from black-box classifiers in such a 
way as to be useful to human experts (R7).  In general “information chunks” are 
needed for a human expert to be able to directly interpret the workings of 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰   
as described in the Comprehensibility Postulate (Michalski, 1983).  Given the 
assumptions for a fraud classifier discussed earlier in 1.5.1, page 35 it is reasonable to 
assume that different fraud vectors form different clusters in instance space in the 
classifier assuming sufficient data is available to differentiate them and that these 
clusters differ in some way from 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 transactions.  Any clusters of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 
vectors will include the generalisation ability of the particular classifier.  It is argued 
that information chunks can be formatted into human readable rules that 
describe 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰   by searching for these fraud vector clusters.  The fewer rules 
generated the better – as a higher level of abstraction and the linguistic simplicity of 
the key fraud factors is preferred over performance.  Simplicity was advocated over 
715 years ago by William of Occam (1284–1347?); “entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter 
necessitatem” (entities are not to be multiplied without necessity) is called “Occam’s 
razor”.  From a practical viewpoint to encourage uptake of a new class of solution to 
fraud management it must be kept simple.  The most general form of a prepositional 
rule is in the general form 𝑦 ← 𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣!  ∧  𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣! …∧  𝑙!  𝑜𝑝 𝑣! , where 𝑙! is a 
named input field, 𝑜𝑝 ∈ ≤,≥,=,≠ , 𝑣! is a value that can be can be an integer, real 
value or a set of unordered or ordered symbolic variables and 𝑦 is an evaluated 
logical result 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 .  This general form of rule does 
not improve comprehensibility of the black-box classifier.  A more understandable 
form of rule is required that adequately describes the cluster so then the problem of 
extracting logical rules from a fraud classifer is described in Eq.(1-3). 
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐱 ≡  𝒪 𝐱;𝐰   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  ⇒ 𝑝 𝐱|𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 ≥ 𝜃 (1-3) 
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𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 𝐱|𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 − 𝑝 𝐱|𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 ≥ 0 
The objective is to infer a 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 that is equivalent to the trained 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  where a 
classifier 𝜃 is defined and both are tested on the same records 𝐱 using the same 
measures.  So that humans can easily interpret these rules they must be written in 
such as way as to include linguistic terms.  Each field and literal can be linguistically 
named, e.g. “high spend”, “micro spend” or repesented by an interval, e.g. 
“V>$5,000”, “V<$5”.   This is illustrated in Figure 1-5. 
 
Figure 1-5  – Block diagram illustrating relationship between input data fields and 
literal values. 
There are two measures used to determined the equivalence between the 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 
and 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  both of which assume that the output of 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  is within a defined 
range that monotonically increases with the probability of fraud.  𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 is used 
as a measure of accuracy of all classified examples and 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 is used as a measure 
of precision of the ruleset as described in Table 2-45, page 129.  The decision 
boundary between the two classes defines how the classifier determines the output 
class.  Therefore the task is to describe this decision boundary in a 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕.  The 
earlier definition of the 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 constrains the functions that can be used.  In the 
example given in Figure 1-1, page 36 there are two input fields X and Y and two 
possible single linear boundary lines between the two classes.  For D1 the 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 
that defines the decision boundary is given in Figure 1-6. 
IF Y>0 ∧	X < D1  
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Figure 1-6  – Example 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 for D1 linear boundary.  
For D2 the 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 that defines the decision boundary is given in Figure 1-7. 
IF x≥0 ∧	x<x1 ∧	y<y1 
IF x≥x1 ∧	x<x2 ∧	y≥y1 
IF x<x2 ∧	x<x3 ∧	y≥y2 
IF x<x3 ∧	x<x4 ∧	y≥y3 
IF x<x4 ∧	x<x5 ∧	y≥y4 
IF x<x5 ∧	x<x6 ∧	y≥y5 
Figure 1-7  – Example ruleset  for D2 linear boundary. 
It can be seen that a series of simple rules are required to create a sequence of 
straight lines to describe the area shown as 𝒞! but this may incorrectly include 
genuine transactions shown as the areas below the line – see Figure 1-8.   
 
Figure 1-8  – Illustration of fitting a rule defined by D2 as a linear boundary.  
The method of fitting a line this way is the same as piecewise linear regression where 
a curve is segmented into intervals and a separate smaller line generated to fit each 
interval where the boundaries between segments are called breakpoints.  As 
previously argued human experts find it easier to comprehend fewer and shorter 
rules that give a higher level of abstraction of the key fraud factors over actual 
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classifier performance.  In the example given in Figure 1-9 there are two input fields 
X and Y and a single non-linear decision boundary line D3 between the two classes.  
The rules create line segments that include an error where the decision boundary 
exhibits a non-linear curve shown as F2 above the curve and this may incorrectly 
include genuine transactions. 
 
Figure 1-9  – Illustration of fitting a rule defined by D3 as a non-linear boundary.  
If the interval were reduced between the segments then more rules would need to be 
defined and a better fit would be achieved.  For D3 the ruleset  that defines the 
decision boundary is given in Figure 1-10. 
x≥0 ∧	x<x1 ∧	y≥y1 = F1 
x≥x1 ∧	x<x2 ∧	y≥y2 ∧	y<y1 = F2 
x≥x2 ∧	x<x3 ∧	y≥0	∧	y<y2 = F3 
Figure 1-10  – Example rules for D3 non-linear boundary. 
There is a balance between the comprehensibility of any extracted 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 and its 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 in representing the classifier 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  from which it was extracted. 
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It is established that a new class of FMS solution is required due to the introduction 
of disruptive payment technologies.  Therefore understanding changing fraud 
vectors is necessary if payment fraud is to be reduced.  It has also been argued that 
there is a pivotal event in the payments sector.  It will be identified next that there is 
a gap in research in rule extraction from neural networks.  With this understood, an 
examination of the literature in two key research areas is undertaken in Chapter 2: 
1. Payment card fraud detection,  
2. Knowledge extraction.  
It will be evident that there is no applicable work that completely meets this need 
and so this thesis proposes a novel method in Chapter 3.  
The next Chapter explores the fraud detection problem by reviewing published 
methods and then reviews published methods in knowledge extraction.  It will 
become evident that while there is a range of methods there is a gap in current 
research for the demanding requirements of the extraction of compact knowledge 
from such fraud detectors.  This is a challenging problem with the size of the 
datasets, unbalanced classes, noise and non-homosedacity. 
 
| Chapter 2 - Literature Review | 
 | 45 |  
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
“The real danger is not that computers will begin to think like men, but that men will 
begin to think like computers.” – Sydney J. Harris. 
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2.1 Introduction 
t is argued that if FMS’ do not improve with transparent reasoning so that 
preventative measures can be taken then payment card fraud will continue to 
increase.  It is contended that fraud may reach a point where national security 
or economy is so threatened that laws will be passed to curtail or even stop 
some innovation in payments.  Table 2-1 lists the two timely requirements. 
Table 2-1 – Fraud management key requirements. 
1. Methods for fraud detection that learn from experience adapt to new and 
changing fraud vectors without the need to first understand these. 
2. Methods to explain these learnt fraud vectors through knowledge extraction 
on large-scale, unbalanced and sparse datasets. 
To determine the state of the art for these two requirements, the following is 
undertaken in the next three sections: 
1. A review of published methods for payment card fraud detection using 
computational fraud detectors with a focus on those methods that use 
machine learning. 
2. A review of published methods that allow computational fraud detectors 
from machine learning to explain their reasoning through knowledge 
extraction to be transparent in operation to human experts. 
3. An overview of current FMS vendor solutions. 
Following the review of the fraud detection and knowledge extraction methods it will 
be concluded that there are only limited applicable methods that can achieve both 
the requirements in Table 2-1 but that these generate explanations that are difficult 
to understand.  Chapter 3 then proposes the SOAR extraction method that starts to 
address the requirements more fully.  
I 
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2.2 Evaluation using datasets 
In the literature when data is used to evaluate the performance of 𝒪 it is usually split 
into two or three datasets.  The terminology for these datasets is not consistent 
between different disciplines.  In industry and business, project management 
terminology uses the term “prototype validation” as being the final step that is taken 
to assess the performance of a prototype before it is moved to deployment.  This use 
appears to have been a term first adopted by the UK army in the early 1970s 
(Oglesby & Abrahamffy, 1971) and as now widely used as a project management 
terminology (Kerzner, 2004).  This term is applied to the final unseen holdout or 
ground-data dataset named as 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄 that is used to validate the performance 
of a software system or model.  Within academic machine learning literature, this 
final unseen holdout dataset is called the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset as defined by Stanford in 
(Hastie et al., 2005).  When two datasets are used as in Chapter 4 then these are 
always called 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 as is the case with the reviewed works in Chapter 2.  
When there are three datasets used then these are either called 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍, 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄, 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 or in some cases 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍, 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓, 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄.  The latter being the project 
management definition as in reviewed works (Chen et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005), 
(HaratiNik et al., 2012), (Zaslavsky & Strizhak, 2006), (Sherly & Nedunchezhian, 
2010), (Carminati et al., 2014), (Gadi et al., 2008).  This terminology confusion was 
noted in “Guidelines for Neural Computing” (Bishop & Ryman-Tubb, 1994).  In 
this thesis the academic definition is used as described in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2 – Evaluation datasets using Stanford nomenclature. 
Dataset Description 
Each dataset is a 𝒏 × 𝒅 matrix of input values and a corresponding class 𝓒𝐤drawn 
from ℝ so that it is exclusive and does not contain records from other datasets. 
𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset is used to train a classifier using a machine-learning algorithm where the parameters within the classifier 𝐰 are modified 
by the algorithm. 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 TEST dataset is used to measure the performance of the classifier once training is completed. 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄  VALIDATE dataset is optionally used to measure the performance of the classifier during training to help to reduce over-fitting. 
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When two datasets are used to create a fraud classifier this is illustrated in Figure 
2-11.   
 
Figure 2-11  – Diagram of 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and TEST datasets used to train and measure 
performance a fraud classifier. 
When three datasets are used to create a fraud classifier this is illustrated in Figure 
2-12.   
 
Figure 2-12  – Diagram of 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍, 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets used to train 
and measure performance a fraud classifier. 
This difference is highlighted in Figure 2-13. 
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Figure 2-13  – Diagram illustrating dataset definitions using Stanford definition. 
2.3 Measuring performance 
To measure the performance of 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  a common method is to use a confusion 
matrix, e.g. (Sokolova & Lapalme, 2009).  This is used to evaluate the performance 
of a two-class system based on the classifier decision 𝑟 𝑦  at a fixed 𝜃 in Eq. (1-1), 
page 36 and that of the known class label and is given in Table 2-3.  Here 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 
dataset is a set of unseen example records that consists of 𝑃 positive (𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑) and 𝑁 
negative (𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒) class records and the classifier assigns a class to each record but 
sometimes this assignment will be incorrect – see Eq. (2-1) and Eq. (2-2).  Each entry 
in the confusion matrix is a count of a classifier decision.  An entry in the table is 
increased per decision based on the intersection of the decision output class and the 
known actual class. 
Table 2-3 – Confusion matrix table layout used for evaluation. 
K
no
w
n 
 Classifier Decision 
 Fraud  Genuine  
Fraud (P) 
TRUE POSITIVE 
(TP) 
A fraud transaction 
was expected and was 
correctly classified by 
the decision system. 
FALSE NEGATIVE 
(FN) 
A fraud transaction 
was expected but was 
wrongly classified as 
genuine. 
Genuine (N) 
FALSE POSITIVE 
(FP) 
A genuine transaction 
was expected and was 
wrongly classified as 
fraud.  
TRUE NEGATIVE 
(TN) 
A genuine 
transaction was 
expected and was 
correctly classified by 
the decision system. 
TRAIN TESTVALIDATE
TRAIN TEST
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𝑃 = 𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (2-1) 𝑁 = 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 (2-2) 
The general form of the confusion matrix and performance figures that is used 
throughout the remainder of this thesis is given in Table 2-4.  The performance 
measures are described below. 
Table 2-4 – Format used for confusion matrix in this thesis. 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 
K
no
w
n Reported  
x.x x.x x.x x.x x.x x.x Fraud 𝑇𝑃 𝐹𝑁  
Gen 𝐹𝑃 𝑇𝑁  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
x.x x.x x.x x.x x.x x.x Fraud 𝑇𝑃’ 𝐹𝑁’  
Gen 𝐹𝑃’ 𝑇𝑁’  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud.  Other measurements defined in Eq. (2-3) to Eq. (2-8). 
In some published work this definition is swapped so that 𝑁 is defined as fraud and 𝑃 
as genuine transactions.  Where this is the case the reported figures are converted to 
the definition given here.  𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 is scaled to be 100% and 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 is scaled to 
be 100%.  A perfect classification is where 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐹𝑁 are zero, which is highly 
unlikely to occur in a large-scale real-world decisions system where the data used 
contains many non-linear and complex relationships and often conflicting or 
overlapping classes creating misclassifications.  Therefore a classifier will be 
suboptimal and there is a range of different methods to create the best classification 
model that suits the needs of detecting fraud that are explored in Chapter 2. 
The accuracy of a two-class decision system is given by Eq. (2-3). 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁𝑃 + 𝑁  (2-3) 
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%𝐴𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦. 100%  
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 in Eq. (2-3) is not a reliable metric when the dataset is unbalanced 
(skewed) and sparse as in real-world fraud datasets.  For example based on the 2013 𝑅𝐺𝐹of 4,800 (see B.8, page 545) to correctly detect 80% of fraudulent transactions 
per day would require an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of  ≥ 1− !!"##!!.! . 100=99.9740%.  It will be 
shown that the ratio of genuine to fraud (RGF) transactions in the real-world is 
highly unbalanced and sparse as there are considerably fewer fraud transactions 
compared to genuine transactions making the problem of classifying them nontrivial 
and as stated in (Brause et al., 1999): 
“These data proportions have several implications. For the very low fraud occurrence of 
only 0.1% a constant, “stupid” diagnosis of “transaction is not fraud” will have a 
success rate of 99.9%. All adaptive fraud diagnosis that has lower success than this 
99.9% is questionable. In principal, we are aiming for maximizing the correct diagnosis 
by minimizing both the number of false alarms and the number of fraud transactions not 
recognized.  ” 
An improved measure of classifier performance over that of 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is the 
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (𝑀𝐶𝐶) given in (Matthews, 1975) and Eq. (2-4) is 
used as a measure of the quality of the fraud detector as it takes into account true 
and false positives and true and false negatives to give a single measure which can be 
used in highly unbalanced data as with payment card transaction data.  𝑀𝐶𝐶 is a 
correlation coefficient between the observed and predicted binary class with a value 
[−1, +1].  A positive coefficient of +1 represents a perfect prediction, 0 no better 
than the “coin flip” classifier described in 2.3.1 and <0 indicates a worse 
performance than the “coin flip” classifier. 
𝑀𝐶𝐶 = 𝑇𝑃.𝑇𝑁 − (𝐹𝑃.𝐹𝑁)𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 . 𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 . 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 . (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁) (2-4) 
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The precision of the classifier for fraud transactions being the number of fraud 
transactions correctly identified out of the total number of identified fraud 
transactions is defined in Eq. (2-5). 
𝑝! = 𝑇𝑃T𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 (2-5) 
The precision of the model for genuine transactions is the number of genuine 
transactions correctly identified out of the total number of identified genuine 
transactions is defined in Eq. (2-6). 
p! = 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁 (2-6) 
The false-positive rate is the number of genuine transactions that were wrongly 
identified as fraud out of all known genuine transactions, defined in Eq. (2-7).  The 𝐹𝑃𝑅 has the greatest (adverse) affect on real-world performance of a payment fraud 
detection system.  The transactions are highly unbalanced and sparse.  With high 
volumes these will consist of mostly genuine transactions and so any misclassification 
due to a high 𝐹𝑃𝑅 will generate disproportionately more alerts and these then need 
to be manually reviewed by a human.  A perfect classifier will have 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦,  𝑝!,  𝑝! ,𝑇𝑃𝑅 = 100% and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 = 0. 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 = 𝐹𝑃𝑁  (2-7) 
The true-positive rate is the number of fraud transactions that were correctly 
identified as fraud out of all known fraud transactions, defined in Eq. (2-8). 
𝑇𝑃𝑅 = 𝑇𝑃𝑃  (2-8) 
2.3.1 Coin-Flip 
A classifier that uses a random “coin flip” to determine the class of the transaction 
has a random classification which is identically distributed with a prior distribution 
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weighted around the 0.5 region according to the Bernoulli distribution so that the 
fraud detector classifier previously is given by Eq. (2-9). 
𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 0, 𝑃 𝐱|𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 0.5𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 = 1, 𝑃 𝐱|𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 = 0.5 (2-9) 
Using this “coin flip” classifier on 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes performance 
has been calculated and given in Table 2-5.  Any method that has a worse 
performance than the “coin flip” classifier is inadequate. 
Table 2-5 – “Coin Flip” classifier. 
 
Key: A/F=Alerts per fraud. 
2.3.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) chart 
A ROC chart indicates how well the classifier for a specific training algorithm for a 
dataset is able to be specific (the proportion of correctly classified negative 
observations) and sensitive (the proportion of correctly classified positive observations) 
simultaneously over a range of measurements, e.g. (Provost et al., 1998; Vuk & Curk, 
2006).  Sensitivity is the same as TPR for the fraud class and is the proportion of 
fraudulent transactions correctly identified as genuine. The sensitivity of the classifier 
can be calculated as in Eq. (2-10). 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≡ 𝑇𝑃𝑅 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁	 (2-10) 
Specificity is the proportion of the genuine class correctly identified as genuine which 
is identical to 1 − 𝐹𝑃𝑅. The specificity of the classifier can be calculated as in Eq. 
(2-11). 
%Acc %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC
Coin Flip 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 4,545 2,500,000 0
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𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 ≡ 1 − 𝐹𝑃𝑅	 (2-11) 
Sensitivity (y-axis) and Specificity (x-axis) are plotted for various values of 𝜃.  The 
best possible predictive model would have its inflection point closest to the top left 
corner. A perfect classification has 100% sensitivity and no false negatives and 100% 
specificity with no false positives.  A completely random guess would give a point 
along a plotted diagonal line – “the line of no-discrimination” so points above this 
line indicates a good prediction and points below indicate an error.  For each point 
on the ROC line there is a value of 𝜃 and this then defines a binary classifier and by 
varying 𝜃 a range of individual classifiers is created as a function of 𝜃.  A “best” 𝜃 is 
typically selected as the point closest to the top-left of the plot indicating the best 
sensitivity and specificity, given in (Perkins & Schisterman, 2006) as Eq.(2-12).   
min 1− 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ! + 1− 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 !  (2-12) 
As described in (Japkowicz & Shah, 2011c) the points in the ROC space are 
projections that correspond to the TPR and FPR from a 2x2 confusion matrix (that 
has three degrees of freedom).  ROC space is insensitive to class imbalance and so 
does not take into account the distribution of the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and genuine 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠.  
Therefore choosing this “best” point for 𝜃 based only on Eq.(2-12) does not 
represent the real-world “best” point.  A third dimension that is sensitive to class 
imbalances such as the cost of misclassification will yield different points as a slice in 
ROC space.  This 3D approach enables the characterisation of the classifier over 
different class distributions.  A business may wish to reduce false alerts while 
eschewing accuracy of fraud detection.  Few research papers reviewed in Chapter 2 
pay this issue sufficient attention and select a 𝜃 value for the classifier based only on 
Eq.(2-12) rather than real-world performance metrics.  The Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) is a numeric value calculated for area under the ROC curve with a 
trapezoidal rule and can to some extent be interpreted as the probability that the 
classifier will score to a randomly chosen P example higher than a randomly chosen 
N example.  It is typically used to compare the performance of different models but 
there is considerable debate as if this is a valid approach (Robin et al., 2011).   
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Figure 2-14  – Illustration of ROC chart using UCI-B dataset.  
2.3.3 Re-calculation of reviewed work performance 
A detailed discussion and analysis is given in Appendix A. 
To understand the real-world effectiveness of a fraud detection classifier the volumes 
per day (denoted as ‘D’) are an important measure as they directly influence the 
practical effectiveness of detection and are given by Eq. (2-13) to Eq. (2-16) where 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 is one year.  The proportion of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 that contain fraud transactions that 
can be subsequently blocked is a key metric as this drives the number of human 
reviewers required to process the alerts created.  
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𝑇𝐷 ≅ 𝑇!"#$%&365  (2-13)  
𝐹r𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐷 ≅ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%&365  (2-14)  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒𝐷 ≅ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒!"#$%&365  ≡   𝑇𝐷 − 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐷 (2-15)  𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 ≅ 𝑇𝑃!"#$%& +  𝐹𝑃!"#$%&365  (2-16)  
As industry statistics for issuers are readily available (see B.12, page 548) and to 
understand the effectiveness of a range of fraud detection methods 
contemporaneously, figures have been calculated for an “average large issuer” 
(denoted “Tier-1 issuer”) using published figures and assumptions (see Appendix B).  
The proportion in a year of transactions #𝑇𝐷! !"#$ processed by a large Tier-1 issuer 
is calculated to be an average of worldwide $CEV.  Assuming this proportion is the 
same for transactions then Eq. (2-19) and Eq. (2-20) are given. 
#𝑇𝐴𝐷!"#$! =   #𝐹𝑃!"#$! + #𝑇𝑁!"#$! (2-17) $𝑇𝐴𝐷!"#$! =    $𝐹P!"#$! + $𝑇𝑁!"#$! (2-18) #𝑇𝐷!"#$! ≅ #𝑇𝐷. 1 (2-19) $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐷!"#$! ≅ $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐷. 1 (2-20) 
The number of transactions and the fraud write-off for a typical Tier-1 issuer is 
calculated in Table 2-6 as given by Eq. (2-19) and Eq. (2-20). 
Table 2-6 – Calculated worldwide Tier-1 issuer statistics. 
Tier-1 issuer per day Eq. 1971 1982 1993 2013  
Number of transactions 
(#𝑇𝐷!"#$!) (2-19) 7,000 40,000 560,000 5m  
Fraud write-off 
($𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐷!"#$!) (2-20) $330 $35k $27k $386k  
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
For comparison the top 15 issuers by $CEV per day in the USA in 2010 is given in 
Figure 2-15. 
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Source: (Banks-around-the-world, 2010) for 2010.  Typical Tier 1 Issuer for 2013 given in 
B.12, page 548.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are 
not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure 2-15 – Bar chart of top 15 payment card issuers in the USA (2010) by $CEV 
per day. 
Figure 2-16 highlights the difficulty of separating the transactions to detect 
fraudulent transactions.  For example in 2013 a typical Tier-1 issuer needs to detect 
1,100 transactions out of 5m in a day.  
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Source: See B.12, page 548.  Note log scale.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure 2-16 – Line chart of tier-1 issuer number of transactions per day that are 
fraud over period 1971 to 2013. 
Where possible the results of each reviewed method are put in context by using 
figures calculated using 2013 Tier-1 issuer figures.  Where performance is reported 
as 𝑇𝑃𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 these values are used to estimate the performance using Eq. (2-21) 
to Eq. (2-24). 
𝑇𝑃 = P.𝑇𝑃𝑅 (2-21) 𝑇𝑁 = N. (1− 𝐹𝑃𝑅) (2-22) 𝐹𝑃 = N.𝐹𝑃𝑅 (2-23) 𝐹𝑁 = P. (1− 𝑇𝑃𝑅) (2-24) 
In the Tier-1 statistics the dataset is unbalanced with an average 𝑅𝐺𝐹of 4,800 (see 
B.8, page 545).  The results from the cited work use a range of datasets, which have a 
different 𝑅𝐺𝐹.  Therefore when re-calculating the performance the cited method 
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may not maintain the same 𝑇𝑃𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 on the Tier-1 issuer dataset – the greater 
the difference in 𝑅𝐺𝐹 the less confidence in the results for the re-calculation.  It is 
not known if this is significant.   
2.3.4 Measuring classifier performance using cost 
In (Hand et al., 2008) a method that differentiates between costs was proposed and 
given in Table 2-7 but it assumed a constant cost difference between 𝐹𝑃 and 𝐹𝑁 
whereas this work uses: 
§ A cost for 𝐹𝑃 (those transactions classified as fraud when they are 
genuine) as the cost related to reviewing the transaction,  
§ A cost of 𝐹𝑁 (fraud transactions missed) as the amount of the fraudulent 
transaction, 
§ A cost of 𝑇𝑃 (correctly identified fraud) as the negative amount of the 
fraudulent transaction (as a saving).   
This forms a cost matrix that is then used with the probability calculated for each 
condition and the 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is then multiplied by the associated cost to make an alert 
decision.   
Table 2-7 – Cost multiplication matrix (Hand et al., 2008). 
 Classifier 
Fraud Genuine 
K
no
w
n Fraud  -€value €5 
Genuine €value 0 
The work reports that the proposed method improves on the cost of fraud operations 
by 23% over that of a benchmark random forest classifier (Hastie et al., 2005) with a 
cost of €36,634 (compared to the total direct losses of €866,410).  The work uses an 
administrative cost of €5 per transaction, the cost of a fraudulent transaction for an 
issuer given in Eq. (8-12), page 430 and is calculated in Table A-17 is $276 per 
transaction around 100x that used in the work and a suggested real-world cost 
matrix is given in Table 2-8. 
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Table 2-8 – Cost matrix based on 2013 issuer statistics. 
 Classifier 
Fraud Genuine 
K
no
w
n Fraud -$value $260 
Genuine $value $1 
The example records may overlap as criminals aim to make their transactions 
appear legitimate or the data has been incorrectly marked in the dataset.  The cost of 
misclassification might outweigh the cost of the value of that transaction.  The 
decision boundary is not crisp in the real-world so that the transition from 𝒞! to 𝒞! is 
not discontinuous but gradual, known as the “plausibility range”.  The value of 
correctly classifying a transaction to the payment participant is a function of time – 
earlier detection is more valuable than one that is delayed over a period.  
Transactional evidence builds up over time as a number of transactions are 
completed and so it becomes easier to distinguish between a genuine transaction and 
that which is not.   
2.3.5 Benchmark Datasets 
Some researchers assess their proposed method on datasets from the public UCI 
data repository (UCI, 2010).  Ten datasets selected as being the most common in the 
reviewed works in this Chapter have been selected and are collated in Table 2-9 and 
are referenced throughout this thesis. 
Table 2-9 – Datasets used from the UCI machine learning repository. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, Dataset=title of dataset, #Classes=Number of classes converted to two classes for the 
experiments, Class labeles=linguistic class descripition. 
Ref↓ Dataset #Records #Fields #Classes Fraud {1} Genuine {0} RGF
UCI-A Statlog – Australian Credit Approval 690 14 2 Decline Approve 1.2
UCI-B (Wisconsin) Breast Cancer 569 10 2 Malignant Benign 1.7
UCI-G Statlog - German Credit Score 1,000 24 2 Bad Good 2.3
UCI-H Hepatitis 930 19 2 Die Live 3.8
UCI-I Iris dataset 100 4 3 Iris-setosa Iris-versicolor 1.0
UCI-L Lung Cancer 32 56 3 1 2 & 3 2.6
UCI-M Mushroom 8,124 22 3 Poisonous Edible 1.1
UCI-O Ionosphere 351 34 2 Bad Good 1.8
UCI-P Pima Indians Diabetes 768 8 2 No Yes 1.9
UCI-U 1985 Auto Imports 205 26 7 -3 3 1.2
Class Labels
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2.4 Pre-Processing 
Machine learning techniques benefit from the raw data being transformed before 
being used by the algorithms.  For machine learning algorithms such as the neural 
network this step is necessary so that the data is converted into a suitable numerical 
representation.  Neural network algorithms operate using numerical values (see 
2.5.2, page 85).  The input and outputs of a neural network are in a specific numeric 
range depending on the activation function chosen, for example 0.0,1.0  for a 
sigmoidal function.  The real-world dataset contains fields that are both numeric and 
symbolic and has a range of real-world values.  All real-world values need to be 
converted into the equivalent specific numeric range for the algorithms.  This is 
discussed further in 3.4, page 171. 
2.5 Fraud Detection Review 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to produce an improved fraud detector as SOAR 
has been designed to extract abstract knowledge so that underlying patterns of fraud 
in an exisiting deployed FMS can be understood in such a way as to add to the 
knowledge of human experts.  The methods reviewed here all use a dataset to create 
a classifier. 
A review of key published work, which is focused in the domain of the fraud 
detection for payment cards has been undertaken.  Google “Scholar” and the IEEE 
“Xplore Digital Library” was mostly used to search a large selection of indexed 
works using search terms such as “payment fraud”, “fraud detection”, “credit card 
fraud” and “payments”.  Literature survey works and general subject descriptive 
papers and books were a useful source of further references but were excluded from 
the actual review.  The papers in the review include research on the application of 
Artificial Intelligence techniques to the problem of detecting fraud in payments.  The 
papers are examined with respect to their publication year, methods, algorithms, 
results, implementations and the events discussed in Appendix A. 
From around 375 papers dated between 1975 and 2016 key methods are evaluated 
from academic journals and conference proceedings.  The body of work forms 
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ontology where each methodology has itself a taxonomy and this is described in each 
section along with the relationships between them.  The key fraud detection 
methodologies are classified into eight methods in Table 2-10.  It will be seen that 
each of these detection methodologies has different strengths and weaknesses with 
respect to accuracy, comprehensibility and imbalanced datasets. 
Table 2-10 – Payment card fraud detection ontology. 
Method Section Description  
1. Expert Systems 2.5.1 
Based on human-readable symbolic representations 
of knowledge sometimes called Knowledge Based 
Systems (KBS).  Expert systems are the most 
established AI technique used in fraud detection.  
AI includes rules, decision trees and Case Based 
Reasoning. 
2. Supervised 
Neural 
Network 
2.5.2 
Creates a model by inferring a function from 
training data with inputs and associated (labelled) 
outputs.  This model is used to classify 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  classes.  Supervised neural 
networks and their derivatives are used extensively 
in fraud detection. 
3. Unsupervised 
Neural 
Networks 
2.5.3 
Creates a model by topographically representing 
input data so that data with similar properties are 
placed at nearby locations so the input data is 
therefore meaningfully clustered.  Unsupervised 
neural networks and their derivatives are typically 
used to detect unusual or anomalies in transactions 
for fraud detection. 
4. Bayesian 
Network 2.5.4 
Creates a probabilistic model by inferring 
conditional dependencies from data.   
5. Genetic 
Algorithms 2.5.5 
Used as a search method to find an optimised set of 
functions that can classify fraud using a heuristic 
algorithm that mimics aspects of biological natural 
selection.  This includes Artificial Immune System 
(AIS) models that are inspired by aspects of the 
biological immune system. 
6. Hidden 
Markov Model 
(HMM) 
2.5.6 
A statistical model of the probability of sequences of 
events. 
7. Support Vector 
Machine 
(SVM) 
2.5.7 
Creates a classifier from training data with inputs 
and associated outputs by creating single separating 
hyperplanes between two classes. 
8. Eclectic and 
Hybrid 2.5.8 
A range of novel methods. 
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The early payment card fraud management methods start in the 1990s (as detailed 
in A.12, page 457) where there was an increased use of payment cards with 3bn 
payment cards in circulation with a $CEV of $1,400bn (see Appendix B) and the 
direct cost of fraud of $1.0bn.  This necessitated the payment processors to look for 
improved methods for fraud detection.  The payment processors had made a 
considerable investment in rule-based fraud detection systems including fraud 
experts, the review teams and the creation and maintenance of the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠.  
Research into new fraud detection methods was therefore motivated to devise 
improved methods with this as background.  Computing power measured in cost per 
MIP was around 431,000 times more expensive at that time than in 2015 (see B.31, 
page 564) and so many of these new detection methods were constrained by the 
computing power available within the banking IT environment.  Indeed some 
authors mention this constraint or it is implied.  It is established in A.15.8, page 524 
that computing power and payment fraud are implicitly linked and it is likely that 
fraud detection methods and computing power are explicitly linked.  This is 
expected to be true for researchers as the authors of the new methods will likely to 
have been constrained by the computing power and tools available to them for their 
research.   
(Yufeng et al., 2004) offers a literature review of techniques used for general fraud 
detection from 1991 to 2002 including payment card fraud detection.  (Phua et al., 
2010) provides a survey of data mining for general fraud detection methods covering 
1994-2004.  (Sethi & Gera, 2014) reviews methods focused only on credit card fraud 
detection and include a description of common fraud vectors and a comparison of 
the different methods.  (Danenas, 2015) provides a survey of patents in financial 
fraud detection over the period 1998 to 2013 including (Ryman-Tubb, 2010) patent 
that was granted for the proposed SOAR extraction algorithm described in Chapter 
3. 
2.5.1 Expert Systems 
In this thesis Expert System is used to mean any symbolic AI that is based on 
human-representations of knowledge.  Expert systems are probably the most 
established form of AI technique.  They attempt to embody human knowledge in a 
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computer program through the creation of a set of symbolic rules.  These rules can 
then be used to make a decision for a specific set of inputs.  Examples of rules and 
how they have been extensively used in fraud detection are discussed in Appendix A.  
Rules can be written by human experts or created using inductive learning methods 
to extract rules from data.  Rules are sometimes referred to as Inductive Logic 
Programming (ILP) where first order predicate logic is used to define a “concept” by 
using a set of positive and/or negative examples.  With ILP the complex 
relationships among fields can be expressed, which improves the expressive power of 
the model.  Domain knowledge can be represented in an ILP system, which 
improves the effectiveness of the system (Al-Khatib, 2012).  Inductive learning 
methods do not require explicit human knowledge as with ILP/expert systems; as 
they learn relationships in the data based from examples and so do not impose 
possible arbitrary human assumptions on the problem.  
Table 2-11 lists an AI taxonomy here established for payment card fraud detection 
along with the key work describing published payment card fraud detection methods 
and results. 
Table 2-11 – AI fraud detection taxonomy. 
 Method Section Date ê  Work  
1.  Rule Based 2.5.1.1 
1993 (Leonard, 1993) 
1995 (Shao et al., 1995) 
2006 (Aggelis, 2006) 
2007 (Edge et al., 2007) 
2009 (Vatsa et al., 2009) 
2012 (HaratiNik et al., 2012) 
2012 (Maruatona et al., 2012) 
2.  Decision Tree 2.5.1.2 
1986 (Quinlan, 1986) 
1997 (Kokkinaki, 1997) 
1997 (Stolfo et al., 1997) 
1999 (Chan et al., 1999) 
1999 (Brause et al., 1999) 
2004 (Fei et al., 2004) 
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 Method Section Date ê  Work  
2006 (Jianyun et al., 2006) 
2011 (Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) 
2011 (Sahin & Duman, 2011b) 
2012 (Philip & Sherly, 2012) 
2013 (Sahin et al., 2013) 
2014 (Gaikwad et al.), (Bharani & Rao) 
3.  Case Based Reasoning 2.5.1.3 
2000 (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) 
2008 (Aoki & Seita, 2008) 
2015 (Balley & Chaudhari) 
2.5.1.1 Rule Based 
A common technique used within the payments industry for the detection of 
payment card fraud is the use of association rules.  In (Shao et al., 1995) it was 
reported that expert systems are widely adopted throughout the UK payments 
industry.  Human payment fraud experts create rules that aim to capture their 
knowledge on fraud vectors.  As described in (Dazeley, 2006) this is an expensive and 
time-consuming task and requires experts in their field.  Expert systems are called 
brittle as they are unable to detect previously unseen fraud vectors.  Small sets of 
well-written rules are transparent as to their operation and easy to understand.  Most 
expert systems lack any form of automated learning and therefore cannot adapt to 
follow changes in the external environment.  Changes have to be implemented 
manually and is characteristically time consuming to perform.  As the rule-base 
grows it becomes hard to maintain, requires more computing power and becomes 
more opaque.  (Aggelis, 2006) notes that rules continue to be added as new fraud 
vectors are understood by human experts.  (Edge et al., 2007) proposes a Financial 
Fraud Modelling Language (FFML) based on SQL this can be applied to more data 
fields from a range of different data sources as an alternative to the example rule 
format previously given in 1.6, page 39.  (Leonard, 1993) proposes an early expert 
system for the detection of credit card fraud where a Canadian bank provided a 
dataset consisting of 12,709 transactions.  The system was run on an hourly batch 
basis, throughout the day and the results are summarised in Table 2-12.  
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Table 2-12 – Expert system FMS performance reported results (Leonard, 1993). 
Measure Value N 12,131 P 578 𝐹𝑃𝑅 91.35% 𝑇𝑃𝑅 70.76% 𝑅𝐹𝐺 21 
The rules used in the expert system are not described due to confidentiality.  The 
results from the work are given in Table 2-13 as a confusion matrix and recalculated 
using 2013 industry volumes. 
Table 2-13 – Expert system FMS confusion matrix results (Leonard, 1993). 
 Classifier  Performance 
Fraud Gen  %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR %TPR A/f AlertsD 
K
no
w
n (Leonard, 1993) 
 
90.414 98.498 28.045 8.650 70.760 - - Fraud 409 169  
Gen 1,049 11,082  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013 
 
91.345 99.993 0.180 8.65 70.76 394 433,183 Fraud 778 322  
Gen 432,405 4.6m  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
The 𝑅𝐺𝐹 in the Candian Bank dataset is unusually high (1 fraud per 21 genuine 
transactions) even for that decade.  It is not known if a different ruleset would be 
needed for more sparse fraud.  Using the 2013 industry volumes, 433,183 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
would have been created with the reviewers having to review 394 alerts to find a 
single fraud.  Using a rule-based only method is increasingly ineffective (see A.13.10, 
page 490) as the volumes of transactions exponentially increase. 
A more sophisticated expert system used to classify transactions is proposed in (Vatsa 
et al., 2009) and builds on the work in (Liu & Li, 2002) to use game theory combined 
with an expert system.  In game theory there are two players (1) the fraudster and (2) 
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the FMS.  Both are opponents that both wish to ‘win’ by maximising their gain; 
there are two parties with conflicting goals.  Thus the fraudster attempts various 
fraud vectors and the FMS must minimise any loss by detecting them as early as 
possible.  It is assumed that the fraudster will try to use stolen payment cards on a 
repeated basis.  The fraudster will have a belief about the best method to obtain 
funds, initially using low value transactions with a belief that the FMS will not block 
such transactions.  Therefore the fraudster is playing according to a Nash 
Equilibrium (Rosenthal, 1973) such that they cannot do any better given their belief 
about the FMS.  The FMS needs to learn the best strategy to detect such fraud and it 
does this by predicting the next most likely ‘move’ of the fraudster.  The proposed 
system is one of the few reviewed approaches that include feedback, as the game is 
made up of a number of repeated “moves” with the criminal trying a number of 
methods to avoid detection.  Cardholder data is available and an expert system is 
used to classify each cardholder transaction.  The classification is then passed to the 
game theory heuristics that predict the next action of the opponent and map a belief 
to this classification.  If they do not match then the belief is updated for that 
cardholder.  As more transactions are made on the same payment card the belief is 
adjusted through a learning process (see Figure 2-17) to improve the accuracy of 
fraud alerts.  The game theory heuristics use a Markov Chain to make a prediction 
on the likely “next move” of the fraudster.  A Markov Chain is a sequence of values 
whose probabilities at a time interval depend upon the value at the previous time.   
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Figure 2-17  – Game theoretic fraud detector diagram (Vatsa et al., 2009). 
(Vatsa et al., 2009) used synthetic dataset due to the described difficulty of obtaining 
large real-world datasets.  The results are reported as the number of fraudulent 
transactions correctly alerted that improve over nine rounds of the fraudster using 
the same payment card 𝑃! improves from 45% to 70%.  Results are re-plotted in 
Figure 2-18 and demonstrate how the fraud detection system progresses by updating 
its strategy per move so that more fraudulent transactions are correctly detected.  It 
is argued this improvement is due to the inability of the criminal to learn the 
changing strategy of this FMS.  When the results from the work are recalculated 
using 2013 industry volumes an impracticable number of alerts are generated per 
day of 2.7m due to poor FPR of 30%.  It is argued that this is likely to be the result of 
the initial rules used as the earlier (Leonard, 1993) had an 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 8.65% so that 
adding the game theoretic method to such an expert system may improve overall 
performance over time. 
FRAUD
ANALYST
TRANSACTION
DATA
BELIEF
GAME - SYSTEM
CORRECT WRONG
CONTINUE TO
NEXT MOVE
RULE BASED
EXPERT
SYSTEM
r(y)
| Chapter 2 - Literature Review | 
 | 70 |  
 
Source: (Vatsa et al., 2009).   
Figure 2-18  – Graph of game theoretic fraud detector performance after each 
“move” (Vatsa et al., 2009). 
In (HaratiNik et al., 2012) a system using fuzzy rules is described.  Fuzzy rules have 
fields that are described in fuzzy terms such as “high”, “average”, “low”, where these 
labels are allocated using a Gaussian membership function.  The output of a rule is a 
value calculated based on the combination of fuzzy field values such that each rule 
has an output range [0,1].  Using synthetic data the results indicate a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 91.6% 
but a poor 𝐹𝑃𝑅 77.5%.  When the results from the work are recalculated using 2013 
industry volumes the alerts are generated per day are 3.9m due to the small size and 
number of fields used in the synthetic data.   This is worse than a random coin-flip.  
In (Maruatona et al., 2012) a method to alert that specific transactions are outside its 
range of experience (rule-base) is proposed so as to reduce their brittle nature as 
fraud vectors change but no results are given.  In (Correia et al., 2015) a set of 14 
manually created rules were created through a manual trial-and-error method 
looking for specific patterns that indicate known fraud vectors and are given in Table 
2-14.  An open source software tool PROTON is used to implement the proposed 
method (IBM, 2015). This used an Event Processing Network (EPN) that had 8+4 
Event Processing Agents (EPA) one for each written rule.  An uncertainty measure 
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was used in the transactions as the value of the fields may be imprecise and so each 
field was accompanied by a derived PDF so that a certainty output was calculated by 
the EPN for each new transaction.   
Table 2-14 – Event Processing Agents fraud rules defined (Correia et al., 2015). 
Ref Rule 
EPA1 Increasing Amounts 
EPA2 Decreasing Amounts 
EPA3 CVV Attack 
EPA3.1 – Increasing Amounts after a CVV Attack 
EPA 3.2 – Flash Attack after a CVV Attack 
EPA 3.3 – Sudden use near the payment card expiration date after a CVV 
Attack 
EPA4 Flash Attack 
EPA4.1 Small followed by large transaction amount after a Flash Attack 
EPA5 Multiple ATM withdrawals 
EPA6 Sudden use near the payment card expiration date 
EPA7 Transaction has occurred in a physically distant location 
EPA8 Small followed by large transaction amount 
These EPAs are implemented in PROTON which supports a range of pattern 
matching algorithms, filters, event pattern matching (including temporal context).  If 
an EPA is triggered it will generate a certainty score based on the sum of PDF in the 
fields in the transactions.  These EPAs were created to detect the following known 
typical fraud vectors: 
1. Consecutive withdrawals of increasing or decreasing amounts for a single 
payment card (EPA1, EPA2). 
2. Several attempts to use a wrong CVV for the same card are made (EPA3). 
3. A high number of transactions in a short time-period for a single card 
(EPA4). 
4. Small amount followed by big purchase for a single payment card (EP A5). 
5. Many large withdrawals from a single ATM (EPA6). 
6. Sudden card use near the expiration date (EPA7). 
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7. Consecutive attempts to use the same card in different physical locations 
(EPA8). 
A real-world dataset was provided by a FMS vendor Feedzai (vendors are discussed 
in 2.7, page 154).  This dataset had 5.6bn transactions covering 2009 to 2011 with a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 2,000 and 27 fields.  For evaluation 7 of the 27 fields were manually selected.  
Setting a certainty 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 of 70%, the results reported 80% of the fraudulent 
transactions were detected with a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 0.02% (this is an excellent result but it is 
not clearly stated if this is the FPR).  These results are excellent and when 
recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes generate just 1,880 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
missing 20% of the fraudulent transactions. (Correia et al., 2015) does not detail the 
evaluation methodology used with such a large dataset.  The authors note that the 
EPAs are created manually and parameters such as event patterns, thresholds and 
sizes of time windows were manually set using trial-and-error to provide the best 
results.  Given the uncertainties inherent in real-world transactional and cardholder 
datasets the precision of the results seems to indicate a degree of overfitting to the 
dataset through this trial-and-error setting of EPAs.  Therefore it is possible that 
there will be a poor generalisability of these results when used with different datasets.  
The work notes that future research will include learning mechanisms to 
automatically generate EPAs from historical data analysis.  Table 2-15 summarises 
the reviewed expert systems work and re-calculated results. 
Table 2-15 – Comparison of expert system methods reviewed for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
It can be seen in Table 2-15 that (Correia et al., 2015) produces the lowest 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
and is ranked the second highest performance out of all 44 works ranked.  The other 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
Expert (Correia et al., 2015), 0.02 80.00 20.00 2          1,880         0.612 2
Expert (Leonard, 1993) 8.65 70.76 29.24 557      433,183      0.033 25
Expert (Vatsa et al., 2009) 30.00 70.00 25.00 1,364   1,500,440  0.014 37
Expert (HaratiNik et al., 2012) 77.50 91.60 8.40 3,523   3,875,155  -0.002 44
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methods in the table are poor making them all impractical for 2013 industry 
volumes. 
2.5.1.2 Decision Tree (DT) 
A DT is a graphical representation of a tree used to make a decision (Morgan & 
Sonquist, 1963).  A DT can be created as a classifier using inductive learning by 
creating a tree structure which attempts to separate the classes into mutually 
exclusive subgroups at each node in the tree (Quinlan, 1986).  Once created the DT 
performs a comparison using input values at each node of the tree and then branches 
to either the left or the right based on the result – see Figure 2-19.  A DT consists of: 
§ A set of nodes, which are either non-terminal (internal) or terminal (leaf).  
The tree starts with a single root node and every possible path eventually 
leads to a leaf node. 
§ A set of decision functions with one associated with each internal node.  
Each decision function is expressed in terms of a subset of the attributes 
that correspond to the fields of the learning dataset.  The attributes may 
be any defined and the decision function may be a linear or Boolean 
combination of these. 
§ Each internal node generates child nodes, according to the decision.   
§ The number of children generated by an internal node may be fixed (for 
example two for a binary tree) or variable.  Typically the degree of 
creating a child (splitting) is binary for numeric attributes and variable for 
discrete symbolic attributes: an optimum split in terms of information 
gain is chosen at each internal node regardless of how many branches this 
gives. 
§ Every leaf node has an associated class label 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  that 
classifies the data example, that traverses a path from the root node at the 
top of the tree to that leaf node, that is each leaf node has a propensity for 
an output class based on the class distribution of the training subset 
associated with that node. 
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§ Every internal node can be treated as a leaf node if required.  Hence 
every node in the decision tree may have associated class labels and 
propensities. 
§ Most widely available decision tree implementations only handle binary 
outputs. 
 
Figure 2-19  – Example diagram of a Decision Tree (DT) used in fraud detection. 
A benefit of this method is that the generated DT can be viewed as rules in a similar 
form to that in expert systems which are English-like and are explicable.  Every 
classification is easily understood by a rule generated by the path from the root node 
to the leaf.  An example form of a rule is a logical conjunction from Figure 2-19 and 
the route through the DT is given by: 
IF (decision 1 is Fraud) ∧ (decision 2 is fraud)     
∧ … (decision 4 is fraud) THEN (Fraud) 
 
decision 1 ‘if transaction value < $10’ 
decision 2 ‘if #Transactions in 10 minutes > 3’ 
decision 4 ‘if time of day is between 1300-0400’ 
An offline DT uses a 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset where the DT is first created so that each 
decision at a node defines a membership to a class.  Each child node is split based on 
the value of a field that best separates the training records at that point.  The process 
recursively creates child nodes until there is no split that makes a difference or the 
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number of records represented by the node is too small.  There are many well-
known algorithms that can induce a DT from training vectors some of which are 
listed in Table 2-16.  It is not necessary to review each of these algorithms in detail 
for the purpose of this Chapter. 
Table 2-16 – Common Decision Tree algorithms. 
Source Algorithm Node splitting method 
(Quinlan, 1986) ID3 Information gain 
(Quinlan, 1993) C4.5 Information gain/pruning 
(Quinlan, 2007) C5.0 Gain ratio/boosting 
(Breiman et al., 1983) CART Gini coefficient 
(Kass, 1980) CHAID Chi-square or F statistic 
(Cohen, 1995) RIPPERk Information gain plus pruning 
(Clark & Niblett, 1989) BAYES/CN2 Information gain 
(Breiman, 1996) Random Forest Ensemble approach 
A newer DT approach has emerged that addresses the problems of overfitting in the 
earlier DT induction algorithms by combining different DTs using subsets of the 
training dataset and random selection – known as a random forest.  Early work 
(Breiman, 1996) used “bagging” where each DT is generated from a random 
selection from examples in the training dataset.  In newer methods, features are 
randomly selected from a random subset of all possible features for the node split 
and a threshold selected according to an information gain criteria (Geurts et al., 
2006).  Many different DTs are created which may be individually weak predictors 
but together cover more of the search space.  This ensemble of DTs is then averaged 
for performance.  Overfitting is reported as reduced where the splitting criteria is 
randomised.  Individual tree size is determined by various parameters such as node 
size, number of splits and split improvement measures; most of such appear to use a 
rule-of-thumb.  It appears that the tree overall depth typically becomes larger which 
does not lead to improved comprehensibility (Segal & Xiao, 2011) which is 
important in this thesis.  Much of the empirical work has used the small UCI datasets 
which are generally difficult to overfit (Breiman, 2001).  In (Bergstra & Bengio, 2012) 
it is shown that the random search method is more computationally efficient as it 
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searches a larger, less promising feature space.  So while random forests are 
improved classifiers they do not improve explainability of the data.  
To classify transactions into 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  (Stolfo et al., 1997) compares four 
algorithms for generating a decision tree: (1) Iterative Dichotomiser 3 (ID3) 
algorithm (Quinlan, 1986), (2) CART (Breiman et al., 1983), (3) RIPPERk (Cohen, 
1995), (4) BAYES/CN2 (Clark & Niblett, 1989).  These were tested with 0.5m 
transactions with 30 fields provided by a financial services firm; no details of the 
dataset are given due to confidentiality.  The fraud rate was altered in the dataset for 
reasons of confidentiality as it is “a closely guarded industry secret” (discussed in A.11.5, 
page 456).  The work does not give the number of rules created with each algorithm 
or any example volumes.  The results show that each algorithm produces a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 
between 74% to 80% and a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 13% to 23%.  The ID3 algorithm was the 
inferior and BAYES being the best with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 13%.  When the results from the 
work are recalculated using 2013 industry volumes for the BAYES method then an 
impractical number of alerts are generated per day of 650k.  (Chan et al., 1999) 
builds on this work to add a financial cost to the classifications during the creation of 
the DT classifier.  For each transaction there is an associated value of that 
transaction (purchase value) and therefore the associated cost of either detection or 
misclassification can be estimated as there is an overhead cost to review each alert.  
These values are used in an algorithm called Adacost originally proposed in (Fan et 
al., 1999).  A metaclassifier method is used where multiple DTs are created using a 
range of algorithms and are then combined in a novel way to produce the highest accuracy.  The same 0.5m transactions were used to assess this proposed method.  
The results are given in terms of only the cost savings with no typical performance 
measures and so the method cannot be compared.  In (Brause et al., 1999) rules are 
generated by a DT using a real-world dataset of 542,858 genuine examples and 
5,850 fraud examples, supplied by an unnamed banking dataset.  Two separate 
models are created as illustrated in Figure 2-20.  It is not necessary to describe the 
RBF neural network model in this section (see 2.5.2, page 85).  
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Figure 2-20  – Diagram of the proposed multiple RBF model and Decision Tree 
approach (Brause et al., 1999). 
The symbolic data fields are analysed using an imputed DT and the continuous data 
fields are modelled using RBF neural models.  A voting system is used for the final 
classification where the output from the RBFs overrides the output from the DT 
where fraud is indicated.  The results are given in Table 2-17. 
Table 2-17 – Decision Tree performance reported results (Brause et al., 1999). 
Measure Value N 542,858 P 5,850 𝑅𝐺𝐹 93 𝑃! 99.73% 𝑃! 90.91% 
The 747 rules correctly classified 90.91% of the frauds.  The results from the work 
are given in Table 2-18. 
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Table 2-18 – Decision Tree FMS confusion matrix results (Brause et al., 1999). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n (Brause et al., 1999) 
 
99.636 99.902 78.394 0.270 90.910 - - Fraud 5,318 532  
Gen 1,466 541,392  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
99.728 99.998 6.898 0.270 90.910 13 14,497 Fraud 1,000 100  
Gen 13,497 4,985,403  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
The work notes the high computational complexity of the rule-induction method.  
The generalisation of the rules is poor as smaller 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 reduce efficacy and 
confidence; with 747 rules and 5,850 fraud examples it can be observed that each 
individual rule represents a large proportion of the 5,850 fraud examples explicitly 
and therefore may not generalise well on new transactions taken from a different 
period. The learning method shows promise in terms of performance but it is not 
able to produce a sufficiently comprehensible small set of rules that have generalised 
the fraud vectors.  In (Fei et al., 2004) a novel method is proposed by modifying the 
ID3 algorithm (Quinlan, 1986) so that a score is calculated at each DT node using a 
measure of information gain based on a Kullback–Leibler divergence measure 
(Kullback & Leibler, 1951) as an indication of how well a given attribute separates 
the overall 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 dataset into the correct classes at that node.  This is tested on a 
dataset provided by the Commercial Bank of China on data from individuals 
applying for a credit card.  Although this is not transactional payment card fraud 
detection the work does provide a classification method that by producing a score at 
each node there is an improved transparency.  Performance measures are not given 
but it is reported that the DT generated is an improvement over the standard ID3 
algorithm.  In (Sahin & Duman, 2011b) a dataset of 22m records that contain 978 
marked fraud and a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 22,500 is used to assess the performance of the CART, 
C5.0 and CHAID DT algorithms.  The dataset is rebalanced in different ratios and 
DTs are imputed.  No information is given on the size of the resultant DTs.  The 
only performance measure given is 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of between 86.79% and 94.69%.  The 
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work highlights how improving the 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 measure of the classifier is generally 
the focus of research rather than comprehensibility or producing a system that can 
be used practically.  This work is continued in (Sahin et al., 2013) and is similar to 
(Chan et al., 1999) that uses the monetary cost of a misclassification and correct 
classification within the splitting criteria.  The same dataset is used but results are 
provided using a new proposed measure called ‘Saved Loss Rate’ and so yet again 
cannot be compared to other work.  The work states that the cost based methods 
outperform the previous method but do not provide any results for comparison.  
(Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) use an on-line DT where the DT is generated as new 
marked transactions 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  arrive at the FMS as an alternative to 
requiring all the data to be present in a single 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset, similar to Multiple 
Instance Learning that will be discussed as a possible future research direction in 
7.2.6, page 322.  To impute the DT the ‘Very Fast DT’ (VFDT) algorithm from 
(Domingos & Hulten, 2000) was selected.  This algorithm is modified so that the 
splitting of data at a node is based on comparing the Hoeffding bound to the 
information gain.  A real-world dataset of marked credit card transactions is used 
with 124 fields and is re-sampled to have a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 9.  Results are given as a 
confusion matrix for a range of parameters used in the algorithm.  106 rules were 
created that correctly classified 94.931% of the frauds but with a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 41.534%.  
The results from (Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) are given in Table 2-19 where over 2m 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷 are generated.  
Table 2-19 – Decision Tree FMS confusion matrix results (Minegishi & Niimi, 
2011). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴/𝑑 
K
no
w
n (Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) 
 
91.236 58.466 94.534 41.534 94.931 - - Fraud 40,174 1,982  
Gen 2,145 2,790  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
58.474 99.998 0.050 41.534 94.931 1,888 2m Fraud 1,044 56  
Gen 2,076,241 2,922,659  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
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Detecting anomalous transactions is proposed in (Kokkinaki, 1997) and uses a 
modified DT that is used to essentially store a list of habits at each node of typical 
cardholder behaviour.  If a new transaction for a cardholder does not match one of 
the habits in the DT then the transaction is atypical and marked as suspicious.  No 
experiment of the method was undertaken and no method for updating cardholder 
behaviour is provided.  It is argued in the work that such a system would need to be 
able to store and rapidly recall and evaluate a DT for each individual cardholder; for 
a Tier-1 issuer this is likely to be impractical, given the number of cardholders and 
the number of transactions (calculated to be 1.8bn per year in Table B-18, page 
549).  This method is common to many anomaly detection methods and is unable to 
explain common patterns of fraud as it creates alerts based on changes to individual 
behavioural modelling.  A further anomaly method using a modified DT is proposed 
in (Jianyun et al., 2006).  This work uses the (Han et al., 2000) DT algorithm to 
extract the associations between the fields, importantly over a certain time period of 
transactions.  Each cardholders profile over a period generates a new DT.  The DT 
is then used on a new transaction to indicate a level of match and conversely a 
measure of anomaly.  The level indicates how close the new transaction is to the 
learnt cardholders’ normal behaviour.  If the level is over 𝜃 then it indicates fraud.  
Synthetic data is used to assess the method and the results are given in terms of cost 
savings and so cannot be compared to other work.  The reported results indicate that 
except for one dataset that there is no statistical significant difference between the 
new method and that of the standard C4.5 DT algorithm.  (Philip & Sherly, 2012) 
propose a similar method but add additional pre-processing to the data fields and a 
new method of handling accumulated alerts but give no results for their work.   
With any DT that has long root to leaf paths, which is “deeper” trees, the associated 
rules become more complicated to understand since they contain many antecedents 
to indicate fraud.  The tree size needs to be limited in a way that achieves good 
explainability as well as generalisation.  In payment card fraud detection where the 
data contains noise the DT is seen to generate a large number of rules.  A large 
number of rules where each rule has many conditions are difficult to understand.  
Previous work has compared DT learning to neural network methods and found that 
in almost all cases neural networks outperform in terms of classification accuracy and 
generalisation (Fisher & McKusick, 1989).  The ID3 algorithm is compared with that 
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of neural network and establishes that a MLP has a higher accuracy than the ID3 
method when noise is present in the data as with real-world data.  It is for this reason 
that it is argued that the DT method is unlikely to provide sufficient accuracy and 
general explainability when applied to payment card fraud detection in the real-
world.  Table 2-20 summarises the DT results. 
Table 2-20 – Comparison of Decision Tree methods for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
To provide a benchmark for the proposed experiments in Chapter 4 it was found 
that the C4.5 DT algorithm was commonly reported as a comparison from a range 
of published sources and these results are provided in Table 2-21. 
Table 2-21 – Cited results for UCI datasets using the C4.5 Decision Tree algorithm 
used as a benchmark. 
 
Sorted
Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
(Brause et al, 1999) 0.27 90.91 0.69 13           14,497      0.250 4
(Stolfo et al., 1997) 13.00 80.00 20.00 592          650,737     0.030 27
(Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) 41.53 94.93 5.07 1,989       2,077,285 0.016 35
Source #Rules %Acc #Rules %Acc
UCI-A (Setiono & Liu, 1997) 6.6 83.6 14.6 84.2
UCI-B (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) 2.0 78.8 9.0 95.3
UCI-G (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 13.0 97.3 13.0 90.5
UCI-H (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 8.0 100.0 6.0 95.0
UCI-I (Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) 10.0 92.0 4.0 97.3
UCI-L+ (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 36.0 100.0 5.0 88.9
UCI-M (Tsukimoto, 2000) 2.0 98.5 2.0 98.7
UCI-O+ (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) 10.0 96.6 8.0 90.5
UCI-P (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) 4.0 78.7 19.0 64.9
UCI-U+ (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 12.0 100.0 20.0 95.6
C4.5Published Results
Ref
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2.5.1.3 Case-Based Reasoning (CBR)  
CBR uses example transactions that have been previously marked as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 or 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 by a human.  A CBR system determines a weighting for each field in a 
fraud case typically using a stochastic hill-climbing algorithm to find the best 
combinations of field weights.  When presented with a new transaction the CBR 
system selects the most ‘similar’ cases by calculating a degree of match between that 
presented to it and those in a base of stored cases such as using a k-nearest neighbour 
algorithm on the weighted fields that expands its neighbourhood so as to capture a 
fixed number of cases.  If a match is made in the case-base then an alert is generated.  
When this alert is subsequently human reviewed and is determined to be actual 
fraud then the newly identified fraud is added into the historical case base (see Figure 
2-21).  The advantages of CBR systems over expert systems are that the fraud 
vectors do not need to be previously understood and fraud experts are not needed to 
create a rule-base.  As in all inductive learning methods knowledge is embodied in 
the historical data and the processes make use of this data.  This feature makes it 
straightforward to automate fraud detection and allows them to adapt to changes in 
the environment.  The main disadvantage is inefficient in operation and poor 
performance with real-world sparse data.  A large number of case examples are 
needed to replace a single rule in a rule-based system.  As the complexity of the 
problem grows such as the number of data fields required to establish the pattern of 
fraud or genuine transactions so too does the intrinsic dimensionality of the problem 
then the number of historical examples required increases exponentially.  This leads 
to large computational and storage overheads in operational use.  For a typical Tier-
1 issuer, there are 384,000 fraud transactions a year.  If each were detected they 
would add to the case-base that would become sizeable.  While CBR is more robust 
to noisy or imprecise data than expert systems their performance is significantly 
degraded when one class is sparse which is true with fraud or when historical 
transaction data has been marked in a way that is contradictory.   
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Figure 2-21  – Diagram of proposed Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) FMS (Wheeler & 
Aitken, 2000). 
In (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) a CBR method is applied to fraud detection in 
applications for credit loans.  The real-world dataset consisted of 128 fields, 4,000 
applications marked as 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 and 175 applications marked as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑.  The 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset consisted 584 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 and 96 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑.  The work updates the 
standard CBR method to use four different algorithms to search for matches each of 
which reports a confidence.  The highest reported confidence is then used to select 
the “case” to use.   
The multi-algorithms are: 
1. Best match: for comparison of the fields using k-nearest neighbour clustering. 
2. Negative Selection: only selects those cases over a specific threshold value 
and if the number of selected cases is over a pre-defined value then the case is 
marked as suspicious. 
3. Density Selection: uses the number of cases recalled for both classes as an 
indicator. 
4. Default Goal: where outlier cases with no close match are randomly assigned 
a class.  
The results from (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) are given in Table 2-22. 
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Table 2-22 – Case-Based Reasoning (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000). 
Measure Value N 584 P 96 𝑇𝑃𝑅 78% 𝐹𝑃𝑅 50% 𝑅𝐺𝐹 6 
The confusion matrix is given in Table 2-23.  It can be seen from these results the 
CBR performs considerably worse than the human written rules e.g. (Leonard, 1993) 
in Table 2-13, page 67. 
Table 2-23 – CBR FMS confusion matrix results (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000). 
 Classifier  Performance 
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) 
 
74.047 90.467 27.199 22.000 50.000 - - Fraud 48 48  
Gen 128 456  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
77.994 99.986 0.050 22.000 50.000 1,000 1.1m Fraud 550 550  
Gen 1,099,758 3,899,692  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
As can be observed the CBR performance is poor.  The work notes that the method 
is sensitive to the experimental setting of various values of 𝜃.  It suggests that a hybrid 
CBR and neural system may give improved results.  The work concluded that the 
multi-algorithm method is capable of high accuracy but the published results do not 
support this claim.  Recall that to detect 80% of the fraudulent transactions per day 
in 2013 would require 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of over 99.9740%, which is considerably higher 
than the 77.994% reported here.  In the Tier-1 statistics for 2013 the dataset has an 
average 𝑅𝐺𝐹of 4,800 (see B.8, page 545) then based on this work CBR is not likely 
to be a reasonable method. 
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Table 2-24 – Summary of CBR results for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
It will be shown that the FMS provided by vendors (see 2.7, page 154) consistently 
use some form of AI expert system.  It is argued that this indicates sufficient 
reliability and effectiveness of expert systems.  Most commercial FMS integrate a 
selection of methods to help overcome the limitations of each individual method. 
2.5.2 Supervised neural networks 
Supervised neural networks are constructed from a number of simple neurons 
interconnected by connections (synapses) each of which has an associated weight to 
form a network.  Each neuron (processing element) computes its output as a non-
linear function of its weighted inputs.  The entire neural network implements a 
complex non-linear function that is used to solve classification, prediction or 
optimisation problem.  Knowledge in the neural network is encoded and distributed 
throughout this architecture.  The neural network is therefore polythetic where all 
inputs are simultaneously considered to produce an output.  Supervised neural 
networks are a number of real-valued parameters (weights, etc.) with no obvious 
method to determine their meaning as knowledge is represented by the distributed 
weights between the connections and other values adjusted during training.  
Supervised neural networks are trained using a training dataset 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 that contains 
example records 𝐱 in the form of a vector.  Training is an iterative process that 
measures some error between the outputs generated by the neural network and the 
target class 𝒞! required.  This error is then used to adjust parameters in the neural 
network in proportion to the error.  Over a number of iterations the neural network 
should converge upon a set of parameters that minimises the overall error.  Based on 
this learning, the neural network forms a computational model that can then be used 
to process new input data and produce an output.  The ability of a model to 
generalise is important in the detection of fraud vectors so that once trained it is able 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
CBR (Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) 22.00 50.00 50.00 1,000   1,100,308  0.010 39
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to interpret new data in a way that is consistent with the experience gathered during 
training.  Table 2-25 lists the supervised neural network taxonomy here established 
for fraud detection along with the key work describing payment card fraud detection 
methods with published results. 
Table 2-25 – Supervised neural network fraud detection taxonomy. 
Method Date ê  Work  
Local functions 
P-RCE, RBF/PNN 
1990 (Tafti, 1990) 
1994 (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994) 
1996 (Hanagandi et al., 1996), 
MLP 
1997 (Aleskerov et al., 1997) 
1997 (Dorronsoro et al., 1997) 
1997 (Richardson, 1997) 
2007 (Tsung-Nan, 2007) 
(Tafti, 1990) is the earliest work on the use of machine learning explicitly for the 
detection of payment card fraud.  Here the use of software called ‘NeuralWorks 
Professional’, which was an educational software tool for experimenting with a range 
of neural network algorithms that was used at Chase Manhattan Bank.  A real-world 
dataset of 1,000 records was sampled from 100,000 records and used to train a 
neural network.  No details of the results or the neural network architecture are 
given.   
2.5.2.1 Probabilistic-Restricted Coulomb Energy (P-RCE) 
neural network 
The seminal payment card fraud detection methodology paper was published by 
(Ghosh & Reilly, 1994).  This describes a feasibility study undertaken for Mellon 
Bank in the USA to detect payment card fraud using a supervised neural network 
the Probabilistic- Restricted Coulomb Energy (P-RCE) neural network.  This 
algorithm is a local function neural network originally conceived for use in Optical 
Character Recognition (OCR).  This was an early neural network application 
deployed in industry that was used for reading of magnetic ink characters printed on 
cheques (Scofield & Reilly, 1991).  The algorithm considers that a training vector 
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could be viewed as a charged object that are fixed in space at their vector co-
ordinates defined by their field values.  When new data is presented, each charged 
object is considered to ‘move towards a basin of attraction’ under the influence of the 
total electrostatic field created by all the training vectors.  Eventually the vector is 
‘captured’ by one of these basins and assigned a classification.  In (Ghosh & Reilly, 
1994) to be effective the transactional dataset used to train the P-RCE was pre-
processed, such that there are only a small number of examples representing the 
differing fraud types.  The dataset was extracted from the banks authorisation 
settlement file (similar to transaction data) and consisted of 50 data fields that were 
manually combined in some way to produce 20 input features that were grouped 
into four categories of 450,000 transactions so that 𝑅𝐺𝐹 was 30:1.  No details of this 
process are given.  The data was split into a 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and a 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset.  
The 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset was extracted from a period after that of the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and 
was used to validate the P-RCE model once it was trained.  The P-RCE was used 
with a single output neuron that produced a fraud score as a continuous numerical 
value indicating the likelihood of fraud.  The work reported results by setting 𝜃 such 
that 50 accounts would be alerted per day to match the ability of the review team.  
The performance of the P-RCE method was compared with the method taken by 
Mellon Bank at that time using a simple Fraud Report (see A.10.1, page 441) that 
required the review of 750 accounts a day yielding one detected fraud per week.  
The P-RCE generated 50 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 20 fraudulent transactions in those alerts – a 
considerable performance increase over the simple rule-based Fraud Report.  The 
reported results have been re-tabulated into a confusion matrix, on a per day basis, 
given in Table 2-26. 
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Table 2-26 – P-RCE FMS confusion matrix results (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994) 
 
99.820 99.910 40.000 0.090 40.000 3 50 Fraud 1,200 1,800  
Gen 1,800 1,995,200  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
99.897 99.987 8.896 0.090 40.000 4 4,946 Fraud 440 660  
Gen 4,506 4,994,394  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
It was reported that the P-RCE method could detect fraud on either the first or 
second day with an accuracy of 60%.  The P-RCE results are interesting; as if the 𝑃! 
is accepted at this level then this method has a good 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  It is this algorithm that is 
used by two vendors in their FMS products and remains in use today (see 2.7, page 
154). 
2.5.2.2 Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural network 
Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural networks are similar to the local function of the 
P-RCE and is described in detail in (Bishop, 2006b).  The RBF has a three-layer 
feed-forward structure where neurons in one layer are connected to the neurons in 
the preceding layer.  A RBF is a function whose output value depends on the 
distance from a fixed centre that decreases or increases monotonically from this 
centre with distance and is derived from the theory of functional approximation 
(Chui et al., 1993). The RBF is trained in two stages (1) using an unsupervised process 
where the centres of the hidden units are positioned and their widths determined and 
(2) a supervised process to calculate the weights from the hidden layer to the output 
layer. With fraud data having a large number of input fields and high variability this 
method could become impractical without extensive pre-processing of the data.  
(Hanagandi et al., 1996) is reviewed as the general requirement of reducing 
dimensionality in the dataset prior to classification is well motivated.  The work 
outlined a method for generating credit card fraud scores using a dataset of 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 
and 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 examples.  These are converted into orthogonal cardinal component 
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space to reduce the dimensionality of the data.  The precise method is not explained 
but it appears to use Principal Component Analysis (PCA).  The dataset used had 36 
input fields and once the data was pre-processed, five cardinal components were 
chosen to be the input values to a RBF neural network.  A claim is made that: 
“The result obtained by this technique was better than ANN [Artificial Neural Network] 
with back-propagation…however it was not the best of all the modelling methods applied 
to the problem”.  
No results are presented to substantiate this claim.  
2.5.2.3 Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network 
The Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network is able to approximate arbitrary 
functions as a global function and is described in detail in (Bishop, 2006b).  The 
process of approximating the function involves training the MLP using training 
vectors.  A three-layer neural network is typically used.  An early method of training 
an MLP was using a back-propagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al., 1986). This 
method is computationally slow as the weights that are furthest away from the output 
layer do not learn quickly.  There are many different methods that can be used to 
train an MLP that all have the same objective and it is not necessary for this Chapter 
to detail these.  In (Aleskerov et al., 1997) a method called CARDWATCH is 
described using a three-layer feed-forward MLP neural network that was trained 
using back-propagation.  A synthetic 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset was used with 323 transactions 
and 7 fields.  A synthetic validation dataset was created with 112 transactions where 
53 of these were marked as fraud.  The results are given in Table 2-27 where 85% of 
the fraudulent transactions were identified with 13.47% 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  The work claims, 
“The system is easily extensible and able to work directly on a large variety of commercial 
databases”.  Given the uncertainties inherent in the data the precision of the results 
seems to indicate a degree of overfitting to the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and therefore it is 
possible that there will be a poor generalisability of these results with other complex 
and noisy data found in real-world transactional and cardholder datasets.   
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Table 2-27 – CARDWATCH FMS confusion matrix results (Aleskerov et al., 1997). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n (Aleskerov et al., 1997) 
 
85.804 86.525 85.000 13.475 85.000 - - Fraud 45 8  
Gen 8 51  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
86.525 99.996 0.139 13.475 85.000 613 674,516 Fraud 935 165  
Gen 673,581 4,325,319  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
(Dorronsoro et al., 1997) uses a novel training algorithm called ‘Minerva’ in place of 
the back propagation method that is based upon Fisher’s discriminant analysis 
(Fisher & McKusick, 1989).  This novel training algorithm does not seek to minimise 
the overall error during training but to minimise the ratio of the determinants of in-
class and outside-class variances with respect to linear projections of the class target.  
A real-world dataset was provided by the card scheme Visa although no detail of the 
dataset size or number of fields is given.  The results are given in terms of a range of 
threshold values (‘ratings’).  𝜃 is chosen so that 𝑇𝑃𝑅 is 73% and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 is then 14%.  
The work does not give the number of records used in the datasets.  The 
performance has been calculated for 2013 Tier-1 in Table 2-28. 
Table 2-28  – Minerva FMS confusion matrix results (Dorronsoro et al., 1997). 
 Classifier  Performance 
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
85.997 99.993 0.115 14.000 73.000 872.5 700,649 Fraud 803 297  
Gen 699,846 4,998,603  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
In (Richardson, 1997) a probability-based methodology is developed using 
discriminant analysis.  The work notes that the accuracy of any model depends on 
the fields used.  Here the fields from the transaction data are chosen and a series of 
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derived fields are calculated using the original fields.  For example the change 
between consecutive transactions amounts to include knowledge on the prior 
transaction and its relationship to the current transaction and a moving average is 
calculated over a longer period.  61 fields were used for the model.  The work states 
that 5m transactions were used for assessing the method but does not state the 𝑅𝐺𝐹.  
The work notes that the performance of the probability-based classifier is determined 
by setting a 𝜃 value as discussed in 1.5, page 33.  If 𝜃 is chosen as 0.95 then 0.13% of 
the genuine transactions generate alerts (FPR) that capture 61.41% of the fraudulent 
transactions.  The performance has been calculated for 2013 Tier-1 in Table 2-29.  
By selecting the 𝜃 the number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 has been kept at 7,174 but misses almost 
39% of the fraud.  The business can decide to reduce this threshold, which will 
increase the FPR and so the number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 but will also increase the number of 
fraudulent transactions correctly alerted.   
Table 2-29 – Discriminant based FMS confusion matrix results (Richardson, 1997). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
99.862 99.991 9.416 0.130 61.410 6.5 7,174 Fraud 676 424  
Gen 6,499 4,992,401  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
(Tsung-Nan, 2007) used gray incidence analysis and Depster-Shafer theory 
(Dempster, 2008).  The fields from a transactional database were ranked and only 
those with a high ranking are used as inputs to the MLP neural network.  Gray 
incidence analysis transforms a sequence of transactions over time into single-
dimensional space.  Here various different grey sequences were generated and 
Depster-Shafer theory was then used to fuse these together.  The results were a small 
subset of input features.  As with all pre-processing of this nature a subset of variables 
may be the important in that dataset but over time and with a changing 
environment it may be that fields that were removed become more prominent.  This 
area needs further research.  In (Aihua et al., 2007) a real-world dataset from the 
period 2005 to 2006 was used with 40 fields none of which were disclosed due to 
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confidentiality (discussed in A.11.5, page 456).  The dataset has a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 1,429.  
The work compares logistic regression MLP neural network and DT classifiers 
without giving detail as to their structure.  The results state that the neural network 
outperformed the other two methods with the DT being the poorest performance 
but no details are given.  In (Ise et al., 2009) transactional data is treated as a stream 
of data.  The work automatically constructed new derived fields from 53 original 
input fields from real-world dataset that had over 1m transactions a day using time-
oriented information contraction methods similar to that to be described in Figure 
5-56, page 270.  The dataset was marked for fraud/genuine with a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 263.  The 
best features for classification accuracy are chosen from all the generated features by 
a novel stepwise procedure.  Fraud experts manually created additional new derived 
fields.  The results are presented as graphs and show that in nine cases out of ten, the 
existing method was the same or better and so concluded that the selection of 
features had reduced generalisation.  In (Sahin & Duman, 2011a) 13 classification 
methods are compared that include MLP neural network and logistic regression.  A 
real-world dataset of 22m records was used with 978 marked as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 with a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 
of 22,500.  The fields were manually pre-processed by grouping together symbols 
that resulted in 20 input fields.  The work used stratified sampling to under sample 
the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 records rather than the more often used oversampling of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 
records.  The results demonstrated that the neural network classifiers outperform 
those of the linear regression but notes that the performance of all the models 
decreases the more unbalanced the datasets become.  The work used a commercial 
software package called ‘SPSS Clementine’ to generate the results.  The reported 
results have been re-tabulated into a confusion matrix on a per day basis given in 
Table 2-30. 
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Table 2-30 – MLP based FMS confusion matrix results (Sahin & Duman, 2011a). 
 Classified  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n (Sahin & Duman, 2011a) 
 
99.08 100.0 0.444 0.92 92.29 - - Fraud 903 75 
 
Gen 202,400 21,797,600 
 
K
no
w
n 
Tier-1 2013   
99.08 99.99 2.160 0.92 92.29 43 
47
,0
05
 
Fraud 1,015 85  
Gen 45,990 4,952,910  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
Table 2-31 is a summary of supervised neural network methods sorted by rank. 
Table 2-31 – Comparison of neural network methods for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
The supervised neural network methods have favourable performance when 
compared with other methods in this Chapter.  
2.5.3 Unsupervised neural networks  
In general unsupervised neural networks learn the relationship between the input 
fields so as to form clusters where each cluster groups together similar inputs 
(Hartigan, 1975).  Table 2-32 lists the unsupervised neural network taxonomy, here 
established for fraud detection along with the key methods and published results. 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
Neural (Richardson, 1997) 0.13 61.41 38.59 7          7,174         0.240 6
Neural (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994). 0.09 40.00 13.34 4          4,946         0.188 8
Neural (Sahin & Duman, 2011a) 0.92 92.29 7.71 46       47,005       0.140 9
Neural (Brause et al, 1999) 37.60 95.20 37.60 351      240,634      0.040 24
Neural (Aleskerov et al., 1997) 13.47 85.00 15.00 613      674,516      0.031 26
Neural (Dorronsoro et al., 1997) 14.00 73.00 27.00 873      700,649      0.025 31
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Table 2-32 – Unsupervised neural network fraud detection taxonomy. 
Method Date ê  Work  
SOM 
2006 (Zaslavsky & Strizhak, 2006) 
2007 (Quah & Sriganesh, 2007) 
2011 (Ogwueleka, 2011) 
2013 (Olszewski et al., 2013) 
2014 (Olszewski, 2014) 
K-means / KNN 
2012 (Ganji & Mannem, 2012), 
2012 (Amer & Goldstein, 2012) 
2014 (Sivakumar & Balasubramanian, 2014), 
2015 (Kalaimani et al., 2015) 
2015 (Namdev et al.) 
Similar coefficient sum-based 
2009 (Ju & Wang, 2009), 
2010 (Sherly & Nedunchezhian, 2010) 
2014 (Massa & Valverde, 2014) 
Attribute Frequency 2007 (Koufakou et al., 2007) 
Stream Clustering 2008 (Tasoulis et al., 2008) 
Hybrid 
2008 (Juszczak et al., 2008), 
2008 (Weston et al., 2008) 
2012 (Lesot & d’Allonnes, 2012) 
2011 (Elías et al., 2011) 
2014 (Tech, 2014) 
2.5.3.1 Self-Organising Map (SOM) 
The Self-Organising Map (SOM) was created as a biological representation of 
sensory neurons creating maps and is described in detail in (Kohonen, 1984).  The 
SOM organises itself into clusters that represent high-dimensional input data as a 
two-dimensional map while maintaining the topological properties of the input 
space.  The two-dimensional map can be thought of as a regular array of neurons 
that are updated using a repeated heuristic learning algorithm so that a single 
neuron (the Best Matching Unit) is more likely to “fire” for specific patterns of data.  
The SOM is indifferent to the ordering of the input patterns.  It is not 
| Chapter 2 - Literature Review | 
 | 95 |  
straightforward to assess the convergence of a SOM as there is no guarantee of self-
organisation and it is dependent upon the initialisation and setting of parameters.  
The training algorithm uses competitive learning; this is an iterative process that 
adjusts the weights to cause different parts of the network to respond similarly to 
similar input patterns therefore creating clusters.  The process continues until a 
convergence criterion is satisfied.  The size of the topographic map directly 
influences the processing time and the number of iterations it takes to converge.  In 
(Zaslavsky & Strizhak, 2006) and (Quah & Sriganesh, 2007) a method is taken where 
a SOM is used to cluster payment card transaction data.  This research concentrates 
on creating clusters of behaviour where temporal data is encoded by creating derived 
variables such as the total number of transactions on the card that day and over five 
days, the average transaction amount in the same day, over five days, etc.  Once the 
SOM has converged transactions for each cardholder are processed by the SOM 
and the associated BMU recorded.  The SOM is therefore used as an anomaly 
detector that can identify atypical transactions.  For a new transaction, the distance 
from the BMU is calculated and compared to a threshold set for that cardholder’s 
profile.  If the threshold is exceeded the transaction is considered suspicious and 
flagged as potential fraud.  As with the supervised methodology this method trains 
the unsupervised network using collected transactional data off-line and once the 
unsupervised model is trained they are fixed and then updated at certain intervals as 
part of an off-line process.  The unsupervised method has a number of benefits:  
1. It does not require labelled data to train.  
2. It can model each cardholder’s behaviour. 
3. It is a computationally light algorithm.   
(Zaslavsky & Strizhak, 2006) report a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 3.45% with a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 65.75% for a tiny 
dataset containing 100 transactions of which 10 are atypical.  When calculated for 
2013 Tier-1 this would produce over 173k alerts per day and it is therefore 
impractical.  Results in (Quah & Sriganesh, 2007) are again for only 100 transactions 
and were not given in terms that can be analysed for real-world volumes.  In 
(Ogwueleka, 2011) a SOM for each class was used to classify transactions into two 
classes.  Real-world data was used from a Nigerian bank reported with 18,752 
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records containing 7 frauds and so calculating a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 2,700. It is reported that 
95% of the fraud cases are detected with no false alarms that is 𝐹𝑃𝑅 is zero.  This is 
presented on a ROC curve and can be used to calculate the performance of the 
system in real terms.  Given the uncertainties inherent in data the precision of these 
results indicate a large degree of overfitting to the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and it is be 
expected that these results are unlikely to be reproduced with large datasets.  For this 
reason these results are not included in the comparison tables.  The almost perfect 
performance has been calculated for Tier-1 in Table 2-33. 
Table 2-33 – SOM based FMS confusion matrix results (Ogwueleka, 2011). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
K
no
w
n (Ogwueleka, 2011) 
 
99.998 99.998 100.0 0.0 95.0 - - Fraud 7 0  
Gen 0 6  
K
no
w
n Tier-1 2013  
 
99.999 99.999 100.0 0.0 95.0 1 1,045 Fraud 1,045 55  
Gen 0 4,998,900  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
(Olszewski et al., 2013) proposes using a SOM to detect fraudulent 
telecommunications accounts by looking for anomalies in a users account using a 
proposed threshold setting method.  A centroid is placed over the account on the 
SOM two-dimensional map and a dissimilarity measure calculated.  A real-world 
dataset of 100 accounts was used from a Polish telecoms company with a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 9 
and results presented on a ROC chart.  If 𝜃 is set for a TPR of 90% then this 
generates a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 20%.  This performance has been re-calculated for Tier-1 issuer 
in Table 2-34.  As can be observed with such a poor 𝐹𝑃𝑅 this method would 
produce over 1m alerts of genuine transactions.  It is therefore impractical as a 
classifier.  The author continues the work in (Olszewski, 2014) using real-world 
credit card fraud dataset of 10,000 account transaction from the Warsaw region in 
Poland where 100 accounts were marked as fraudulent a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 1,000.  The results 
reported a “perfect” fraud detection rate of 100% with a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 0% and so the 
perfect classifier was produced and the highest possible fraud detection performance 
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was achieved.  This performance may be due to small number of transactions that 
was used, which may represent a single common fraud vector within the city of 
Warsaw over that data and so the pattern could be easily separated from the others.  
This method is unlikely to scale to produce such a perfect classifier with other 
datasets.  Given the uncertainties inherent in large-scale data the precision of these 
results indicate overfitting to the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset.  For this reason these results are 
not included in the comparison tables. 
Table 2-34 – SOM based FMS confusion matrix results (Olszewski et al., 2013). 
 Classifier  Performance  
Fraud Gen  %𝐴𝑐𝑐 %𝑃𝑔 %𝑃𝑓 %𝐹𝑃𝑅 %𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝐴/𝑓 𝐴/𝑑 
D
ec
is
io
n (Olszewski et al., 2013)  
81.0 33.333 98.63 20.0 90.0 - - Fraud 9 1  
Gen 18 72  
D
ec
is
io
n Tier-1 2013   
80.0 99.997 0.099 20.0 90.0 909 1m Fraud 990 110  
Gen 999,780 3,999,120  
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
Table 2-35 is a summary of unsupervised neural network methods used for payment 
card fraud detection excluding (Ogwueleka, 2011) and (Olszewski, 2014).   
Table 2-35 – Comparison of unsupervised neural network methods for fraud 
classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
The SOM method performs poorly in performance compared to other reviewed 
methods. 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
SOM (Zaslavsky & Strizhak, 2006) 3.45 65.75 34.25 157      173,185      0.051 18
SOM (Olszewski et al., 2013) 20.00 90.00 10.00 910      1,000,770  0.026 30
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2.5.4 Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian network is a network of nodes that are connected to form a directed 
acyclic graph.  A detailed description of Bayesian networks is given in (Bishop, 
2006a).  There are no connections that go from any node to a lower numbered node.  
The Bayesian network describes the joint probability distributions over a set of 
arbitrary inputs and the dependence between the variables.  In (Maes et al., 2002) the 
topology of the Bayesian network was created using the STAGE algorithm (Boyan & 
Moore, 1998) which uses a metric that measures the best fit against the complexity of 
the topology.  Results are given for a dataset that is not described with just four fields 
where 68% of the fraudulent transactions are correctly classified and 10% 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  
When re-calculated using Tier-1 issuer volumes 650k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 is generated which is 
considerably worse than the results given in other work.  In (Filippov et al., 2008) 24 
fields of transaction data is first clustered into discrete values 0,1  before being used 
by the Bayesian network.  The Bayesian network topology was created using a 
training algorithm that used the same metric as (Maes et al., 2002).  Since the data 
has been first clustered to calculate the class probability the classifier uses the 
dependence between the clusters that are activated based on the value of the input 
fields.  The 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset was based on real-world data for a single cardholder over 
three months with 83 transactions and 31 of these being marked as fraudulent 
(𝑅𝐺𝐹 2.7).  The results were tested on just 11 transactions, 2 of these were 
fraudulent.  The two fraudulent transactions were given a probability of 0.30 without 
the clustering and 0.65 with the proposed method.  The author notes that the results 
cannot be scaled to the real-world but that states that they indicate that the pre-
processing of the data improves performance.  For this reason, these results are not 
included in the comparison tables.  (Bahnsen et al., 2013) proposes a method that 
uses a Bayesian network to calculate the monetary gains and losses due to the 
detection of fraud.  The work argues that the cost of fraud of a transaction is the 
value of that transaction; this does not take into account costs that have been 
previously discussed.  A European card processing company with 80m transactions 
provided a 2012 real-world dataset each with 27 fields and the 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 4,000.  A 
manual process was used to select attributes that were considered useful and these 
were then used to derive 260 fields that aimed to capture behaviour over time (such 
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as average spend over 30 days).  A subset of this data was used with 750k 
transactions which was adjusted to have a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 214 with total value of the fraud 
transactions of €866,410.  The results are taken from a graph and shown the 
accuracy of fraud detection 80% and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 around 2%.  When re-calculated using 
Tier-1 issuer volumes 101k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 would be generated which is worse than the 
results given in earlier work in for MLP and RBF methods.  The work concentrates 
on the cost of such performance here it is proposed that wrongly predicting a 
fraudulent transaction as legitimate has a significantly different cost than the inverse 
case.  Using this realistic value and based on the results from the paper and assuming 
that fraudulent transactions have the same average value then 100k transactions are 
classified as fraud when they are genuine that results in a review cost of c. $17m for 
these wrongly alerted transactions with a saving of only c. $0.5m from correctly 
identified fraud.   
Table 2-36 is a summary of Bayesian network methods used for payment card fraud 
detection.   
Table 2-36 – Comparison of Bayesian network methods for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
Comparing the results in Table 2-36 with those previously discussed indicates that 
the Bayesian network methods provide no practical improvement in performance 
than other methods. 
2.5.5 Genetic algorithms 
Genetic algorithms are search algorithms based on the mechanics of biological 
natural selection and natural genetics.  A general description of genetic algorithms is 
given in (Holland, 1973) and is described in F.1, page 599.   
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
Bayes (Bahnsen et al., 2013) 2.00 80.00 20.00 92       100,858      0.082 11
Bayes (Maes et al., 2002) 10.00 68.00 32.00 455      500,638      0.029 28
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The process begins with a population of candidate solutions to a problem.  These 
candidates are represented using a variety of encoding schemes equivalent to genetic 
chromosomes typically encoded in the form of a binary string.  Having been 
randomly initialised the performance of each candidate is evaluated using a fitness 
function.  After obtaining the fitness values, the fitter candidates (better solutions) are 
allowed to ‘breed’ while others are ‘killed off’ by a process of selection.  A process of 
mutation augments the reproduction process, where small random changes are 
introduced into members of the population.  Many of the mutants will not perform 
well and will perish.  Some will do well and survive.  Like neural network learning 
algorithms genetic algorithms are used to search for solutions to classification, 
prediction and optimisation problems.  Their main strength lies in their ability to 
find globally optimal solutions to a problem even when the global optimum is hidden 
among many poorer local optima.  The evolutionary process is time-consuming 
requiring large amounts of computing resource.  Another more serious disadvantage 
relates to the expertise required in encoding the candidate solutions and setting the 
fitness function.  This means that the initial development process is highly skilled.   
In (Bentley, 2000) a genetic algorithm is used to find fuzzy logic rules to classify the 
data.  The data consisted 4,000 real-world credit card transactions covering January 
to December in 1995 with 96 fields of which 34 fields were removed as being 
irrelevant.  The 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset consisted 66 records used for cross-validation using 
3-folds to provide meaningful results on how the model might generalise to an 
independent dataset with a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 4.  Each field is first clustered into three sets 𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  and three different types of functions for membership are 
selected 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ .  The membership function 
and its parameters are selected for all input values.  A set of 100 fuzzy logic rules is 
initially randomly generated where each rule consists of a field, a membership 
function and a set, for example: 
IS_LOW(VALUE) ∨ IS_HIGH(MERCHANT) ∧ 
IS_MEDIUM(TIME OF DAY) 
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The logical disjunction and conjunction are both supported along with unary 
function NOT.  The rules are evaluated using the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and four fitness 
measures: 
1. Minimise the number of misclassified transactions (FP, FN). 
2. Maximise the difference between the average scores for correctly classified 
fraud (TP) and the average scores for genuine transactions (TN). 
3. Maximise the sum of scores for correctly classified fraud (TP). 
4. Penalise the length of rules that contain more than four fields.   
A multi-objective genetic algorithm is then used to determine which of the rules will 
survive and then have children.  The child rules are created using crossover and 
mutation and added to the surviving parent rules to create the next generation.  For 
each generation any rules that misclassify transactions in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset by more 
than a fixed percentage are removed.  This process is continued until the overall 
performance of all the rules meets a specific criterion.  The entire process is repeated 
four times and each ruleset produced retained.  In each 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 individual rules are 
assigned a score based on its accuracy.  A total score for each 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 is calculated 
weighting the aggregated accuracy and the final best ruleset selected.  The 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 
dataset had 1,000 genuine transactions and 328 fraudulent transactions (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 3) 
and three experiments were undertaken with different membership functions.  The 
best results detected 100% of the fraudulent transactions with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 5.79%.  The 
results from the work are recalculated using 2013 issue Tier-1 industry volumes to 
give 291k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷, which is worse than the results in earlier work.  The work reports 
that the best ruleset had three rules: 
(field49 ∨ field56) 
IS_LOW(field26 ∨ field15) 
IS_MEDIUM(field56) 
It can be seen that field56 dominates these rules.  Again given the uncertainties 
inherent in real-world data the precision of these results seems to indicate a degree of 
overfitting to the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and it is expected there to be a poor generalisability 
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of these results.  The work notes that the rulesets completely change depending on 
the experimental setup and so the method is not consistent.  The initial random 
selection of transactions for the datasets has a significant impact on the results.  This 
is often a problem with small datasets.  It appears that the genetic algorithm is 
strongly overfitting the problem and creating a 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 that produces the best results 
on the specific dataset but generalises poorly.  The selection of the input fields is 
important as a single strong variable may indicate that there is an error in the 
dataset.  It is rare in the real-world that a single variable is such a single strong 
indicator of fraud. 
(Ozcelik et al., 2010) and (Duman & Ozcelik, 2011) propose a method that uses the 
monetary gains and losses due to the detection of fraud as the fitness measure.  The 
genetic algorithm is similar to that previously discussed except that fuzzy operators 
are not used.  A real-world dataset of 1,050 fraudulent transactions was used but no 
figure is given for the number of genuine transactions.  It was stated that the 
algorithm, “took several weeks to observe a convergence” and so it was necessary to reduce 
the number of genuine transactions.  The best results report that the method had a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 35% higher than the existing solution that is not given with an 89% higher 
saving.  Savings are assumed to be the total value calculated using the proposed 
method over that of the existing solution but no detail is given.  As the results are not 
presented so that they can be compared it is not known if this method presents any 
improvement of other methods already discussed.  (RamaKalyani & UmaDevi, 
2012) and (Patel & Singh, 2013) repeat this work verbatim with nothing new and 
again presents no results that can be used for comparison. 
The Artificial Immune System (AIS) attempts to model certain aspects of what is 
understood as to how biological organisms defend against molecular foreign attack.  
This method to pattern recognition was proposed in (de Castro & Timmis, 2002) 
and contains a general description of AIS.  The biological immune system can 
distinguish between ‘self’ (using antigens) and ‘non-self’ (using antibodies, that is 
between harmful non-self and everything else).  The ability to recognise differences 
in patterns and to identify anomalies makes it a potential useful new method for a 
range of domains.  A key property of AIS is that it does not require training with 
examples of non-self examples to make distinctions and can identify items as non-
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self, which it has never before encountered.  It operates in a generally similar method 
as previously described generic genetic algorithms. 
(Jianyong et al., 2004) first proposed the use of AIS in the detection of payment fraud 
and outlined a method including CBR so that previous transactions that are marked 
as fraud and genuine are used as cases to create self (antigens) cells.  Detector cells 
(antibodies) are created with random or genetic algorithms.  These are initially 
marked as immature and use negative selection those that bind to the self cells are 
eliminated over a specified time before they can be used.  No results are given but 
the following work in this area is based around this original method.  In (Gadi et al., 
2008) a real-world dataset from a large Brazilian bank (issuer) with 41,647 credit 
card transactions from between July 2004 and September 2004 containing 3.74% 
fraud transactions (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 26).  There were originally 33 fields, which were 
manually reduced to 10 fields each of which has a single digit value.  The monetary 
gains and losses due to a classification were used as a fitness measure where the cost 
is a fixed multiple given by Table 2-37.  This differs from the real-world cost matrix 
proposed in Table 2-8. 
Table 2-37 – Cost multiplication matrix used in (Gadi et al., 2008). 
 Classifier 
Fraud Genuine 
K
no
w
n Fraud $0 $10 
Genuine $100 $1 
A commercial software tool was used (Waikato, 2010) which supported an 
implementation of AIS.  The work used a genetic algorithm similar to that 
previously discussed to select a set of values for the parameters likely to be sub-
optimal for each algorithm evaluated using the same sampled 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset and the 
cost as above. The results are presented as the average saving for each method in 
Table 2-38. 
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Table 2-38 – Reported savings using a cost based approach for different methods 
proposed in (Gadi et al., 2008). 
Method Saving é  (‘000 Brazilian Reais) 
Neural Network R$36.33 
Naive Bayes R$30.44 
Bayesian Network R$28.90 
DT R$27.87 
AIS R$23.30 
The proposed AIS method has the least saving to the bank with the neural network 
having the most (a 55% difference).  It is argued that the cost matrix used is naïve as 
previously discussed.  A minimum cost is more realistically proposed in Table 2-8. 
and using this will have a considerable impact on the results.  As the results are not 
given in terms of performance measures the work cannot be usefully compared with 
others.  (Brabazon et al., 2010) use a real-world dataset provided by WebBiz with 21 
fields and 4m transactions from 462,279 unique customers with 5,417 transactions 
marked as fraudulent giving a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 738.  This data was first pre-processed to 
remove any with missing values and to correct errors in the fields, including 
converting network IP addresses to country of origin.  Continuous valued fields were 
all normalised to [0,1].  A randomly sampled subset of 50,000 transactions was taken 
with 209 fraudulent transactions.  Consequently the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset has an RGF of 
238.  Three AIS algorithms were then tested using:  
§ Unmodified Negative Selection Algorithm 
§ Modified Negative Selection Algorithm 
§ Clonal Selection Algorithm.   
The AIS algorithms were implemented using an Euclidean distance where the Value 
Distance Metric (Stanfill & Waltz, 1986) is used to calculate the distance between 
fields that are nominal.  The work finds that the Modified Negative Selection 
Algorithm has the best overall results where 𝐹𝑃𝑅 is 4.06% and 𝑇𝑃𝑅 is 96.55%.  The 
results from the work are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes give 
204k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 due to the high FPR.  The work notes that the results indicate the 
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system is not a workable solution in the current form and suggest a better cost 
function that uses a cost matrix and to use a combination of rules to filter out fraud 
patterns that are evident. 
(Wong et al., 2012) proposes AIS for Credit Card Fraud Detection (AISCCFD) and 
used a real-world dataset of 640,361 total transactions from 21,746 credit cards from 
a major Australian bank.  This data had 164 fraudulent transactions marked (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 3,904).  The AIS algorithm was based on that proposed in (Hofmeyr & 
Forrest, 1999).  The best results (denoted ‘IV’ in the work) indicate that 67.1% of the 
fraudulent transactions were identified with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 3.7%.  The results from the work 
are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes give 186k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 
33% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  (Wong et al., 2012) compares their 
performance to that of Fair Isaac’s Falcon Fraud Manager (see 2.7, page 154) that 
claimed in a case study for a Mexican bank a TPR of 80% with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 0.194%.  If 
these reported figures are correct, the Falcon Fraud Manager generates 10,560 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 20% of the fraudulent transactions missed.   
(Soltani et al., 2012) proposed an AIS method for classification of specific cardholder 
behaviour using real-world data with 12 fields but no information is given on the size 
of the dataset.  The best results indicate 100% of the fraudulent transactions were 
identified for each cardholder with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 as 9.89%.  When recalculated using 2013 
issuer Tier-1 industry volumes 495k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 is calculated with all the fraudulent 
transactions being detected.  Each cardholder only had a small number of 
transactions in the dataset and so the detection of an unusual transaction was made 
relatively trivial, which may explain the 100% detection rate.  It may be that this 
method will not scale to the real-world.  (Hormozi et al., 2013) concentrate on 
implementing the AIS algorithm so that it can be processed in parallel on a cloud-
computing platform.  In doing so it is shown that processing in parallel reduces the 
compute time by at least 25x and this then allows the number of AIS ‘detectors’ to 
be increased and this in turn improves detection rate.  Using the same dataset as 
previously discussed in (Gadi et al., 2008) from a large Brazilian bank the best results 
indicate that 75.28% detection has a 229𝑥𝑇𝑁 false positive rate and recalculating 
using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes gives 190k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 25% of the 
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fraudulent transactions missed.  (Taklikar & Kulkarni, 2015) repeat the method in 
(Gadi et al., 2008) and use a synthetic dataset of  50 transactions with 38 fraudulent 
transactions and 12 genuine transactions with an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 0.32 which does not reflect 
the sparse fraud examples in the real-world.  The results report a fraud detection rate 
of 66% with very poor FPR of 50%.  These results would result in over 2.5m 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
with 34% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  This is little better than generated 
by the “coin-flip” classifier discussed earlier in Table 2-5. 
(Duman et al., 2013), (Duman & Elikucuk, 2013) proposed using a Migrating Bird 
Optimisation (MBO) algorithm.  A model of how birds expend energy when flying in 
a flock inspires this algorithm.  The MBO algorithm is a neighbourhood search 
technique that starts with a number of initial solutions (birds) corresponding to birds 
in a ‘V formation’.  The complete solution is then evaluated.  Only those solutions 
that perform the best are kept.  A new solution is then obtained by swapping bird 
position with its neighbour.  A real-world dataset provided by Denzi Bank in Turkey 
was used with 22m transactions where 978 of these were marked as fraud a sparse 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 22,294.  An average 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 88.91% is reported.  These results are 
recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes to give 302k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 
11% of the fraudulent transactions missed.   
Table 2-39 is a summary of genetic algorithm methods used for payment card fraud 
detection.   
Table 2-39 – Summary of genetic and AIS methods for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
Genetic (Brabazon et al., 2010) 4.06 96.55 3.45 185      204,017      0.069 13
Genetic (Bentley, 2000) 5.79 100.00 0.00 264      290,536      0.060 14
AIS (Hormozi et al., 2013b) 3.79 75.28 24.72 230      190,458      0.055 16
AIS (Duman & Elikucuk, 2013b) 6.02 88.91 11.09 309      301,912      0.052 17
Genetic (Wong et al., 2012) 3.70 67.10 32.90 169      185,697      0.050 19
AIS (Soltani et al., 2012) 9.89 100.00 0.00 450      495,491      0.045 21
AIS (Taklikar & Kulkarni, 2015) 50.00 65.79 34.21 2,273   2,500,174  0.005 42
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Comparing Table 2-39 with those previously discussed broadly indicates that the 
genetic algorithm method is useful but provides no substantial difference in general 
performance than any of the other methods.   
2.5.6 Hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
An HMM is a statistical model based on the parametric probability distribution of 
observable features and are commonly used in temporal pattern recognition domains 
such as speech recognition where time related sequences are important and is 
described in detail in (Bishop, 2006b).  Statistical estimation algorithms are used to 
train HMMs that calculate parameters based on the probability of observing a 
sequence.  Statistical independence of observations and mutually independent 
outputs are assumed.  HMMs do not account for correlation between adjacent 
feature vectors given a state sequence.  In (Srivastava et al., 2008) a HMM is used to 
predict temporal sequences based on individual cardholder transactions.  The work 
does not address the requirement of adding a subsequent new transaction into the 
HMM sequence and it takes an empirical method to setting the sequence length and 
the number of states within the HMM.  In the work transaction data is first 
quantised into a limited set of symbols that are determined using a K-means 
clustering algorithm and three symbols, low,medium, high  are used for the 
amount per transaction.  This research is based on synthetic data and reported a 
good 𝑇𝑃𝑅 while maintaining a low 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  The results are encouraging as the work 
successfully demonstrates the power of using temporal sequences for fraud detection 
for the first time.  The training phase of the HMM was offline and the detection 
phase was on-line.  Computation increases linearly against the number of transaction 
sequences.  The HMM algorithm is computationally complex and may not be 
sufficiently scalable to a deployable solution where a model is trained for each 
cardholder typically 2m-3m cardholders per issuer.  (Chetcuti & Dingli, 2008) first 
group cardholders by their similarity of spending behaviour into a number of 
profiles.  Each profile is then clustered and these clusters are used to represent the 
hidden states of the HMM.  The state transition probabilities are derived by 
counting the number of transactions associated to a particular cluster that are 
followed by transactions from each of the other clusters and the same cluster.  The 
proportion of each count to the total is calculated.  This procedure is applied to each 
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cluster.  A real-world dataset was used but the size is not given.  The best results are 
given as a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 59% with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 8% and 33% where no classification is given.  
While the author notes that this is “a very positive result”, to correctly detect 80% of 
fraudulent transactions per day using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes would 
require an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of over 99.9740%.  These results will give 401k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 – 
worse than previously less complex methods.  (Bhusari & Patil, 2011a; b; Dhok, 
2012; Mishra et al., 2013; Prasad, 2013; Khan et al., 2014) repeat this work using a 
small synthetic dataset and fixed cardholder profiles, which depend on total spending 
value that are either set at fixed values or determined by clustering.  Results state 
that 88% of the transactions are detected as fraud with a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 8% and these 
results can be calculated to compare the method; here 401k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 similar to the 
earlier HMM work in (Chetcuti & Dingli, 2008).  The authors note that the 
technique is useful and that it is scalable for handling large volumes but there is no 
evidence that this is so.  (Patel & Kale, 2012; Vaidya & Mohod, 2012; Mule & 
Kulkarni, 2014; Thosani et al., 2014) again use an HMM per cardholder to estimate 
the value of their next transaction in sequence.  If the actual value of the transaction 
differs by a threshold then the cardholder is required to validate the transaction 
using two-stage verification (discussed in A.13.9, page 489).  No experimental results 
using a dataset are given and so the work cannot be usefully compared.  Table 2-40 
is a summary of HMM methods used for payment card fraud detection.   
Table 2-40 – Comparison of HMM methods for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
Comparing these results in Table 2-40 with other methods discussed position the 
HMM methods generally lower in performance than other simpler methods.  In 
particular, the work has not been tested on large real-world datasets where it is 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
HMM (Bhusari & Patil, 2011a) 8.00 88.00 12.00 414      400,880      0.044 23
HMM (Chetcuti & Dingli, 2008) 8.00 59.00 41.00 364      400,561      0.028 29
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expected that the complexity of the proposed methods will require higher computing 
power than other better performing methods. 
2.5.7 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
SVM is a classifier that was developed from the theory of Structural Risk 
Minimisation – a general description of SVM is given in (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995).  
In a binary classification problem the decision function of SVM is trained by 
maximising the margin of separation between two classes.  The margin of separation 
is measured as the distance between two hyperplanes.  (Chen et al., 2004; Chen et al., 
2005) takes a novel method to the detection of fraud for a newly issued credit card 
where previous transactions do not exist.  Here a self-completion questionnaire is 
given to the new customer to complete of 105-120 questions.  Examples of 
fraudulent transactions are collected (but no detail is given).  In total 12,000 
questionnaires were used to create SVM models for each of the individuals.  A 
software tool called ‘mySVM’ was used to create and train the SVMs.  Only the 
accuracy measure is reported with the best being 84%.  (Whitrow et al., 2009) 
propose a method of aggregating transactional data so that transaction information 
accumulated over time.  A range of classifiers was used to assess the method one of 
these being an SVM using the RBF kernel defined earlier.  A real-world dataset was 
collected from transactions at ATM and POS terminals.  175m transactions 
collected between August 2005 and November 2005 with 76 fields per transaction 
from 16.8m accounts of which 5,946 experienced fraud (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 2,824).  A cost 
matrix is used to evaluate the performance of the classifier where the cost of a fraud 
that is classified as a genuine (𝐹𝑃) is x$100.  A cost of $2 per alert is used (𝐹𝑁 and 𝑇𝑁) and the cost of a correct genuine classification is $0.  Results are only presented 
using total cost – as previously discussed in (Hand et al., 2008).   For this reason the 
work again cannot be compared.  The work does indicate that the SVM has a 
similar performance to the other classifiers and that all the classifiers reduced the cost 
to the bank over that of using no classifier.  This result is reliant on the cost matrix 
chosen and as already argued a more realistic minimum cost is given in Table 2-8 
that will have a considerable impact on the results.  (Dheepa & Dhanapal, 2012) use 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to pre-process the input fields to reduce the 
size of the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset.  A dataset of 576 genuine transactions and 15 fraudulent 
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transactions was used (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 38).  A SVM using the RBF kernel was trained and 
then tested using a 5-fold.  Results for this small dataset are reported as a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 
90% with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 2.5%, which when recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry 
volumes give 126k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 10% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  It is not 
known if a system tested on such a small dataset with an unlikely 𝑅𝐺𝐹 could scale to 
the real-world.  (Wei & Yuan, 2012) use an SVM trained on data from a commercial 
bank’s business database with 2,548 customers, giving 33,236 genuine and 532 
fraudulent transaction records (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 61).  The transaction fields were processed 
so that missing values were replaced with the mean value for that field.  The data 
was then converted into a numerical representation and scaled.  A SVM using the 
RBF kernel was selected and then a range of different SVM were trained using 
different parameter selection values, according to proposed heuristics – called grid 
selection.  These SVMs were trained and evaluated in parallel.  No results are 
presented but the author claims the performance of the best SVM model selected is 
higher than the performance of a rule based and neural network system cited from 
unpublished work. 
Table 2-41 is a summary of SVM methods used for payment card fraud detection.   
Table 2-41 – Summary of SVM method for fraud classification. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
Comparing the results available in Table 2-41 with those previously discussed 
position the one SVM method favourably but with no substantial difference in 
general performance and with an impractical number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷. 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
SVM (Dheepa & Dhanapal, 2012) 2.50 90.00 10.00 115      125,963      0.083 10
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2.5.8 Eccelectic  
There are methods of payment card fraud detection that cannot be categorised into 
the previous ontologies.  These are interesting as each uses an eclectic method with 
the same aim to provide the best separation between the genuine and fraud classes.  
It is not necessary to detail each of these methods as their results are in general 
comparable to those already discussed but are typically more complex in terms of 
implementation.  A summary of key work is given and where possible performance is 
re-calculated to provide comparable measures.  As reported in (Sahin et al., 2012) the 
neural network inference methods generally offer a more robust and accurate 
method for new or unexpected inputs whereas the symbolic inference methods are 
easy to understand and have exiting domain knowledge.  Therefore a method that 
integrates these two methods appears to offer a good hybrid solution. 
(Zhaohao & Finnie, 2004) propose a theoretical foundation for rules used for the 
detection of fraud.  It provides a logical analysis of fraud, which classifies recognition 
of fraud into: 
§ Knowledge-based 
§ Inference-based 
§ Hybrid recognition.   
The work makes use of game theory discussed in (Vatsa et al., 2009), page 67 and a 
set of general logical inference rules are proposed.   
In (Chiu & Tsai, 2004) a method to share fraud patterns among participating issuing 
banks is proposed using a Fraud Patterns Mining Service Centre (FPMSC).  The 
banks are required to adhere to a published standard of data format using the Web 
Services Description Language (WSDL) and to then upload transactions that have 
been investigated and determined to be fraudulent.  The work does not address 
security issues with respect to the data either in the messages or at the FPMSC, 
which will be a key concern to all participants.  A data-mining algorithm is proposed 
that first discretises the field values using k-means clustering on all the transactions.  
The normalised transactions are then grouped together based on their fields and 
then calculating a measure of ‘support’ as the proportion of transactions over all 
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transactions in each cluster.  Where the support does not reach a predetermined 
value then is merged with the next similar group.  These groups can then be 
represented in the form of rules.  While real-world data was provided by a 
commercial bank in Taiwan no results are given in terms of the performance of 
fraud detection.  (Cabral et al., 2006)  group transactions but propose the use of 
rough sets for fraud detection for a Brazilian electrical energy distribution company.  
This extends the work in (Chiu & Tsai, 2004).  Rough sets theory is founded on non-
discernment among data using the concepts of finite sets, cardinality, relationships 
and equivalence classes.  A dataset of 38,551 records of genuine users and 1,944 
users marked as fraud (𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 20) was created after cleaning the original dataset for 
errors and missing records.  Each record contained 12 fields and those that were 
continuous were converted into discrete categories with a finite set of values required 
by the rough set analysis.  Fields are selected by creating a minimal subset that keeps 
the indiscernibility relationships.  It was discussed that a complete discernibility 
matrix was impractically large given the number of fields and records and a sampled 
method was used.  The records are grouped by means of matching records based on 
their field values and then calculating a measure of support as a count similar to the 
method in the previously discussed (Chiu & Tsai, 2004).  Four subsets are created, 
which contain records that are marked as: 
1. 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑. 
2. 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒. 
3. 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 but are also found in (2). 
4. 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 but are also found in (3).   
A method is then used that looks for similar records between (3) and (4) and a 
measure called ‘reason’ is calculated for each of the support values for (4) over the 
support value for (3).  The smaller reason value the more likely it is to be fraud and 
similarly the higher the value the more likely it is to be genuine.  The records are 
ordered by the smallest reason value and a neighbour distinct value calculated for 
each so that the position to separate these a ‘cut’, can be evaluated.  To determine 
this cut a range of sets are created varying this cut and each are evaluated.  The set 
with the highest fraud detection rate and lowest 𝐹𝑃𝑅 was chosen.  The unique 
records in the chosen set can then be represented in the form of rules.  The best 
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results detected just 30% of the fraudulent records correctly with a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 4.1%.  If 
these results can be used to indicate performance in the payment card fraud domain, 
when recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes give results of 205k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 70% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  (Gupta et al., 2012) use 
rough sets to reduce the number of fields from 24 to 6 using an off-the-shelf software 
tool.  The reduced dataset is used to train an MLP neural network.  No details of the 
dataset used are given and only 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is given as 71%.  While the use of rough 
set theory would seem well motivated in reducing the fields required no comparison 
of performance can be made and it is not known how many mis-classifications were 
produced due to the possible loss of information. 
(Kundu et al., 2006) argue that a fraudster is unlikely to be able to replicate the 
spending behaviour of the actual cardholder especially as the criminals try to 
maximise their possible gain within a limited period that they believe they have 
before detection.  A hybrid method is proposed using two detectors: 
1. Anomaly detection as the detection of unusual behaviour by a cardholder 
(more typically called a behavioural model). 
2. Misuse detection models that use previously know patterns of fraud.   
A sequence alignment algorithm is devised to determine similarity of an incoming 
sequence of transactions called the Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST).  
Sequence alignment is a technique used to arrange two or more sequences in order 
to measure their similarity.  It is a generalisation of the longest common subsequence 
problem where the purpose is to find a common subsequence of greatest possible 
length.  A behavioural model is created for each cardholder by storing a list of 
genuine transactions in sequence.  These are used to calculate a match score 𝐺 for a 
new transaction in sequence through a sequence alignment algorithm.  A single 
misuse detection model is created in a similar way using a list of known fraudulent 
transactions and calculating a match score 𝐹.  For each new transaction a total score 
is generated, 𝑆 = 𝐺 − 𝐹.  Synthetic data is generated to evaluate the performance of 
the system.  A range of tests are reported with the best results detecting nearly 80% 
of the fraudulent records correctly with a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of around 18%.  These results are 
recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes calculating a 901k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
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with 20% of the fraudulent transactions missed, due to the high 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  The proposed 
method is complex and it is likely that the use of synthetic data and the random 
variations of individual cardholder behaviour lead to high misclassification of 
genuine transactions.  The research is well motivated and it appears that more 
researchers are turning their attention to the issue of recognising sequences.  It is the 
recognition of a sequence that identifies the individual cardholder and conversely if a 
transaction does not conform to the expected sequence then it may be fraudulent.  
The timing of each transaction within the sequence contains critical information for 
recognising a behavioural profile, for example shopping is normally carried out at 
11am on Saturdays.  Therefore it is argued that both the time between transactions 
and actual normalised time-of-day are important.  (Fang et al., 2007) propose a 
similar sequence-based method using ontology and ontology instance similarity that 
is analogous to the sequence based behavioural model discussed above.  In this 
ontology method transactions are stored as metadata events structured as a graph for 
each cardholder here using a defined Resource Description Framework (RDF).  In 
this ontology instance the leaf node is a node that does not have an output edge so 
that there may be more than one path from the root node to a leaf node.  An 
algorithm is proposed to match a new event with that of the graph.  A trial case using 
computer network login data is presented but it is not known if this will translate into 
the payment card fraud detection domain.  Results are only given in terms of 𝑇𝑃𝑅 
being between 70.6% and 93.2% and so cannot be compared to other work.  
(Kundu et al., 2009) advance their earlier work through proposing a hybrid method 
using two sequence alignment algorithms: (1) BLAST as previously discussed and (2) 
Sequence Search and Alignment by Hashing Algorithm (SSAHA) originally created 
to search large DNA databases (Ning et al., 2001).  The two detectors are used and 
tested on synthetic data.  A range of tests is reported by varying parameters in the 
proposed algorithms.  The results compared to the previous work are given with the 
lowest 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 5% (18%) that detects nearly 70% (80%) of the fraudulent records 
correctly.  The number of misclassifications has substantially reduced over the 
previous work but at the expense of fraud classification accuracy.  These results are 
recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes calculating 251k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 
30% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  (Ramaki et al., 2012) propose another 
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ontology graph method previously discussed in (Fang et al., 2007).  The ontology 
graph is built using a dataset of genuine transactions using three concept descriptors:  
§ Relationship between the classes 
§ Relationships between the transactions 
§ Relationships between (1) and (2).   
An algorithm is proposed to match a new transaction with that of the graph, in terms 
of calculating a distance matrix using the Euclidean distance measure between the 
fields in the new transaction and those in the ontology.  This distance is used as an 
outlier measure and the higher the value the more unusual the transaction.  If this 
value exceeds a fixed 𝜃 then the transaction is considered fraudulent.  A synthetic 
dataset of 5,000 records is used with a reported 89.4% 𝑇𝑃𝑅 and a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 3%.  
These results are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes, to give 
151k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 11% of the fraudulent transactions missed. 
In (Guo & Li, 2008) a synthetic dataset is pre-processed so that a confidence value is 
calculated for each field.  This value is determined applying a PDF on continuous 
fields and a simple probability based on the total frequency of a discrete field.  This 
pre-processed data is then used to train a standard MLP using a (slow) back-
propagation learning algorithm.  The best results are given as 𝐹𝑃𝑅 8% and with 
95% 𝑇𝑃𝑅.  When these results are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry 
volumes they indicate level of 401k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 5% of the fraudulent transactions 
missed.  The performance remains lower that the seminal work in (Ghosh & Reilly, 
1994) previously discussed although it is unclear if this pre-processing method would 
provide improved results on real-world data. 
(Panigrahi et al., 2009) propose a hybrid fraud detection method based on individual 
cardholder transactions that use Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer, 1976) to combine 
the results of each fraud detector into an overall belief (genuine, fraud or suspicious).  
The system has three detector components: 
1. A rule-based system. 
2. An anomaly detector (previously described in 1.5.2, page 38). 
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3. A Bayesian behavioural model (previously described in 2.5.4, page 98) that 
uses historic marked transactions for each individual cardholder. 
These transactions are first processed to calculate the frequency that the payment 
card is used through measuring a transaction gap (time) over successive eight-hour 
time windows.  A posterior probability is calculated on a new transaction using the 
Bayes rule for either genuine or fraud cases and that which has the highest 
probability is chosen as the output.  A Dempster–Shafer Adder (DSA) is used to 
combine evidences from the detector components and compute an overall belief 
value for each transaction.  For each transaction the detector components contribute 
their independent observations about the behaviour of the transaction – see Figure 
2-22.  DSA assumes a Universe of Discourse (Frame of discernment) that is a set of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities.  There are three possibilities: 
1. the hypothesis that the transaction is not fraud. 
2. the hypothesis that the transaction is fraud. 
3. the universe hypothesis that the transaction is suspicious. 
 
Figure 2-22  – Diagram of hybrid FMS method using Dempster–Shafer Adder 
(Panigrahi et al., 2009). 
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A synthetic dataset is generated using a method similar to that in the earlier 
CARDWATCH work (Aleskerov et al., 1997), page 89 with an improved method for 
creating realistic sequences of cardholder transactions.  The best results are given as 
98% of fraudulent transactions correctly classified and 4% misclassified.  These 
results are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes to give 201k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 2% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  The alert per day is four 
times fewer alerts generated than the CARDWATCH method.  It is stated by the 
author that the proposed method exhibits a substantial reduction in false alarms 
without compromising the detection rate. 
(Wen-Fang & Na, 2009) proposes an anomaly detection method based on a distance 
sum according to the infrequency of fraud transactions.  Previous transactions are 
stored and a matrix calculated using a Euclidean distance measure between all the 
fields in all the previous genuine transactions and that of the new one.  The sum of 
the row in the matrix is then a measure of the total distance between the new 
transaction and those marked as genuine.  A 𝜃 is set which if exceeded the new 
transaction is considered suspicious and generates an alarm.  A real-world dataset 
was supplied by a Chinese domestic commercial bank as cardholder transactions.  
There were 15,135 genuine transactions and 1,449 fraudulent transactions a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 
10 with 28 fields.  The data was first normalised using a standardisation method 
based on standard deviation.  The best results are given as 89.4% 𝑇𝑃𝑅.  No other 
measures are given and so again it is impossible to understand the overall 
performance of this method. 
(Krivko, 2010) propose an anomaly detector trained only on genuine transactions.  
These transactions have derived fields added that calculate aggregated statistics over 
various time windows.  Any new transaction that is a set distance from those in the 
anomaly detector is considered to be an outlier and therefore suspicious.  It is noted 
that this method alone would lead to a large number of genuine transactions being 
misclassified, resulting in a poor performance.  To enhance the performance all 
accounts are separated into 10 groups based on a set of different characteristics that 
are manually determined.  For each group a different procedure for modifying the 
data description boundary is then applied.  This filters the output of the anomaly 
detector depending on the pre-determined characteristic of the cardholder.  A real-
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world dataset was used of debit card transactions from an issuing bank.  The dataset 
contained 618,712 debit card accounts with 189m transactions over the period 
October 2007 and April 2008 and each transaction contained 76 fields.  The dataset 
required pre-processing to transform it into a suitable representation for the 
classifier.  The dataset was sampled into sub-samples called ‘A’ and ‘B’.  𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets were created and each dataset had 11,555 accounts of which 1,555 
included a 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 transaction and so a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 7.4.  The 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 transactions are 
different in A and B but the fraudulent accounts remain the same.  The 𝑅𝐺𝐹 in the 
sub-samples do not correspond to the 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of the natural dataset and this is 
corrected by multiplying on the sub-sampled datasets in proportion to the size of the 
whole dataset, as will be described in 5.2.3, page 266.  The best results are poor and 
are reported as 27.6% 𝑇𝑃𝑅 with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 11.4%.  This is a poor performance, which 
the work compares to that performance of the collaborating bank’s existing rule-
based system and notes that the proposed method was capable of identifying 
fraudulent activity in a timely manner resulting in substantial monetary savings.  It 
was described that the majority of the fraudulent cases identified with the proposed 
method were not detected by the bank’s rule-based system.  These results are 
recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes to give 570k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 
72% of the fraudulent transactions missed.   
(Jha et al., 2012) propose a logistic regression, e.g. (Crow, 1960) fraud detector 
trained on transactions where these transactions have additional derived fields added 
that calculate aggregated statistics over a day, a month and three months.  This 
aggregation method is proposed by many works, e.g. (Ise et al., 2009) reviewed on 
page 92.  A dataset from a Hong Kong bank was used with 49,858,600 credit card 
transactions over 13 months from January 2006 transactions generated by 1,167,757 
credit cards.  A logistical regression model was created.  The results are given as 
82.98% 𝑇𝑃𝑅 with 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 4.52%.  These results are recalculated using 2013 issuer 
Tier-1 industry volumes to give 227k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 17% of the fraudulent 
transactions missed.   
(Salazar et al., 2012) proposes a novel method using signal-processing techniques to 
create two fraud detectors:   
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1. A non-Gaussian mixture model, that is a non-Gaussian PDF is created by 
learning from a 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset – similar to that of a neural network. 
2. A discriminant classifier that aims to find the best possible separation 
between the classes by assuming they are normally distributed and creates 
a quadratic hyperplane on the input data.   
The posterior probabilities produced by the two fraud detectors are fused by means 
of ordered statistical digital filters.  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Spain) 
provided a real-world dataset with 3m credit cards and 64m transactions.  A smaller 
subset was sampled corresponding to 10,002,005 transactions, containing 2,005 
known fraudulent transactions from 682 credit cards (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 4,988), which 
reflects real-world sparse datasets.  A range of results is presented by varying the 𝜃 for the classifiers.  The result with the lowest 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 0.2% was chosen which has a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 60%.  These results are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry 
volumes to give a good 11k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 but with 40% of the fraudulent transactions 
missed.   
(Mishra & Dash, 2014) propose a Chebyshev Functional Link neural network 
(CFLANN), which is a single layer neural network in which the input vector, in 
lower dimensional space is expanded to a higher dimensional space by using a set of 
Chebyshev orthogonal functions.  Two datasets were used UCI-A and UCI-G (see 
Table 2-9, page 61) were used to assess the CFLANN method.  These datasets are 
for credit scoring on loans and not fraud detection as stated in the work.  The results 
are compared to an MLP with an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of 86% (89%) on the UCI-A dataset 
and 77% (78.5%) on the UCI-G.  No other measures are given and so it is 
impossible to understand the overall performance of this method except it appears to 
be worse than the reported MLP. 
(Lee, 2013) propose a cardholder behavioural modelling method using a complex 
autoregressive model.  This model learns time based transactions so that the output 
classification depends linearly on its own previous values and on a stochastic term.  
The results are tested on a small dataset of 200 transactions obtained from a public 
source but no information is given on the number of frauds.  The accuracy is given 
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as 80%, which infers that 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 = 160.  As the 𝑅𝐺𝐹 is not known statistics 
cannot be calculated without making an assumption.  If it is assumed that the 𝑅𝐺𝐹 is 
5 then a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 44% and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 12% is calculated.  Despite the complexity of the 
proposed solution these results are poor and would result in over 610k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 on 
2013 issuer data.  This may be a result of the small and possibly poor quality dataset 
used but it is not known.  
(Seeja & Zareapoor, 2014; Zareapoor & Shamsolmoali, 2015) propose a simple 
‘frequent itemset data-mining’ method called FraudMiner where previous 
transactions for a cardholder are separated into the two classes 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .  
For each class transactions are matched based on their fields and then calculating a 
count of all those that are similar as a measure of frequency.  The transaction with 
the highest frequency is then used as a single ‘prototype’ representing the 
cardholders’ behaviour and the other transactions are discarded.  Each cardholder 
then has two prototypes.  This process is repeated for all cardholders.  When a new 
transaction is processed a simple matching algorithm is used which counts the 
number of fields that match in both cardholder prototypes.  A decision is made that 
the transaction is fraudulent if the count for the fraud prototype is greater or equal to 
that for the genuine prototype over a fixed 𝜃.  The FraudMiner is a simplification of 
the method in the previously discussed (Chiu & Tsai, 2004).  A real-world dataset 
from an UCSD-FICO Data mining contest in 2009 is used (FICO, 2009).  This 
dataset of e-commerce transactions was used to detect anomalous e-commerce 
transactions using the proposed method.  The dataset has 100k transactions of 
73,729 customers spanning a period of 98 days with 20 fields.  A 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 20% and 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 80% is reported.  The work states that the 𝑇𝑃𝑅 is a low rate but this is not 
so.  These results are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volumes to give a 
poor 1m 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 20% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  As can be 
observed the majority of these alerts are genuine transactions misclassified as 
fraudulent, which is to be expected with such a simple method. 
(Carminati et al., 2014) proposes a semi-supervised method called ‘BankSealer’ based 
on learning behavioural profiles for individual cardholders and then detecting 
outliers.  Three fraud detectors are proposed each of which generate a score: 
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1. Global profiles are created in a similar method as discussed in (Chiu & Tsai, 
2004) so that historic transactions are grouped into similar clusters.  These 
clusters are then labelled as representing characteristics of spending 
behaviour.  Each cardholder is associated with one of these profiles.  
2. Temporal profiling that uses data aggregated over time for each cardholder 
and calculates the mean and variance of the numeric values to create a 
profile that is used to determine if the new transaction causes the mean and 
variance to change by more than a threshold.  
3. A histogram of each cardholder’s transactions is created and is used to 
compare with a new transaction.   
A large retail bank provided a real world dataset for the period between April and 
June 2013 with 460,264 transactions that were unmarked, that is no frauds were 
known or reported.  Domain experts created frauds based on three fraud scenarios 
using their experience to replicate typical real attacks performed against online 
banking users.  A number of experiments are performed with the best results being 
those where cardholders with less than three transactions were first removed 
reported a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 0.19% and 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 98.26%.  These (Carminati et al., 2014) results 
are recalculated using 2013 issuer Tier-1 industry volume to give 10,579 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 
with 2% of the fraudulent transactions missed.  These are excellent results but may 
be due to the use of human created synthetic fraud cases rather than real-world data.  
It is not known if the performance would remain similar if used with payment card 
datasets.   However previous reviewed anomaly based methods have performed 
poorly due to the high variability of individual cardholder behaviour. 
(Mahmoudi & Duman, 2015) propose a method that uses the Fisher discriminant 
function in a similar method to the Minerva algorithm discussed in (Dorronsoro et 
al., 1997).  This method notes that cost of 𝐹𝑃 is higher than 𝐹𝑁 due to the 
unbalanced dataset having many more genuine transactions than fraud so a 
modified Fisher discriminant function is proposed which makes the standard 
function more sensitive to 𝐹𝑃.  This modification introduces a weighted average into 
the objective.  Unusually this weight is calculated by taking the available amount of 
credit available to the cardholder at the time of a transaction over the average credit 
available to all cardholders.  A retail bank in Turkey provided a small real world 
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dataset of 8,448 genuine transactions and 939 fraudulent transactions (an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 9).  
A number of experiments are performed reporting a 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 8.32% and fraud 
detection accuracy of just 25%.  These results are recalculated using 2013 issuer 
Tier-1 industry volumes to give 416k 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 with 75% of the fraudulent 
transactions missed.  By weighting the objective function the 𝐹𝑃𝑅 is not sufficiently 
reduced and is also at the expense of correctly identifying fraud. 
The key works in eclectic methods to payment fraud detection have been reviewed 
and are summarised in Table 2-42.  
Table 2-42 – Ranked comparison of eclectic methods performance for FMS. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53. 
It can be seen the eclectic methods cover a range of differing classification techniques 
and many propose a hybrid method making use of different multiple classifiers.  
Comparing results of the eclectic methods in Table 2-42 with those previously 
discussed position the methods widely among the body of work.   
2.5.9 Summary 
A review of published methods for payment card fraud detection using 
computational fraud detectors with a focus on those methods that can learn from 
experience has been undertaken and detailed.  From 1993 to 2015, 39 key published 
* Sorted
Descr Work %FPR %TPR %Miss A/F AlertD MCC  Rank ⬇  
Ecc - Rule+Neural (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994)+Rules 40.00 99.91 60.00 1          309            0.427 3
Ecc - semisupervised (Carminati et al., 2014) 0.19 98.00 2.00 10       10,576       0.316 4
Ecc - Non G+Discr (Salazar et al., 2012) 0.20 60.00 40.00 16       10,658       0.192 7
Ecc - Ontology (Ramaki et al., 2012) 3.00 89.40 10.60 153      150,950      0.075 12
Ecc - Agg+Logit (Jha et al., 2012) 4.52 82.98 17.02 249      226,863      0.056 15
Ecc -Conf+MLP Guo & Li, 2008 8.00 95.00 5.00 384      400,957      0.048 20
Ecc - Sequence (Kundu et al., 2009) 5.00 70.00 30.00 326      250,715      0.044 22
Ecc - Sequence (Kundu et al., 2006) 18.00 80.00 20.00 1,024   900,682      0.024 32
Ecc - itemset (Seeja & Zareapoor, 2014) 20.00 80.00 20.00 1,137   1,000,660  0.022 33
Ecc - Rough Sets (Cabral et al., 2006) 4.10 4.10 70.00 622      205,285      0.019 34
Ecc - autoregressive (Lee, 2013) 12.20 44.44 55.56 1,248   610,111      0.015 36
Ecc - Fisher (Mahmoudi & Duman, 2015) 8.32 25.13 74.87 1,506   416,260      0.009 40
Ecc-Anom+Rules (Krivko, 2010) 11.40 27.60 72.40 1,878   570,178      0.008 41
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works have been reviewed on fraud detection methods to detect payment card fraud 
in journals of note.  The scarcity of key research papers may in part be put down to 
the difficulty of obtaining real-world data to assess the algorithms (discussed further 
in A.5, page 397).  Some authors resort to creating their own synthetic datasets. 
Table 2-42 summarises the performance of all methods reviewed in this Chapter and 
includes results from the SOAR extraction algorithm that will be described in 
Chapter 5.  As previously discussed most fraud detection systems require the alerts to 
be reviewed by humans.  Based on 2013 figures for a Tier-1 Issuer and assumptions 
on review team performance (see B.31, page 564) a team of 50 is required to review 
5,000 transactions a day and a team of 100 is required to review 10,000 transactions 
a day.  From Table 2-42 it can be observed that those methods ranked by 𝑀𝐶𝐶 at 
positions 1 to 8 produce a manageable level of alerts below 15,000/day.  Ignoring 
the Chapter 5 results, the earliest published work on payment card fraud detection 
(Ghosh & Reilly, 1994) is ranked as 8 and with the addition of the rule filter it is 
ranked at 3 but it misses 60% of the fraudulent transactions.  (Correia et al., 2015) is 
ranked second highest performance using an agent based method based on human 
created rules where the authors undertook an extensive model fitting exercise to 
optimise predictive accuracy to the dataset.  The other top methods all use machine 
learning to build the fraud classifiers.  Due to the different datasets used in each 
work, variation in the dataset size, fraud scarcity (RGF) and differing fields in the 
datasets, it is difficult to accurately compare and determine the efficacy of the fraud 
detection methods and so caution must be exercised when making conclusions.  
There is one method that performs worse than a random “coin-flip” and it is 
suggested that this can be safely removed.  There is no dominant fraud detection 
method in the top quartile or within the body of work reviewed.  Machine learning 
fraud classifiers offer useful methods of detecting fraud especially when presented 
with new, previously unseen fraud vectors.  Figure 2-23 provides a pychogram that 
visualises the key fraud detection methods reviewed, shown with their date of 
publication.  All those above the plotted horizontal line denote methods that produce 
a manageable level of alerts and are shown with their rank.  Those boxed are 
machine learning methods.  As argued in (Bolton & Hand, 2002) fraud detection 
research typically focuses only on a particular payment card fraud detection 
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subproblem such as creating a model to detect fraud through classification or 
detecting anomalous behaviour.  Each work then abstracts those parts that are 
challenging for that technique such as the temporal aspects of transactions and 
explores these.  The detection of fraud is “nonstationary” that is fraud vectors 
change over time and this will occur rapidly with the pivotal event in payments.  The 
nonstationary nature of the problem is complex as when a detection system is put in 
place, the effectiveness is reduced over time as the fraud vectors are reflexive due to 
the criminals responding to the system to alter their MO.  As a minimum the 
detection classifier needs to be updated rapidly and frequently.  An on-line adaptive 
learning method would be more effective; this is a difficult problem. 
From this review of key published work focused in the domain of the fraud detection 
for payment cards it is established that there are a range of classifiers in the described 
ontology that can detect fraud with a sufficient performance to be useful to the 
payments industry.  Those that are based on machine learning are able to learn from 
datasets without the need for experts to first understand fraud vectors.  As will be 
discussed in 2.7, page 154 the majority of industry FMS solutions include a fraud 
classifier based on machine learning which it is suggested use similar methods to 
those in the reviewed body of work. 
The next section will review methods that can be used to interpret these classifiers 
through knowledge extraction.   
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Table 2-43 – Ranked comparison by MCC for all reviewed methods for FMS. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all 
methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, page 53.  Shading indicates 
results from SOAR in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 2-23  – Psychogram for all reviewed methods for FMS comparing MCC 
performance and year of publication. 
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2.6 Rule Extraction Review 
A review of key published work that is focused on the extraction of knowledge from a 
trained classifier has been undertaken.  Google “Scholar” and the IEEE “Xplore 
Digital Library” were used to search a selection of indexed works using search terms 
including “rule extraction”, “rule inference”, “knowledge extraction”, 
“pedagogical/decompositional rules”, “cognitive computing” and “knowledge 
engineering”.  Literature survey works and general subject descriptive papers and 
books were a useful source of further references but were excluded from the actual 
review.  The included papers are examined with respect to their publication year, 
methods, algorithms assessment criteria, results and implementations.  Out of 351 
papers between 1988 and 2015, 40 key methods have been evaluated from academic 
journals and conference proceedings.   
2.6.1 Measuring extracted rule performance 
A supervised classifier 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  that has been previously created through learning 
from a 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset has knowledge encoded within its internal structure.  This 
knowledge is shown in the wider context of the knowledge domain in Figure 2-24 
modified from (d'Avila Garcez et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 2-24  – The domain of knowledge. 
TRAIN ruleset1DOMAINKNOWLEDGE
GENERALISATION
ruleset1𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!  
| Chapter 2 - Literature Review | 
 | 128 |  
Figure 2-24 with respect to the fraud detection application illustrates: 
§ Domain knowledge: being all that knowledge that is known from time to 
time on fraud vectors and criminal MO with respect to payment cards 
and payment systems in general. 
§ Train: is a set of data examples that may corroborate domain knowledge 
through examples and may include new knowledge that is not yet known. 
§ Generalisation: is the set where the classifier can reasonably infer an 
accurate classification without having to see every example of fraud. 
§ If 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡! 1 were extracted this is sound but not complete.  If 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡! were extracted this is unsound and incomplete. 
Rule extraction methods can be assessed according to six criteria that have been 
adopted in some of the literature, e.g. (Towell & Shavlik, 1993; Taha & Ghosh, 
1997; d'Avila Garcez et al., 2002), etc. and are given in Table 2-44.  If the extracted 
rules represent the generalisation set then this is sound and complete.   
Table 2-44 – General rule extraction algorithm assessment criteria. 
Criteria Details 
1. Soundness and 
support 
Measures of equivalence between the extracted 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 and 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 . 
2. Comprehensibility 
The ability to inspect the learnt knowledge.  The ease 
of human understanding of key relationships and 
features is important.  Many rules may be of a high 
quality but do not aid the explainability of the fraud 
classifier.  The more expressive and compact the rules 
the better. 
3. Translucency 
How easy the rules are to understand in terms of 
relating the inputs to the outputs?  Are the rules 
related to individual concepts or do they express the 
relationships only in terms of the inputs and outputs? 
4. Consistency 
A measure if similar rules are produced on the same 
dataset under from differently trained classifiers. 
5. Method Generality 
How general is the method – is it independent of the 
classifier architecture and datasets? 
6. Method complexity 
How complex is the method and in particular the 
computation time required to perform the extraction 
process? 
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In this thesis an important measure is that of soundness and support which are 
calculated as described in Table 2-45.  (Kryszkiewicz, 2002) defines a ruleset to have 
a lossless representation if all the rules derived through rule extraction from the 
classifier have the exact performance of the classifier.  This is called a sound 
representation.  In this work where the minority P class is sparse there is considerable 
class skew.  A typical measure of soundness in the literature is the equivalent of 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 in Eq. (2-3) where the “known” figures are replaced with that of the 
predicted output from the classifier.  This soundness is a measure of the number of 
correct rule predictions for the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class plus the number of correct rule 
predictions for the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 class as a percentage of all predictions.  As discussed this 
is not a reliable metric, as a simple case where none of the rules correctly classify any 
fraud will give a misleadingly high value.  Therefore in this work support is also 
presented as an improved measure of the accuracy of the rule prediction for just the 
P class that is equivalent to TPR defined in Eq. (2-8).  There is no common measure 
of comprehensibility in the literature save as to typically report the number of rules 
extracted.  This is clearly inadequate as a large number of small rules or a small 
number of very large rules are not equally comprehensive.  Within this work, a 
measure of comprehensibility of the extracted ruleset is proposed as simply being the 
total number of antecedents in the entire ruleset as described in Table 2-45.   
Table 2-45 – Empirical evaluation rule performance measures. 
Measure Description Equation Eq. 
Soundness 
A percentage measure of the 
proportion of examples that 
are predicted in the same 
way by the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the 
classifier.   
!"!!"!!! . 100, where the rules 
are compared to the 
classifier. 
 
(2-25) 
Support 
A percentage measure of the 
proportion of examples that 
are predicted as fraud by the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the classifier.   
!"! . 100, , where the rules 
are compared to the 
classifier. 
 
 
(2-26) 
Comprehensibility 
A measure of ruleset 
comprehensibility.  A 
smaller ruleset with simpler 
rules is easier for human 
understanding.   
#𝑙!!"#$%$&  (2-27) 
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These measures are used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to provide a meaningful 
assessment of the performance of the proposed SOAR extraction algorithm in 
Chapter 3. 
2.6.2 Rule extraction methodologies 
There are two methodologies to opening a black-box fraud detector through rule 
extraction given in Table 2-46. 
Table 2-46 – Main rule extraction methodologies. 
Method Section Description  
1. Decompositional 2.6.3 
Rules are extracted by decomposing the 
architecture and components of the trained 
classifier and therefore this is applicable to 
specific architectures and training algorithms.  
These rules are then combined into a ruleset. 
2. Pedagogical 2.6.4 
Rules are extracted that describe each 
individual input field in terms of their 
relationships to the output classification.  The 
rules are then combined into a ruleset that 
describes the trained classifier as a whole.   
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012b) provides a short literature review of 
techniques used for rule extraction from neural networks over the period 1995 to 
2010.  (Darbari, 2001) is a reasonably exhaustive survey covering the period 1975 to 
2000.  (Duch et al., 2001) provide a review of rule extraction methods and a 
measurable performance comparison between some of these and other methods 
using the public datasets previously detailed . 
The rule extraction methodologies are discussed in the following two sections. 
2.6.3 Decompositional (local) method 
A decomposition method extracts rules by analysing the architecture and 
components of the trained classifier and training algorithms.  Individual rules are 
created through this analysis and are then combined into a ruleset.  Each of these 
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approaches requires a specific type of black-box classifier.  Table 2-47 lists the key 
work describing published decompositional rule extraction methods and results. 
Table 2-47 – Key published decompositional rule extraction methods. 
 Date  Work Description 
1.  1988 (Saito & Nakano, 1988) 
SUBSET – searches all positive input 
combinations 
2.  1991 (Fu, 1991) 
KT – Maps the hidden and output 
neurons 
3.  1992 (Towell, 1991) MofN 
4.  1993 (Ridella et al., 1993) Neural network pruning 
5.  1993 (Craven & Shavlik, 1993) 
Extension to MofN 
6.  1993 (Sestito & Dillon, 1993) BRAINNE 
7.  1994 (Craven & Shavlik, 1994) 
Extension of SUBSET 
8.  1995 (Setiono & Liu, 1995) NeuroRule 
9.  1995 (Thrun, 1995) Validity Interval Analysis (VIA) 
10.  1995 (Huber & Berthold, 1995) 
RecBFN 
11.  1996 (Craven, 1996) MofN thesis 
12.  1996 (Hayward et al., 1996) Stepwise negation 
13.  1996 (Setiono & Liu, 1996) NeuroRule 
14.  1997 (Setiono & Liu, 1997) NeuroLinear 
15.  1997 (Duch et al., 1997) Simplify to logical network 
16.  1997 (Benitez et al., 1997) Fuzzy Rule based 
17.  1998 (Duch et al., 1998) FSM2LN – Feature Space Mapping 
18.  1998 (Kasabov et al., 1998) 5-layer “fuzzy” neural network 
19.  1999 (Setiono & Leow, 1999). 
Extraction into DT 
20.  1999 (McGarry et al., 1999) LREX (Local Rule Extraction). 
21.  1999 (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) PARTIAL-RE and FULL-RE 
22.  2000 (Duch et al., 2000) C-MLP2LN 
23.  2000 (Wall & Cunningham, 2000) 
Ensembles of neural networks 
24.  2000 (Jin et al., 2000) RBF weight sharing 
25.  2000 (Bahler et al., 2000) MofN case study 
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 Date  Work Description 
26.  2001 (d'Avila Garcez et al., 2001) 
Complete and sound algorithm 
27.  2001 (Bologna, 2001).   
DIMLP (Discretised Interpretable 
MLP) 
28.  2003 (Baesens et al., 2003) MofN case study 
29.   2004 (Setiono & Thong, 2004) 
Requires hyperbolic tangent function 
Each of these twenty-nine decompositional rule extraction methods is next 
described. 
In (Saito & Nakano, 1988) a method of rule extraction is described that analyses the 
weights on each connection on each neuron in the MLP neural network and is called 
the SUBSET method.  It examines every possible combination of positive input 
weights that will cause that neuron to become active or not, that is it exceeds the bias 
of that neuron.  With each of these subsets of positively weighted connections a 
search is then undertaken for combinations within the sub-set and on negatively 
weighted links that still cause the neuron to be active.  It then produces a rule for 
each of these combinations, for example 
If p AND NOT n THEN fraud… 
There is a combinatorial problem as the number of connections to each neuron 
grows.  In (Craven & Shavlik, 1994) this SUBSET method was again used but 
remained computationally impractical for anything other than small problems.  
Since it assumes that neurons tend to be either highly active or inactive the 
algorithm searches for minimal sets of antecedent neurons that when maximally 
active cause the connected neuron to become maximally active to a fixed number of 
combinations of inputs.  By arbitrarily limiting the combinations that are searched, 
important rules may be easily ignored leading to a lack of soundness in the method. 
The KT algorithm was proposed by (Fu, 1991) and maps the hidden and output 
neurons into a function: 
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IF output ≤ threshold1 THEN genuine 
IF threshold2 ≤	output THEN fraud 
where threshold1 < threshold2 
Following the earlier SUBSET method it was noticed that many of the rules 
generated could be expressed in a general form: 
If (M of the following N antecedents are true) 
If N=M then the rule is conjunctive that is all the antecedents must be true.  If M=1 
then the rule is disjunctive so that any of them can be true to activate the rule. 
In (Towell, 1991) the MofN algorithm is developed to extract rules from a MLP 
neural network.  The MofN algorithm has five steps given in Table 2-48. 
Table 2-48 – MofN rule extraction algorithm steps. 
 Step Description 
1 Averaging 
Set weights of all group members to the average of the 
group so as to cluster the input connections into groups. 
2 Eliminating 
Remove any groups that do not significantly affect if the 
neuron will be active or inactive. 
3 Optimising 
Hold all weights constant then optimise the biases of all 
hidden and output neurons using the back-propagation 
algorithm. 
4 Extracting 
Form a single rule for each hidden and output unit.  The 
rule consists a threshold given by the bias and the weight. 
5 Simplifying 
Where possible simplify the rules to eliminate superfluous 
weights and thresholds. 
The key to this method is the creation of groups of input connections on a neuron, 
which are found by clustering similar weight values.  This allows the group to be 
considered as a whole rather than having to process all the combinations of the 
individual links.  Once groups are found any that can never affect the connected 
neuron or have no effect for the training data examples are removed.  This reduces 
the search space.  Although the effectiveness of pruning after training is limited an 
improved method would be to undertake the process during training so that the 
remaining weights can adjust to the removal of the weak weights.  The MofN rule 
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extraction method assumes that the hidden and output neurons can be 
approximated using a step function so that they can be described as being either 
“on” (activation is 1) or “off” (activation is 0).  Given this assumption each individual 
hidden and output neuron can be described in a set of rules based on their weighted 
connections.  If a group of input connections summed weight exceeds the bias 
regardless of the activation carried by other connections then a rule can be created 
from that group.  The individual rules can then be combined into a single ruleset 
that describe the neural network as a whole.  When the activations of each neuron 
are limited to [0, 1] then the relationship between any input connection and the 
output of the neuron is monotonic.  This considerably simplifies the search space as 
if the sign of an input connection is positive it can only move the neuron’s output 
towards 1.  Conversely if the sign of an input connection is negative it can only move 
the neuron’s output away from 1.  Therefore to extract a rule to explain when the 
neuron has an activation of 1: 
§ Only positive literals for input connections that are positive need be 
considered, 
§ Only negative literals for input connections that are negative need be 
considered. 
The MofN method therefore represents each hidden neuron as a set of rules.  This 
means that an assumption is made about how each hidden neuron represents a 
single “concept” rather than this being encoded across many neurons.  If this is not 
so then the generated rules will be difficult to understand.  The MofN algorithm was 
developed to extract rules from a specialised MLP neural network.  The neural 
network known as a Knowledge-Based Network (KBANN) had its weights initially 
specified by inducing them from a set of symbolic rules, such as inserting symbolic 
rules into a neural network.  A more general MLP network starts from a set of 
randomised weights and is trained from examples.  The reliance of the MofN 
algorithm on the initial setting of weights means that it may not perform well on the 
more general MLP network.  Although the work notes that experimental results with 
a MLP neural network trained using back-propagation did appear to cluster, there is 
no reason why this should be so.  The work states that the assumptions made are 
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“not particularly restrictive”.  Example MofN rules are given in Table 2-49 extracted 
from a neural network trained on a dataset of fraud examples from the Real-E 
dataset described in Chapter 5 and as can been seen the rules are difficult to 
understand.  As positive antecedents are needed to extract rules from a standard 
MLP neural network the MofN algorithm has been updated and this has contributed 
to the increased complexity of the rules.  The extracted rules are now not sufficiently 
comprehensible.  This is likely due to the assumed natural clustering of similar 
weights on a single neuron is not true in practice and that each hidden neuron does 
not represent a single recognisable “concept”.  The hidden layer rules therefore 
become more specialised and difficult to understand. 
Table 2-49 – Example MofN rules. 
HIDDEN#1 : 
 NOT IP1 AND IP2 AND NOT IP3 AND NOT IP5 AND NOT IP9 
 NOT IP1 AND NOT IP2 AND NOT IP3 AND IP5 AND NOT IP9 
 NOT IP1 AND IP2 AND NOT IP3 AND IP5 AND NOT IP9 
 NOT IP1 AND IP2 AND IP3 AND IP5 AND NOT IP9 
 NOT IP1 AND IP2 AND NOT IP3 AND IP5 AND IP9 
 
HIDDEN#2 : 
 IP1 AND NOT IP2 AND NOT IP3 
 
HIDDEN#5 : 
 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND NOT IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND NOT IP5 AND 
NOT IP6 
 NOT 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND NOT IP5 AND 
NOT IP6 
 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND NOT IP5 AND NOT 
IP6 
 NOT 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND NOT IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND IP5 AND 
NOT IP6 
 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND NOT IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND IP5 AND NOT 
IP6 
 NOT 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND IP5 AND NOT 
IP6 
 1 of [IP1,IP2] AND IP3 AND NOT IP4 AND IP5 AND NOT IP6 
 
OUTPUT#1 : 
 NOT 1 of [HIDDEN#1,HIDDEN#2] AND HIDDEN#5 
In (Ridella et al., 1993) a method of pruning a neural network is described to simplify 
rule extraction.  Pruning removes connections and whole neurons if all connections 
to it are removed to create a slimmer neural network that still models the training 
data with the sufficient accuracy.  The idea of pruning during learning is to simplify 
the representation of the learnt knowledge prior to rule extraction with the aim of 
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generating a smaller and more understandable set of rules.  The pruning process 
requires a re-training of the slimmer neural network.  The paper does not mention 
the possible reduction of generalisation that pruning will cause which is an important 
aspect when applied to datasets such as fraud that will not hold all the possible 
patterns but still a classification on unseen data is required.  The work uses a rule 
extraction method that requires the original 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset.  This dataset is used as 
the input to now slimmer neural network.  The algorithm is recursive and stops 
when the composition of each group satisfies a condition.  Such a method is 
dependent upon the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and may therefore fail to represent the 
generalisation within the neural network.  
(Craven & Shavlik, 1993) extend the MofN method to overcome the requirement for 
the weights to be set by rule insertion.  This allows a MLP neural network to be 
trained and the MofN algorithm then applied.  The paper modifies the training 
algorithm such that the weights are encouraged to form natural clusters during 
training using Soft Weight Sharing originally proposed by (Nowlan & Hinton, 1992) 
to help with generalisation.  The results demonstrated that small sets of rules could 
be extracted from a general MLP neural network.  Interestingly the later Craven 
thesis (Craven, 1996) presents an empirical evaluation of the use of this modification, 
which shows that the method made little effect on the accuracy of the extracted 
rules.  It did make a significant reduction on the number of literals in the rules.  This 
is one of the main criteria for the rules extracted from fraud data and therefore 
shows promise as a useful enhancement. 
(Sestito & Dillon, 1993) propose an algorithm called BRAINNE that extracts rules 
from an MLP using back propagation training and does not require discretisation of 
the input fields.  The method changes the architecture of the MLP neural network so 
that the original neural network now has the output as an additional input.  This is 
then retrained.  Once trained the method compares the weights for the connections 
between the inputs and their corresponding hidden units with those between the new 
input and its corresponding hidden units.  The smallest difference between these two 
values indicates the largest contribution of the original input to output and can be 
used to generate a rule. 
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(Setiono & Liu, 1995) use a modified back-propagation algorithm so that bigger 
weights represent more important connections.  A weight-decay method is proposed.  
The lower valued weights are then be pruned, while maintaining accuracy and 
finally rules extracted by discretising the hidden neuron activation values, using 
clustering in a similar way to step 1 in the MofN algorithm.  The rule extraction 
algorithm extracts rules from the hidden-layer to the output-layer and from the 
input-layer to the hidden-layer and then merges the rules from these two steps.  The 
method relies on the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset for the rule extraction.  There is no experiment 
for the generalisation of the neural network post pruning and the extracted rules 
from the neural network can be difficult to understand in neural networks with more 
than a small number of connections.  In (Setiono & Liu, 1996) this method was 
called NeuroRule but there was little new in this paper.  It still relied upon a large 
number of constants that needed to be manually set for the weight decay and cross 
entropy functions within the back-propagation algorithm.  These constants are 
manually set by trial-and-error by the authors.  (Baesens et al., 2003) described a case 
study that was applied to a real-world problem of credit-risk analysis.  The results 
were excellent where NeuroRule produced a ruleset that was more accurate than a 
DT and had four rules although no information is provided on the antecedents.   
In (Huber & Berthold, 1995)  local function networks such as the previously 
described are directly decompiled into rules.  Local function networks typically map 
an output to a single area of the input space, represented by a single hidden neuron.  
These can be thought of as representing prototypes of similar data.  To extract rules 
a minimum and maximum value can be determined that cause a hidden layer to be 
active.  These values can then be simply expressed as a Boolean rule.  The extraction 
of rules is trivial since each hidden neuron represents one rule described by its 
parameters.  Often the RBF is implemented using a non-linear function (Φ) that is 
combined to cover a radial area and once combined they create secondary ridges 
that extend to infinity that must be cut off.  The Rectangular Basis Function 
(RecBFN) a hyper rectangle is formed in the feature space.  Although a promising 
method in terms of simplicity of rule extraction the network had problems in 
classifying datasets with a large number of input fields.  The training algorithm has a 
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dependency on the order of these parameters that may make it inappropriate for 
large real-world problems. 
(Hayward et al., 1996) proposed RuleNeg, which requires a simplification of the 
MLP that allows a classification to be made using stepwise negation.  A rule 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝟏 is 
created from 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛!.  This is tested against 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 and if not already covered then 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒! is negated where each field 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒′! = 𝑥′!!, 𝑥′!!, 𝑥′!!… 𝑥′!!  to create a new rule.  
If the class of 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒′! is not the same as 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒! the fields of 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛! are added to 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!.  
This is a simplification of MofN (Craven, 1996). 
(Duch et al., 1997) propose a method called MLP2LN that transforms a specially 
trained MLP neural network into a logical network (LN).  The back-propagation 
training algorithm is first changed so that constraints are gradually imposed by (1) 
increasing the slope of sigmoidal functions to obtain crisp decision regions, (2) 
simplifying the neural network structure by inducing weight decay through a penalty 
term and (3) forcing integer weight values such that 0 is irrelevant input, +1 = 
positive influence and -1 = negative influence.  Once the MLP is trained rules can be 
extracted by simply considering the contributions of each field 𝑥! in the input 𝐱 so 
that the contribution to the activation is the dot product 𝑥! .w!, where 𝐰 is the 
weight vector corresponding to 𝑥!.  The input fields that activate the hidden neuron 
above a threshold then form a rule in the form 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 = 𝑥! ∧¬ 𝑥! ∧…∧  𝑥! .   
Three datasets were used to assess the proposed method, from Table 2-9:  
(1) UCI-I:  There were 3 extracted rules that had an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of 98%. 
(2) UCI-M: There were 4 rules extracted with 99.90% 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦. 
(3)  ‘MONK’s Problems’:  This dataset has 432 records and 7 fields.  This 
dataset has three separate problems to solve all of which extracted rules that 
had a 100% 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 and the following 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠: (Monk-1), 4 rules, 
(Monk-2) 16 rules and for (Monk-3), 3 rules.   
(Duch et al., 1998) expand this work by proposing a method called FSM2LN that use 
a Feature Space Mapping (FSM) density estimation constructive network in place of 
the previously used MLP.  After training each neuron has class label and represents a 
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cuboid in relevant dimensions of the input subspace, which is easily converted into 
logical conditions for a given class.  No results are given for the new method. 
In (Setiono & Liu, 1997) NeuroLinear is proposed to allow both discrete and 
continuous input fields which is an important factor when dealing with real-world 
datasets.  This is the same as (Liu & Setiono, 1995) except that the hidden-layer 
activation values are discretised using the Chi-squared algorithm.  The algorithm 
makes no assumption on the weights or type of activation functions used in each 
neuron.  NeuroLinear may produce more compact rules than the MofN method but 
this depends upon the number of decision boundaries within the fraud dataset.  The 
algorithm is computationally expensive compared to other methods.  (Setiono & Liu, 
1997) propose a method to prune larger neural networks such that new sub-networks 
are created.  It is argued that the rules found in smaller sub-networks are easier to 
understand and that the training is faster as unneeded inputs in each sub-network 
can be removed and trained independently; the method is recursive, more sub-
networks are automatically created.  The same method as in (Liu & Setiono, 1995) is 
used but rules are extracted from each sub-network so that hierarchical rules are 
generated.  The generation of sub-networks can be compared to (d'Avila Garcez et 
al., 2001) where a sound and complete pedagogical method is proved.  (Setiono et al., 
1998) provide a case study for NeuroLinear that was applied to a real-world problem 
of identifying organisations adopting IT.  The rules extracted were shown to achieve 
higher predictive accuracy than a conventional analysis of the same data.  
(Benitez et al., 1997) provides a proof that neural networks are equivalent to a fuzzy 
rule-based system and that both are universal approximators.  Fuzzy rules map n-
dimensional spaces into m-dimensional spaces and are composed of four parts: (1) 
fuzzifier converts real valued inputs into fuzzy values typically linguistic terms such 
as ‘high’, ‘low’, (2) knowledge base that includes all the fuzzy rules in a similar form 
to that described in 1.6 except that fuzzy values are compared using membership 
functions, (3) Inference engine calculates fuzzy output from fuzzy inputs by applying 
a fuzzy implication function and (4) Defuzzifier that converts the fuzzy output to a 
real-value output value.  A trivial constructive proof is given that demonstrates that a 
fuzzy rule-based system can be created to be exactly the same function as the neural 
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network and not approximated.  With this proof it is concluded that (1) there can be 
a method devised to express any neural network in terms of a fuzzy rule-based 
system and therefore, a means for them to be transparent to humans and (2) using a 
neural network there is a mean to acquire knowledge through learning that can then 
be added to a fuzzy rule-based system.  The work proposes a method of extracting 
fuzzy-rules in terms of decomposition of the neural network through its weights and 
bias value using a new fuzzy operator that more naturally represents the activation 
functions in the neural network. 
In (Kasabov et al., 1998) a 5-layer “fuzzy” neural network that uses modified back-
propagation algorithm is proposed.  This relies on the MLP being altered to perform 
logical functions so that only the linear part of the sigmoid activation function is used 
so that larger weights are encouraged.  While a number of claims are made for this 
complicated method and no details are given or results are presented. 
(Setiono & Leow, 1999) propose a method of extracting a DT from a neural network 
so that their inherent intolerance to noise could be overcome.  This is interesting as it 
combines the AI method with that of neural networks.  The paper notes that a DT 
extracted from a neural network is often smaller and simpler than other DT 
algorithms. 
(McGarry et al., 1999) use an RBF with a sigmoidal function and a new method is 
proposed called LREX (Local Rule Extraction).  This method uses two rule 
extraction algorithms: 
1. mREX extracts propositional rules as previously described, where it is 
assumed that a hidden neuron uniquely represents a specific output class.  
The hidden units of an RBF tend to be shared across output classes or may 
not contribute at all on non-linear or complex data.   
2. hREX is proposed that first quantises the weights and then the hidden 
neuron activation levels such that any below a defined threshold value do not 
participate in the rule extraction.  A rule can then be created that consists of 
one or more hidden neurons that must be active for the class to be active.   
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There is an upper limit on the rules extracted for each class that enables a trade-off 
between comprehensibility and soundness/support.  The local functions suffer from 
poor accuracy with certain types of data and they are especially sensitive to inputs 
that are non-discriminatory.  This leads to substantial overlap of the hidden neurons.  
Further work is required on this overlap, perhaps by using other Gaussian like radial 
functions.  The method does not look to be sufficiently robust for real-world fraud 
type data.   
(Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) propose three rule extraction methods two of which are 
decompositional and are reviewed here.  Each rule extraction method was tested 
using public datasets UCI-I and UCI-B described in Table 2-9.  The proposed rule 
extraction methods are: (1) Partial-RE method was proposed to address the 
combinatorial problem of BIO-RE and does not require the input fields to be binary.  
For each hidden neuron and output neuron the weights were sorted in descending 
order, creating two sets of positive only values and negative only values.  Starting 
with the highest positive weight a search is made of single synapses that will cause the 
neuron to be active regardless of the value of any other synapses in the same way as 
in the earlier (Towell, 1991).  For each single synapse that this is so a rule is 
generated using the activation value of the neuron as the threshold value for the 
input synapse in the rule.  This search is repeated but looking for combinations of 2 
synapses that will cause the neuron to be active.  This is repeated for all 
combinations or until a terminating criterion is reached.  The entire process is then 
repeated for the negative values such that the synapse must be inactive to allow a 
neuron to be active so as to create a ‘NOT’ rule.  Once both processes are complete 
the rules need to be re-formatted so that they represent the input fields.  A method 
where any rule that refers to a hidden layer neuron is replaced by a conjunction of 
corresponding input fields that causes it to be active.  With dataset UCI-I 5 rules 
were extracted with an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of 78.67% and with UCI-B 9 rules were extracted 
with an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of 96.49%.  (3) Full-RE is proposed that require the neural 
network to have monotonically increasing activation function and can work with any 
type of input field.  The method is similar to Partial-RE except that partial rules are 
now created for each hidden neuron taking into account their entire input vector 
and weight vector.  Input values are discretised using Chi-squared test from (Liu & 
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Setiono, 1995) into intervals.  The rule is tested with the discretised values and the 
minimum or maximum values are chosen dependent on the sign of the synapse.  
Linear programming is then used to find a rule that satisfies all constraints through 
this method.  Rules are extracted from the hidden layer to the output using the same 
method as described for Partial-RE.  With dataset (a) 3 rules were extracted with an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 of 97.33% and with dataset (b) 5 rules were extracted with an 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
of 96.19%. 
(Duch et al., 2000) proposed the C-MLP2LN model.  This method starts with a 
standard MLP using a sigmoidal function and gradually reduces the slope during 
training.  The earlier thesis (Towell, 1991), highlighted the problem of training a 
neural network with a sharp-slope and suggests that it “must be done cautiously”.  A 
steep sigmoidal-function only has non-zero gradients in small regions of the feature 
space and it is therefore possible that the number of input examples contributing to 
the learning process goes to zero.  This method therefore may be applicable to the 
earlier MofN work.  A regularisation is proposed for the error function in the back-
propagation algorithm.  The method allows for both discrete and continuous valued 
inputs.  Back-propagation is applied to a single neuron at a time for a single class 
using regularisation and if the error rate stalls then an additional neuron is added.  
The weights and bias can then be analysed by checking the combinations of features 
that activate the first neuron(s).  Once rules are extracted a complex optimisation 
procedure is carried out on the rules independent of the neural network that allow 
rules to produce probabilities of class membership.  This optimisation may be slow 
for large sets of rules as it is based upon a gradient search method. 
A method using multiple networks was proposed in (Wall & Cunningham, 2000) as a 
positional idea suggesting that since ensembles of neural networks have been shown 
to outperform a single neural network in terms of accuracy, that rule extraction from 
such networks is a key research issue. The paper highlights a research question as 
being how to combine the rulesets from individual neural networks, especially when 
some of the rules may conflict.  The paper is included in this review as it provides a 
good examination of other rule extraction techniques with a list of key issues in the 
area.  
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RBF Fuzzy (Jin et al., 2000) uses a RBF neural network with a weight sharing similar 
in concept to Soft Weight Sharing discussed earlier.  It is then used to extract rules in 
the form of a set of fuzzy rules as in Table 2-50.  Depending upon the membership 
functions the extracted rules have the potential to have high comprehensibility.  The 
paper does not address the previously discussed limitations of local functions. 
Table 2-50  – Example RBF fuzzy rules (Jin et al., 2000). 
If type-of-terminal=POS AND CVV=NO AND amount is 
LARGE AND institution-id is SME AND Type QUITE 
NORMAL THEN Fraud 
 
If institution-id<=K AND Type NORMAL AND Amount  
QUITE SMALL THEN Genuine 
In (Bahler et al., 2000) the MofN method was applied to a real-world problem of 
predicting carcinogenicity of chemical compounds where it yielded a tractable sized 
set of rules that had substantial explanatory power.  These were compared with DT 
and a Bayesian Classifier and found to be excellent. 
(d'Avila Garcez et al., 2001) propose an extraction algorithm that is both sound and 
complete by applying an ordering on the input data.  The method is not dependent 
upon the architecture of the neural network although it does assume only one hidden 
layer nor does it have any (re-) training requirements. 
An unusual four layer MLP is proposed in the DIMLP (Discretised Interpretable 
MLP) method (Bologna, 2001).  Each neuron in the input layer is connected to one 
equivalent neuron in the first hidden layer that uses a “staircase” activation function 
with the rest of the layers connected as a standard sigmoid MLP.  The idea is that 
hyper rectangles are better defined which easily define symbolic rules as the staircase 
function provides precise localisation of discriminant hyper-planes.  The number of 
stairs corresponds to the number of hyperplanes.  To extract rules the algorithm 
checks where a hyper-plane is effective or not for a given region of input space.  This 
gives the relevance of each and a DT is then built starting at the highest number of 
points that is the hyperplane transition to another class.  This has the potential to 
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generate a large tree and therefore a pruning method is then applied.  When the 
method is compared to C4.5 algorithm the model is more accurate but the number 
of rules generated is equal to or considerably larger in many cases.  The work shows 
promise with perhaps the pruning methods suggested by other work being applied it 
may outperform.   
In (Setiono & Thong, 2004) rules are created that relate the input fields to a 
continuously valued output.  A standard 3-layer MLP is used with the hyperbolic 
tangent function.  This is selected as it can be approximated by a 3-piece linear 
function, prior to the rule extraction.  Converting the hyperbolic tangent requires 
finding the threshold, the slope and the intersection of three line segments of a piece-
wise linear function.  Once this is completed using each training sample to produce 
the neural networks output at that point generates a 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡.  The un-simplified 
rules are in a difficult to read format but a simplification process can be applied to 
remove the weights from the rule conditions.   
2.6.3.1 Summary 
The key works in decompositional rule extraction methods have been reviewed.  
Earlier in Table 1-1 the general desiderata for a payment card fraud management 
system are listed with the features of the AI techniques previously described in 2.4, 
page 62.  It is for this reason that they are widely used as fraud detectors.  All vendor 
FMS solutions include a form of machine learning (see 2.7, page 154).  Since there 
are FMS vendor systems deployed throughout the payments industry new methods 
need to impose as few assumptions and requirements on the deployed classifiers.   It 
is for this reason that the decompositional methods for symbolic rule extraction are 
found to be unsuitable.  
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2.6.4 Pedagogical (global) method 
A pedagogical method is where a set of global rules are extracted to describe each 
individual input field in terms of their relationships to the output classification – here 
fraud.  The architecture of the classifier need not be known.  The rules for the 
individual fields are combined into a ruleset that describes the classifier as a whole.  
Pedagogical methods can guarantee that the ruleset extracted is both sound and 
complete but only if all possible combinations of values of the input fields are taken 
into account.  Table 2-51 lists eleven key methods describing published pedagogical 
rule extraction methods and any results.  
Table 2-51 – Key published pedagogical rule extraction methods. 
 Dateê  Work Description 
1.  1994 (Craven & Shavlik, 1994) TREPAN 
2.  1995 (Thrun, 1995) 
VIA – Validity Interval 
Analysis 
3.  1996 (Filer et al., 1996) IA – Interval Analysis 
4.  1999 (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) BIO-RE 
5.  2000 (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) STARE – discrete literal search 
6.  2000 (Lazar & Sethi, 2000) Decision table 
7.  2002 (Nunez et al., 2002) SVM classifier using K-means 
8.  2004 (Barakat & Diederich, 2004b) 
SVM classifier as oracle to 
create a DT 
9.  2009 (Ren & d'Avila Garcez, 2009) 
GOSE – for SVM classifier 
with DBA 
10.  2012 (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) 
RxREN 
11.  2015 (Plikynas, 2015) SOM and MLP 
Each of these key eleven methods is described in the following sections. 
(Craven & Shavlik, 1994) proposes a method called TREPAN that stochastically 
samples the instance space based on two ‘oracles’ (1) accepts a conjunctive rule as set 
of field value ranges and a class and returns true if the rule is classified as the class in 
all instances using the SUBSET method from (Saito & Nakano, 1988). (2) Generates 
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a source of example records initially from the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset but when that is 
exhausted it provides examples by randomly sampling the input space.  A public 
dataset UCI-S was used to assess the method.  A MLP neural network was trained 
with 8 input neurons, 1 hidden layer neuron and 1 output neuron.  The proposed 
method explores many fewer combinations than other search methods and it is 
therefore considerably faster.  The ruleset created has a similar accuracy and similar 
size to other methods.  Rules that cover only a few instances may require a large 
number of examples to try to find maximally general rule.  The algorithm is 
extended to represent the conjunctive rules in the MofN format proposed in (Towell, 
1991) and reviewed in 2.6.3, page 130.  A MofN rule is defined when at least M of 
the N antecedents is true, for example: 2 𝑜𝑓 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ≡ (𝑎 ∧ 𝑏) ∨ (𝑎 ∧ 𝑐) ∨ (𝑏 ∧ 𝑐).  
MofN is motivated as they are better suited to describing a neural network as they 
more closely match the inductive bias of neurons.  Once a conjunctive rule is 
supplied in step (2) this is converted into a trivial MofN rule where M is set to N.  
Either changing M or adding a new term then expands the rule.  Heuristics are used 
to try to ensure the MofN rule is generalised rather than becoming specialised.  
Results show that the number of rules produced using this method (c.10) is around a 
10th that of conjunctive rules (c.100) and it is claimed that the number of antecedents 
is reduced by a multiple of 4 for a similar accuracy performance.  Further results for 
this method were given in (Zhou et al., 2000) using five datasets from Table 2-9, page 
61 where the results are given in Table 2-52. 
Table 2-52 – Rule extraction performance reported results compared to Decision 
Tree C4.5 benchmark (Craven & Shavlik, 1994). 
 
Key: Method=(Craven & Shavlik, 1994). C4.5=cited DT C4.5 results. 
Work Dataset Method C4.5 Method C4.5  
(Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) UCI-G 96.6 90.5 32 13
(Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) UCI-L+ 92.6 88.9 7 5
(Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) UCI-U+ 93.1 95.6 27 20
(Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) UCI-H 92.5 95.0 11 6
(Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) UCI-I 92.0 97.3 10 4
%Acc #Rules
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(Thrun, 1995) developed the Validity Interval Analysis (VIA) algorithm that creates 
intervals on the input neurons that create an activation range of an output neuron 
such that these intervals are consistent with all other intervals by excluding these, 
using linear programming to find the upper and lower bounds so as to create a 
hypercube.  The proposed method starts with a set of specific rules, which are then 
generalised by enlarging their validity intervals using randomly generated changes 
and verifying that the rule remains in the class.  To assess the method a MLP neural 
network was trained with 8,192 examples with 4 input neurons (x, y, z, angle), 5 
hidden neurons and 4 output neurons.  The dataset used was for a robotic arm with 
five degrees of freedom.  Results show that 11 rules were generated that covered 
50% of the input space but that as the rules increasingly cover the space then more 
specific rules are generated that are closer to the decision boundary.  After 10,000 
rules are extracted only 84% of the input space is covered.  Since the decision 
boundary is highly non-linear then a finite number of rules may never cover the 
input space.  VIA has an advantage of working with continuous valued inputs rather 
than the requirement for discrete values as in other work.  
(Filer et al., 1996) propose Interval Analysis (IA), which propose a hypercube search 
method.  To find the hypercube an initial hypercube is constructed from 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛! by 
selecting a single 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 example.  The hypercube is then extended until the output 
class from the classifier changes so that no hypercube included any instance space 
that belongs to the genuine class.  This is repeated for all the fraud examples.  A 
search is then made of all the found hypercubes so that each is enlarged or moved to 
cover more of the instance space but without overlapping any of the others.  Finally, 
the instance space is searched so as to guarantee that none of the space for fraud has 
been missed.  (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) propose three rule an extraction method one of 
which is pedagogical and is reviewed here and the two remaining reviewed in 2.6.3, 
page 130.  The rule extraction method was tested using UCI-I and UCI-B datasets 
(UCI datasets described in Table 2-9).  The proposed pedagogical rule extraction 
method is called Binarised Input-Output Rule Extraction (BIO-RE).  This assumed 
that the neural network was been trained with discretised binary input fields.  The 
method tests all 2! combinations and creates a truth table with the output of the 
neural network for each combination.  A rule can then be generated for all entries in 
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the truth table.  As the rules are in a logical form then any Boolean simplification 
method can then be applied to the ruleset.  The authors note that this method is 
only suitable for simple problems where 𝑖 is small.  With dataset UCI-I 4 rules were 
extracted with an accuracy of 78.67% and with dataset UCI-B 11 rules were 
extracted with an accuracy of 96.63%.  (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) propose a framework 
for rule extraction from a neural network classifier called STARE.  A sample-set of 
data is created for rule extraction by rotating the input fields through their instance 
space that is across its value range.  The paper does not discuss the size of the dataset 
when the number of input fields is large.  A modified Chi-squared algorithm Chi-
Merge (Kerber, 1992a) is used on the dataset where there are continuous values to 
convert into discrete literals.  A single field is randomly selected and then a value of 
this field is searched for where it falls into a specific class.  If it does then a rule will 
be created.  If it does not then the next single field is selected and the process 
continues.  If no rule has been created after processing all inputs as single values then 
two inputs are chosen and the process repeats.  If a rule is found then it will have two 
conjunctive antecedents, 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒! = 𝑙! ℰ 𝑣!  ∧  𝑙!  ℰ 𝑣! .  The authors limit the 
number of possible antecedents to three for combinatorial reasons.  The rule 
extraction method was tested using five datasets from Table 2-9 and the results are 
given in Table 2-53. 
Table 2-53 – Rule extraction performance reported results compared to Decision 
Tree C4.5 benchmark (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000). 
 
Key: Method=(Zhi-Hua et al., 2000). C4.5=cited DT C4.5 results. 
(Lazar & Sethi, 2000) describes a method that uses a neural network with the 
assumption that neurons are either active or inactive.  A neural network is trained 
Work Dataset Method C4.5 Method C4.5  
(Zhi-Hua et al. , 2000) UCI-B 100.0 88.9 8 5
(Zhi-Hua et al. , 2000) UCI-G 98.3 90.5 38 13
(Zhi-Hua et al. , 2000) UCI-H 100.0 95.0 12 6
(Zhi-Hua et al. , 2000) UCI-I 97.3 97.3 13 4
(Zhi-Hua et al. , 2000) UCI-U+ 100.0 95.6 36 20
%Acc #Rules
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and then used to extract a complete decision table.  Such a decision table can 
become large for networks that have a large number of connections.  The decision 
table is then reduced using rough sets to remove superfluous entries associated with 
the same class.  Rough set theory (Pawlak, 1991) is based upon finite (crisp) sets and 
was created to help classify uncertain or imprecise data.  The reduced table is 
converted into rules.  Although there are some interesting concepts it appears to be 
only practical for small datasets where the size of the initial decision table can be 
kept manageable.  (Nunez et al., 2002) propose a method to extract rules form a 
SVM classifier that uses the support vectors and K-means clustering to create 
prototypes that define ellipsoids in the instance space, which are then mapped into 
rules.  This approach does not perform well for a large number of training vectors.  
(Barakat & Diederich, 2004b) propose a further method for SVM classifiers that 
creates input patterns for prediction by the SVM.  These inputs and the output from 
the SVM are then used to create a DT, which can then be converted into rules as 
previously described.  (Ren & d'Avila Garcez, 2009) propose a method for SVM 
classifiers with an approach called Geometric and Oracle-Based Support Vector 
Machines Rule Extraction (GOSE) based on locating the points on the SVM 
classification boundary by constructing hypercubes using Decision Boundary 
Analysis (DBA) based on the distance between each class point and the hyperplane.  
Synthetic input examples are created using kernel density estimates that are the same 
as described for TREPAN in (Craven, 1996).  This is similar to that described earlier 
in Interval Analysis (Filer et al., 1996).  Decision Boundary Analysis in neural 
networks has generated much research literature with a number of researchers using 
sensitivity analysis as the search method such as described in (Goh, 1993; Viktor et 
al., 1995; Engelbrecht & Cloete, 1998; Engelbrecht & Viktor, 1999) are all based on 
using an MLP as the classifier.  (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) propose a 
method called RxREN that ‘reverse engineers’ the neural network so as to discover 
which input neurons are insignificant.  Two sets are created using the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 set (1) 
as a set of correctly classified records, (2) as a set of incorrectly classified records.  A 
minimum error is calculated as a count is made of those records in set (2) where they 
do not overlap (1) and each input neuron is temporarily removed from the neural 
network and the count is again calculated.  The 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 for the temporary pruned 
neural network is calculated using the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset and if within a threshold the 
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process is continued.  This is repeated for all combination of input neurons.  Once 
the neural network has been pruned, each significant input neuron is analysed to 
find the best range of values.  First the set of incorrectly classified records in (2) is 
grouped into its classes.  A range is calculated being the minimum and maximum 
value from the incorrectly classified records.  Rules can then be constructed from the 
significant neurons and these data ranges.  Following this stage rule pruning is 
undertaken where conditions are iteratively removed from a rule where (a) the 
accuracy is not altered, (b) the minimum value in the rule is greater than that of the 
field, (c) the maximum value in the rule is greater than that of the field.  Next each 
rule is analysed by measuring its misclassifications.  This method changes the range 
such that the number of misclassifications is reduced.  The rule extraction method 
was tested using six datasets from Table 2-9 and the results are given in Table 2-54. 
Table 2-54 – Rule extraction performance reported results compared to Decision 
Tree C4.5 benchmark (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a). 
 
Key: Method=(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a). C4.5=cited DT C4.5 results. 
(Plikynas, 2015) propose a hybrid method that uses a standard SOM to cluster input 
data in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset as previously described in 2.5.3, page 93 so that each 
cluster is given a unique label.  An iterative process is proposed so that for each 
unique cluster, the maximum number of input vectors for a class is found – called a 
solution fragment.  A measure of fitness is calculated for the solution fragment and 
the cluster.  Once all clusters have been processed, the total fitness for the whole set 
of clusters compared to the whole set of solution fragments is calculated.  The entire 
process is continued until a set number of iterations are exceeded.  The best match 
between solution fragments and the SOM is chosen based on the total fitness 
Work Dataset Method C4.5 Method C4.5  
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) UCI-B 96.9 95.3 2 9
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) UCI-H 82.7 95.0 2 6
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) UCI-I 98.7 97.3 3 4
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) UCI-O+ 94.3 90.5 2 8
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) UCI-G 74.3 90.5 2 5
(Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) UCI-P 78.8 64.9 2 19
%Acc #Rules
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measure for all solutions.  Each cluster has an assigned solution fragment.  An MLP 
neural network is trained on the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and for each cluster and the solution 
fragment is used with the MLP to assign a probability of class based on the output 
value.  The set of solution fragments with the highest scores can then be used to 
create rules.  The rule extraction method was tested using datasets from UCI and the 
author notes the results were “promising” but no values are given. 
2.6.5 Summary 
The key works in pedagogical and decompositional rule extraction methods have 
been reviewed.  The decompositional methods are reliant on the architecture of the 
fraud classifer and as it has been argued that exisiting vendor FMS are deployed 
throughout payments industry and so to implement new methods with as little risk as 
possible the new methods need impose as few assumptions and requirements.  It is 
for this reason that only the pedagogical rule extraction methods are considered 
further.  As has been established there is a requirement for a method to explain the 
learnt fraud vectors in existing fraud detectors.  Following the desiderata for fraud 
detection listed in Table 1-1 these have been extended in Table 2-55 to include rule 
extraction algorithm desiderata.   
Table 2-55 – List of payment fraud knowledge extraction desiderata (R10-R16). 
Reference Desiderata 
R10.  The rules must be compact and expressive. 
R11.  
The literals in the rules must relate to the input fields and so are simple 
to understand. 
R12.  
The extracted 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 needs to reasonably represent the black-box 
fraud classifier in terms of measures of performance. 
R13.  
The same rules should be generated if the algorithm is re-run using the 
same dataset. 
R14.  
The 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 must be able to generalise.  That is it must capture the 
generalisation ability of the black-box fraud classifier in terms of 
measures of performance.  
R15.  
The algorithm needs to be as independent from the black-box fraud 
classifier as is possible and make only limited assumptions. 
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Reference Desiderata 
R16.  
The rule extraction algorithm must operate on current computing 
server platforms to produce a complete 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 within a reasonable 
timeframe to encourage regular use. 
The pedagogical rule extraction methods are summarised in Table 2-56.  It can be 
seen that the pedagogical rule extraction methods reviewed outperform the 
benchmark DT C4.5 figures in terms of fewer number of rules generated which is on 
average 9.18 compared to 12.76 while maintaining a similar 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 92.0% 
(92.3%).  Those methods with a score of over 80% all comply with the desiderata in 
Table 2-55.   
| Chapter 2 - Literature Review | 
 | 153 |  
Table 2-56 – Comparison of all reviewed pedagogical rule extraction methods. 
 
Key: Method=results for the cited work.  C4.5 comparison results from Table 2-21.  R10-
R16=Requirement as defined in Table 2-55.  %Score=%Total score out of maximum of 12.  
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A review of published methods that allow computational fraud detectors to explain 
their reasoning so as to be transparent in operation to human experts has been 
completed.  None of these methods explores the problem of symbolically 
representing a fraud-model with real, large and sparse datasets so that human 
experts can better understand payment card fraud.  There is no published research 
on this important and demanding application area.  It is concluded that there are 
only limited applicable methods that may achieve some of the requirements. 
2.7 Vendor Payment Card FMS Solutions 
It is not necessary for the purpose of this Chapter to provide a detailed commentary 
or analysis of all existing vendor FMS solutions but rather an overview to provide 
background on the technologies used within the payments industry and where these 
are positioned within the research body of work.  A list of twenty-seven vendors is 
given in Table 2-57 and has been compiled using vendor web site that includes 
claimed features that cannot be verified.  It is not claimed that this list is complete. 
To make a pratical difference and to improve fraud detection any new method must 
be deployed within the payments industry.  Research methods must translate into a 
real-world deployed application to have impact.  To encourage uptake of the 
proposed novel method in Chapter 3 it must operate with the varying vendor 
classifiers with as little imposition as possible on their function. 
Table 2-57 – List of FMS vendor solutions and functionality (2015). 
 Vendor Rules Neural Profiles 
Neural 
Anomaly 
1.  Accertify ✔ ✖ ✖ 
2.  ACI Proactive Risk Manager (PRM)* ✔ ✔ ✖ 
3.  Alaric (Fractals) ✔ ✔ ✖ 
4.  Algocharge ✔ ✖ ✖ 
5.  authorize.net (AFDS) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
6.  BAE systems /Detica (NetReveal) ✔ ? ? 
7.  Brighterion ✔ ✔ ✔ 
8.  Ccbill (Fraud Scrubbing) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
9.  CompassPlus (TranzWare) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
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 Vendor Rules Neural Profiles 
Neural 
Anomaly 
10.  Cybersource/Visa (Decision Manager) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
11.  CyoGate (iSpy) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
12.  Entrust (Transaction Guard) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
13.  Ethoca (Ethoca Alerts) ✔ ✖ ✖ 
14.  Featurespace (ARIC) ✔ ✔ ✔ 
15.  Feedzai ✔ ✔ ✔ 
16.  FICO Falcon Fraud Manager ✔ ✔ ✖ 
17.  First Data (FRIS/DefenseEdge/FDR 
Falcon) ✔ ✔ 
? 
18.  FIS (Memento) ✔ ? ? 
19.  IBM & SearchSpace (ICFM) ✔ ✔ ✔ 
20.  Iovation ✔ ? ✔ 
21.  MasterCard (Expert Monitoring Fraud 
Scoring for Merchants) ✔ ✔ 
✔ 
22.  NICE (Actimise) ✔ ✔ ✔ 
23.  Retail Decisions/ACI “Shield”* ✔ ✔ ✖ 
24.  SAS Fraud Management ✔ ✔ ✖ 
25.  Sift ✔ ✔ ? 
26.  Experian & 41st Parameter (FraudNet) ✔ ✔ ? 
27.   Visa (DPS) ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Key: *Based on the P-RCE algorithm,  ✔=supported.  ✖=not supported, ?=unknown. 
 
Key Description 
Rules 
A rule management system that enables users to create fraud 
detection rules and for these to be executed. 
Neural 
Profiles 
A supervised neural network is used to learn from historic patterns of 
fraudulent and genuine transactions.  The neural model is then 
applied to new data to provide a score on the likelihood that the 
transaction is fraudulent. 
 Neural 
Anomaly 
An unsupervised neural network is used to learn from historic 
patterns of transactions.  When a new transaction for a particular 
cardholder is presented if this differs by a measure from that 
expected by the unsupervised neural network then the transaction is 
considered suspicious. 
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Most vendor solutions rely on a hybrid approach based on human entered rules and 
some element of machine learning.  In common with many of the vendor systems the 
ACI Inc. Proactive Risk Manager has a rule management system combined as a 
hybrid solution with a P-RCE neural network (described in A.13.10, page 490).  It is 
claimed to be in use by the top 20 banks in the world and in more than 40 countries 
(Maruatona et al., 2012).  The same P-RCE algorithm was licenced to Retail 
Decisions and used in their product and services that are aimed at CNP fraud 
management claimed to combine proprietary, domestic and international screening 
databases and industry cardholder authentication initiatives.  The FICO Inc. Falcon 
Fraud Manager has a rule management system and a modified back-propagation 
neural network algorithm that is reported to learn cardholder profiles as they evolve 
that are updated with every transaction.  Falcon Fraud Manager operates in real-
time and is designed to produce a score to indicate a suspicious transaction.  It 
includes pre-trained neural profiles that aim to increase fraud detection accuracy by 
profiling known high-risk ATMs and regions as well as depending on the type of 
payment card, for example Credit, Debit, Retail, Fuel (Yufeng et al., 2004).  The 
SAS Inc. FMS has a rule management system and claims to use an ensemble of 
SOMs called SONNA that is stated to be in use at more than 43,000 online sites.  As 
far as can be determined and from 25 years within the payments industry vendors 
focus on detection rather than knowledge discovery or understanding of fraud 
vectors.  As discussed in Chapter 8 there has been little incentive for the vendors to 
innovate. 
2.8 Summary 
A review of published fraud detection methods and knowledge extraction methods 
has been undertaken.  It has been argued that it is only through understanding new 
fraud vectors that payment card fraud can be prevented.  It has been established that 
there is a pivotal event in the payments industry that will create unknown fraud 
vectors that will change at a more rapid rate than has been seen since the 
introduction of payment cards.  It has been shown that the detection of fraud relies 
on fraud classifiers and that it is common practice for these to be based on machine 
learning to induce the fraud classifier from data using a black-box method so that 
human experts need not understand the fraud vectors in order to detect fraud.  It is 
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the timely understanding of new fraud vectors that will be necessary to the payment 
industry during the pivotal event where the black-box classifiers remain taciturn.  
There is therefore a requirement to extract this understanding from these black-box 
classifiers in such a way as to be useful to human experts.  With a neural network 
trained to recognise patterns of fraud, knowledge is encoded and distributed 
throughout its architecture.  There is no obvious way of viewing this encoded 
information to explain the fraud vectors that have been learnt.  Those who are 
expert in payment fraud are accustomed to rules.  Therefore extracting knowledge in 
the form of rules from such a black-box to represent the fraud detector in a way that 
is sound will provide understanding of new fraud vectors.  The problem of extracting 
rules or symbolic knowledge from a neural network has attracted much interest 
because it provides a method to combine the knowledge-intensive deductive learning 
and the knowledge-free method of inductive learning into a hybrid system.  The 
hypothesis to be confirmed by this thesis that knowledge in symbolic form that captures 
general characteristics of payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, 
imbalanced, high-dimensional transactional data can start to be understood through 
previous published work.  A key objective of this thesis is the comprehensibility of the 
neural classifier deployed in an existing FMS so as to understand fraud vectors.  
Pedagogical methods can ensure that the rules extracted from the neural network are 
equivalent, that is it is both sound and complete but an exhaustive approach is not 
effective when the size of input fields is large.  It has been established in this Chapter 
that there is a gap in research that combines fraud detection with symbolic 
knowledge extraction.  Most vendor FMS solutions include a form of machine 
learning so there is a requirement for any new method to operate with these.  
The Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive Rule (SOAR) Extraction Algorithm is proposed 
as one such method and this is detailed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 The Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive 
Rule Extraction Algorithm 
“Any fool can know.  The point is to understand.” – Prof. Albert Einstein. 
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3.1 Introduction 
pedagogical rule extraction method is proposed called Sparse Oracle-
based Adaptive Rule (SOAR) Extraction that uses sensitivity analysis to 
avoid the exhaustive decision boundary searches of the other published 
pedagogical methods.  In doing so abstract patterns of payment card fraud 
can be revealed to create improved knowledge on payment card fraud vectors. 
As established in Chapter 2 exisiting FMS vendor systems are widely deployed 
throughout the payment card industry.  To reduce fraud it must first be understood 
by humans (R7).  The choice of a pedagogical rule extraction method is made where 
a black-box classifier is used as an oracle.  For this work to have a real-world impact 
on payment card fraud the SOAR algorithm must be implimented in software and 
deployed alongside an incumbent FMS.  To encourage the uptake of SOAR an 
implementation has been publically provided (Appendix D). 
3.2 Knowledge Extraction and Abstraction 
It is not necessary for this thesis to review the human acquisition of knowledge in 
general but it is essential to set out the meaning with respect to the hypothesis that 
knowledge in symbolic form that captures general characteristics of payment card fraud can be 
extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, imbalanced, high-dimensional transactional data.  
The human acquisition of knowledge is different from the acquisition of information 
that in turn is different from data.  In this thesis in respect to payment card fraud: 
§ The Oxford English Dictionary defines “data” as “facts and statistics collected 
together for reference or analysis.” (Oxford-English-Dictionary).  The data 
available to the payment processors is described in A.5, page 397.  Other 
data such as tables of crime patterns, surveys, databases of transactions, 
etc., are all included as available data. 
§ Information is defined as facts, facets of data, statistics or summaries that 
have been generated from data that relate to the patterns of payment 
fraud and to other wide areas such as criminality, human behaviour, 
payments, government social sciences, computing and technology, local 
A 
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customs, previous patterns that have been discovered, etc.  There are 
now countless such facts in this respect some of which have been 
discussed in Chapter 8 ranging from the minutiae of data analysis and 
data mining at a specific point in the payments process through to the 
behaviour of individual groups of transactions, cardholders, issuers, 
societal norms.  It is likely that since the early payments market (described 
in A.2.5, page 375) these facts have grown in volume and importance and 
are likely impossible for an individual or a group of individuals to 
comprehend their scope.  
§ Human knowledge can be considered as a set of cognitive models on a 
subject such as payment fraud, which are created by human learning 
through experience; analogous to machine learning such as neural 
networks.  Human cognitive models have many associations 
(relationships) and can be applied either to phenomena or to abstract 
ideas.  Some argue that human cognition includes information that 
extends outside of the individual such as a book, web site, papers, news, 
etc. and that this is a “distribution of cognition” (Münsterberg, 1914).  
This is important here as such background information is included in the 
knowledge that an individual human payment card fraud expert is likely 
to require to successfully undertake their role.  
“Generalising symbolic knowledge” is defined as more general patterns of payment card 
fraud can be revealed and explored and in doing so an understanding is gained that 
is combined with human background knowledge already acquired to generate 
improved cognitive models and so improved knowledge on fraud.  When there is a 
large volume of changing information it becomes difficult to understand.  Therefore 
a higher level of information abstraction is required.  The higher the abstraction the 
easier the information is to understand as it is represented as a generalisation that 
remains a representation of the original but with unneeded detail omitted.  Such 
generalisation may not be specifically accurate but must be sufficiently accurate to 
hold true for most cases and so provide a wider understanding of fraud vectors and 
how these change over time as new disruptive technologies grow towards an argued 
pivotal event (argued in A.15, page 502).  The motivation for this thesis to extract 
knowledge from a machine learning system was in part to provide such an abstraction.  
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A choice was made to represent this abstraction in the form of English-like symbolic 
association rules as (a) both past and current FMS substantially rely on such rules 
and so these are commonly accepted, (b) shorter rules indicate a higher abstraction 
whereas rules with a large number of antecedents represent more specific cases.  The 
SOAR extraction algorithm described in 3.5, page 182 aims to provide a high level 
of abstraction.  The rules produced can be visualised in a number of different 
formats.  The visualisation of such knowledge is an important topic as humans are 
known to be able to interpret and find associations quicker in some formats than 
others (Tufte, 1991; 2006).  Again this is a wide topic and is not necessary for this 
thesis to review in detail. 
3.3 SOAR Extraction Design 
To understand the design choices for the SOAR Extraction method the following 
will be discussed: 
1. Underlying assumptions 
2. Pre-processing of dataset 
3. Symbolic pedagogical rule extraction algorithm 
It is important that the underlying assumptions are understood and these are 
reviewed in the following sections.  Following this the pre-processing algorithm and 
the SOAR algorithm are then described. 
3.3.1 Underlying assumptions 
A summary of the key assumptions made is given in Table 3-1 and are then 
discussed.  Each assumption has a reference and this is referred to throughout this 
thesis. 
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Table 3-1 – Summary of key SOAR extraction algorithm assumptions (A1 to A9). 
Ref Assumption Reason 
A1.  Pedagogical rule extraction method 
Architecture of fraud classifier unknown. 
A2.  The 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset used to create the classifier is available. Use of this data directs the search to reduce the search space. 
A3.  The dataset available is large-scale. 
The dataset must contain sufficient 
examples to have created the classifier with 
a reasonable performance (R2).   
A4.  
The dataset is highly 
unbalanced so that the fraud 
examples are sparse. 
The examples of fraud in 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 are used 
as the start point for a local search.  This 
reduces the search space (R1). 
A5.  
Discretised continuous valued 
input fields 𝑙! . Reduce search space through pre-processing. 
A6.  
That the fraud class is the 
minority class and forms 
clusters. 
As established, criminal MO tends to follow 
a similar pattern.  Therefore fraud vectors 
also follow similar patterns and will 
therefore form clusters of similar fraud 
vectors. 
A7.  
Symbolic fields are transformed 
through meaningful groupings 
that can be linguistically named. 
Fewer literals mean fewer antecedents and 
so the rules are simpler to understand 
through pre-processing. 
A8.  
That 𝑙!  is able to sufficiently 
describe the fit to the decision 
boundary within a practical 
tolerance. 
Fewer literals mean fewer antecedents and 
so the rules are simpler to understand. 
A9.  Classifier output is a 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 indicating probability of fraud. 
Selecting a particular value of 𝜃 for a 
classifier is necessary for all binary 
classifiers as reported in the fraud detection 
research reviewed in 2.5, page 62.  In the 
real-world this decision is made typically 
using measures that are sensitive to class 
skew such as the cost of misclassification.  
In the experiments in Chapter 4 a ROC 
analysis is undertaken for each classifier 
and a “best” value of 𝜃 for the classifier 
chosen using the point closest to the top-left 
of the plot indicating the “best” sensitivity 
and specificity.  It is noted in the thesis that 
this best point is insensitive to class skew 
and therefore does not represent the best 
real-world threshold. 
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The Landau notation is used in this section (Big-𝑂 notation)1 to describe the limiting 
behaviour of a function as its argument tends towards infinity, see Eq. (3-1).   
𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑂 𝑔 𝑥  𝑎𝑠 𝑥 → ∞	 (3-1) 
The process of extracting rules from a classifier can be described as the calculation of 
a set of functions and so the Landau notation can be used to help describe the 
complexity of this calculation and so the practical computer processing required.  
The decision boundary between the two classes defines how the fraud classifier 
determines the output class.  The task is to describe this decision boundary in a 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 using a pedagogical method.  The problem with the pedagogical rule 
extraction method is that the size of the search space is large.  With 𝑖 fields 
(dimensions), which have a range of 𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑚𝑎𝑥  an interval of 𝑚 steps then the 
complexity is given by 𝑂(𝑚)𝑖.  As an example, for 10 input fields with a range and 
interval of 0.000 𝑡𝑜 1.000  results in 𝑂(1,000)10, which are 130 computational 
extractions steps.  A sound pedagogical method is not practical in real-world 
problems where even a small number of input fields will mean a large search space 
and so an impractical level of computing power required to exhaustively search all 
combinations along the decision boundary.  For any classifier its accuracy, precision 
and certainty of a decision have an associated cost.  For practical reasons, each 
payment processor must have a tolerance for imprecision, uncertainty, approximate 
reasoning and partial truth (Zhou et al., 2000).  This practical approach can be 
exploited when designing algorithms.  To necessarily reduce the search space 
previous work reviewed (Filippov et al., 2008), (Chiu & Tsai, 2004), (Guo & Li, 2008), 
(Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) discretised the continuous valued input fields to reduce the 
search space with results within an acceptable accuracy.  Therefore a decision is 
made to require that all input fields be first discretised.  For 10 input fields if it is 
assumed that each field is discretised into 3 literals 𝑙! = 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!  the complexity 
                                                
1 An historical point of note is that the 𝑂 notation first appeared in Bachmann, P. Die analytische 
zahlentheorie. Vol. 2 (Teubner, 1894).  The ‘Landau Notation’ was only later established in 
Landau, E. Über die Einteilung der positiven ganzen Zahlen in vier Klassen nach der Mindestzahl 
der zu ihrer additiven Zusammensetzung erforderlichen Quadrate.  (1909). 
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is reduced to 𝑂(2)3𝑥10 that is 19 computational extractions steps.  If it is assumed 
that half the input fields are discretised in this manner the complexity for these fields 
is 𝑂 3𝑥5 + 25  then total complexity is 𝑂 23𝑥5 + 3𝑥5 + 25 ~3𝑥104.  To 
further reduce the search space it is intuitive that the instance space around learnt 
fraud vectors would be the most ‘interesting’ and that this space is likely to lie on or 
around the decision boundary.  Previous work such as (Filer et al., 1996) and (Ren & 
d'Avila Garcez, 2009) focus the search on the fraud vectors that lie on the decision 
boundary.  The relationship between a given input 𝒙 and the output of the classifier 𝑦 is not necessarily monotonic but depends on the values of the input fields so that 
changing a single value may increase the output value in some cases but reduce it in 
others.  A decision was made to further reduce the search space by using only the 
example 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 records filtered from the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset (A2) 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍!"#$% =𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 ∩ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and limiting the search to areas around these examples.  If there 
were 𝑛 records in 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍!"#$% and if the proposed method now searched only the 
local area then 3x104 combinations needed to be searched per example, giving 𝑗! . 3x10! computational extractions steps for 𝑗!=500 that is ~1.5𝑥10!.  As 
described in A.6, page 403 a fraud vector consists of a specific sequence of operations 
undertaken by criminals.  Most criminologists believe that offenders develop a MO 
from which they rarely depart.  It is these sequences of operations that are 
recognised by human fraud experts and it is these experts that try to capture the 
fraud behaviour to write rules.  These rules are deployed in a FMS that aim to 
classify known fraud vectors and are known to have a level of efficacy.  It follows that 
a specific sequence of operation generates similar data each time it is undertaken.  
Different data is available at the various payment participators as described in A.5, 
page 397 but it is reasonable to assume that sufficient data is available to differentiate 
these sequences of operations, at least some of the time.  It is argued that different 
fraud vectors are likely to form clusters in instance space in the classifier.  Thus a 
decision was made to first cluster 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍!"#$% so that the search space is reduced to 
only those clusters used as an example of a fraud vector that is 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 < 𝑗!.  The 
computational extractions steps is thus reduced for 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠=10 to ~3.3𝑥10!.  The 
centre of a cluster is the average distances between all the vectors in that cluster so 
that a 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 example is created at the centre.  The 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 is considered to 
| Chapter 3 - The Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive Rule Extraction Algorithm | 
 | 167 |  
be the typical value of the assumed fraud vector that the cluster represents.  Through 
these assumptions the search space has been reduced by a magnitude of c.1025.  The 
requirement (R7) is to produce as few rules as possible while maintaining a 
reasonable level of soundness/support measured as in Eq. (2-25).  To achieve this 
objective the pedagogical SOAR extraction method aims to reduce the search space 
through these assumptions to extract a set of rules that: 
§ Covers the largest cardinality of the input space. 
§ Covers the largest area of “interest” for each rule. 
An assumption is made by the SOAR extraction method that classifiers produce an 
output 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 that indicates the probability that the input is 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 so that a 𝜃 value 
can be defined over which the class is determined to be 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 (A9). 
As assumption is made that the dataset used to create the classifier is unbalanced 
(A4) and sparse (A6).  In 2013 a Tier-1 issuer needs to correctly detect 1,100  
fraudulent transactions out of 5m transactions every day (Table 2-6, page 57).  The 
average worldwide RGF is summarised in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 – Comparison of estimated real-world RGF over period 1971 to 2013. 
 Source 1971 1982 1993 2013 𝑅𝐺𝐹 B.8 1,400 200 5,600 4,800 
Source: See Appendix B, page 535.  Data may contain errors  
(see B.2, page 535). 
Reviewing the work in 2.4, page 62 those methods where the results were based on 
real-world datasets are given in Table 3-3.  There is a wide range of reported RGF 
from 3 to 22,494.  It is considered unlikely that a payment processor would have a 
RGF of below 1,000 (for the reasons discussed in A.8, page 423) the cost would be 
prohibitively high to an extent that the business would unlikely make profit.  An 
assumption is made that the dataset has an RGF of at least 1,000 and the SOAR 
extraction method has been designed with this assumption. 
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An assumption is made that the dataset available contains sufficient examples to 
have created the underlying classifier within an acceptable performance.  Based on 
assumptions for RGF the smallest dataset size can be calculated and is given Table 
3-4.  The SOAR Extraction method has been designed with such large-scale datasets 
(A3). 
Table 3-3 – Comparison of real-world datasets stated in cited work using RGF and 
number of records. 
 
Key: Work=published work reviewed, ?=unknown. 
Work RGF ⬇ #Records
(Lee, 2013) ? 0
(Seeja & Zareapoor, 2014) ? 100
(Stolfo et al., 1997) ? 500
(Richardson, 1997) ? 5,000
(Soltani et al., 2012) ? ?
(Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) ? ?
(Chetcuti & Dingli, 2008) ? ?
(Dorronsoro et al., 1997) ? ?
SOAR II - Real-K 165,518 170,979,600,000
(Ghosh & Reilly, 1994). ? 2,000,000,000
(Sahin & Duman, 2011a) 22,495 22,000,978,000
(Duman & Elikucuk, 2013b) 22,494 22,000,000
SOAR II - Real-E (high) 17,206 59,344,649,000
(Salazar et al., 2012) 4,988 10,002,005,000
(Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) 4,544 700,000
(Bahnsen et al., 2013) 4,000 80,000,000,000
(Wong et al., 2012) 3,904 640,000,000
(Correia et al., 2015), 1,999 5,600,000,000,000
(Ghosh & Reilly, 1994)+Rules 666 2,000,000,000
(Brabazon et al., 2010) 239 50,000,000
(Brause et al, 1999) 93 500,000,000
(Brause et al, 1999) 93 548,708,000
(Dheepa & Dhanapal, 2012) 38 591,000
(Gadi et al., 2008) 26 42,000,000
(Leonard, 1993) 21 12,709,000
(Cabral et al., 2006) 20 40,495,000
(Jha et al., 2012) 11 50,000,000,000
(Olszewski et al., 2013) 9 10,000,000
(Mahmoudi & Duman, 2015) 9 9,300,000
(Krivko, 2010) 6 11,555,000
(Bentley, 2000) 3 2,671,000
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An assumption is made that the method by which a continuous numeric field 𝑙! is 
discreetised to 𝑙!  is such that it represents a continuously increasing real range (A5).  
The transform method used will determine the accuracy of the fit in the extracted 
rules to the decision boundary in the classifier.   
Table 3-4 – Illustrative minimum dataset size calculated for a given RGF. 
RGF ê   Fraud Examples Genuine Examples Data 
500 1,250 625,000 626,250 
1,000 1,250 1,250,000 1,251,250 
2,000 1,250 2,500,000 2,501,250 
3,000 1,250 3,750,000 3,751,250 
4,000 1,250 5,000,000 5,001,250 
5,000 1,250 6,250,000 6,251,250 
Key: Data=number of records in dataset used over a period.  Assumptions: 25 different fraud vectors 
that require 50 examples of each. 
As assumption is made (A7) that any symbolic fields from the raw data are 
transformed through meaningful groupings that can be linguistically named.  This is 
important if the rules extracted from the classifier are to be understandable.  The 
linguistic field names associated with the fields need to be human meaningful as it is 
those field names that are used to create a descriptive propositional antecedent in a 
rule.  Fewer names that have a higher level of abstraction are easier for human 
comprehension than a larger number of names that may be difficult to interpret. 
Some fields may contain 100s or 1,000s unique symbols.  It is impractical to use each 
of these as an input to the classifier as the dimensionality of the input would require a 
large 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset to cover sufficient examples for a generalising classifier to be 
created.  A small number of inputs representing important/interesting symbols will 
make any rules more understandable. 
The underlying assumptions have been discussed and are based on a set of 
motivations which have been established to provide a pratical approach to the 
problem of extracting meaningful and compact rulesets with a good level of 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 from fraud classifiers.  The requiremens for pre-processing raw real-
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world data are reviewed which once defined the SOAR Extraction algorithm is then 
described as one method that meets the hypothesis. 
3.3.2 Extracted Rule Format 
Rules are presented in this thesis using nomenecleture that differs from the 
mathematical notation on page 2 for reasons of clarity.  In the extracted rules 
“𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏]” is used to denote a literal that has a scalar interval ≥ 𝑎 and < 𝑏.  
This can be expanded to “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏, 𝑐] used to denote a literal that with a 
scalar interval ≥ 𝑎 and < 𝑏 OR the single scalar value 𝑐. Various combinations of 
this format are supported.  “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = a, b, c ” denotes a literal that must contain at 
least one of the symbolic elements of the set, here “a” OR “b” OR “c”.  Where there 
is only one element in a given set it is denoted “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = a.”  A prefix of “NOT” is 
used to indicate the logical inverse, so that 𝑁𝑂𝑇 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏] inclidates that the 
literal must not be in the scalar interval defined. 
3.3.3 Pseudo Code 
This Chapter presents pseudo code to describe the algorithms.  This is an informal 
high-level description of the principle of the algorithm given in sufficient detail that 
the algorithm can be reproduced in an implementation of choice by someone 
sufficiently skilled in computer programming.  It uses some of the structural 
conventions of modern programming languages but pseudo code is intended for 
human reading rather than machine execution.  It is not necessary for pseudo code 
to have a formal definition.  Where appropriate the presented pseudo code has been 
used to impliment software code in the R language that is made publically available 
(described in Appendix D).  R is a stastical programming language that is in use 
within the AI, machine learning, statistical and academic community (R-
Development-Core-Team, 2008).  It is this implementation that has been used for 
the analysis in Chapter 4, page 203.  
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3.4 Pre-processing 
In 1.5, page 33 a fraud classifier is defined in terms of a non-linear mapping from 
inputs 𝐱 to an output 𝑦 so that the classifier undertakes an arbitrary functional 
mapping from high dimension space to that of a single dimension.  Raw input data 
can thus be mapped to such a space but in practice, it is expedient to transform the 
data before it is applied to the classifier (Bishop, 1995a).  There is a balance between 
the complexity of the preprocessing undertaken and the machine learning itself.  
This preprocessing transformation is denoted as 𝒻 .  so that ℝ 𝒻ℝ.  In many cases 
the choice of preprocessing steps has a significant effect on the classification and 
generalisation performance of the classifier.  All work reviewed in Chapter 2 describe 
that the data was pre-processed in some way before it was used.  The SOAR 
extraction method includes pre-processing before a back-box classifier is created (A5 
and A7).  The data available for the detection of fraud has some unique properties: 
§ Sparse examples of fraud. 
§ Large number of input fields. 
§ Non-normal distributions. 
§ Made up of a sequence of events over time. 
These attributes make it a difficult problem to model the data to create a useful 
classifier to aid in the detection of fraud.  The transaction data is highly dimensional 
with 30-100 fields defining each transaction that are made up of both continuous 
and discrete values and is not normally distributed.  The intrinsic dimensionality is 
high and indicates that an unworkable number of examples would be required to 
comprehensibly build a model.  Given the highly dimensional nature of the data and 
the sparse fraud examples a method is needed to reduce the dimensionality (Maaten 
et al., 2008) and to group similar examples prior to class classification.  Pre-processing 
aims to enhance the modelling characteristics of the dataset through a series of such 
steps and is a key part of SOAR.   
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There are two types of raw input literals: 
1. Scalar literals.  To determine if the scalar input is ordinal where it has a 
natural ordering or is categorical NumericRelevance() is applied.  If these 
variables are determined to be ordinal then they may benefit from being 
transformed by applying a non-linear transformation to reduce their 
statistical skew.  This step aims to improve the efficacy of the neural network 
algorithms and this is undertaken by NumericSkew().  Numeric values that 
have outlier values that are some large standard deviation from the mean 
have been widley reported in the literature to adversely affect performance 
and Outlier() is used to detect and remove such records prior to training the 
classifier.  NumericRedundancy() is applied with the aim to reduce 
dimensionality so that the learning algorithm has fewer parameters to 
determine that may lead to improved generalisation as well as being quicker 
to train.  Normalisation is applied using a linear transform so that all scalar 
variables have a input range that is suitable for input to the neural network 
classifier training algorithms.  As previously discussed, all scalar values are 
discretised so that 𝐿! = 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!  where each 𝑏! is {0,1} and represents a 
scalar range 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟  that is input to the neural network. 
2. Symbolic literals.  Within the available data for payments there are a large 
number of symbolic type inputs these may be a date or time, symbolic code 
or free-form text.  Before a neural network can use discrete data it must be 
transformed into meaningful numbers.  In most cases, the ordering of 
categorical literals is not known and therefore symbols cannot be assigned a 
set value for the neural network input as this imposes an artificial ordering.  
However, where there are a large number of categorical literals this encoding 
produces too many inputs to the neural network and so symbols are grouped 
by SymbolicConditionalProbabilityGrouping() that aims to retain as much 
information as possible while reducing dimensionality.  A set of symbols is 
created and this set is then assigned to a single input. 
For the SOAR extraction method, a set of pre-processing steps is given in Table 3-5 
along with any constant parameters.  There are five parameters that need to be 
deterimed for the pre-processing and these were set in the experiments based on the 
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characteristics of the datasets (see discussion on “phenomenological adjustment of constants”  
in 4.2.1, page 206).  The pre-processing will create a dataset suitable for both (a) 
training a classifier and for (b) rule extraction.  It is likely that incumbent fraud 
detection systems will have taken similar steps (R3).   
Table 3-5 – Description of each pre-processing step used in the SOAR extraction 
algorithm. 
Algorithm Constant Description 
NumericRelevance() 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 Numeric fields are checked to ensure they represent continuous values or if these would benefit from being converted into discrete 
valued literals.  Frequency histograms of 
numeric data are created. 
NumericSkew()  
The skew of numeric fields is assessed and if 
not normally distributed mathematical 
transforms are attempted to reduce skew. 
SymbolicRelevance() maxredun Identifying redundancy in symbolic field data to ensure maximum entropy through frequency analysis of symbolic fields to 
ascertain which low frequency fields could 
benefit from being grouped. 
ChiSymbol() 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟 Symbolic fields are grouped and converted into discrete numeric values. 
NumericRedundancy() maxcorr Identifying redundancy in numeric field data. 
Outlier() maxoutlier Attempts are made to identify outliers in the data and to make a decision if these records 
should be included in the modelling process. 
Derive()  
To encode the temporal and sequential 
dimension of transactions, one approach is to 
calculate “global features” by producing 
derived fields that encapsulate behaviour over 
time. 
Discretise()  All input fields to be discretised for SOAR. 
Normalise()  
This is included for completeness as in SOAR 
all fields are discretised.  If fields are not 
discretised then numeric values must be 
converted into a suitable range for the 
underlying classifier. 
Each of these nine pre-processing steps is detailed in the following sections along 
with pseudo code. 
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3.4.1 NumericRelevance() 
To determine if the input is a scalar, ordinal or symbolic then field is first checked to 
see if it contains only valid numbers.  If it does not then it is marked as symbolic.  To 
determine if it is a continuous scalar, the field is linearly scaled between [0,1], then 
ten bins are created each of which represent a decile, a count of the number of 
records in the field that has a value within the range of each bin is then calculated.  
This is a form of histogram equalisation where each bin should contain 10% of the 
total number of records if the field is continuous scalar.  If any of the bins are empty 
or contain significantly different number of records then the field is considered to be 
not continuous and the field is processed so as to create discrete literals.  
NumericRelevance() ensures that continuous valued fields are actually continuous, 
since uniform distributions have maximum entropy.  This process is described in 
Figure 3-25. 
NumericRelevance()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒:	percentage	threshold	
Output:		𝑥	input	records.	Each	field	𝒙𝒋	is	marked	as	a	(type):	“numeric	discreet”,	
“numeric”	or	“symbolic”	
(1) for	each	field	𝒙𝒋 𝑖𝑛 ℝ where	𝑗 is 0 to d	
(2) 	 if	𝒙𝒋	is	numeric	then	
(3) 	 	 let	𝒄𝒋:= 𝒙𝒋!𝐦𝐢𝐧(𝒙𝒋)𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝒙𝒋 !𝐦𝐢𝐧 𝒙𝒋 	
(4) 	 	 let	cutpoints:= 0, 0.111, 0.222… 0.888, 1 	
(5) 	 	 for	each	𝑏 = 1… 10	
(6) 	 	 	 let	𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠!=	𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐞𝐬 𝒄𝒋!!"#$%&'#(! ,𝒄𝒋!!"#$%&'#(!!!! . 100	
(7) 	 	 if	𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝐛𝐢𝐧𝐬 > 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐎𝐑 bins = 0 then	
(8) 	 	 	 let	𝒙𝒋(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒):= 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡	
(9) 	 	 else 	
(10) 	 	 	 let	𝒙𝒋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 := 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 	
(11) 	 else	
(12) 	 	 let	𝒙𝒋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 := 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐 	
(13) return:	x	
Figure 3-25  – Pseudo code: numeric relevance. 
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3.4.2 NumericSkew() 
As noted in (Bishop & Ryman-Tubb, 1994) machine learning approaches generally 
benefit from the raw data being pre-processed by deriving new input fields so that 
the classifier complexity and computation times are reduced.  A distribution that is 
approximately symmetric is sometimes more efficient to process and so transforming 
numeric fields to reduce their skewedness is undertaken.  It is useful to produce a 
homoscedastic distribution, i.e. an approximately equal spread despite large 
variations in values.  It is more straightforward to model approximate linear 
relationships between fields.  NumericSkew() is a modest approach to undertake such 
transforms.  In the following discussion, statistics measures are described in general 
in (Crow, 1960) and are as implemented in (R-Development-Core-Team, 2008).  
NumericSkew() measures the difference between the distribution of the field and that 
of a normal distribution using a 1-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic that quantifies 
a distance between an assumed continuous distribution and a normal distribution 
(Kolmogorov, 1933; Smirnov, 1948).  A search is undertaken that uses the list of 
non-linear transform functions (given in Table 3-6) on each field and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied.  The results of each transform are measured by a 
computed p-value.  A small value, here 0.05 is used as a cutoff and indicates strong 
evidence against the null hypothesis being that the distribution is normal and so it is 
rejected and the transform with the largest p-value over this cutoff, including that of 
no transform, is subsequently selected (see discussion on “phenomenological adjustment of 
constants”  in 4.2.1, page 206).  
Table 3-6 – Non-linear transforms used in NumericSkew(). 
Transform Description 
Square root Used for Poisson distributed data (such as counts). 
Fisher Used for for Pearson distributed data. 
Arcsine square root 
Used where the data measures proportions 
(binomial data). 
Cube root Used to reduce left side skewedness. 
Log10 Used to reduce right side skewedness. 
Reciprical / negative 
reciprical 
Used where values represent ratios.  
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The NumericSkew() process is described in Figure 3-26. 
NumericSkew()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Output:		ℝ that	may	have	fields	transformed.	
(1) for	each	field	𝒙𝒋 𝑖𝑛 ℝ where	𝑗 is 0… d	
(2) 	 if	𝒙𝒋	is	numeric	then	
(3) 	 for	each	fnc ∈ !! , !!! , log!" 𝑥 , 𝑥, 𝑥! , 𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟, sin!! 𝑥, !!!! , 𝑥 	
(4) 	 	 let	p:= ks 𝑓𝑛𝑐 𝒙𝒋 	//compare	with	normal	distribution	
(5) 	 	 if	𝑝 > 𝑝!"#$#%&'	AND	𝑝 ≥ 0.05 then	bestfnc:=fnc	
(6) 	 let	𝒙𝒋:=𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡fnc(𝒙𝒋)	
(7) return:	ℝ	
Figure 3-26  – Pseudo code: numeric skew. 
3.4.3 SymbolicRelevance() 
A group of symbols is known as a categorical symbol.  A single input field to the 
underlying neural network classifier is associated with one categorical symbol.  The 
more fields the greater the complexity of the classifier.  Complex classifiers are more 
computationally expensive to train and more difficult to understand.  Categorical 
symbols are analysed by SymbolicRelevance() that transforms the symbols into 
binary digits each of which are assigned to an input to the neural network using one-
hot encoding (Oerlemans & Theeuwen, 1987).  𝑙!  = 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!  where 𝑏 𝜖 1,0  
and 𝑏! = 1!…! .  So that 𝑙! 𝒻 𝑙!, where the transformation is denoted as 𝒻 . .  For 
example, 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = ′𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙!, 𝑖! 𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒!, 𝑉! 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒!, 𝐼! 𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜!,  has 3 
unique symbol and is transformed to 1,0,0,0 ≡! 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙!, 0,1,0,0 ≡! 𝑖𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒!, 0,0,1,0 ≡! 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑛𝑒! 0,0,0,1 ≡! 𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜′.  Each symbolic field is analysed and a measure of 
redundancy denoted 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛 is calculated using (Shannon, 1948) that calculates the 
conditional entropy for each unique symbol based upon its conditional probability 
on the fraud class.  If this value is over a fixed constant then that symbol is 
determined to have insufficient additional information and is marked to ignore. 
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SymbolicRelevance()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! ,𝒞! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Proportion	of	symbolic	fields	required:	𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡, 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 > 0%, 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ≤100%	
Redundancy	measure	of	symbolic	field:	maxredun ,maxredun > 0%, maxredun ≤ 100%	
Output:		ℝ that	may	have	new	columns	added	using	one-hot	encoding,	where	each	column	
represents	a	1-of-n	single	symbol.	𝑑	is	the	updated	number	of	fields	in	the	dataset	
(1) for	each	field	𝒙𝒋 𝑖𝑛 ℝ where	𝑗 is 0…  d	
(2) 	 let	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡:=number	unique	symbols(𝒙𝒋 )	
(3) 	 if	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 =	0	then	mark	field	𝒙𝒋	to	be	ignored	
(4) 	 if	!"#$%&! . 100 <  𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 then	‘insuffcient	examples	of	symbol’	
(5) 	 for	each	𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑠	in	𝒙𝒋	
(6) 	 	 let	active:=count	of	s	where	𝒞!"#$%	
(7) 	 	 let	𝑝𝑦 ≔ !!"#$%&	
(8) 	 	 if	𝑝𝑦 = 1	then	let	𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛:=0	
(9) 	 	 else	
(10) 	 	 let	𝑝𝑥𝑦:= !"#$%&!"#$% !" 𝒞!"#$% 	
(11) 	 	 if	𝑝𝑥𝑦 > 0	let	𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛 ≔ !"# !"#!"# !" 	\\	Shannon’s	entropy	
(12) 	 	 else	let	𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛 ≔ 100	
(13) 	 if	𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛 > maxredun	then	mark	field	𝒙𝒋	to	be	ignored	
(14) 	 else	
(15) 	 let	𝑖 ≔ 1… 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 	
(16) 	 	 let	𝑥!…! ≔ 𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑂𝑁 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 	
(17) 	 	 𝐥𝐞𝐭 𝑑 ≔ 𝑖	
	
(18) return:	ℝ,	𝑑	
Figure 3-27  – Pseudo code: symbolic relevance. 
3.4.4 ChiSymbolMerge() 
Symbol “parcelling” is a method to concatenate “associated” symbols within a field 
so as to reduce the dimensionality of the dataset (Bandalos, 2002).  Generally this 
approach is reported as ameliorating the effects of too many nominal values (when 
compared to the depth of the dataset) and that are non-normally distributed.  
Characteristically, improved classifiers are produced when symbols are parcelled in 
some way.  The classifier will exhibit lower bias but the approach will obfuscate 
weaker interactions between symbols and this may be important to the accuracy of 
the classifier.  ChisymbolMerge() aims to subsume symbols into larger groups where 
they have both similar conditional target probabilities and the number of records in 
each group is kept approximately the same.  This process is similar to that described 
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as Chi2 (Liu & Setiono, 1995; 1997) and ChiMerge as extended by (Kerber, 1992b) 
to be used for the discretisation of numeric fields.  Their approach has been 
extended here so that it can be applied to symbolic fields rather than numeric only 
versions described.  ChiMergeSymbol() will reduce the variance in the model as 
symbols are parcelled together but it will introduce a higher bias.  
This process is described in Figure 3-28. 
ChiSymbolMerge()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! ,𝒞! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝑝𝑥𝑦 . 	function	is	defined	in	SymbolicRelevance()	
Measure	of	closeness:	𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟	
Output:		ℝ 	with	fields	merged	added	for	symbolic	fields	where	the	original	symbols	have	
been	grouped.		Each	new	field	represents	a	set	of	symbols	symbols	using	one-hot	
encoding.	𝑥	in	ℝ has	attributes	 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 ≔ 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙!, 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙!, 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙! 	𝑑	is	the	updated	number	of	fields	in	the	dataset.	
(1) for	each	field	𝒙𝒋 𝑖𝑛 ℝ where	𝑗 is 0…  d	
(2) 	 let	𝑆:=sort	lowest	to	highest	by	𝑃 𝒙𝒊 	
(3) 	 for	each	𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑆	in	𝒙𝒋	and	counted	as	1…n	
(4) 	 	 if	𝑝𝑥𝑦 𝑺𝒏 ≅ 𝑝𝑥𝑦 𝑺𝒏!𝟏 ± 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟	then	
(5) 	 	 	 join	 𝑺𝒏, 𝑺𝒏!𝟏 	
(6) 	 	 	 𝐥𝐞𝐭 𝑑 ≔ 𝑑 − 1	
(7) 	 for	each	group	n	
(8) 	 	 if	𝑝𝑥𝑦 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒏 ≅ 𝑝𝑥𝑦 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒏!𝟏 	then	
(9) 	 	 	 if	#records	in	each	group	similar	then	
(10) 	 	 	 	 join	 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒏,𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑!!! 	
(11) 	 for	each	group	n	
(12) 	 	let	𝑥! ≔ 𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑂𝑁 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  	
(13) 	 𝐥𝐞𝐭 𝑑 ≔ 𝑑 − 1	
(14) return:	ℝ,	𝑑	
Figure 3-28  – Pseudo code: symbolic conditional probability grouping. 
Each new field generated is given a linguistic name that is the original field name 
plus each of the symbol names that it represents.  Where there are many unique 
symbols, the set may be renamed by a human expert to linguistically describe the 
grouping for example, “High risk countries”, “Foreign transaction”, etc.   
3.4.5 NumericRedundancy() 
Once fields have been converted into equivalent numeric values the original raw 
dataset is no longer required.  To discover potential redundant fields a linear 
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correlation is calculated between all input fields using the method described in detail 
(Kendall, 1938).  This is used to calculate a measure of association between all fields 
where the distributions of the fields may not come from a bivariate normal 
distribution despite the efforts of NumericSkew().  It is not necessary to detail the 
correlation calculation as this is based on the implimentation in (R-Development-
Core-Team, 2008) and the process is described in Figure 3-29. 
NumericRedundancy()	
Input:	
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! ,𝒞! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Redundancy	measure	of	field:	maxcorr ,maxcorr > 0%, maxcorr ≤ 100%	
Output:	ℝ 	with	fields	removed	if	considered	highly	correlated	with	another	field.	𝑑	is	the	updated	number	of	fields	in	the	dataset.	
(1) let	𝑚!,! ≔ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑥!…!,!…! 𝑖𝑛 ℝ 	using	Kendall	measure	
(2) let	𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑:= 𝑚!,! ≥ maxcorr 	
(3) if	𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 > 0	then	mark	field	𝒙!"#$%"&!'#()**&!+$&'	to	be	ignored	
(4) 𝐥𝐞𝐭 𝑑 ≔ 𝑑 − 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 	
(5) return:	ℝ,	𝑑	
Figure 3-29  – Pseudo code: numeric redundancy. 
3.4.6 Outlier() 
Individual records that contain outliers that are defined as values that are outside a 
fixed number of standard deviations from the mean and it is often useful due to 
neural network training algorithms to remove for training.  This may improve the 
accuracy of the classifier and computational efficiency during training when tested.  
This optional process is described in Figure 3-30. 
Outlier()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! ,𝒞! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Redundancy	measure	of	field:	maxoutlier , maxoutlier > 0%, maxoutlier ≤ 100%	
Output:		ℝ 	with	records	removed	if	considered	an	outlier.	𝑛	is	the	updated	number	of	records	in	the	dataset.	
(1) let	count:=0	
(2) for	each	record	𝒙𝒋 𝑖𝑛 ℝ, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑		
(3) 	 if	𝒙𝒋 < 𝒙𝒋 + 𝝈 𝒙𝒋 . maxoutlier  𝑶𝑹 𝒙𝒋 > 𝒙𝒋 − 𝝈 𝒙𝒋 . maxoutlier 	then	
(4) 	 		 mark	record	𝑗	to	be	ignored	
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(5) 	 		 let	count:=count+1	
(6) let	𝑛 ≔ 𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡	
(7) return:	ℝ,	𝑛	
Figure 3-30  – Pseudo code: outlier. 
3.4.7 Derive() 
As previously established in previously reviewed work (Richardson, 1997), (Zaslavsky 
& Strizhak, 2006), (Ise et al., 2009), (Jha et al., 2012) in 2.5, page 62 most humans 
develop habitual behaviours and this is true of financial transactions.  To encode the 
temporal and sequential dimension of transactions one approach is to create “global 
features” by producing derived fields that encapsulate this behaviour over time.  In 
this case aggregated statistics are calculated over a specified period so as to generate 
a new field.  For example fields could be created that calculate the average spend on 
a payment card over 1, 7, 30 and 60 days.  These new fields are then included in the 
dataset and analysed.  These fields can be computationally expensive to calculate 
and therefore derived fields that do not have a significant effect on the accuracy of 
the classifier are removed.  Derived fields that strongly correlate with other fields are 
removed. 
3.4.8 Discretise() 
The discretise step is used to convert all real or integer numeric values in the dataset 
into discreet literals.  Each jth literal 𝑙! is transformed into a number of new literal 
columns using one-hot encoding (Oerlemans & Theeuwen, 1987) where the values 
represented within the field are quantised into 𝑚 exclusive bins representing lower 𝑙! and upper values 𝑢! where the corresponding value forms intervals 𝑙!  ≡𝑙!,𝑢! , 𝑙!,𝑢! ,… 𝑙!,𝑢!  where 𝑙! <  𝑢! and 𝑙! < 𝑙! and 𝑢! < 𝑢!.  A 
ChiMerge algorithm is used that is described in detail in (Kerber, 1992b) that uses 
the conditional probability of the class being 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 when the value is present in the 
dataset.  This algorithm uses the chi square statistic (Pearson, 1900) to determine if 
the relative class frequencies of adjacent intervals are distinctly different or if they are 
similar enough to justify merging them into a single interval.  It is not necessary to 
detail this calculation in Figure 3-31.  The discretised fields consist of n literals each 
of which is a binary digit.  The literal field will be linguistically named with a 
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meaningful description denoting the corresponding continuous real or integer 
value 𝑙!,𝑢! , for example, ‘$100>Spend<$500’.   
Discretise()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! ,𝒞! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Output:		ℝ 	with	fields	converted	to	n	discreet	literal	fields.	Each	discreet	literal	field	𝑥	has	attributes	 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 ≔ 𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 	𝑑	is	the	updated	number	of	fields	in	the	dataset.	
(1) let	𝔻 ≔ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒 ℝ 	\\	implemented	in	(Kerber,	1992b)	
(2) for	each	cutoff	in	𝒙𝒋 𝑖𝑛 𝔻 where	𝑗 is 0 to number of cutoffs-1	
(3) 	 let	𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 ≔ 𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝒙𝒋 	
(4) 	 let	𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 ≔ 𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝒙𝒋!𝟏 	
(5) 	 let	𝑥!𝑖𝑛 ℝ ≔ 𝑂𝑁, 𝑖𝑓 𝒙𝒋 ≥ 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝒙𝒋 < 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝐹𝐹, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                      	
(6) 	 let	𝑥! 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 ≔ 𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 	
(7) 	
(8) 	 let	𝑑 ≔ 𝑑 − 1 +  number of cutoffs	
(9) return:	ℝ,	𝑑	
Figure 3-31  – Pseudo code: discretise. 
3.4.9 Normalise() 
Any fields that are marked as “numeric” are normalised so as to be in a suitable 
range for input to the classifier, typically between 𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑚𝑖𝑛  as in Eq. (3-2).  This 
does not change the distribution of the data and is just for the purpose of the neural 
network classifier algorithm.  This step is included for completeness as all the 
datasets for the SOAR algorithm are always discretised.  
𝑥 = 𝒙−𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝒙𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝒙 −𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝒙  (3-2) 
3.4.10 Summary 
The pre-processing steps required as part of the proposed SOAR extraction method 
has been described.  These steps create a dataset that is suitable to train a classifier to 
detect fraud that is then used to extract rules.  The SOAR extraction algorithm is 
described in the next section. 
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3.5 SOAR Extraction 
An overview of the algorithm for the SOAR extraction method is given in Figure 
3-32 which each of the steps summarised in Table 3-7.  This algorithm efficiently 
searches for a decision boundary of the classifier that represent fraud.  A prototype is 
generated and is “expanded” to cover the largest area that continues to represent 
fraud.  In the SOAR extraction algorithm sparse training examples are used as the 
initial search space “seeds” – since locating points on the decision boundary in a 
large search space would be otherwise inefficient.  The SOAR extraction algorithm 
is designed to be independent of the fraud classifier.  The rules are subsequently 
optimised to avoid overlap, etc.  This step includes rule pruning to remove rules that 
have a large estimated error and those which have zero coverage for the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 
dataset.  Each step is detailed in pseudo code and a working implementation is given 
in the R language (Appendix D), which was used to generate the results for the 
experiments in Chapter 4.   
 
Figure 3-32  – Diagram of the SOAR extraction method. 
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The SOAR extraction algorithm is described in pseudo code that can be deployed 
using a range of implementations.   
Table 3-7 – Description of each step used in the SOAR extraction algorithm. 
Step Algorithm Description 
1.  ConstructPrototypes() 
Group similar examples from the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class to 
reduce complexity forms prototypes of fraud 
examples. 
2.  Sensitivity() 
Each prototype is expanded using sensitivity 
analysis that is based on the output of the neural 
oracle to search for points on the decision 
boundary to form a hyper-polytope that contains 
only one class.  The aim is to capture the 
generalisation of the neural model while covering 
as much of the feature space contiguously as is 
possible.  This is used to create a rule as a list of 
antecedents as a combination of the expanded 
input fields. 
3.  Optimise() 
The rules are optimised to avoid overlap, etc.  This 
step includes rule pruning to remove rules that 
have a large estimated error and those which have 
zero coverage for the 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 dataset. 
Since the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 examples are sparse it is claimed that the above procedure is 
computationally efficient.  This approach will approximate the classification of the 
neural system by creating a set of rules.  
3.5.1 SOAR extraction algorithm 
In Figure 3-33 the SOAR extraction process takes as its input a dataset that is 
formed from those marked as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 with 𝑛 records that is the output of the 
previous pre-processing steps, ℝ that has been discretised using one-hot encoding.  A 𝜃 value is required which defines the point at which the probabilistic output from the 
classifier indicates fraud, Eq. (1-3), page 40.   
In line (2) the extraction process first constructs a set of prototypes 𝒫 by clustering 
the passed dataset into similar groups.  Each prototype 𝒫! is then processed using 
sensitivity analysis where an efficient search is undertaken to locate points that may 
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lie on the decision boundary by “expanding” the prototype.  This expanded 
prototype creates a single rule in line (6).  Each rule is added to the ruleset in line (7) 
and when all prototypes have been processed, this ruleset is then optimised and 
returned in line (9). 
ExtractRules()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,!, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .	𝑥	has	attributes	following	preprocessing	defined	as	
(type):	“numeric	discreet”,	“numeric”	or	“symbolic”,	 name ≔ fieldname, lower, upper 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 	is	a	trained	classifier	as	previously	defined,	here	denoted	𝒪 . 	𝜃 value	over	which	indicates	fraud,	where, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 <  𝜃.	
Output:		
A	ruleset:	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 = 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟏  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟐  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟑… ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 	
(1) \\	Create	unique	prototypes,	each	aims	to	represent	a	different	fraud	
vector.	Each	is	centered	on	an	example	from	the	TRAIN	dataset	
(2) let	prototype	𝒫:=ConstructPrototypes(ℝ,𝒪, 𝜃)	
(3) initialise	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∶= 	
(4) for	each	prototype	𝒫!	where	𝑗	is	the	number	of	prototypes	
(5) 		\\	Locate	extent	to	which	prototype	each	can	be	expanded	in	feature	space	
(6) 	 let	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!:=  sensitivity 𝒫! ,𝒪, 𝜃 	
(7) 	 \\	Create	a	set	of	disjunctive	rules	
(8) 	 let	ruleset:=  ruleset +  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!	
(9) \\	Optimise	the	entire	ruleset	
(10) let	ruleset:=  Optimise(ruleset) 	
(11) return:	ruleset		
Figure 3-33  – Pseudo code: SOAR high-level extract rules. 
3.5.2 Constructing prototypes 
A prototype is created that represents a single fraud vector in the form of a rule.  
This process is described in Figure 3-34.  The prototypes aim to represent a common 
fraud vector that has been located as a cluster in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset.  Clustering is 
used to reduce the search space to create a ruleset that is more comprehensible and 
generalising.  There are a large number of different clustering algorithms that cover 
statistics, machine learning, AI, data mining and mathematics (Devi & Devi, 2014) 
some of which were discussed in 2.5.3, page 93.  There is a taxonomy of clustering 
techniques and it is not necessary for this thesis to review this.  The choice of the 
clustering method for SOARs made on practical considerations of ease of 
implementation, efficient computationally, that can work with a large number of 
input fields (dimensions), operates where the dataset is not consistent so that the 
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examples may overlap and operates where the examples may be both close and 
distant over a wide instance space and places similar examples within a cluster within 
a reasonable accuracy.  Three different clustering methods have been tested (see 
Chapter 4) and are detailed along with their parameters in Table 3-8, (1) Gaussian 
Mixture Modelling for Model-Based Clustering as implemented in (Fraley et al., 
2012), (2) Adaptive resonance theory (ART) network (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987) 
and a Self Organising Map (SOM) as implemented in (Christoph Bergmeir, 2012).   
Table 3-8 – Choice of clustering algorithm in the SOAR extraction algorithm. 
Algorithm Description 
Gaussian Mixture 
Modelling 
An iterative Expectation Maximisation (EM) 
method is used for maximum likelihood estimation 
in a parameterised Gaussian mixture model.  The 
Expectation step calculates the conditional 
probability that a record belongs to a given cluster 
given the current parameter estimates and the 
Maximisation step then computes parameters 
estimates given this result.  The algorithm requires 
a constant that determines when the above 
iterative process is terminated which is set to its 
default value as described in (Fraley et al., 2012). 
Adaptive resonance 
theory (ART) 
ART2 is a probabilistic clustering approach that 
develops new clusters as they are if sufficiently 
different patterns exist.  ART2 calculates the 
Euclidean distances between the input pattern and 
the existing exemplars to determine cluster 
membership except where a pattern lies outside the 
radii of a hypersphere set by a parameter in which 
case a new cluster is formed.  The algorithm was 
modified so that only clusters with sufficient 
number of members were formed.  Those with just 
one member were combined with the nearest 
cluster.  The algorithm requires five parameters (1) 
vigilance that measures error (0.99), strength of 
influence of the lower and middle levels (20), the 
proportion of the number of neurons used to 
compute an error (0.1) and the threshold for the 
output function of the neurons (0).  These 
parameters and the default values that were used 
are described in detail in (Zell, 1998).  A step-by-
step description of the ART2 algorithm is given in 
(Yoh-Han, 1989).   
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Algorithm Description 
Self Organising Map 
(SOM) 
A SOM was used as implemented in (Christoph 
Bergmeir, 2012) and organises itself into clusters 
that represent high-dimensional input data as a 
two-dimensional map while maintaining the 
topological properties of the input space.  A map 
size of 5x5 neurons was chosen through trial and 
error. 
 
In Figure 3-34 the ConstructPrototypes() algorithm is given.  In line (3) the prototype 
construction process first clusters the records in the 𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑰𝑵 dataset using one of the 
clustering methods described.  In each record the membership of a cluster is marked 
as a numeric attribute “(clusterID)”.  In cases where the number of examples are 
very small, such as in some of the datasets in Chapter 4 it is possible that no 
meaningful clusters can be found and the chosen clustering algorithm in line (3) 
simply returns just one “(clusterID).  If this is the case, then line (7) uses each positive 
example as though it were a separate cluster of a single example.  A prototype is 
derived from each set of records that have the same (clusterID) in line (10).  The 
centre of this cluster is then calculated in line (11) using the function centroids().  
Once a centroid has been calculated, this centroid may not activate the trained 
underlying classifier and if this so then line (13) ensures that the prototype created 
from this centroid is moved to be the nearest example in the 𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑰𝑵 dataset that is 
known to activate the trained underlying classifier.  ConstructPrototypes() thus 
creates a list of single prototypes that can be considered as the closest to the centre of 
its cluster that aims to represent a fraud vector and a list of prototypes is returned. 
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ConstructPrototypes()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,!, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .		Where	𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! .  𝑥	has	attributes	following	
preprocessing	defined	as	(type):	“numeric	discreet”,	“numeric”	or	“symbolic”,	name ≔ fieldname, lower, upper 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 	is	a	trained	classifier	as	previously	defined,	here	denoted	𝒪 . 	𝜃 value	over	which	indicates	fraud,	where, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 <  𝜃.	
Output:		𝒫	is	a	list	of	protypes.		𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! 	where	𝑑	is	the	number	of	discreetised	
fields. 𝑥	has	attributes	added	(𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷):	A	numeric	value	indicating	membership	of	
a	cluster.	
P	is	the	number	of	prototypes	created.	
(1) let	prototype	𝒫 = 	
(2) \\	cluster	all	fraud	class	examples	in	the	TRAIN	dataset	
(3) \\	returns	a	memerbship	of	cluster	ID	
(4) let	𝑥!…! 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷 ≔ 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑥!…!  where	cluster(.)	is	Gaussian,	ART2	or	SOM	
algorithms	
(5) let	numberClusters:=length(unique(clusterID))	
(6) \\	if	just	one	cluster	then	use	each	example	as	a	centroid	
(7) if	numberClusters = 1	then	let	𝑥!…! 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷 ≔ 1… 𝑛	
(8) \\	calculate	the	centroid	of	each	of	the	returned	clusters	
(9) for	each	cluster	where	cluster=1…numberClusters	
(10) 			let	𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠:= 𝑥  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥(𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷)=cluster	
(11) 			let	𝒫! ≔ centroid 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 	
(12) 			\\	position	centroid	so	covers	one	example	in	the	TRAIN	dataset	
(13) 			let	𝒫! ≔ movecentroid 𝒫!,ℝ,𝒪, 𝜃 	
(14) return:	list	of	prototypes	𝒫,	number	of	prototypes	p	
Figure 3-34  – Pseudo code: construct prototypes. 
3.5.3 Centroids 
A centroid is calculated in Figure 3-35 using a set of records that have the same 
(clusterID).  There are three types of literal that have been previously determined in 
numericRelevance() that are attached to each literal in the dataset as (type): 
“numeric discreet”, “numeric” or “symbolic”.  Lines (4)-(16) deal with numeric 
discreet types.  To locate the centroid, the original space is used to calculate an 
average value of a field in set of records that have the same (clusterID) and this result 
is then projected back into discreet space.  Each of these fields has been previously 
discretised in discretise() and have attributes attached of 
(name)≔{fieldname,lower,upper}.  A list of literals, all of which have the same 
fieldname is created in line (6).  The mid-point value for each of these fieldnames is 
calculated in !"#$%!!""#$!  in line (9) that is then multiplied by the dataset vector for 
that literal which has the values 0,1  in line (11).  The mean value is then calculated 
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in line (12) being in original space.  In lines (15)-(16) this value is then used to 
determine which of the 1-of-n same fieldname comparing their lower and upper 
attributes with that of this value should set literals in the centroid.  In this way the 
original space values are used and then projected back to the discreet space.  Lines 
(17)-(23) deal with symbolic types.  A list of literals all of which have the same 
fieldname is created in line (19).  Each of these literals represent a single symbol 
determined by NumericRelevance() or a group of symbols determined by 
SymbolicConditionalProbabilityGrouping().  In either case the literal has an attached 
attribute as 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 ≔ 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙!, 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙!, 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙! .  There is no straightforward 
method to determine how close one set of symbols is to another.  Calculating a 
Euclidean distance between 1,0,0  and say 0,0,1  where the first might represent 
“Guildford” and second “Exeter” is clearly incorrect.  To estimate the most 
representative symbol in the cluster, the number of symbols active in each literal is 
calculated in (20)-(22).  This is sorted in (23) so that the literal with the most symbols 
can be determined and this is used to create the entry in the centroid in line (25) as 
being the most representative.  It is recognised that this is not necessarily the correct 
position in original space but it is a pragmatic approach to the symbolic problem.  It 
was not necessary for the purpose of this work to further solve this problem and it is 
suggested that this is an area of future research that is discussed in 7.2.3, page 320.  
Lines (27)-(33) deal with numeric types.  The SOAR algorithm does not currently 
support numeric types, as all values must be first discretised for reasons of 
computational efficiency.  They are included here for completeness.  Line (30) 
creates a vector of real space values that share the same (clusterID) and the mean of 
this is taken in line (31) that is used to create the entry in the centroid in line (34). 
The MoveCentroid() algorithm is called from ConstructPrototypes() in Figure 3-34.  
Once a centroid has been calculated it may not activate the trained underlying 
classifier.  Lines (4) and (5) generate a decision {𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒} from the classifier 
for the TRAIN dataset.  A Euclidean distance is calculated from the passed single 
centroid 𝒞! and all those examples that share the same (clusterID) in the TRAIN 
dataset and that cause the classifier to indicate {𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑}.  While it is recognised that 
the Euclidean distance is a poor measure with discretised literals it is sufficient for the 
purpose of locating a nearby record.  Line (10) locates this record and line (12) then 
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replaces the centroid with this example.  In this way, the centroid is known to cover 
at least one example in the TRAIN dataset that is known to activate the trained 
underlying classifier. 
Centroids()	
Input:		
Dataset:	 𝑠!,! , 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .		Where	𝑠	denotes	only	those	records	have	the	same	 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷 .	𝑠! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! .	𝑠	has	attributes	denoted	as	(type):	“numeric	discreet”,	“numeric”	
or	“symbolic”,	 name ≔ fieldname, lower, upper ,	(𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷):	A	numeric	value	indicating	
membership	of	a	cluster.		
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Output:		𝒞	is	a	list	of	centroids	in	the	same	form	as	𝑥	
c	is	the	number	of	centroids	
(1) let	centroid	𝒞:= 	
(2) for	each	literal	𝑙!	in	𝑠!	where	𝑘 = 1… 𝑑	
(3) \\	Discreetised	numeric	fields	
(4) 			if	𝑙! 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =“discrete	numeric”	then	
(5) 					\\	calculate	mean	value	in	original	space	&	then	project	to	discreet	
(6) 					\\	space	
(7) 						let	samename:=list	of	all	literals	with	the	same	fieldname	from	𝑙!	
(8) 						\\	choose	the	mid-point	value	of	the	discreetised	literals	
(9) 						let	𝑣 ≔ 𝑙!"#$%"#$	\\vector	from	dataset	of	same	named	literals	
(10) 						let	𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ≔ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒): lower, upper 	
(11) \\	multiply	each	literal	column	of	 0,1  by	mid-point	
(12) let	𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠 ≔ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝑣 	
(13) let	𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡 ≔ 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠)/𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑠(𝑣)	
(14) \\	This	is	the	mean	original	space	value	in	the	literal	from	dataset	
(15) \\	Project	this	back	to	discreet	space	
(16) let	𝑙! ≔ 𝑂𝑁  ,                         𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡 ≥ 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟	
(17) 	let	𝑘:= 𝑘 + 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(samename)	
(18) \\	Symbolic	numeric	fields	
(19) if	𝑙! 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =“symbolic”	then	
(20) let	samename:=list	of	all	literals	with	the	same	fieldname	from	𝑙!	
(21) let	𝑣 ≔ 𝑙!"#$%"#$	\\vector	from	dataset	of	same	named	literals	
(22) let	𝑠 ≔ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣 =   1 		\\	count	of	symbols	in	each	column	
(23) 		let	ℎ:= 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝑠 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 	
(24) 		\\	choose	the	literal	with	the	majority	symbols	
(25) 		let	𝑙! ≔ 𝑂𝑁  ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒!                        	
(26) 		let	𝑘:= 𝑘 + 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(samename)	
(27) \\	Numeric	fields	
(28) 		if	𝑙! 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =“numeric”	then	
(29) 	\\	create	list	of	literal	values	with	same	cluster	ID	
(30) 	let	listSame:= 𝑙	where	𝑙! 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷 = 𝑙!…! 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷 	
(31) 		let	𝑙! ≔ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(listSame)	
(32) 					let	𝒞!:= 𝑙! 	
(33) let	𝒞:= unique 𝒞 	
(34) return:	list	of	centroids	𝒞,	number	of	centroids	c	
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	MoveCentroid()	
Input:		
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! , 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .		Where	𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝒞!	is	a	single	centroid	in	the	same	form	as	𝑥	𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 	is	a	trained	classifier	as	previously	defined,	here	denoted	𝒪 𝐱 	𝜃 is	a	threshold,	where, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 <  𝜃.	
Output:		𝒞	is	the	centroid	closest	to	a	matching	example	of	fraud	in	the	dataset	in	the	
same	form	as	𝑥	
c	is	the	number	of	centroids	(1) \\	score	the	entire	train	dataset	using	classifier 
(2) let	similarExamples:= x  where x(clusterID)	is	the	same	
(3) \\	score	the	entire	train	dataset	of	same	clusterID	using	a	classifier	(4) let	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠:= 𝒪(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
(5) let	𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠:= 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 > 𝜃	
(6) let	𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡:= 999,0 	
(7) for	each	record	𝑟	in	𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠	
(8) 			\\	calculate	Euclidean	distance	between	the	record	and	the	centroid	
(9) 			let	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ≔ 𝐸𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑛. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝒞!, 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠!)	
(10) if	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ≤ 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 ≔ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑟 	
(11) \\	replace	the	centroid	with	the	closest	record	to	its	centre	
(12) let	𝒞! ≔ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠!  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 =  𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑟 	
(13) return:	centroid	𝒞!	
Figure 3-35  – Pseudo code: centroids. 
3.5.4 Sensitivity 
The core algorithm for SOARs presented in Figure 3-36.  This algorithm efficiently 
searches from the start point of a prototype that has been positioned to be at the 
closest point to the centre of a cluster where it is known that the classifier indicates 
fraud and so to locate the furthest boundary where the underlying classifier 
continues to classify as fraud within that cluster.  In this way antecedents are created 
that define the original space by way of straight lines (as described in 1.6, page 39 
and analysed in 4.4, page 247).  A combination of these straight lines creates a single 
propositional 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒.  Thus a set of anticedents is generated by “expanding” each set 
of same named literals in projected discreet space in line (5) to cover an area on the 
decision boundary in original space that continues to represent fraud.  This is 
accomplished using the neural network as an oracle in lines (6)-(11).  The binary 
digits in each literal in the single prototype is sequentially activated in line (7) in a 
forward only direction from the first literal that is active, for example, 0,1,0… 0 , 0,0,1… 0  𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙 0,0,0… 1   and the class membership determined by 
the oracle in line (11).  In the case where all the same name literals are determined to 
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activate this classifier in line (14) then it could be considered that there is no 
additional information in this field.  However, since the sensitivity search algorithm 
purposefully does not search all subsequent combinations of literals this assumption 
does not hold true.  Therefore just the values defined within the prototype rather 
than an expansion is used and this is in line (15).  Lines (18)-(20) deal with numeric 
discreet types each of which has attributes attached of (name)≔{fieldname, lower, 
upper}.  Where the classifier has indicated fraud these attributes are used to generate 
an antecedent in the form “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏]” that denotes a literal that must have a 
scalar interval ≥ 𝑎 and < 𝑏.  This can be expanded to “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏, 𝑐] used to 
denote a literal that must have a scalar interval ≥ 𝑎 and < 𝑏 OR the single scalar 
value 𝑐.  Combining the range(s) of the attached attributes supports various 
combinations of this format.  Lines (21)-(22) deal with symbolic types where an 
antecedent is formed using the attached attributes as “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = a, b, c ” denotes a 
literal that must contain at least one of the symbolic elements of the set, here “a” OR 
“b” OR “c”.  Where there is only one element in a set it is denoted “𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 = a.”  
Lines (23)-(24) deal with the case where there is just one same named literal and that 
the classifier activates when this literal is set as (x et al.) and so in this case an 
antecedent is formed using the prefix “NOT”.   
The sensitivity() algorithm is given in Figure 3-36. 
Sensitivity()	
Input:		
A	list	of	prototypes	𝒫!…! = 𝑥!, 𝑥!… 𝑥! 	where	each	prototype	𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! 	where	𝑑	
is	the	number	of	fields.	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑘, 𝑘 > 0, k ≤ 𝑑		
The	number	of	prototypes:	𝑖, 𝑖 > 0, i ≤ 𝑝		
Each	field	𝑥	has	an	attribute	denoted	(type):	“numeric	discreet”,	“numeric”	or	
“symbolic”	and	denoted	 name ≔ fieldname, lower, upper 	𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 	is	a	trained	classifier	as	previously	defined,	here	denoted	𝒪 . 	𝜃 is	a	threshold,	where, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 <  𝜃.	
Output:		
Single	rule	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 = 𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣!  ∧  𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣! … ∧  𝑙!  𝑜𝑝 𝑣! ,	where	𝑙!	is	a	named	input	field,	𝑜𝑝 ∈ ≤,≥,=,≠ 	
For	a	numeric	discreet	field	𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏]	is	used	to	denote	a	literal	that	must	have	a	
scalar	interval	≥ 𝑎	and	< 𝑏.		A	discontinuous	range	is	denoted		𝑙 = [𝑎 − 𝑏, 𝑐]	that	
must	have	a	scalar	interval	≥ 𝑎	and	< 𝑏	OR	the	single	scalar	value	𝑐.		
1. for	each	prototype	𝒫!	where	i=1…p	
2. 	initialise	Rule	let	𝑟:= 	
3. 	for	each	literal	𝑙!	in	𝒫!	where	k=1…d	
4. 				let	literalON:= 	
5.       	let	samename:=list	of	all	literals	with	the	same	fieldname	from	𝑙!	
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6.         for	each	𝑟𝑜𝑤!	where	r=1…length(samename)	
7. 							let	𝑟𝑜𝑤!:=2!	\\expressed	in	binary	
8. 							let	𝒫:= 𝒫!	
9. 							let	𝒫 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 ≔ 𝑟𝑜𝑤!	
10. 							let	score:= 𝒪(𝒫)	
11. 							if	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 > 𝜃	let	𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁:= 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 + 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑟 	
12. 				if	samename	has	any	values	ON	then	
13. 						if	𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 ≠ 	then	
14. 									if	length(𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁)	=	length(samename)	then	
15. 												let	𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 ≔ 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝒫 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒  𝑖𝑠 𝑂𝑁	
16. 							\\	creates	an	anticedent	
17. 							for	each	𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁	
18. 									if	𝑙! 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =“discrete	numeric”	then	
19. 											𝑟:= 𝑟 + "𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 name = [𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 ]"	
20. 											𝑟:=merge	any	overlapping	ranges	in	r	
21. 									else	if	𝑙! 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =“symbolic”	then	
22. 												𝑟:= 𝑟 + "𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 name = 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙 "	
23. 				else	if	𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 = 	AND	length(samename)=1	then		
24. 						𝑟:=	"𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁 name = 𝑁𝑂𝑇 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑁(𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙) "	
25. return:	r	
Figure 3-36  – Pseudo code: sensitivity. 
The key differences between the presented SOAR extraction method described 
above and existing pedagogical approaches (reviewed in Chapter 2) will be detailed 
in Chapter 6.  In summary these are: 
§ Each example of fraud is first discretised using clustering such as ART2 
so that the subsequent step of DBA no longer needs an extensive search 
to find a hyper-surface. 
§ It creates a 𝑑-polytope by a limited expansion of each binary-discretised 
field in a method similar to sensitivity analysis.  For each “expansion” in 
this search the oracle is used to produce a classification so that the upper 
and lower bounds or a list of symbols on each field that make up the rule 
can be efficiently located.   
3.5.5 Ruleset optimisation 
Following the SOAR rule extraction post-processing of the ruleset is undertaken in 
Optimise().  There are two key areas of post processing that was considered: 
1. Optimising the performance of the ruleset against some measure 
2. Simplifying the ruleset without significant change in performance 
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If the performance of the ruleset is optimised against some calculated measure using 
the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset then this measure may improve but is likely to lead to overfitting 
to the dataset so that the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 becomes less generalising when tested with further 
holdout data.  This is a similar problem to training any classifier.  An experiment 
was undertaken in Appendix F using a genetic algorithm to improve the 
performance in this way, the results of which indicated overfitting and so a decision 
was made to omit his post-processing step that will be the subject of future work. 
There are many methods that can be used to simplify the prepositional 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
without significant change in performance and this area has been the subject of 
active research for a considerable period, from early mathematical work such as 
(Balinski, 1965) to other examples including (Boyan & Moore, 1998; Duch et al., 
1999; Horrocks & Patel-Schneider, 1999; Plastria, 2002).  There are considerable 
combinatorial problems to solve when attempting to optimise a list of logical rules.  It 
is not necessary for this thesis to explore these methods further and a practical 
approach was taken which is shown in the experiments in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
to be sufficient.  Four steps have been devised: 
1. Discard duplicated rules or rules that can be subsumed 
2. Discard rules that have a TP of zero when tested 
3. Discard rules that have a 𝑀𝐶𝐶 ≤ 0 when tested 
4. Simplify all antecedents that overlap between rules 
None of these steps will significantly alter the predictive accuracy of the ruleset.  It 
can be argued that while the order in which these steps are undertaken will not alter 
the final results but will alter the computational complexity.  In Figure 3-37, in 
Optimise() duplicated rules are discarded in CheckDuplicated() called in line (4).  
This is a simple approach to match those rules with exactly the same list of 
antecedents, invariant to their order and then remove those that are duplicated in 
line (7).  A test in line (8) is for a complete intersection between a shorter rule (being 
that with fewest matching antecedents) and subsequent rules.  If there is a complete 
intersection then it is known that the shorter rule will always be active if processed 
earlier in the ruleset and it is this rule that is chosen for best comprehensibility and 
generalising.  In Optimise(), each rule is next evaluated individually using the 𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑰𝑵 dataset and the TP measured in lines (7)-(9).  Any rule where TP is zero is 
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discarded.  The estimated error for such is rule is likely to be high since it can only 
contribute to being a FP.  Each rule is again evaluated individually using the 𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑰𝑵 
dataset and the MCC calculated in lines (11)-(13).  Any rule where MCC is zero or 
less is discarded.  As previously discussed, an MCC in this range is no better than a 
coin-flip classifier and so the rule can be safely discarded. 
It is possible that one rule may intersect another where one or more antecedents are 
not the same and one or more other antecedents are a subset of one another.  In this 
case the two rules can be processed so as to remove the subset so that they no longer 
intersect.  A single rule can be generated that consists of three ranges (1) those 
antecedents that do not overlap, (2) those values in the overlapped antecedents 
updated so that they do not overlap and (3) those values in the overlapped 
antecedents that overlap.   
Optimise()	
Input:		
A	ruleset:	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 = 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟏  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟐  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟑… ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 	
Dataset:	ℝ = 𝑥!,! , 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .		Where	𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! 		
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Output:		
A	SOAR	ruleset:	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 = 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟏  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟐  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟑… ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 	
(1) \\	Simplify	anticedents	in	the	rules	
(2) let	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≔ 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 	
(3) \\	Remove	duplicated	rules	
(4) let	𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ≔ 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 	
(5) let	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≔ 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 !"#$%&'()!	
(6) \\	Remove	individual	rules	that	have	TP=0	
(7) for	r1	where	r1=1…r	
(8) 			let	𝑇𝑃 ≔ 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!!,ℝ 	
(9) 			if	TP=0	then	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≔ 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!!	
(10) \\	Remove	individual	rules	that	have	MCC<=0	
(11) for	each	r1	where	r1=1…r	
(12) let	𝑀𝐶𝐶 ≔ 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!!,ℝ 	
(13) if	𝑀𝐶𝐶 ≤ 0 then	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≔ 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!!	
(14) return:	ruleset	
CheckDuplicated()	
Input:		
A	ruleset:	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 = 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟏  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟐  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟑… ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 	
Output:		
A	list	of	rule	IDs	that	can	be	removed	
(1) \\	Simplify	anticedents	in	the	rules	
(2) let	𝑟 ≔ 𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒	
(3) let	𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ≔ 	
(4) for	𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1… 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑟 − 1	
(5) 			if	𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑟!) = 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑟!!!)	
(6) 						\\	tests	for	exact	duplication	
(7) 						if	𝑟! = 𝑟!!!	then	let	𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ≔ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝑖 	
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(8) 						\\	if	the	shorter	rule	is	contained	in	the	longer	rule,	then	overlap	
(9) 			else	if	𝑟! 𝑟!!!	then	let	𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ≔ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝑖 + 1 	
(10) return:	𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	
Figure 3-37  – Pseudo code: SOAR optimise rules. 
3.5.6 Genuine class extraction 
A modified SOAR algorithm was proposed in (Ryman-Tubb & Krause, 2011) that 
extracts the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 class from the underlying classifier and then excludes overlaps 
from 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 rules (see Figure 3-38).  The algorithm has been extended so that the 
extraction is repeated at ExtractRules() in Figure 3-33 to extract rules for the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 class.  For those rules that overlap or intersect within the two sets of rules 
the fraud rule is “trimmed” so as to remove the overlap. 
 
Figure 3-38  – Diagram of SOAR extracting and combines rules for 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 classes. 
The process is summarised in Figure 3-39. 
ExtractSOAR-IIRules()	
Input:		
Dataset:	𝔽 = 𝑥!,!, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .	𝔾 = 𝑥!,!,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 ,	where	𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	
Output:		
A	ruleset:	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 = 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟏  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟐  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟑… ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 	
(1) let	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$% ≔ 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝔽 	
(2) let	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$%#":=ExtractRules(𝔾)	
(3) let	ruleset:=OptimiseRulesFraudGenuine(𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$% , 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$%#")		
(4) return:	ruleset		
Figure 3-39  – Pseudo code: SOAR extract 𝑔𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 and 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 rules. 
The main process is given in Figure 3-40 that first removes exact overlapping rules 
and then trims antecedent ranges in the fraud rules if they are overlapped with a 
similar genuine rule. 
SOAR
SOAR
REMOVE
OVERLAPS
rulesetgenuine
rulesetfraud
rulesetfraud
{x1...n, j ....d , fraud}~ ~ ~
{x1...n, j ....d , genuine}~ ~ ~
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OptimiseRulesFraudGenuine()	
Input:		
Dataset:	𝔽 = 𝑥!,!, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .	𝔾 = 𝑥!,!,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 	𝑥	has	attributes	following	preprocessing	defined	as	(type):	“numeric	discreet”,	
“numeric”	or	“symbolic”,	 name ≔ fieldname, lower, upper 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 	is	a	trained	classifier	as	previously	defined,	here	denoted	𝒪 . 	𝜃 value	over	which	indicates	fraud,	where, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 ≥  𝜃0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 <  𝜃.	
Output:		
A	ruleset:	𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 = 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟏  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟐  ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝟑… ∨  𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒏 	
(1) if	#rules	in	ruleset	ℛ!"#$%>0	AND	#rules	in	ruleset	ℛ!"#$%#">0	then	
(2) 			let	ruleset	overlap:=	Exact	Match	Rules(ℛ!"#$% ,ℛ!"#$%#")	
(3) 			remove	all	rules	in	ℛ!"#$%	that	are	also	in	overlap	
(4) 			let	ruleset	better:=	Filter	by	MCC	on	genuine(ℛ!"#$% ,ℛ!"#$%#")	
(5) 			let	ruleset ℛ:=trim	anticedents	in	ℛ!"#$%	using	matching	in	better	
(6) return:	ruleset	ℛ	
Figure 3-40  – Pseudo code: optimise rules. 
3.5.7 Confidence extension 
There is uncertainty (Krause & Clark, 2012) within the datasets and the trained 
classifier and therefore in any rules that are extracted from it using SOAR: 
§ Data Uncertainty – refers to noise in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and uncertainty 
regarding the representation of the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset (𝜎!!).   
§ Model Uncertainty – refers to the inaccuracy in the estimates of the 
neural network weights.  The weights learned by the neural network are 
only estimates of the true weights of the neural network where the true 
weights perfectly explain the dataset being learned (𝜎!! ). 
The 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset is known to be noisy and incomplete where not all possible 
input/output examples are available in the real-world datasets.  Noise is inherent 
and contributes to the total prediction variance as data noise 𝜎!!.  The limitations of 
the underlying fraud detection neural network model and the training algorithm 
introduce further uncertainty as to the classification output.  Neural networks are 
trained using an iterative optimisation algorithm and the learnt weights may 
correspond to a local rather than the global minimum of the error function.  As the 
training algorithm only uses the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset the fraud detection neural network 
model is likely to be valid only for regions sufficiently represented and this is model 
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uncertainty variance given by 𝜎!! .  Having analysed the performance of the neural 
network the inclusion of neural model uncertainty estimation is important to give a 
measure of generalisation.  The confidence estimation must therefore take into 
account both sources: 𝜎!"!#$ = 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! .  There are four key approaches to 
calculating the confidence of a neural network in the literature and these are 
summarised Table 3-9. 
Table 3-9 – List of common methods for neural network classifier confidence 
calculation. 
Method Complexity 
Bayesian  
Bayesian methods are reported to be computationally intensive (Nix 
& Weigend, 1995). 
Bootstrap 
This approach uses an ensemble of neural networks (Carney et al., 
1999). 
Maximum 
Likelihood  
This approach attempts to estimate confidence intervals by finding a 
set of parameters that maximise the variation in the output of the 
neural network on unseen data.  It requires the use of an auxiliary 
neural network in calculating the confidence and two training cycles 
for both neural networks (Papadopoulos et al., 2001).  
Nonlinear 
Least 
Squares 
This is an analytical approach that uses a Taylor series linear 
approximation to obtain linear an approximation of the neural 
network function.  The computational complexity is the calculation 
of a Jacobian matrix, which is computationally costly (Chryssolouris 
et al., 1996). 
The Bayesian method was chosen as being straightforward to implement.  An 
algorithm that produces a single value for confidence in the range 0%-100% for any 
output score of the fraud detection neural network model is given in Figure 3-41.  
Here, setupConfidence() is called as part of an initiation phase that builds the 
computationally efficient lookup table.  Once this table has been created subsequent 
calls to confidence() passing the output score from the neural network classifier in 
line (7) uses simple interpolation between the closest entry and the next in the lookup 
table and return an approximate confidence as a percentage in line (9) calculated 
using the Bayesian method and Parzen window approximation. 
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Confidence()	
Input:	
nnscore	–	neural	network	output	score	to	be	evaluated	for	confidence	
depth	–	size	of	lookup	table,	e.g.	10,000	
Output:		
confidence	–	0	to	100%	confidence	that	the	score	indicates	a	fraud	
(1) let	𝑐 ≔ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(nnscore. depth)		\\	closest	position	in	look	up	table	
(2) let	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓:= interpolate(𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝! , 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝!!!, nnscore) 	\\	straight	line	calc	
(3) return:	𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝!	
setupConfidence()	
Input:	
Dataset:	𝔽 = 𝑥!,!, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 .	𝔾 = 𝑥!,!,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 ,	where	𝑥! = 𝑙!, 𝑙!, 𝑙!… 𝑙! 	
The	number	of	records:	𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛	
The	number	of	fields:	𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, j ≤ 𝑑	𝒪 𝐱;𝐰 	is	a	trained	classifier	as	previously	defined,	here	denoted	𝒪 . 	
depth	–	size	of	lookup	table,	e.g.	10,000	𝜀 –	A	scaling	constant	to	weight	the	results,	e.g.	0.05	
Output:		
Lookup	–	a	list	of		
(1) let	ℎ0:= 𝒪(𝔽)	\\	null	hypothesis,	i.e.	scored	fraud		
(2) let	ℎ1:= 𝒪(𝔾)	\\	alternative	hypothesis,	i.e.	scored	genuine		
(3) let	𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝 ≔ 	
(4) for	𝑐 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑐 = 1… 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 	
(5) 			let	𝑠𝑢𝑚0 ≔ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑒𝑛(ℎ0, 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝔽 , 𝒄𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 , 𝜀)	
(6) 			let	𝑠𝑢𝑚1 ≔ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑒𝑛(ℎ1, 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝔾 , 𝒄𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 , 𝜀))	
(7) 			let	𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝! ≔ !"#!!"#!!!"#! . 100	
(8) return:	𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝	
parzen()	
Input:		
hypothesis	–	vector	of	values	
count	–	number	of	entries	in	hypothesis	
netout	–	observed	value	𝜀 –	A	scaling	constant	to	weight	the	results,	e.g.	0.05	
Output:		
sum	-	the	mean	difference	between	the	hypothesis	and	an	observed	value,	weighted	
by	sigma	and	then	a	guassian	function	
(1) let	𝑠𝑢𝑚 ≔ 0		
(2) for	𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1… 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡	
(3) 			let	𝑠𝑢𝑚 ≔ 𝑠𝑢𝑚 + 𝑒! !"#$%#!!!"#$!!"#"!! !	
(4) return:	 !"#!"#$%	
	
Figure 3-41  – Pseudo code: SOAR extension for confidence. 
This approach is computationally intensive if evaluated for each score as each output 
score produced by the fraud detection neural network model is compared against all 
training examples to determine if the output is sufficiently close to that calculated 
during training.  The novelty of each input is assessed by estimating the probability 
of the input being close to any output score seen during training.  The process for 
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estimating confidence using this approach is deterministic, which implies the output 
of the confidence algorithm can be recreated provided the input value is known. 
Therefore interpolation is employed for building a software lookup table from which 
confidence can be efficiently estimated.  This is achieved by estimating the 
probability density of the distribution of inputs from when the target is classified as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and the probability density for when the output is classified as 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 using 
Parzen windows, detailed in (Postaire & Vasseur, 1982).  Six interpolation methods 
were considered in estimating confidence using this method and are summarised in 
Table 3-10.  
Table 3-10 – List of six interpolation methods. 
Key Description 
Linear Piecewise linear interpolation. 
Cubic Cubic function. 
Spline Polynomial function. 
Pchip 
Piecewise Cubic Hermit Interpolation, which is a localised 
version of cubic.   
Nearest 
Nearest neighbour where data points closest to the value being 
interpolated are employed. 
V5cubic A variant of cubic. 
A lookup table was generated using each of the methods to calculate the Parzen 
window for 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 and 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 transactions and it was found that there was no 
significant difference between the methods. It is for this reason that the simple linear 
interpolation was implemented.   
An extension to SOAR was made as illustrated in Figure 3-42.  High confidence 
transactions are transactions that the neural network model has seen during training.  
The output of the neural network and that of the confidence calculation passes to a 
low-pass filter whose bandwidth is controlled by the choice of threshold values and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒.  The pass rate of this filter is number of transactions that are passed as 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 that will increase as the threshold is decreased.  This is because the 
probability of the neural network output having a value less than threshold decreases 
as the threshold is increased.  High confidence scores are used to extract 
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𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$%&'"!!" that represents well-established fraud vectors within the classifier.  
The fraud experts should recognise most of these rules.  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$%&'"!!"  can be 
deployed within an existing FMS as it has been shown to have a high degree of 
accuracy.  The low confidence score is used to extract a 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"!#$%&$ that 
represents new and emerging fraud vectors where there are only a few examples 
within the classifier.  This knowledge is crucial to ensuring that the FMS remains 
effective as fraudsters develop new and creative methods.  Analysing 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"!#$%&$ and importantly how it changes over time will give important 
insights.  
 
Figure 3-42  – Block diagram of confidence filters to extract SOAR rulesets . 
3.6 Summary 
The SOAR extraction method has been presented.  The hypothesis is that this 
method provides an approach to the extraction of knowledge from a black-box fraud 
classifier that can be practically deployed alongside an incumbent fraud detection 
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system.  It is claimed that the proposed method will operate efficiently on large-scale 
datasets that are highly unblanced and have sparse examples of fraud and will 
produce a ruleset that is compact and contains expressive English-like rules.  It is 
largley independent of the black-box fraud classifier and the ruleset generated will 
be sufficiently sound so as to represent the classifier in terms of a range of measures.  
The method will operate on current computing server platforms to produce a 
complete 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 within a short timeframe.  The 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 will aid the understanding 
of fraud patterns and so improve human understanding of fraud vectors and 
emerging fraud vectors if it is used on a regular basis. 
It has been discussed in Chapter 1 and established in Appendix A through a 
discursive examination of the growth of payments and fraud that there is a pivotal 
event where the rapid understanding of fraud vectors is necessary.  It was seen in 
Chapter 2 through a review of literature on fraud detection methodologies and 
symbolic knowledge extraction that there is a gap in research to address this 
problem.  In this Chapter this problem has started to be addressed through the 
proposed SOAR extraction algorithm.   
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will next evaluate the efficacy of SOAR against published 
academic datasets and large, real-world datasets provided by payment card issuers.  
It will be concluded that SOAR extraction method outperforms leading published 
results and produces a compact explanation of payment card fraud, which payments 
industry experts have verified.   
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Chapter 4 Public Domain Data Empirical 
Evaluation 
“It would appear that we have reached the limits of what it is possible to achieve with 
computer technology, although one should be careful with such statements as they tend to 
sound pretty silly in 5 years.” – John von Neumann. 
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4.1 Introduction 
he boundaries of applicability of the SOAR extraction algorithm are 
examined through an empirical evaluation.  It will be shown that SOAR 
extracts rules that are more compact and are superior or similar in five 
out of ten datasets when compared to benchmark figures.  This Chapter 
undertakes a set of experiments using publicly available datasets.  UCI datasets are 
chosen as being those found to be common in the reviewed rule extraction works 
from Chapter 2.  These datasets are used as benchmarks so as to position this work 
within that of other published methods.  This work does not focus on increasing the 
accuracy of a classifier to detect fraud as SOAR has been designed to extract 
abstract knowledge so that underlying patterns of fraud in deployed FMS can be 
understood in such a way as to add to the knowledge of human experts.  It is for this 
reason that these small datasets do not perform well.  In this thesis an important 
measure is that of soundness/support as Eq. (2-25) and comprehensibility as Eq. 
(2-27) of the extracted rules.  The experiments will show that SOAR extracts rulesets 
that have reasonable soundness/support and good comprehensibility that meets the 
R1 to R7 desiderata.  An analysis of the UCI datasets will underline that there are only 
a few examples from which to apply the algorithms.  Employing the SOAR 
Extraction algorithm to such datasets is not the core research contribution of this 
thesis.  Earlier experiments indicated that this method might perform poorly for 
datasets where the classes are not sparse and do not necessarily form natural clusters 
and so the method was extended to include both classes. 
It is established in Appendix A that there is a pivotal event in payments that will 
create new and changing payment card fraud vectors and that the detection of such 
fraud will require machine learning approaches.  It is the timely understanding of 
these changing fraud vectors that will be fundamental to reducing payment card 
fraud crime.  Therefore extracting knowledge from black-box classifiers deployed 
inside an existing FMS used in the payment processors is important.  Following the 
review of 80 key works from around 750 published relevant papers it was discovered 
that there remains a gap in current research on combining fraud detection with 
symbolic knowledge extraction.  The experiments in this Chapter will lead to an 
T 
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understanding of how the proposed algorithm is one solution to fill this gap.  
Through the experiments it will be seen that the SOAR extraction algorithm is 
sensitive to the number of initial clusters but not the clustering method.  The SOAR 
extraction algorithm will be found not to be sensitive to the underlying classifier so it 
can be used on a range of classifiers with similar results.  The rule optimisation 
methodology reduces the number of rules so that they are more abstract while 
maintaining performance and it is therefore an essential step.  Following these results 
Chapter 5 will undertake similar experiments using large real-world datasets 
provided by two large issuers in confidence.   
4.2 Experimental Method 
The empirical evaluation of the SOAR extraction algorithm has been designed to 
benchmark performance and to assess the key assumptions.  The following form the 
basis of the experimental setup: 
§ Constants, conventions and assumptions 
§ Independent validation of results 
§ Public datasets  
§ Performance measures  
§ SOAR extraction algorithm assumptions 
§ Pre-processing 
Each of these topics is discussed in the following sections. 
4.2.1 Constants, conventions and assumptions 
It is important for empirical experiments to avoid “phenomenological adjustment of 
constants” so as to fit the objectives of the experiment; even if unintentionally 
(Feynman et al., 1992).  Therefore constants including datasets and their assumptions 
are given and where possible random selection is used throughout to avoid human 
bias.  Due to the nature of some constants not all assumptions can be eliminated and 
therefore there may be some doubt or bias introduced in the interpretation of results, 
which will be discussed with those results.  Common statistical measures have 
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underlying assumptions that are typically not explicitly stated or evaluated for 
suitability in the reviewed works.  Research papers in the field of machine learning 
often use “conventions” such as splitting a dataset into “70:30” for 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets.  In this case there appears no discernible reason why this specific 
ratio is selected and it is more of a “foundational myth” than scientific rigor.  As argued 
by (Garland, 2002),  
“The telling and retelling of these standard historical tales [conventions] is a most effective 
way of persuading the discipline’s recruits that whatever else may be contested, this much 
at least can be taken for granted.” 
That is conventions and assumptions are often unquestioned as truths.  It is for this 
reason that careful attention is given to the experimental setup and all assumptions 
are detailed in 4.2.8, page 215.  Although it is not argued that this work avoids all 
such conventions it does at least recognise the issue.  The choice of datasets 
introduces some bias through the historic selection of these specific datasets by 
previous authors of the published body of work.  The experimental results herein can 
be readily reproduced, reviewed and further developed by other researchers.  Results 
are compared with other published work so as to provide some measure of position 
within that body of work and the results are published here “as is”, both poor and 
good to avoid experimental bias or removal of results that appear not to fit within 
what may be seen as “normal”.  Results are compared in research to determine their 
significance.  Using a statistical test to give a measure of this significance a value is 
then set in the work such that, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ≤  𝛼, 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡}.  𝑝 is often interpreted as a 
measure of the evidence against the null hypothesis (here the null hypothesis being 
that the SOAR extraction method is an improvement over other comparable 
measures in published work).  With real-world data and the stated aims of this thesis, 
there is no correct value for 𝛼 as many papers claim as further argued by learned 
works including (Krämer, 2011), (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008) – it is not 0.05.  For this 
reason 𝑝 is reported here but it is not used as the measure of significance; the results 
will be discussed in context of their real-world application.  The Wilcoxon signed-
ranks statistical significance test (Wilcoxon 𝑇 test) has been chosen (Wilcoxon, 1945; 
Conover & Iman, 1981) as a paired-difference significance test that does not assume 
the data to have a normal distribution.  It does assume independence nevertheless as 
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a folded cross-validation approach is taken then the averaged folded results are not 
entirely independent but the error in the Wilcoxon 𝑇 test is argued to be small.  
4.2.2 Independent validation of results 
Publicly available datasets have been chosen to provide a method to allow 
independent validation of the SOAR extraction method and the stated experimental 
results.  The algorithm has been detailed as pseudo code in Chapter 3 which has 
been implemented in the R language and can be used to reproduce all the 
experiments, tables and visualisations in this Chapter.  This permits the datasets and 
the method to be independently validated and gives straightforward access to future 
researchers.  This R code used is made publically available at (Ryman-Tubb, 2016) 
and in Appendix D. 
4.2.3 Public datasets 
The datasets for the experiments were selected from the public UCI repository (UCI, 
2010) as previously listed in Table 2-9.  Each of the selected datasets has been chosen 
where there are published results in terms of some performance measures for 
pedagogical rule extraction methods reviewed in Table 2-56.  Where there is more 
than one published result for the same dataset a benchmark figure is selected with 
the highest 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 as Eq. (2-3), page 51.  The smallest class in each dataset is 
used to represent the equivalent 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class (class 1) and the largest is the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 
class (class 0).  This Chapter continues the convention of using the terms 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 for the classes in the selected datasets and not the class labels specified.  
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Table 4-1 – List of public datasets used in empirical experiments with their detailed 
characteristics. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, Dataset=title of dataset, #Classes=Number of classes in original 
dataset; these are converted to two classes for the experiments.  Class Labels=Linguistic class 
descripition. 
4.2.4 Stratified cross-validation 
From Table 4-1 the datasets have a small number of example records.  Any dataset 
with fewer than c.1m records is considered “small” in the context of financial 
transaction datasets.  When data is used to evaluate the performance of 𝓞 𝐱;𝐰  it is 
usually split into two or three datasets   The UCI datasets are too small to create a 
separate unseen dataset with which to assess the performance and so a 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset is created in these experiments using cross-validation.  At any one time 
if a single random sample is taken to create a 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset from such a small 
population there is a reasonable likelihood that this will contain unique examples, 
which are not included in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and that also fall outside of an area of 
generalisation (as illustrated in Figure 2-24, page 127).  Therefore such a sample will 
not adequately capture the knowledge domain and results in this case will be 
unreliable.  To help overcome this problem a stratified k-folded cross-validation 
approach is taken (Japkowicz & Shah, 2011a), which aims to provide results that are 
indicative of performance on a more generalised and independent dataset shown in 
Fraud Genuine RGF
Class 1 Class 0
UCI-A
Statlog – Australian 
Credit Approval
690 14 2 Decline Approve 1.2
UCI-B
(Wisconsin) Breast 
Cancer 569 10 2 Malignant Benign 1.7
UCI-G
Statlog - German Credit 
Score 1,000 24 2 Bad Good 2.3
UCI-H Hepatitis 930 19 2 Die Live 3.8
UCI-I Iris dataset 100 4 3 Iris-setosa Iris-versicolor 1.0
UCI-L+ Lung Cancer 32 56 3 1 2 & 3 2.6
UCI-M Mushroom 8,124 22 3 Poisonous Edible 1.1
UCI-O+ Ionosphere 351 34 2 Bad Good 1.8
UCI-P Pima Indians Diabetes 768 8 2 No Yes 1.9
UCI-U+ 1985 Auto Imports 205 26 7 -3 3 1.2
Ref Dataset #Records #Fields #Classes
Class Labels
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Figure 4-43.  This cross-validation approach partitions the dataset ℝ into k-folds of 
complementary subsets so that for a k-fold, a subset of unique records is created of 
roughly ℝ!, which is withheld from the dataset to become the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset.  
Importantly the k 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets do not overlap records so that each example record 
is used only once for testing and k-1 used for the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset.  The experiments 
return a set of 𝑘 results, which are estimates of performance 𝑝′ and are calculated as 
a mean along with a standard deviation.  If the actual performance of the classifier is 𝑝 then ℝ is sampled and it is assumed this sample has the same distribution.  In some 
cases this can result in datasets in which onew of the classes is unrepresented or 
absent.  To overcome this problem the dataset is first stratified where each of the two 
classes is separated and the k datasets created for each class.  These are then 
combined so as to maintain the original class distribution (𝑅𝐺𝐹).  It can be seen that 
the results for 𝑝′ may vary considerably.  𝑝′ will be slightly biased as the 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 
dataset is slightly smaller than the actual dataset (the 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 dataset is ℝ− ℝ! records).  
It is possible that the bias will suggest slightly poorer results than in reality but is not 
likely to be significant.  A common value for k in the literature is 10.  This is 
empirically set to reduce this bias and keep the computational complexity of 
obtaining results manageable.  As the results for 𝑝′ can have a large variance if two 
different classifiers are compared using performance figures calculated it is possible 
that what is measured as the higher performing classifier may not actually be so.  It 
has been stated that calculating confidence intervals for stratified k-fold cross-
validation is a difficult problem that has not yet been resolved (Japkowicz & Shah, 
2011a).   
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Figure 4-43  – Block diagram illustrating stratified k-fold cross validation method. 
Results in this Chapter have been obtained using 10 folds and therefore represent 
resampled performance figures.  It follows that if there are no overlapping similar 
examples from the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset that appear in the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset then when 
measuring the performance of rules using this method it relies on the ability of the 
rules (or classifier) to generalise.  The classifier 𝑦 = 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  is created based on the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset and has only a certain area of generalisation within the feature space.  
The rules are extracted from this classifier by SOAR and so if a specific example that 
has never been seen by the classifier in the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset lies on the border or 
outside this generalisation feature space then the rules will always misclassify.  Each 
dataset is analysed as to overlap and given in Table 4-2.  Here common examples in 
the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets are shown to have very few overlaps.  Those 
examples that have the same fields but are marked in some cases as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and in 
others as 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 are shown in the shaded rows. 
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Table 4-2 – Analysis of overlapping classes and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 and 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 datasets. 
 
Key: #Records=Mean number of records in dataset over 10 folds,  f=𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔 = 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒.  σ 
standard deviation over 10 folds.  All values in the shaded rows should be zero. 
4.2.5 Performance measures 
Table 4-3 details the measures used in the experiments repeated from their previous 
definitions that are calculated using the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset created through stratified 
cross-validation.  In this thesis the important measures are soundness/support as Eq. 
Dataset #Records ! #Records ! #Records ! #Records ! #Records !
TRAINg 344.7 0.5 321.3 0.5 630.0 0.0 664.2 0.4 45.0 0.0
TRAINf 276.3 0.5 190.8 0.4 270.0 0.0 172.8 0.4 45.0 0.0
TESTg 38.3 0.5 35.7 0.5 70.0 0.0 73.8 0.4 5.0 0.0
TESTf 30.7 0.5 21.2 0.4 30.0 0.0 19.2 0.4 5.0 0.0
TRAINg ∩ TESTg 7.1 1.9 10.2 1.9 0.0 0.0 71.0 2.4 1.2 0.4
TRAINf ∩ TESTf 5.5 1.6 10.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.4 1.0 0.0
TRAINg ∩ TRAINf 15.7 1.1 13.3 0.8 1.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
TESTg ∩ TESTf 0.1 0.3 2.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4
TRAINg ∩ TESTf 2.5 1.7 4.9 1.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
TRAINf ∩ TESTg 2.3 1.4 6.1 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4
Dataset #Records ! #Records ! #Records ! #Records ! #Records !
TRAINg 19.8 0.4 3,787.2 0.4 202.5 0.5 450.0 0.0 162.0 0.0
TRAINf 9.0 0.0 3,524.4 0.5 113.4 0.5 241.2 0.4 22.5 0.5
TESTg 2.2 0.4 420.8 0.4 22.5 0.5 50.0 0.0 18.0 0.0
TESTf 1.0 0.0 391.6 0.5 12.6 0.5 26.8 0.4 2.5 0.5
TRAINg ∩ TESTg 0.0 0.0 56.2 75.5 1.4 1.6 14.3 1.8 3.7 2.5
TRAINf ∩ TESTf 0.0 0.0 2.8 4.8 0.4 0.5 17.0 1.7 1.2 0.6
TRAINg ∩ TRAINf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 35.7 1.1 0.0 0.0
TESTg ∩ TESTf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 2.0 0.0 0.0
TRAINg ∩ TESTf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 14.1 2.4 0.0 0.0
TRAINf ∩ TESTg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 14.7 1.8 0.0 0.0
Overlaps between TRAIN and TEST datasets
Overlaps between TRAIN and TEST datasets
Wrongly marked classes within either TRAIN or TEST datasets
Wrongly marked classes in TRAIN and TEST datasets
Wrongly marked classes within either TRAIN or TEST datasets
Wrongly marked classes in TRAIN and TEST datasets
UCI-L+ UCI-M UCI-O+ UCI-P UCI-U+
UCI-A UCI-B UCI-G UCI-H UCI-I
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(2-25) and comprehensibility as Eq. (2-27) of the extracted rules as discussed in Table 
2-45, page 129).  There is no agreed common set of measures used throughout the 
literature, which makes it difficult to compare any performance with the published 
body of work.  Where the performance measure cannot be determined it is shown as 
“NA” in the result tables.  Where there are results for all folds and any of these 
figures is NA then the measures are estimated over the remaining figures. 
Table 4-3 – List of empirical evaluation performance measures. 
Measure Description Equation See Eq. 
𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 A percentage measure of how many unseen records are classified in the same 
way by the ruleset and 
classifier. 
!"! . 100, where 
TP is correct rule prediction 
of fraud and P is the total 
number of fraud examples. 
(2-25) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 A percentage measure of  the proportion of examples that are predicted as fraud 
by the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the 
classifier.   
!"! . 100, where the rules are 
compared to the classifier. 
 
 
(2-26) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 A measure of ruleset comprehensibility.  A smaller ruleset with 
simpler rules is easier for 
human understanding.   
#𝑙!!"#$%$&  (2-27) 
Quality 
The Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient (𝑀𝐶𝐶) is used 
as a measure of quality of 
the ruleset. 𝑇𝑃.𝑇𝑁 − (𝐹𝑃.𝐹𝑁)𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 . 𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 . 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 . (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁) (2-4) 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 The accuracy of both the classifier and the extracted rules are measured to 
compare against published 
benchmark figures. 
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 (2-3) 
False and True 
Positive Rate 
The TPR and FPR are 
measured to compare 
against published 
benchmark figures. 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 = 𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 𝑇𝑃𝑅 = 𝑇𝑃𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 
(2-7) 
 
 
(2-8) 
Significance 𝑇 test Wilcoxon signed-ranks pairs statistical significance test is used as a 
comparison measure of 
result significance. 
See (Wilcoxon, 1945)  
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4.2.6 Selection of classifier threshold 
The value for 𝜃 for each classifier has been determined using a ROC analysis (see 
2.3.2, page 54) which has been implemented using (Robin et al., 2011).  As noted 
earlier, for real-world performance this is not necessarily the best point as false 
positive and false negative predictions do not have the same importance.  No 
adjustment has been in this Chapter.   
4.2.7 Experimental fixed parameters 
The parameters given in Table 4-4 are fixed in all experiments unless otherwise 
stated.  It is beyond the scope of this work to provide methods of avoiding such fixed 
parameters – which are (if perhaps arbitrarily, as discussed in4.2.1) determined based 
on experience.  These parameters may cast some doubt on the veracity of some of 
the results but this has been ameliorated as far as possible. 
Table 4-4 – List of experimental fixed parameters. 
Parameter Value Description 
Classifier type Deep-MLP 
As discussed in 4.2.6.   
Classifier 
training 
algorithm 
Deep As discussed in 4.2.6.   
Classifier 
output neuron 
Non-
linear 
Activation function. 
Classifier 
weight 
initialisation 
Random Randomly generated. 
Clustering 
method Gaussian 
This implementation is from (Chris Fraley, 2012).   
Stratified cross-
validation folds 10 
Number of folds. 
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 0.4 In NumericRelevance() the proportion of ten equal histogram bins that are not “full”.  Fields are considered non-continuous in this case and are 
marked to be processed as a discreet set of symbols.  
𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟 0.5 In ChiMergeSymbol() this is used to determine how “close” one symbolic field conditional probability is to 
another, taken as a +/- proportion of the difference. 
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Parameter Value Description maxredun 70% In SymbolicRelevance(), the field is removed if it is ≥ maxredun according to redundancy calculation using 
information theory. maxcorr 0.9 In NumericRedundancy(), any field that has a correlation of ≥ maxcorr is removed. maxoutlier N/A Not used in this Chapter. 
4.2.8 SOAR extraction algorithm assumptions 
A list of the key assumptions in the design of the SOAR extraction algorithm was 
given previously in Table 4-5 and these are summarised in Table 4-5 and are 
discussed. 
Table 4-5 – List of SOAR assumptions made in experiments (A1 to A9) summarised. 
 Assumption Description True? 
A1.  Pedagogical rule extraction method. SOARs a pedagogical rule extraction method. 
✔ 
A2.  
The 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset 
used to create the 
classifier is available. 
10 fold stratified cross-validation.   ✔ 
A3.  The dataset available ℝ is large-scale. All the public domain datasets are small. ✖ 
A4.  
The dataset is 
unbalanced so that 
the fraud examples 
are sparse. 
The UCI datasets are not sparse. ✖ 
A5.  
Discretised 
continuous valued 
input fields 𝑙! . Yes. ✔ 
A6.  
That the fraud class 
is the minority class 
and forms clusters. 
Criminal MO tends to follow a similar 
pattern.  Therefore fraud vectors also follow 
similar patterns and will therefore form 
clusters of similar fraud vectors. 
✖ 
A7.  
Symbolic fields are 
transformed through 
meaningful 
groupings that can 
be linguistically 
named. 
The UCI datasets are too small to use 
probability grouping of symbols without 
significant loss of information.  This step was 
therefore not performed. 
✖ 
| Chapter 4 - Public Domain Data Empirical Evaluation | 
 | 216 |  
 Assumption Description True? 
A8.  
That 𝑙! . is able to 
sufficiently describe 
the fit to the decision 
boundary within a 
practical tolerance. 
To be determined. N/A 
A9.  
Classifier output is a 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 indicating 
probability of fraud. 
A fixed 𝜃 value is selected for the experiments.  
The output of the classifier is argued to be 
sufficiently close to true probability so as not 
to prejudice the results. 
✔ 
Further assumptions were made for the experiments and these are given in Table 
4-6. 
Table 4-6 – List of further assumptions made for empirical experiments (A10-A14). 
 Assumption Description 
A10.  
Number of 
neurons/hidden 
units. 
As it is not necessary for this thesis to analyse or create the 
best fraud classifier but to demonstrate the extraction of 
knowledge from such a classifier, a fixed number of neurons 
have been manually chosen though earlier experiments to 
give a reasonable performance. 
A11.  
Strength value 
indicating 
importance of a 
field. 
During experiments it was found that the number of fields 
led to a dimensionality issue.  An additional step was added 
that provided a measure of importance for each field as a 
percentage.  Any fields below a fixed value are subsequently 
ignored. 
A12.  Fixed intervals 
Where experiments involve using continuous input values 
then there are substantial combinatorial problems as 
previously discussed.  To overcome in part this problem 
continuous values are analysed over their range using fixed 
and assumed intervals.  There is doubt that such a method 
is reasonable if the instance space is discontinuous or 
sensitive in only a particular region of space. 
A13.  Fixed fields 
Where experiments involve using continuous input values to 
avoid excessive search times the maximum number of such 
fields is fixed and any others are ignored. 
A14.  
Random 
numbers are 
random 
The code used to implement the algorithms and those of the 
machine learning uses a pseudo-random number generator 
that generates numbers about a uniform distribution with 
an initial seed.  This seed ensures that the same sequence of 
random numbers is generated each time the code is 
executed.  It is assumed that this is sufficiently random over 
the experiments to not prejudice the results.   
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4.2.9 Pre-processing 
The SOAR extraction algorithm assumes that the dataset has been pre-processed 
into ℝ.  This is a common requirement for machine learning approaches.  The steps 
required for large scale datasets were given previously in Table 3-5, page 173.   
For each dataset with numeric fields the numeric relevance analysis was completed.  
As an example, the results have been plotted for UCI-B as a bar chart in Figure 4-44 
where those fields below the dotted line were removed from further processing, 
which is set at a fixed threshold.  
 
Key: Shading indicates %numeric relevance: 
      Low………………………......High 
 
Fields below the plotted dotted line threshold are converted to discrete numeric fields. 
Setup: Dataset: UCI-B. Fold: 1.  
Figure 4-44  – Bar chart of numeric relevance for each field in the UCI-B dataset. 
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The number of fields removed through this process is summarised in Table 4-7.  
Once the numeric relevance pre-processing is completed the dataset is updated so 
that it contains either the original numeric field or new field(s) created by converting 
the numeric field into discrete literals.   
Symbolic relevance is used to convert fields that contain symbols into separate fields 
that is for each symbolic field, 𝑙! = 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏!  where 𝑏! is a single binary 
digit which is exclusively set to 1 for the corresponding unique symbol in the field.  
Each new literal field is linguistically named using the original field name and the 
unique symbol identifier.  To ensure maximum entropy a frequency analysis of the 
symbolic fields is undertaken and if a unique symbol represents over a fixed 
threshold of all the records is it then converted to a new discrete literal field, 
otherwise it is ignored.   
Information theory (Shannon, 1948) is used to calculate the redundancy for each 
discrete literal field and if redundancy is calculated to be over a fixed threshold then 
that field is removed.  A stacked bar chart is used to visualise the distribution of 
unique symbols 𝑙! and as an illustration is plotted in Figure 4-45 for UCI-U where 
the y-axis is the total number of records and the x-axis the name of the field.  Each 
bar is shaded to indicate a unique symbol within that field; which allows the 
variability of a field to be visulised.  The number of fields removed through this 
process is summarised in Table 4-7. 
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Key: Each bar is shaded to indicate the number of unique symbols within that field.  The greater 
number of segments indicates a greater variability within that field. 
Setup: Dataset: UCI-U. Folds: 1. 
Figure 4-45  – Bar chart of unique symbols for each field in the UCI-U dataset. 
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information in the dataset.  For each dataset the numeric redundancy analysis was 
completed.  Those fields that either contained all the same values or were highly 
correlated were removed from further processing.  To illustrate the correlation 
results for UCI-U have been plotted in Figure 4-46. 
 
Fields that are correlated over a threshold are plotted as larger circles and a darker shade.  One of 
these correlated fields is removed by the pre-processing.  Fields that contain one value are removed. 3 
fields removed as correlated (Make=Peugot, EngineType=l, FuelSystem=1bbl). 
Setup: Dataset: UCI-U. Fold: 1. 
Figure 4-46  – Correlogram for the UCI-U dataset. 
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CurbWeight=[1488−4066]
Length=[141.1−208.1]
EngineSize=[61−326]
Price=[0−45400]
Horsepower=[0−288]
Drive={rwd}
Bore=[0−3.8]
FuelSystem={mpfi}
Height=[47.8−59.8]
Aspiration={turbo}
Doors={four}
BodyStyle={sedan}
Stroke=[0−3.9]
Compression=[7−23]
EngineLocation={front}
EngineType={ohc}
CityMPG=[13−49]
HighwayMPG=[16−54]
Doors={two}
Width=[60.3−72.3]
WheelBase=[86.6−120.9]
PeakRPM={4800}
Losses=[0−256]
UCI−U.csv
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The discretise step is used to convert remaining continuous numeric values into 
discrete literals.  Results from all the pre-processing steps are summarised in Table 
4-7. 
Table 4-7 – Pre-processing results for all UCI datasets. 
 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, Original=figures prior to pre-processing, Pre-Processed= results 
after pre-processing, #Num=#fields with numeric values, #Discr Num=#fields of discreet numeric 
type, #Symbolic=#fields that contain symbols, #Discr=#fields that are discrete symbolic. 
The discretisation step generates more fields than the original dataset – especially 
when the field is symbolic and contains a large number of different symbols.  There 
is an experimental problem where the ratio of the number of records to examples is 
low as highlighted in Table 4-8.  
Ref↓ #Records RGF #Num #Discr Num #Symbolic Total Fields
UCI-A 690 1.25 6 8 0 14
UCI-B 569 1.68 10 0 0 10
UCI-G 1,000 2.33 3 4 13 20
UCI-H 930 3.84 6 13 0 19
UCI-I 100 1.00 4 0 0 4
UCI-L+ 32 2.56 55 0 1 56
UCI-M 8,124 1.07 0 0 22 22
UCI-O+ 351 1.79 32 1 0 33
UCI-P 768 1.87 7 1 0 8
UCI-U+ 205 7.2 15 0 10 25
Original Fields
Ref↓ #Records RGF #Discr Num #Symbolic Total Fields
UCI-A 690 1.25 12 9 21
UCI-B 569 1.68 18 0 18
UCI-G 1,000 2.33 6 20 26
UCI-H 930 3.84 6 24 30
UCI-I 100 1.00 8 0 8
UCI-L+ 32 2.56 6 62 68
UCI-M 8,124 1.07 0 30 30
UCI-O+ 351 1.79 64 2 66
UCI-P 768 1.87 14 0 14
UCI-U+ 205 7.2 39 1 40
After Pre-Processing
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Table 4-8 – Dimensionality of all UCI datasets highlighting ratio of fields to number 
of records. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less.  Ratio is #𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠. 
With the increase in the number of input fields the intrinsic dimensionality of the 
problem grows and so the number of examples required to sufficiently train the 
classifier increases.  In the UCI-L dataset there are more fields than records and it is 
unlikely that the classifier will be able to learn robustly and with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy unless the variability is low and therefore results for this dataset are 
expected to be poor or non determinable.  Those datasets with a ratio below 1:10 are 
marked in this Chapter with “+” to aid in analysis of such difficult to model datasets.  
In the next section experiments are undertaken and results presented to help 
understand the boundaries of applicability of the SOAR extraction algorithm.  It will 
be found through these experiments that SOAR extracts fewer rules in 8 cases, with 
an average of 5.9 rules and all have a similar performance measured by 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
with benchmarks.  The rulesets will be found to have an average 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 of 75% 
and soundness of 60%,which is lower than expected and will be explored further.  
The SOAR Extraction algorithm was not designed for small datasets and these 
results confirm this assumption.   
Ref #Records Input Fields Ratio↓
UCI-L+ 32 68 0.5
UCI-U+ 205 40 5.1
UCI-O+ 351 66 5.3
UCI-I 100 8 12.5
UCI-H 930 30 31.0
UCI-B 569 18 31.6
UCI-A 690 21 32.9
UCI-G 1,000 26 38.5
UCI-P 768 14 54.9
UCI-M 8,124 30 270.8
After Pre-Processing
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4.2.10 Underlying deep learning classifier 
It is assumed for SOAR that the underlying classifier already exists as a part of a 
FMS.  It is worth noting that SOAR relies on the efficacy of the underlying classifier 
implementation that is typically measured against the (sampled) real-world dataset 
and therefore largely its performance relies on a well-trained classifier.  In the 
experiments an advanced deep learning classifier is used with regularisation 
approaches to reduce overfitting as the default black-box classifier.  This thesis does 
not focus on increasing the accuracy of the classifier (to detect fraud) as SOAR has 
been designed to extract abstract knowledge so that underlying patterns of fraud in 
an exisiting deployed FMS can be understood in such a way as to add to the 
knowledge of human experts.  It is known from industry knowledge that many 
deployed FMS are based on older classifier types (see Probabilistic-Restricted 
Coulomb Energy (P-RCE) neural network in 2.5.2.1, page 86 and 2.7, page 154).  
Deep neural network architectures show promise in terms of classifier accuracy, 
generalisation and scalability (Bengio, 2007).  Such a deep classifier is used as the 
underlying classifier in these experiments the implementation of which is described 
in (Aiello et al., 2016; Candel, 2016).  A deep classifier is made up of a number of 
individual layers of a neural network such as the Restricted Boltzmann Machine 
(Salakhutdinov & Hinton, 2009) or Deep-MLP where the lower layers feed into 
those above it to form a hierarchy (Bengio, 2007; Hinton, 2007).  The levels are 
trained individually and then together produce a set of top-level neurons that 
respond to key features within the lower levels.  These levels in the deep architecture 
are argued by some researchers to represent “precepts” but there is no reason why 
these should necessarily map to human explainable features (such as “high spender” 
or “weekend shopper”) unless they are designed to do so.  Deep learning methods 
attempt to train this hierarchy so that the higher level features are formed by the 
composition of lower level features.  The training algorithm chosen uses 
regularisation approaches to reduce overfitting of the classifier.  Lasso, Ridge and 
dropout regularisation are selected as described in (Srivastava et al., 2014).  Weight 
decay regularisation with the regularisation constant chosen by cross validation 
(Bishop, 1995b) is known to reduce overfitting and is selected.  The training 
algorithm implements an approach to increase convergence speed using an adaptive 
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learning rate called ADADELTA as described in (Zeiler, 2012).  The are a number 
of parameters that must be set for this advanced training algorithm and a hyper-
parameter optimisation approach is taken.  (Bergstra & Bengio, 2012) has shown that 
that randomly chosen trials are more efficient for hyper-parameter optimization than 
trials on a grid.  In these experiments randomly chosen values within a specific range 
are used over a number of trials to create a classifier and then measure the 
performance.  Once the trials have been completed a model is chosen based on the 
lowest Mean Squared Error (MSE).  This measure is used for reasons of 
computational efficiency.   
The deep training results for each classifier for each dataset are given in Table 4-9. 
Table 4-9 – Deep-MLP classifier 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 results for all UCI datasets. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less.  >0.5 for 
the column to the left. 
Setup: Folds: 10.  Classifier: Deep-MLP algorithm from (Aiello et al., 2016; Candel, 2016).  
Reviewing the performance in Table 4-9, eight of the datasets have an MCC of 
greater than 0.5, which could be considered a sufficient fit.  UCI-G has a high 
proportion of symbolic fields, which is likely to influence the neural network 
convergence. UCI-P  has only numric fields and it may be the discreetisation step 
has lost too much information to create a good model. 
MCC
Ref↓ %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC >0.5
UCI-A 86.683 15.114 88.926 0.735 1
UCI-B 93.497 7.097 94.497 0.864 1
UCI-G 69.378 31.254 70.852 0.370 0
UCI-H 91.518 6.985 85.770 0.758 1
UCI-I 100.000 0.000 100.000 1.000 1
UCI-L+ 97.192 3.579 98.889 0.939 1
UCI-M 98.967 0.372 98.258 0.979 1
UCI-O+ 95.725 3.408 94.171 0.907 1
UCI-P 62.281 48.822 83.007 0.366 0
UCI-U+ 93.006 7.346 95.553 0.754 1
MCC>0.5 8
Deep MLP (TRAIN) 
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Table 4-10 – Deep-MLP classifier 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 results for all UCI datasets. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less.  >0.5 for 
the column to the left. 
Setup: Folds: 10.  Classifier: Deep-MLP algorithm from (Aiello et al., 2016; Candel, 2016).  
The 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset results show a variation in performance with the MCC varaying 
from 0.310 to 0.909.  This is in part due to the small dataset size.  It is possible that it 
is due to communal random patterns in the subclasses of the class 1 and class 0 
examples that affect the convergence during training.  This is true near decision 
boundaries where insufficient examples of class 1 will cause the neural network to 
learn from the noise that could be common among a large fraction of that class.  
Worse still if the characteristics of a subclass of class 1 place it in a position in data 
space that is fairly isolated from the other subclasses then many training examples 
from that subclass are required (but are not available in the small datasets here) to 
avoid over fitting to the random patterns common to members of that subclass.  
Given that only a few examples are available per fold in the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset ranging 
from just 1 to 47.7, a specific subclass is likely to have only a few examples and may 
be contaminated with noise unless they are all contaminated with the same noise, 
which is unlikely and therefore these examples may not be properly learned.  While 
the use of the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset provides a measure of the performance of the underlying 
classifier it is not the aim of this thesis to create or analyse the classifier in any depth 
MCC
Ref↓ %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC >0.5
UCI-A 85.216 16.471 87.355 0.709 1
UCI-B 92.994 7.833 94.329 0.857 1
UCI-G 63.700 37.286 66.000 0.310 0
UCI-H 91.173 7.866 87.500 0.756 1
UCI-I 92.593 23.333 80.000 0.797 1
UCI-L+ 77.500 23.333 80.000 0.797 1
UCI-M 94.943 1.641 91.272 0.909 1
UCI-O+ 90.579 9.814 91.230 0.803 1
UCI-P 61.876 49.600 83.191 0.408 0
UCI-U+ 87.810 12.778 90.000 0.707 1
MCC>0.5 8
Deep MLP (TEST)
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– as it is assumed that a black-box classifier already exists within the FMS for which 
the SOAR extraction algorithm has been created.   
4.3 Experiments and Results 
To evaluate the SOAR extraction algorithm the experiments in Table 4-11 are 
undertaken.  For each experiment the parameters previously listed in Table 4-4 are 
fixed unless otherwise stated. 
Table 4-11 – Summary of experiments used for the empirical evaluation of the 
SOAR extraction algorithm. 
Summary Description 
Performance 
SOAR 
Experiments to measure the performance of the SOAR extraction 
algorithm and comparing this to the underlying classifier from 
which the rules are extracted. 
Cluster 
dependency 
Sparse training examples from the fraud class are used as initial 
search space “seeds”.  A prototype is created as a single fraud vector 
in the form of a rule using clustering and then locating the centre of 
the cluster as being the most representative (least variance) of all 
those in-cluster examples.  An assumption has been made that any 
clustering approach, which is able to provide some optimal 
separation between in-cluster and outside-cluster variance, will be 
suitable.  Therefore experiments to assess the efficacy of the SOAR 
extraction algorithm using a selection of common clustering 
methods is undertaken. 
Classifier 
dependency 
A trained classifier is used as an oracle so that a search of the 
boundaries between the fraud and genuine classes is undertaken.  
The classifier needs to be as defined in Eq. (1-3), page 40, where the 
output defines the probability of fraud and 𝜃 is used to determine 
when this indicates fraud.  The underlying classifier type is assumed 
not to be important to SOAR and therefore experiments to assess 
the efficacy of the SOAR extraction algorithm using a selection of 
common machine learning classifiers is undertaken. 
Rule 
Optimisation 
In Table 3-7, a method for optimising the extracted rules is 
described to remove overlapped rules that have a large estimated 
error and those that have no coverage for the 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁 dataset.  
Experiments to measure the effectiveness of this step are 
undertaken. 
Benchmarks 
Experiments to measure the performance of the SOAR extraction 
algorithm and comparing this to other published results on 
common datasets. 
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These experiments will establish that SOAR is less effective for datasets where the 
classes are not sparse and do not necessarily form natural clusters.  It is demonstrated 
that the proposed extensions to the SOAR algorithm increase the efficacy of the 
method.  As discussed in 2.6.1 soundness and support is an important measure of 
equivalence between the SOAR extracted 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 and 𝒪 𝐱;𝐰  as defined in Eq. 
(2-25).  SOAR extracts a compact ruleset, which leads to a high level of 
comprehensibility.  The algorithm is not sensitive to the clustering method or the 
classifier type making it suitable for use within a wide range of FMS.  Each of the 
experiments in Table 4-11 is described in the following sections along with results 
and analysis.   
4.3.1 SOAR ruleset soundness and support 
Soundness and support of the extracted rulesets is an important measure defined in 
Eq. (2-25).  Results are tabulated in Table 4-12. 
Table 4-12 – SOAR ruleset soundness and support. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited. σ given as standard deviation over all folds for the column to the left.  
+=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less. >70% calculated for the column to the left. 
Setup: Clustering Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
Ref  ↓ Soundness ! >70% Support ! >70%
UCI-A 38.8 15.4 0 70.1 9.5 1
UCI-B 84.2 10.1 1 93.3 4.5 1
UCI-G 11.9 13.1 0 59.9 25.9 0
UCI-H 57.1 8.1 0 88.1 2.3 1
UCI-I 100.0 0.0 1 100.0 0.0 1
UCI-L+ 18.8 37.2 0 65.0 33.5 0
UCI-M 35.9 18.7 0 72.3 8.4 1
UCI-O+ 81.1 5.8 1 31.6 1.4 0
UCI-P 76.0 27.1 1 80.6 28.8 1
UCI-U+ 75.5 28.1 1 90.8 12.0 1
Mean 57.9 16.4 75.2 12.6
5 7SOAR > 70%
SOAR  (TEST)
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The 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 measure varies considerably between the datasets which a perfect 
100% to a poor 11.9%.  This measure is influenced by the class skew with those 
performing worse having a higher 𝑅𝐺𝐹;  UCI-G has an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 2.33 and UCI-L an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 2.56.  The 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 measure is more reliable and shows that SOAR 
extracted rulesets have an average of 75.2% across all rulesets, with 7 out of 10 
rulesets with 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 of over 70% which can be argued to indicate a good coverage 
of the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class surface of the classifier, despite the small dataset sizes. 
4.3.2 SOAR ruleset comprehensibility 
Comprehensibility of the extracted rulesets is defined in Eq. (2-27) and discussed in 
Table 2-45.  Results are tabulated in Table 4-13. 
Table 4-13 – SOAR ruleset comprehensibility. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited. .  σ given as standard deviation over all folds for the column to the 
left. +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less. 
Setup: Clustering Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
Ref  ↓ Comprehensibility ! #Rules #Anti
UCI-A 49.8 16.2 6.1 8.2
UCI-B 16.7 6.5 4.0 4.1
UCI-G 55.4 23.6 4.4 12.5
UCI-H 146.9 16.1 11.8 12.4
UCI-I 2.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
UCI-L+ 288.8 11.2 8.1 35.7
UCI-M 78.0 19.0 6.0 13.0
UCI-O+ 31.8 8.3 8.0 3.9
UCI-P 7.1 4.3 3.5 1.9
UCI-U+ 58.2 11.2 5.7 0.8
Mean 73.5 11.6 5.9 9.5
SOAR (TEST)
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The SOAR extraction has generated an average of 5.9 rules which each have an 
average of 9.5 anticedents.  The 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 measure indicates that rulesets 
are compact.  Further analysis of the rules comparing to benchmark figures is given 
in 4.3.3.1.  Each rule has a few antecedents that lead to a good comprehensibility.  
This is important as it meets the R1 desiderata listed in Table 1-1.   
4.3.3 SOAR ruleset performance 
The performance of the extracted ruleset is assessed using the quality, accuracy, FPR 
and TPR measures described  Table 4-3 and the results tabulated in Table 4-14. 
Table 4-14 – SOAR performance. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited.  σ given as standard deviation over all folds for the column to the 
left.  +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less. <5%, >0.5% calculated for the 
measure given. Compare is %Acc SOAR / %Acc classifier. 
Setup: Clustering Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
Four of the datasets have an MCC of greater than 0.5, which could be considered a 
sufficient model.  Comparing to the classifier performance it can be seen that UCI-
A, UCI-L, UCI-M and UCI-U all had an MCC of greater than 0.5 and the SOAR 
rules achieved an average of 0.37.  UCI-O had a poor performance and this will be 
discussed further.  It can be seen that in 6 out of the 10 datasets the SOAR rules had 
SOAR (TEST)
%FPR MCC MCC %Acc
Ref  ↓ %Acc %FPR <5% %TPR MCC ! >0.5 >0.5 Compare
UCI-A 69.229 4.433 1 36.344 0.403 0.135 0 1 0.8
UCI-B 90.898 4.468 1 83.052 0.805 0.117 1 1 1.0
UCI-G 67.600 9.857 0 15.000 0.117 0.203 0 0 1.1
UCI-H 86.777 5.148 0 55.684 0.568 0.068 1 1 1.0
UCI-I 100.000 0.000 1 100.000 1.000 0.000 1 1 1.1
UCI-L+ 74.167 0.000 1 20.000 0.200 37.201 0 1 1.0
UCI-M 68.947 0.000 1 35.581 0.457 0.180 0 1 0.7
UCI-O+ 29.640 99.107 0 81.023 -0.328 0.099 0 1 0.3
UCI-P 67.456 30.400 0 63.490 0.324 0.148 0 0 1.1
UCI-U+ 95.071 3.889 1 86.667 0.779 0.357 1 1 1.1
Mean 74.978 15.730 57.684 0.433 3.851
Good performance 6 4 8
CLASSIFIER
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a low FPR that can be argued as being acceptable.  The TPR is an average of 58% 
across all datasets compared to 90% for the classifier.  This performance may also in 
part be due to the uncertainties inherent in the small datasets and the number of 
examples within each fold such that the precision of the results indicates a degree of 
overfitting.  The 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 measure is used but it is not a reliable metric as 
discussed.  It is presented to provide a common measure as is a convention among 
the works reviewed in Chapter 2.  As will be shown in Table 4-7, seven datasets have 
a better 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 to the underlying classifier and this is likely to be due to the low 
FPR for SOAR.  This is intuitive as the SOAR extraction algorithm was designed to 
represent as much of the feature space for the fraud class as possible.  Given this 
result it cannot be the number of fraud examples that are missed that is adversely 
affecting the 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  This suggests that it can only be the number of fraud 
transactions that were wrongly classified as genuine (FN).  Further analysis of the 
rules comparing to benchmark figures is given in 4.3.3.1. 
The 𝐹𝑃𝑅 for SOAR (average 15.730) is a good 20% that of the classifier (18.995).  
However, it is likely that the SOAR algorithm is generating rules that create 
continuous boundaries in feature space where none-should exist due to the 
discretised input steps.  As previously argued criminals aim to make their fraudulent 
transactions look as similar as possible to that of a genuine transaction.  It is likely 
that the boundary between the two classes is both close and has some degree of 
overlap.  
4.3.3.1 SOAR benchmark performance 
To position SOAR within that of other published methods the performance 
measures are compared with benchmark figures in Table 4-15.  None of these 
benchmarks are for extracting rules from an underlying classifier but they do provide 
a useful comparison.   
§ Cited pedagogical rule extraction methods from 2.6.4, page 145 are given 
in Table 4-15 and where provided the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 published for each 
method/dataset are detailed in E.3, page 596. 
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§ Cited results are most commonly given for the C4.5 DT algorithm and 
these are used as benchmarks.  
§ A C5.0 DT algorithm was implemented in R code using the library from 
(Max Kuhn, 2015) available at (Ryman-Tubb, 2016).  Each of the 
selected UCI datasets was used to create a C5.0 DT. 
Table 4-15 – Benchmark SOAR. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, Source=published work as cited, Other measures omitted as not 
published.  +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less. 
The benchmark results are as expected.  Table 4-16 compares the number of rules 
created by the SOAR extraction algorithm and those in the benchmark figures. 
Ref  ↓ Source #Rules %Acc #Rules %Acc #Rules %Acc #Rules %Acc
UCI-A (Setiono & Liu, 1997) 6.6 83.640 14.6 84.2 6.9 86.671 6.1 69.2
UCI-B (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a) 2.0 78.800 9.0 95.3 4.0 92.812 4.0 90.9
UCI-G (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 13.0 97.300 13.0 90.5 6.9 86.671 4.4 67.6
UCI-H (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 8.0 100.000 6.0 95.0 26.2 100.000 11.8 86.8
UCI-I (Craven & Shavlik, 1994a) 10.0 92.000 4.0 97.3 2.0 100.000 1.0 100.0
UCI-L+ (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 36.0 100.000 5.0 88.9 3.5 78.333 8.1 74.2
UCI-M (Tsukimoto, 2000) 2.0 98.500 2.0 98.7 11.9 96.851 6.0 68.9
UCI-O+ (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) 10.0 96.630 8.0 90.5 7.0 90.385 8.0 29.6
UCI-P (Ismail & Ghosh, 1999) 4.0 78.670 19.0 64.9 3.7 75.007 3.5 67.5
UCI-U+ (Zhi-Hua et al., 2000) 12.0 100.000 20.0 95.6 6.4 91.238 5.7 95.1
Mean 10.4 92.6 10.1 90.1 7.9 89.8 5.9 75.0
Cited method Cited C4.5 Calculated C5.0 SOAR 
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Table 4-16 – Benchmark SOAR rules. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, Source=published work as cited, Other measures omitted as not 
published.  +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less. 
In 7 out of the 10 datasets, SOAR has produced fewer rules for the cited works and 
the cited C4.5 DT figures.  In 8 out of 10 datasets, SOAR has improved over C5.0 
DT.  As discussed the C5.0 DT algorithm may not perform well where data contains 
noise, which while not so here is likely to be so for the large payment datasets that 
are the subject of this work.   
Ref SOAR
UCI-A 6.1 6.6 1 14.6 1 6.9 1.0
UCI-B 4.0 2.0 0 9.0 1 4.0 1.0
UCI-G 4.4 13.0 1 13.0 1 6.9 1.0
UCI-H 11.8 8.0 0 6.0 0 26.2 1.0
UCI-I 1.0 10.0 1 4.0 1 2.0 1.0
UCI-L+ 8.1 36.0 1 5.0 0 3.5 0.0
UCI-M 6.0 2.0 0 2.0 0 11.9 1.0
UCI-O+ 8.0 10.0 1 8.0 1 7.0 0.0
UCI-P 3.5 4.0 1 19.0 1 3.7 1.0
UCI-U+ 5.7 12.0 1 20.0 1 6.4 1.0
7 7 8SOAR improve
Cited DT C4.5 DT C5.0
Rules
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Table 4-17 – Benchmark SOAR accuracy. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, Source=published work as cited, Other measures omitted as not 
published.  +=dataset with a ratio of fields to records 1:10 or less. 
The 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 measure is the only common measure in the literature but it is not a 
reliable metric.  In Table 4-17, in just 2 out of 10 datasets does SOAR outperform 
any of the benchmarks in terms of the 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦.  When compared to the 
underlying classifier this is 4 out of 10 datasets.  The small UCI datasets, the RGF 
and dimensionality against the number of records adversely influence the 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
calculated for SOAR.  This 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is lower than all the benchmarks but these 
benchmarks figures are for inducing rules from a dataset and not from an underlying 
classifier and so a lower performance is to be expected.   
The 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 benchmark figures are plotted in Figure 4-47. It can be seen that the 
SOAR extracted rules have a lower accuracy than the benchmark but have a similar 
or smaller number of rules. 
Ref SOAR
UCI-A 69.2 83.6 0 84.2 0 86.7 0 85.216 0
UCI-B 90.9 78.8 1 95.3 0 92.8 0 92.994 0
UCI-G 67.6 97.3 0 90.5 0 86.7 0 63.700 1
UCI-H 86.8 100.0 0 95.0 0 100.0 0 91.173 0
UCI-I 100.0 92.0 1 97.3 1 100.0 1 92.593 1
UCI-L+ 74.2 100.0 0 88.9 0 78.3 0 77.500 0
UCI-M 68.9 98.5 0 98.7 0 96.9 0 94.943 0
UCI-O+ 29.6 96.6 0 90.5 0 90.4 0 90.579 0
UCI-P 67.5 78.7 0 64.9 1 75.0 0 61.876 1
UCI-U+ 95.1 100.0 0 95.6 0 91.2 1 87.810 1
2 2 2 4
Classifier
Accuracy
SOAR improve
Cited CT C4.5 DT C5.0
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Key: “A-U” indicates UCI dataset, C5(.) denotes calculated results for the C5.0 DT, SR(.) denotes 
results for SOAR. 
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
Figure 4-47  – Chart illustrating number of extracted rules and accuracy with C5.0 
DT and SOAR. 
4.3.3.2 SOAR ruleset analysis 
The extracted rulesets for each dataset are detailed in full in E.1.  The first rule of 
each dataset is given in Table 4-18 to illustrate the form of the rules extracted by 
SOAR.  The SOAR extracted rules are formed as association rules (Craven, 1996).  
The 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 is a set of disjunctive rules in the general form 𝑦 ← 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!  ∨  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!  ∨ 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!…∨  𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒!  where 𝑛 is the number of rules and 𝑦 is an evaluated logical result 
of the entire 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 .  Each rule is in the 
general form 𝑦 ← 𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣!  ∧  𝑙! 𝑜𝑝 𝑣! …∧  𝑙!  𝑜𝑝 𝑣! , where 𝑙! is a named input 
field, 𝑜𝑝 ∈ ≤,≥,=,≠ , 𝑣! is a value that can be can be an integer, real value or a 
set of unordered or ordered symbolic variables and 𝑦 is an evaluated logical result 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ≡ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 .  If the literal is categorical it is shown as the 
name of the field in a list for example 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑙, 𝑖𝑍𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒,𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 .  Any of the 
listed values must be present in the field.  If the literal is a continuous numeric it is 
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shown as 𝑚𝑖𝑛 −𝑚𝑎𝑥  then the real value of the field must be ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛,< 𝑚𝑎𝑥 .  
SOAR extracted rules are hierarchical such that they are evaluated in strict order.  
The evaluation occurs left to right and all antecedents must evaluate to TRUE for 
that rule to fire where fire indicates a 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 classification.  If the rule fires no further 
rules are evaluated.  Only once all rules are evaluated in a 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 and none have 
fired is the input determined to be 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒. 
Table 4-18 – First extracted SOAR rule for all UCI datasets. 
Ref First rule in SOAR ruleset 
UCI-A IF A1=0 AND A8=1 AND A11=0 AND A12=2 AND A3>4.21 AND 
A14>255.48 
UCI-B IF Radius>15.04 AND Area>696.25 AND Smooth=[0.05-0.11] 
UCI-G 
IF Checking=A11 AND Savings={A61,A62,A63,A65,A64} AND 
Employment={A72,A73,A75,A74} AND PerCentIncome=4 AND 
Debtors=A101 AND ResidentYears=4 AND Plans={A141,A143} AND 
Job={A173,A172,A174} AND Telephone={A191,A192} AND 
Foreign=A201 
UCI-H IF Sex=1 AND Steroid=2 AND LiverBig=2 AND Spiders=1 AND 
Varices=1 AND Histology=2 AND Age>40.5 AND Albumin>2.85 
UCI-I IF petallength>2.48 AND petalwidth>0.8 
UCI-L 
IF att1={1} AND att2={3} AND att7={3} AND att10={2} AND 
att18={2} AND att20={1} AND att21={2} AND att27={3} AND 
att30={1} AND att33={3} AND att36={2} AND att37={2,3} AND 
att39={1,2} AND att40={2} AND att43={2} AND att44={2} AND 
att45={2} AND att46={2} AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND 
att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND att52={2} AND 
att53={2} AND att54={1} AND att55={1,2} AND att56={2} AND 
att3>0 
UCI-M 
IF CapColour={c,w,g,n,e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND 
Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p,n} AND GillSpace={c} AND 
StalkShape={e,t} AND StalkRoot={b,u} AND 
StalkSurfaceAbove={k} AND RingType={l,n} AND 
SporePrintColour={h,r,w} AND Population={v} AND 
Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
UCI-O 
IF P1=1 AND P3>0.19 AND P4>-0.5 AND P5<0.23 AND P6>-0.22 
AND P8>0.63 AND P12>-0.56 AND P14>-0.55 AND P16>-0.63 AND 
P17>-0.96 AND P18>-0.81 AND P19>0.99 AND P20>-0.91 AND 
P24>0.99 AND P26>-0.98 AND P28>-0.94 AND P30>-0.91 
UCI-P IF Triceps>31.5 
UCI-U 
IF Aspiration={std+turbo} AND Doors=4 AND 
EngineType={dohcv+rotor+l+ohcf,ohc} AND 
FuelSystem={idi+mpfi} AND EngineSize>121.5 AND 
Stroke=[3.53-3.9] AND Price>8882.95 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited.  Example rule chosen from the fold with the highest MCC. 
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇. 
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These results are encouraging as SOAR extracts a compact ruleset.  Rules are in 
human-readable form and can therefore be readily understood.  SOAR has been 
designed to extract knowledge and not to reproduce the underlying classifier or 
precisely model the dataset.  These types of rules eschew some performance over 
improved comprehensibility as they provide “wood-from-the-trees” information 
“chunks” for a human expert to directly interpret.  Within the fraud environment 
such rules offer the promise of aiding human understanding in the patterns of fraud 
in the data.  The rules may highlight previously unknown fraud vectors, new and 
emerging fraud types and give an insight into the model used in the FMS to detect 
“suspicious” transactions.   
4.3.3.3 SOAR performance analysis 
It was earlier claimed in Chapter 3 that SOAR will operate efficiently on large-scale 
datasets that are highly unbalanced and have sparse examples of fraud and will 
produce a ruleset that is compact containing expressive English-like rules.  These 
results suggest that SOAR is less effective where the structure of the dataset differs 
from this assumption.  Table 4-19 compares the size of the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 
datasets for each class for each class averaged over all folds and the performance of 
the SOAR rules. 
Table 4-19 – Mean dataset size per fold for all UCI datasets. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited.   
MCC
Ref Genuine Fraud Genuine Fraud MCC SOAR ↓ >0.5
UCI-O+ 202.5 113.4 22.5 12.6 -0.328 0
UCI-G 630.0 270.0 70.0 30.0 0.117 0
UCI-L+ 19.8 9.0 2.2 1.0 0.200 0
UCI-P 450.0 241.2 50.0 26.8 0.324 0
UCI-A 49.1 276.3 38.3 30.7 0.403 0
UCI-M 3,787.2 3,524.4 391.6 47.7 0.457 0
UCI-H 644.2 172.8 73.8 19.2 0.568 1
UCI-U+ 162.0 22.5 18.0 2.5 0.779 1
UCI-B 321.3 190.8 35.7 21.2 0.805 1
UCI-I 45.0 45.0 5.0 5.0 1.000 1
Train Test
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Those shaded indicate an MCC below 0.5.  Three datasets, UCI-O, UCI-G and 
UCI-L have a poor performance.  It can be observed that UCI-L has just one fraud 
example in the 𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇 dataset per fold on average from which to calculate the 
performance figures and this results in an unreliable measure.  The remaining 
datasets do not have any clear link to the size of the small datasets.  The average 
number of fraud records in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset for each fold for the clustering 
algorithm is small and the average number of records used for testing and calculating 
the 𝑀𝐶𝐶 is small.  It is possible that these small sizes are adversely affecting the 
clustering results of SOAR.   
Table 4-20 compares the performance of the SOAR extracted rules with that of the 
number of records of examples per field in the dataset and ther total number of 
inputs to the neural network classifier following pre-processing – to provide a 
measure of the dimensionaility.  It also includes the proportion of symbolic fields out 
of all fields as it has already been discussed that the relationship between these 
symbols is not know and therefore modelling them is inaccuracte.   
Table 4-20 – SOAR analysis for all UCI datasets. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited..   
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇. 
In Table 4-20, it can be seen UCI-O, UCI-G and UCI-O all have a larger number 
of input fields.  With only a few examples of the combinations of these input fields 
Records per Symbolic MCC MCC
Ref  Test (F) RGF Fields Field proportion Inputs SOAR ↓ >0.5
UCI-O+ 12.6 1.79 5.3 0.0 66 -0.328 0
UCI-G 30.0 2.33 38.5 0.8 26 0.117 0
UCI-L+ 1.0 2.56 0.5 0.9 68 0.200 0
UCI-P 26.8 1.87 54.9 0.0 14 0.324 0
UCI-A 30.7 1.25 32.9 0.4 21 0.403 0
UCI-M 47.7 1.07 270.8 1.0 30 0.457 0
UCI-H 19.2 3.84 31.0 0.8 30 0.568 1
UCI-U+ 2.5 7.2 5.1 0.0 40 0.779 1
UCI-B 21.2 1.68 31.6 0.0 18 0.805 1
UCI-I 5.0 1.00 12.5 0.0 8 1.000 1
| Chapter 4 - Public Domain Data Empirical Evaluation | 
 | 238 |  
this may indicate why the results are poor.  UCI-G and UCI-L also have mostly 
symbolic inputs where the relationship between these may make meaningful 
clustering difficult.  UCI-L also has the lowest number of records per field – with a 
small dataset and a high dimensionality.  In this case no meaningful clusters can be 
found and so the SOAR algorithm uses each positive example as though it were a 
separate cluster of a single example.  
When applied to the payment fraud domain, for fraud classifiers to be effective they 
need to generalise.  SOAR attempts to extract this generalisation through its search 
of the general decision boundary.  Next an experiment is undertaken to examine the 
assumption that any clustering approach that can provide some optimal separation 
between in-cluster and outside-cluster variance is suitable for the SOAR algorithm.  
It will be found that the algorithm is agnostic to the clustering methodology but the 
number of clusters formed is important to performance. 
4.3.4 Cluster dependency 
The SOAR extraction algorithm creates prototypes of fraud vectors by first 
clustering similar examples in the fraud class.  To establish if the choice of clustering 
algorithm is important three clustering algorithms are tested with all datasets and the 
results compared.  There are a large number of different clustering algorithms that 
cover statistics, machine learning, AI, data mining and mathematics (Devi & Devi, 
2014).  The three clustering algorithms tested are given in Table 4-21. 
Table 4-21 – List of cluster methods tested. 
Name Description 
Gaussian 
Finite Gaussian mixture modelling fitted using an EM algorithm for 
model-based clustering.  This approach attempts to find the minimum 
number of clusters with the largest separation.  Each cluster is ellipsoidal, 
centred at the means and represented by a Gaussian model.  PCA is used 
to determine the orientation, density and volume.  This implementation 
is from (Chris Fraley, 2012). 
ART2 
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART2) (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987) is a 
probabilistic clustering approach that can use continuous valued inputs.  
It is claimed to offer a solution to the stability/plasticity dilemma of 
unsupervised neural networks.  In general neural networks learn new 
things that typically alter or delete previously learnt relationships in the 
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Name Description 
neural network.  In ART plasticity is implemented so that new input 
patterns can generate new prototypes when they are not represented by 
another prototype.  Stability is present as a prototype is not altered by 
any new pattern but only by new patterns that are similar to the 
prototype.  This implementation is from (Bergmeir & Benitez, 2012). 
SOM 
The SOM organises itself into clusters that represent high-dimensional 
input data as a two-dimensional map while maintaining the topological 
properties of the input space as described in A.13.10, page 490.  This 
implementation is from (Bergmeir & Benitez, 2012). 
Results for all datasets for the Gaussian and ART2 clustering method are given in 
Table 4-22 to  Table 4-23 to illustrate that the initial clustering step impacts on the 
performance of the extracted rules.  It is argued that this is due to the number of 
clusters formed and not the methodology. 
Table 4-22 – Gaussian clustering results for SOAR. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, #Clusters=Number of clusters created, σ standard deviation over 
10 folds of the measure in the column to the immediate left, +=dataset with a ratio of fields to 
records 1:10 or less.   
Setup: Clustering Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
Train
Ref↓ #F #Clusters #Rules MCC !
UCI-A 345 19.8 6.1 0.403 0.135
UCI-B 321 28.3 4.0 0.805 0.117
UCI-G 630 10.2 4.4 0.117 0.203
UCI-H 664 35.0 11.8 0.568 0.068
UCI-I 45 9.6 1.0 1.000 0.000
UCI-L+ 21 9.4 8.1 0.200 37.201
UCI-M 3,787 39.0 6.0 0.457 0.180
UCI-O+ 203 47.5 8.0 -0.328 0.099
UCI-P 450 40.0 3.5 0.324 0.148
UCI-U+ 162 33.4 5.7 0.779 0.357
Clustering: Gaussian
SOAR (TEST)
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Table 4-23 – ART2 clustering results for SOAR. 
 
Key: Ref=UCI dataset as cited, #Clusters=Number of clusters created, σ standard deviation over 
10 folds of the measure in the column to the immediate left, +=dataset with a ratio of fields to 
records 1:10 or less.   
Setup: Clustering Gaussian, ART2, SOM (5x5).  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  
Folds: 10. 
The number of initial clusters formed varies between the three cluster methods with 
ART2 having on average the fewest clusters and the Gaussian mixture modelling the 
highest.  The best average 𝑀𝐶𝐶 is for the SOM and Gaussian mixture modelling 
and the lowest for ART2.  For each dataset ℝ the results for the number of clusters 
and the corresponding 𝑀𝐶𝐶 for the rules extracted are illustrated as a graph in 
Figure 4-48. The graph shows the general upward direction as arrows for each 
dataset and cluster results indicating that the number of clusters influences the 𝑀𝐶𝐶 
and not the cluster methodology.  The result can be explained as the SOAR 
algorithm uses the initial clusters to create prototypes that try to cover as much of the 
feature spaces as possible, which represent the fraud class.  These prototypes form 
rules and so the number of clusters will be important.   
Train
Ref↓ #F #Clusters #Rules MCC !
UCI-A 345 6.0 4.1 0.344 0.115
UCI-B 321 6.0 3.7 0.659 0.104
UCI-G 630 6.0 2.5 0.104 0.119
UCI-H 664 6.0 5.2 0.335 0.103
UCI-I 45 3.0 1.0 1.000 0.000
UCI-L+ 21 9.6 8.0 NA NA
UCI-M 3,787 6.0 2.3 0.401 0.132
UCI-O+ 203 6.0 5.4 -0.692 0.206
UCI-P 450 6.0 4.2 0.329 0.159
UCI-U+ 162 30.0 19.0 0.641 0.322
SOAR (TEST)
Clustering: ART2
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Key: Clusters=Number of clusters formed. Dotted linear trend lines highlights direction of MCC 
performance against number of clusters.  Each one of the three points per line represents the results of 
a different cluster method. 
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian, ART2 SOM (5x5).  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  
Folds: 10. 
Figure 4-48  – Chart of MCC performance of cluster methods tested in SOAR and 
number of clusters formed. 
This experiment is designed to determine if the SOAR algorithm is dependant upon 
the type of clustering algorithm.  The null hypothesis is that there is no difference 
between the calculated MCC for the SOAR exacted rules between different cluster 
methods over all folds.  A p-value is calculated using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks pairs 
statistical significance test for each dataset (Wilcoxon, 1945).  A small p-value 
indicates strong evidence against this null hypothesis indicating that SOAR is 
dependent upon the clustering.  In this case the MCC of the extracted SOAR rules is 
calculated per fold for each of the clustering methods.  The cluster methods are then 
compared using these results in pairs: Gaussian/ART2, Gaussian/SOM, 
ART2/SOM.  On average the p-value was high indicating that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected and that the SOAR algorithm is not dependant upon the clustering 
method.  
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Any clustering approach, which is able to provide some even sub-optimal separation 
between in-cluster and outside-cluster variance will be sufficient for the SOAR 
extraction algorithm.  Since the number of clusters sets the number of initial rule 
prototypes an experiment to assess the performance of SOAR by setting an 
increasing fixed number of clusters was carried out.  The results are given in Figure 
4-49.  UCI-B was selected as a suitable dataset based on its performance in Table 
4-23 where it has a good 𝑀𝐶𝐶 and the ratio of training records and fields is 
sufficient. 
 
Key: Error bars show maximum and minimum MCC values over all folds. 
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian.  Classifier: MLP.  Dataset: UCI-B 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
Figure 4-49  – Chart for UCI-B of MCC performance against the number of clusters 
formed. 
From Figure 4-49 it is contended that the more initial prototypes that are formed, up 
to some optimum then the greater the area of feature space that is explored which in 
turn leads to superior rules with an improved 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  Due to the small size of these 
datasets the different clustering algorithms have similar difficulties in locating 
meaningful clusters.  There is no reason why any clusters should naturally form in 
these small datasets whereas it has been established that in real-world payment card 
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fraud datasets it is likely that such clusters do exist as fraud vectors.  It is established 
in Appendix A that the payments industry make extensive use of rules within their 
FMS and that these have a level of effectiveness to detect fraud.  It can therefore be 
concluded that if such rules detect a level of fraud then these fraud vectors must exist 
as clusters within the data available.  These results indicate that the choice of the 
clustering method for SOAR can be made on practical considerations of ease of 
implementation: 
§ Efficient computationally. 
§ Can work with a large number of input fields (dimensions). 
§ Operates where the dataset is not consistent so that the examples may 
overlap. 
§ Operates where the examples may be both close and distant over a wide 
instance space and places similar examples within a cluster within a 
reasonable accuracy.  
Next an experiment is undertaken to ascertain if the type of classifier used in the 
underlying black-box classifier is important to the performance of SOAR.  It will be 
found that SOARs able to operate with a similar performance using four different 
trained classifiers, which is important as it is known that deployed FMS make use of 
a range of classifiers. 
4.3.5 Classifier dependency 
The SOAR extraction algorithm extracts rules from an underlying black-box 
classifier 𝓞 𝐱;𝐰 .  To establish if the type of classifier is important to the 
performance of the SOAR extraction algorithm the underlying classifier was varied 
as given in Table 4-24.  The UCI-B dataset was selected as a suitable dataset for this 
experiment as discussed above.  
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Table 4-24 – List of classifier methods tested. 
Classifier Description See 
Deep-MLP 
A mult-layer Deep-MLP neural network 
using deep learning described in (Aiello et al., 
2016; Candel, 2016).   
4.2.10, 
page 223. 
SVM 
Support Vector Machine implementation 
from (Karatzoglo et al., 2015) using the 
default classification setting with a Gaussian  
(Radial Basis) kernel. 
2.5.7, 
page 109. 
RBF 
Radial Basis Function implementation from 
(Karatzoglo et al., 2015) using the dynamic 
decay adjustment algorithm with 1,000 
maximum learning iterations and 
initialisation values between [0,1].   
Discussed 
on page 
88. 
DT C5.0 
The C5.0 Decision Tree algorithm for 
benchmark figures was used as a classifier.  
The implementation was from (Max Kuhn, 
2015).   
2.5.1, 
page 64. 
The performance measures for the differing classifiers are compared against each 
classifier type and given in Table 4-25. 
Table 4-25 – UCI-B SOAR results for Deep-MLP, SVM, DT and RBF classifiers. 
 
Key: σ standard deviation over 10 folds of the measure in the column to the immediate left, 
MLP=results for the underlying Deep-MLP classifier.  DT5.0 calculated results for the C5.0. 
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian.  Classifier: As stated. Dataset: UCI-B 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
This experiment is designed to determine if the SOAR algorithm is dependant upon 
the type of underlying classifier.  The null hypothesis is that there is no difference 
between the calculated MCC for the SOAR exacted rules between different 
classifiers over all folds.  A p-value is calculated using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
Ref↓ Soundness Support %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC
MLP 84.2 93.3 90.898 4.468 83.052 0.805
SVM 78.2 91.4 88.589 3.635 75.455 0.757
DT5.0 75.3 91.0 85.960 3.627 68.398 0.702
RBF 91.0 94.7 85.685 15.579 87.706 0.711
UCI-B SOAR (TEST)
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pairs statistical significance test for each dataset (Wilcoxon, 1945).  A small p-value 
indicates strong evidence against this null hypothesis indicating that SOAR is 
dependent upon the classifier.  In this case the MCC of the extracted SOAR rules is 
calculated per fold for each of the clustering methods.  The classifier methods are 
then compared using these results in pairs: Deep-MLP/SVM, Deep-MLP /DT5, 
Deep-MLP /RBF.  On average the p-value was high indicating that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and that the SOAR algorithm is not dependant upon the 
classifier type. These results indicate that the SOAR extraction algorithm is 
applicable to a wide range of different classifiers.   
The next experiment is to determine the efficacy of three different rule optimisation 
stages that form part of the SOAR algorithm described in 3.5.5, page 192.  It will be 
seen that each step is effective and that when all three are used together the ruleset 
is more compact without adversely affecting the performance measures. 
4.3.6 Rule optimisation 
To determine the efficacy of the rule optimisation steps described in Table 3-7 
experiments were undertaken with the performance measured following the 
optimisation steps as: 
§ 𝑀𝐶𝐶 – Any rules that have a 𝑀𝐶𝐶 below zero.  This indicates a 
performance worse than a ‘coin flip’ when tested with the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset 
are removed. 
§ 𝑇𝑃 – Any rules that have a 𝑇𝑃 of zero when tested with the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 
dataset are removed. 
§ Overlap – Rules that are duplicated or is a complete sub-set of another 
are removed. 
An illustration of the results for the UCI-B dataset is given in Table 4-26. 
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Table 4-26 – SOAR rule optimisation results for UCI-B.  
 
 
 
Key: #Clusters=number of clusters, σ given as standard deviation over all 10 folds of the measure in 
the column to the immediate left. #Anti=Average number of anticedents per rule.  MCC/TN/Overlap marked with ‘X’ indicating the preprocessing method(s) applied.   
Setup: Clustering: Gaussian.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: UCI-B 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  Folds: 10. 
In general each of the optimisation steps reduced the number of rules and the 
number of anticedents, which improves the comprehensibility of the rules.  The 
results therefore indicate that all the rule optimisation steps are important to the 
SOAR algorithm.  Earlier experiments indicated that if the extracted rules were 
pruned further against some performance measure using the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset then 
this causes a reduction a generalisation.  This aspect will be explored further in 
Chapter 5. 
UCI-B MCC TP Overlap Soundness Support
SOAR X X X 84.2 93.3
SOAR X 86.5 94.2
SOAR X 84.8 93.9
SOAR X 84.8 93.9
Optimisation UCI-B SOAR (TEST)
UCI-B MCC TP Overlap %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC
SOAR X X X 90.898 4.468 83.052 0.805
SOAR X 90.380 5.600 83.571 0.798
SOAR X 89.136 6.428 81.580 0.773
SOAR X 90.906 4.460 83.095 0.807
Optimisation UCI-B SOAR (TEST)
UCI-B MCC TP Overlap Comp. #Rules #Anti
SOAR X X X 16.7 4.0 4.1
SOAR X 27.8 7.5 3.6
SOAR X 26.7 7.1 3.8
SOAR X 84.5 20.0 4.2
Optimisation UCI-B SOAR (TEST)
| Chapter 4 - Public Domain Data Empirical Evaluation | 
 | 247 |  
Overall, the results suggest that the SOAR extracted rules do not cover the decision 
surface of the underlying classifier correctly as evidenced by the 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  It is clear that 
the assumptions made for the SOAR to start the search from a single prototype are 
ineffective when there are so few examples within the prototype’s cluster and outside.  
To further understand these results the next section undertakes a detailed analytical 
analysis on a single UCI dataset. 
4.4 Analytical Analysis 
An analytical analysis on one dataset is undertaken using the UCI-B dataset.  In this 
section the results are for the SOAR algorithm with all rule optimisations enabled 
and using Gaussian clustering and an underlying deep MLP classifier.  As before 10-
fold stratified cross validation is used creating a 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset.   
4.4.1 Real and discreet space 
In the real-world there are a large number of input fields (see the example data in 
Appendix C) required for the black-box classifier to detect fraud.  The number of 
fields in the UCI datasets in this Chapter range from 4 to 56 (in Table 4-7, page 221) 
in original 𝑑-space, which is expanded to 8 to 74 𝑑-space by projecting into discreet 
space following pre-processing.  
4.4.2 Preprocessing 
The 10 input fields in UCI-B in original space are converted to 18 discrete literal 
fields by pre-processing.  During the pre-processing one field (“Perimeter”) is 
removed due to a high correlation with other fields, illustrated in Figure 4-50.  Fields 
that are correlated over a threshold are plotted as larger circles and a darker shade.  
Three of these correlated fields are removed by the pre-processing (“Radius”, 
“Perimeter”, “Area”).  Figure 4-51 shows the extent of data overlapping in UCI-B 
and it can be seen that there are few examples that overlap.   
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Figure 4-50 – UCI-B field correlation 
 
 
Figure 4-51  – Euler Venn diagram UCI-B overlapping data. 
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4.4.3 Underlying classifier 
The underlying deep MLP classifier for UCI-B has a 𝑀𝐶𝐶 of 0.833, a TPR 91.47% 
and FPR 7.84% for the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset.  This classifier performance likely suggests 
that the data does not have a wide variability in this case and that there were 
sufficient examples from which to build a classifier that is able to generalise.  It is 
difficult to visually aggregate data to understand the deep MLP classifier.  It is non-
straightforward to visualise the extent of either the 𝑑 or 𝑑 dimensional data and the 
density within component space.  The SOAR algorithm uses only the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 
dataset to initialise the search and then relies on the accuracy of the surface of the 
classifier.  Where the classes are not sparse then there will likely be more overlap and 
the ability to form initial clusters in this space is limited.  In the SOAR extraction 
algorithm sparse training examples of the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class are assumed as the initial 
search space “seeds” since locating points on the decision boundary in a large search 
space would be otherwise inefficient.  With these UCI datasets this assumption is not 
true and this will impact the performance of SOAR.  It may go some way to 
explaining the performance.   
4.4.4 Search space 
If an exhaustive search were undertaken then there are 2!" combinations to search 
in UCI-B given by 𝑙!…!!…! , where 𝑑 is the number of input field dimensions (18) 
and 𝑗 is the number of literals in each field (all were discretised into 2 literals).  The 
sensitivity algorithm is based on concatenating discretised literals that cause the 
underlying classifier to activate moving only “forward” through a prototype that is at 
the “centre” of a cluster.  The SOAR algorithm described in Chapter 3 creates a 
centroid that is initially set as the centre of a cluster measured by distance to the 
other points within the cluster and is then adjusted so that it falls on the closest 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 point in the 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 dataset.  This step is necessary to ensure that the output of 
the classifier always denotes fraud for a centroid.  As all fields are projected into 
discreet space then there is no straightforward method to determine how close one 
set of literals is to another.  Calculating a Euclidean distance between 1,0,0  and say 0,0,1  where the first might represent a value of 10 and second 1,000 is incorrect as 
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the magnitude of the discretised bins is not taken into account.  It was not necessary 
for the purpose of this work to solve this problem and it is suggested that this is an 
area of future research discussed in 7.2.3, page 320.  A directed search is undertaken 
in SOAR and this makes assumptions that lead to misclassification errors.  The 
errors that these assumptions introduce are exacerbated when there are a large 
number of fields that contain just a few literals.  For example, given three fields 𝐀 = 𝑎1,𝑎2,𝑎3 ,𝐁 = 𝑏1, 𝑏2  and 𝐂 = 𝑐1, 𝑐2 , where these each have discreet 
literals (3,2,2) and suppose a prototype is given by P: 
𝐏 = 𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑏1 𝑏2 𝑐1 𝑐21 0 0 1 0 1 0 → 𝑓 
This gives 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑐1 → 𝑓 
The first field A is “expanded: 
𝐏𝟏 = 𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑏1 𝑏2 𝑐1 𝑐2 𝑓1 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 0 1 1 0 1 0 0  
In this case 𝑎1 ∨ 𝑎2 ∧ 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑐1 → 𝑓. The expansion continues with field B: 
𝐏𝟐 =
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑏1 𝑏2 𝑐1 𝑐2 𝑓1 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 0 1 1 0 1 0 01 0 0 0 1 1 0 10 1 0 0 1 1 0 00 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
 
The highlighted row shows 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑏2 → 𝑓 and SOAR assumes the previous expansion 
concatenated with the next: 𝑎1 ∨ 𝑎2  ∧  𝑏1 ∨ 𝑏2 → 𝑓 but we can see in 𝐏𝟐 that  𝑎2 ∧ 𝑏2 ≠ 𝑓, and so the above assumption will create a rule that generates a false 
positive.  We can see 𝑎3 ∧ 𝑏2 → 𝑓, but the first expansion ignores a3 and so this 
assumption will create a false negative. 
The expansion is continued with field C, shown in 𝐏𝟑 where there are a total of  
3x2x2 rows that cover all valid combinations. 
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𝐏𝟑 =
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑏1 𝑏2 𝑐1 𝑐2 𝑓1 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 0 1 1 0 1 0 01 0 0 0 1 1 0 10 1 0 0 1 1 0 00 0 1 0 1 1 0 01 0 0 1 0 0 1 10 1 0 1 0 0 1 10 0 1 1 0 0 1 01 0 0 0 1 0 1 10 1 0 0 1 0 1 00 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
 
The highlighted row shows 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑏2 ∧ 𝑐2 → 𝑓 and concatenating expansions SOAR 
assumed: 𝑎1 ∨ 𝑎2  ∧  𝑏1 ∨ 𝑏2 ∧  𝑐1 ∨ 𝑐2 → 𝑓.  It can be observed that 𝑎3 ∧ 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑐2 ≠ 𝑓,𝑎2 ∧ 𝑏2 ∧ 𝑐2 ≠ 𝑓,𝑎3 ∧ 𝑏2 ∧ 𝑐2 ≠ 𝑓. 
Taking the UCI-B small dataset this gives 2!" ≈ 260𝑘 where it might be 
computationally acceptable to search but for UCI-O this is a 2!" ≈ 4𝑒19 space.  
The SOAR algorithm therefore attempts to search this large space to locate rules 
that have a reasonable soundness but this will introduce misclassifications, as 
demonstrated above.  The SOAR algorithm searches from the centre of each cluster 
outwards by changing the value of each literal in sequence in each field until such 
time that the output of the classifier no longer denotes a 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 classification (see 
Figure 3-36, page 192).  In doing so the search may overlap the other clusters and in 
some cases this will result in the clusters merging and so reducing the initial number 
of prototypes.  As the search progresses it can be said to be following a specific 
‘direction’ along a decision boundary of the cluster and that this direction is 
determined by the ordering of the fields in the prototype.  The ordering of the fields 
in the prototype is arbitrary and so this is a weakness in the current implementation 
of SOAR.  It may be for these reasons that in some datasets with a certain ordering 
of input fields it fails to represent accurately the decision boundaries.  There are two 
suggested improvements that would form useful future research areas that will be 
discussed in 7.2 
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4.4.5 Extracted rules 
4.3.1, page 227 detailed the performance for the UCI-B extracted ruleset as 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 77.83% of and 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 of 91.23% with a 𝑀𝐶𝐶 of 0.77 (𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
86.66%) and 𝑇𝑃𝑅 76.47%.  UCI-B had just 569 records from which to train the 
classifier and to locate suitable clusters within SOAR.  The rule results are 
reasonable but indicate that the rules are optimistic.  The rules generated for UCI-B 
are given in Table 4-27. 
Table 4-27 – SOAR ruleset for UCI-B.  
UCI-B. MCC  = 0.962, Fold=1 
IF Radius>15.04 AND Area>696.25 AND Smooth=[0.05-0.11] 
IF Area>696.25 AND Concavity>0.09 AND Concave>0.05 
IF Radius=[6.98-15.04] AND Perimeter=[43.79-98.75] AND Compact>0.12 AND 
Concavity>0.09 AND Concave>0.05 
4.4.6 Geometric analysis 
Geometrically, the feature space within the black-box classifier has 𝑑 dimensions and 
will form a 𝑑-space.  It is the boundaries of the enclosed but not necessarily 
continuous 𝑑-polytope that then defines a class.  In original 𝑑-space, two input fields 
can be plotted as set of planar points and a convex hull calculated.  The “outline” 
shape of these points being the minimum-area convex polygon containing the planar 
set of points.  The SOAR extraction algorithm determines this convex polygon by its 
vertices was used from (Eddy, 1977).  A single propositional 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 creates a shape that 
is projected into discretised space 𝑑 that is defined by way of straight lines (as 
described in 1.6, page 39).  To define the decision boundary in terms of 𝑙! a line is 
constructed.  Where the decision boundary is non-linear then this line will need to be 
segmented into intervals and separate lines generated to fit each interval where the 
boundaries between segments are called breakpoints.  Each breakpoint represents a 
literal and has a defined lower and upper range in terms of the continuous numeric 
field.  The number of segments and the interval is dependant upon the settings of the 
SOAR method.  The propositional rules in 𝑑 space create a series of 𝑑 hyper-
rectangles.  As more rules are found then more hyper-rectangles are added so the 
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closer the match to the underlying non-linear classifier.  In the general case this 
creates a “cross-like” shape when plotted in 2d space (denoted by the dashed lines).  
It is this cross-like shape that is expanded by SOAR using Decision Boundary 
Analysis (DBA).  DBA in a neural network has generated much research literature 
with a number of researchers also using sensitivity analysis (Goh, 1993; Viktor et al., 
1995; Engelbrecht & Cloete, 1998; Engelbrecht & Viktor, 1999).   
For illustration, the first literal in the first rule is plotted on the x-axis and the other 
literals are each plotted on the y-axis. The limits of each literal are shown using 
dotted lines.  The rectangle created is shown in red as the area that is classified by 
the rule as 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 (class 1).  As only two dimensions are plotted it can be observed 
that it is not possible to separate the classes with considerable overlap.   
The points, convex hull and rectangles formed by the rules in for UCI-B are plotted 
in Figure 4-52 to Figure 4-54 over. 
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Setup: Dataset: UCI-B. Fold: 1.  Plot in original 𝑑-space. Red denotes class 1 and 
green denotes class 0. 
Figure 4-52  – Plot for UCI-B “Area” .v. “Compact” input fields in 𝑑-space. 
In this fold, SOAR extracted the rule: IF	Area>696.25	AND	Compact>0.12	AND	
Concave>0.05.  In Figure 4-52 the red convex hull indicates the area of the classifier 
that represents the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class.  The SOAR algorithm has attempted to locate the 
“centre” of this in 𝑑-dimensional space that is approximately located at the bottom 
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left of the red rectangle in the plot.  The algorithm then proceeds “forward” by 
expanding the prototype – this is shown by the dotted lines on the plot.  In this 
example a rectangle is formed that here appears to cover much of the convex hull 
area. 
 
Setup: Dataset: UCI-B. Fold: 1.  Plot in original 𝑑-space. Red denotes class 1 and 
green denotes class 0. 
Figure 4-53  – Plot for UCI-B Area .v. Compact input fields in 𝑑-space. 
In Figure 4-53 the second literal “concave” in the rule is plotted.  Here it can be seen 
that the rule covers a large portion of the convex hull with only a small overlap with 
the green polygon. 
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Setup: Dataset: UCI-B. Fold: 1.  Plot in original 𝑑-space. Red denotes class 1 and 
green denotes class 0. 
Figure 4-54  – Plot for UCI-B “Radius” .v. “Concave” input fields in 𝑑-space. 
Figure 4-54 is for a second rule: IF	Radius=[6.98-15.04]	AND	Compact>0.12	AND	
Concave>0.05.  In this case the rectangle formed by SOAR appears  to be incorrectly 
placed in 2d space but it cannot be easily determined if this is the case when 
projected into 𝑑-space.  
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Viewing the cross-shape it can be argued that SOAR may be improved further by 
extending the search in all directions along this shape and at a greater fidelity than in 
the current discreet space.  This is identified as an area of future research in 7.2, 
page 319.  This analysis reveals that the SOAR algorithm has difficulty locating the 
decision boundary accurately in these small datasets due to its specific design to try 
to capture the generalising ability of the underlying classifier rather than the 
specificity of classification of individual points, with the aim to create more abstract 
and general rules.  Once a cluster has been identified by SOAR, the ‘centre’ of that 
cluster is located  creating a centroid.  The Euclidean distance is not a sufficient 
measure of similarity between the example vectors and the “centre” cannot be found 
without an accurate measure of some form of distance between all the fields.  This 
discussed as an area of future work in 7.2, page 319.  
The rules discover useful knowledge and their accuracy is in the same order as that 
of benchmarks for UCI-B where the 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 measure is reported by other works 
for this data.  Comparing the SOAR performance of 86.66% to (Augasta & 
Kathirvalavakumar, 2012b) of 78.8% and the C5.0 DT of 86.7% indicates that 
SOAR achieves a similar performance.  Comparing the reported number of 
extracted rules, SOAR has 3 with 2 and 4 by the other methods again suggests a 
similar performance despite not being designed to operate with such small datasets.   
In general, the results from the experiments for all UCI datasets indicate that the 
SOAR algorithm does not fully describe the decision boundaries in the underlying 
classifier surface but that the performance appears sufficiently sound.   
4.5 Summary 
An experimental method was devised and discussed with constants, datasets and 
assumptions given.  To promote independent validation and to encourage further 
research the results set out in this Chapter can be reproduced using R code that is 
publicly available n Appendix D.  Ten UCI datasets were selected and a 10-fold 
stratified cross-validation method used to compile results while noting this may 
introduce some bias and variances.  It was found that each dataset has a low ratio of 
records to field, low RGF and there are few examples from which to apply the 
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algorithms in each fold of the experiments.  It was discovered that there is a limited 
overlap between the examples used for 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 and that this is likely to 
degrade performance.  None of the datasets are from the payment card fraud 
detection domain.  Not all the assumptions made in the design of the SOAR 
extraction algorithm hold true with such datasets.  The performance of the SOAR 
rules was measured using seven statistics as being common in other works so that a 
benchmark has been established.  The pre-processing steps were analysed and it was 
concluded that these are an important aspect of SOAR.  The discretisation step 
generates more fields than the original datasets but was shown to substantially reduce 
the SOAR search space.  The SOAR algorithm is dependant upon the structure of 
the data on which the underlying classifier was trained.  It was noted that a number 
of constants are required and because they cannot all be eliminated there may be 
some doubt or bias introduced in the interpretation of results presented.  The SOAR 
extracted rules had a reasonable coverage of the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class, in 5 out of 10 the 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 of was greater than 70% and this was 7 out of 10 for 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 and just 
5.9 average rules were extracted.  The FPR was less than 5% in 6 of the datasets and 
the MCC over 0.5 in 4.  It was argued that it is the small datasets that lead to a 
degree of overfitting during the creation of the rules and that by using the minority 
class the SOAR algorithm was generating rules that create continuous boundaries in 
feature space where none should exist.  To some extent these results reflect a mis-
match between the SOAR algorithm and small datasets.  Comparing to the 
benchmark figures, 7-8 out of 10 datasets had fewer rules using SOAR and just 2 
had an improved 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (whereas 7 datasets had a similar 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 to the 
underlying classifier). This inpart is explained by measuring the performance of the 
SOPAR extracted rules againts the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets in common with all the reviewed 
works, rather than against the performance of the underlying classifier which is 
trying to be modelled.   Experiments found that any clustering approach that is able 
to provide some separation between in-cluster and outside-cluster variance is 
sufficient for the SOAR extraction algorithm.  It was established that the SOAR 
algorithm is sensitive to the number of initial clusters created which leads to creating 
prototypes that in turn define the search path.  It was found that the underlying 
classifier type was not important which is a key aspect of the algorithm as payments 
industry deployed FMS will make use of a range of different classifiers.  The rule 
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optimisation steps were found to be important to improve the comprehensibility of 
the rules.  As previously, this thesis does not focus on increasing the accuracy of a 
classifier and nor does it propose a theoretical approach to symbolic extraction 
focused only on specific measures.  It is the real-world performance of the SOAR 
extraction algorithm and how it can provide knowledge from an existing FMS that is 
key and Chapter 5 tests this with large-scale real-world datasets provided by two 
well-known issuers.  The aim of the SOAR extraction algorithm is to produce a 
small set of comprehensible abstract rules when applied to real-world fraud 
detection.  There is no reason to assume that the results for small datasets will scale 
for large-scale datasets.  As argued there are few large, real-world public datasets 
available to researchers due to the confidential nature of payments.  The SOAR 
algorithm has been designed to produce high-level rules from a rich and large 
dataset from an existing fraud classifier.  These experiments have established some 
key boundaries of applicability of SOAR extraction algorithm.   
The SOAR extraction algorithm has been tested through a range of experiments 
and it has been demonstrated that generalising rules can be automatically extracted 
from a trained classifier that in some cases outperforms a leading benchmark 
approach.  This analysis has led to a better understanding of the boundaries of 
applicability.  Chapter 5 will undertake similar experiments using the same 
measurements with large real-world datasets containing payment card transaction 
data provided in confidence by two issuers. 
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Chapter 5 Real-World Data Empirical 
Evaluation 
“Computers make excellent and efficient servants, but I have no wish to serve under them.” 
– Dr. Spock, Star Trek: The Original Series, “The Ultimate Computer”. 
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5.1 Introduction 
he SOAR extraction algorithm is tested with large scale real-world 
datasets provided by two well-known issuers; one being a large European 
issuer and the other a leading Republic of Korea credit card issuer.  The 
performance is then reviewed through an empirical evaluation. The 
research hypothesis that generalising symbolic knowledge can be extracted from classifiers that 
were trained on highly dimensional, sparse, large-scale transactional data to detect payment card 
fraud will be asserted using the SOAR extraction algorithm.  In this Chapter an 
important measure is that of soundness/support in Eq. (2-25), page 129 and 
comprehensibility in Eq. (2-27), page 129 of the extracted rules that are detailed in 
this Chapter.  The results from these experiments will demonstrate that for both 
datasets SOAR has a high level of 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 indicating that the extracted rulesets 
accurately represent the underlying classifier – a key aim of this work.  For the large 
European issuer SOAR produced 44 rules compared to their existing 900 rules with 
a TPR of 91% and FPR 13%.  For the Republic of Korea credit card issuer SOAR 
produced a ruleset of 199 compared to the 1,000 in their existing system with a TPR 
of 82% and FPR 28%.  While the confusion matrix measures appear low when these 
are translated into real-world performance with a classifier threshold selected based 
on business factors, then the SOAR performance substantially outperforms 
benchmarks in all measures.  Importantly, the rules extracted English-like rules that 
were easy to understand, sufficiently abstract and discovered new fraud 
characteristics not previously known to the experts at the issuers, which led them to 
implement new countermeasures to pre-empt further fraud attacks.  The large 
European issuer stated: 
“…it therefore impressed me how far advanced Nick's thinking and technology is 
compared to the market place.  He presented to us a truly industry changing approach.” - 
(Johnson, 2010). 
T 
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5.2 Experimental Method 
Experiments have been designed to assess the performance of the SOAR extraction 
algorithm using large-scale real-world datasets.  Where possible a similar 
experimental method as set in 4.2, page 206 has been maintained.  Results are 
presented using the confusion matrix measures described in Chapter 4 for clarity and 
payment industry recognised FMS measures.  Further analysis that is in common use 
within the payments industry is given in Appendix G.  The following details the 
experimental setup: 
§ Confidential datasets 
§ Preprocessing 
§ Sampling and validation 
§ Neural network training 
§ Performance measures 
Each of these topics is discussed in the following sections before the results from the 
experiments are presented.  The experiments will show that SOARs able to extract 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 that help to explain the underlying patterns of fraud vectors and have an 
appropriate accuracy to be used in a real-world FMS. 
5.2.1 Confidential datasets 
As discussed in A.11.5, page 456 real-world transactional data is confidential as it is 
usually covered by local data protection laws and could be used by nefarious means 
to undertake fraud.  Two well-known payment card issuers provided the large-scale 
datasets used in this Chapter (summarised in Table 5-1) and it was required to 
comply with specific security and confidentiality requirements.  It is for this reason 
that the name of these issuers is not given and some of the field names have been 
obfuscated.  Some results have been rounded and sensitive information such as 
monetary values or specific dates of periods have been removed.  These datasets 
currently remain confidential and therefore it is not permitted to make these 
available for further research purposes.  
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Table 5-1 – Characteristics of the real-world datasets used in empirical experiments. 
 
Key: Real-E=Large European issuer, Real-K=Republic of Korea credit card issuer. 
5.2.2 Preprocessing 
For real-world problems a necessary part of a fraud management solution is the pre-
processing step.  This is especially true as real-world datasets contain a mixture of 
numeric (continuous) and symbolic fields that are not normal or exhibit 
homoscedasticity.  Many real-world fields are nominal (categorical) and may be 
ordered or unordered or represent a ratio.  SOAR has been developed to integrate 
the pre-processing to provide a process to automate this necessary step.  There was 
no literature located for the earlier review on the extraction of rules from neural 
networks for large-scale fraud problems and combining these pre-processing steps 
appears to be unique.  As each dataset included discrete literal fields with a large 
number of unique literals.  ChiSymbol was used as described in Chapter 3 that aims 
to subsume symbols into larger groups where they have both similar conditional 
target probabilities and the number of records in each group is approximately the 
same and is then allocated as a single categorical symbol.  A single input (a neuron) is 
associated with this categorical symbol.   
Due to confidentiality details of the fields and symbol analysis is not presented.  As 
previously, pre-processing was applied to each dataset and the results following all 
steps are summarised in Table 5-2. 
Ref Dataset #Records #Fields #Classes Fraud {1} Genuine {0} RGF
Real-E Large European Issuer 59,344,649 210 2 Fraud Genuine 17,206
Real-K South Korea credit card issuer 170,979,600 60 2 Fraud Genuine 165,518
Class Labels
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Table 5-2 – Pre-processing results of sampled real-world datasets. 
 
Key: Ref Real-E=Large European issuer, Real-K=Republic of Korea credit card issuer. 
Original=figures prior to pre-processing, Removed=# fields removed by pre-processing, Pre-
Processed Results=collated results, #Num=#fields with numeric values only, Symb=#fields that 
contain symbols, Corr=number of fields removed through correlation processing, #Discr and #New 
Discr=#fields that are discrete symbolic. 
In contrast to the small UCI datasets in Chapter 4 the dimensionality of the datasets 
is markedly different and comparing Table 4-8 to Table 5-3 there are a large 
number of example records compared to the number of fields and therefore the 
classifier performance is likely to be much improved. 
Table 5-3 – Dimensionality of real-world highlighting ratio of fields to number of 
records. 
 
Key: Ref –Real-E=Large European issuer, Real-K=Republic of Korea credit card issuer 
5.2.3 Sampling and validation 
Compared to the small UCI datasets in Chapter 4 as the natural population in the 
real-world datasets is large-scale (more than 50m records) random sampling is used 
to create a smaller dataset from the natural population of transactions to be 
representative of the natural population.  This dataset includes 100% of the marked 
(known) sparse fraud records (Japkowicz & Shah, 2011b).  This random sampling 
approach is illustrated in Figure 5-55.  In this Chapter three datasets are used: 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍, 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 as described in 1.5, page 33.  The resulting smaller 
dataset makes it practical to train and test the underlying neural classifier without a 
Ref↓ #Records RGF #Fields #Num #Symb #Redun Corr #Fields #Discr #New Discr
Real-E 1,173,532 17,206 210 34 176 165 11 49 23 26
Real-K 1,710,829 165,537 60 16 44 35 45 12 33
Original Removed Pre-Processed Results
Ref↓ #Records #Fields Ratio
Real-E 1,173,532 49 23,950
Real-K 1,710,829 45 38,018
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significant loss in accuracy.  The sampling rate of the natural dataset is defined in 
Eq. (5-1). 
𝑆𝑔 = # 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠# 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 	 (5-1) 
 
 
Figure 5-55  – Illustration of sampling methodology using three datasets with large 
real-world data. 
The natural population and the sampled dataset information are given in Table 5-4. 
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Table 5-4 – Real-world natural and sampled real-world dataset statistics. 
 
Key: Real-E=Large European issuer, Real-K=Republic of Korea credit card issuer.  Transactions, 
cards, accounts – see 5.4.  Some values have been altered due to confidentiality. 
The average RGF in 2013 was 4,800 but the incidence of fraud in the natural 
population in both datasets is atypically low with RGF of 17,206 and 165,518.  This 
in part could be explained as the transactions in the datasets are mostly for CP 
transactions that were authorised at the retail establishment.  The Real-K dataset is 
from Republic of Korea, which has harsh criminal punishment for payment type 
theft with sentences typically of 3-5 years for the fraudulent use of a payment card 
(Yonhap-News-Agency, 2016).  Article 347 of their Criminal Code allows for 
imprisonment for up to ten years and a fine of up to KRW20 million ($15k) although 
other sanctions are available.  The Real-E dataset is from Europe which typically 
follows the USA (Marcum et al., 2011) data from the US Department of Justice 
reports that for the period 2006–2010 the most frequently prosecuted cyber offences 
is credit card fraud (80%) with a total of 1,177 individuals convicted and sentenced 
for all cyber crimes and 51.7% of these received prison time.  Sentences were 
typically short with one third of the convicted criminals receiving less than a year, 
Description Real-E Real-K
Transactions 59,300,000 171,000,000
HyanduiCard Cards 7,900,000 NA
Accounts 5,500,000 6,250,000
Number of fraud transactions 4,000 1,033
Value of fraud marked transactions $1,000,000 NA
Days in period 120 122
RGF 17,206 165,537
Transactions per day 494,167 1,401,639
Genuine transactions per day 494,138 1,401,631
Fraud transactions per day 29 8
Sample % 1.98% 1.00%
Transactions 1,173,532 1,710,829
Cards 81,337 62,501
Number of fraud transactions 4,000 1,033
Value of fraud marked transactions $1,000,000 NA
N
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one third a sentence of 13–24 months and the remaining a sentence of over 24 
months.  The punitive approach by the Republic of Korea may in part lead to this 
higher RGF.  The datasets are sparse where the scarcity of fraud examples may help 
to distinguish them from the genuine transactions as common fraud vectors will 
create common subclasses.  The sampled dataset created is used to generate 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍, 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 as previously discussed  so that the underlying classifier is 
trained using the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 and 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄 datasets and the performance of 𝓞 x;w  
and the rules are measured using the unseen 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset.  For Real-E the 
following procedure was used to extract the sampled dataset that consisted of 210 
fields from the large European issuer transactional and customer databases: 
§ A table was created containing 100% of the account numbers which 
made fraudulent transactions in the period called Month 3 to Month 6. 
§ This table of accounts was then used to produce a complete set of all 
transactions made on these accounts. 
To reduce the size of the sampled dataset, data was selected for nine European 
countries in the natural population given in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5 – Real-E transactions from countries by percentage volume. 
 
Values have been altered due to confidentiality. 
To generate the sample in Table 5-4 approximately 800,000 transactions that were 
not marked as fraud were added in the same ratio as in the above table so that for 
Country Volume %
E1 19,000,000 37.0%
E2 10,000,000 19.5%
E3 7,000,000 13.6%
E4 4,000,000 7.8%
E5 3,000,000 5.8%
E6 2,700,000 5.3%
E7 2,300,000 4.5%
E8 1,800,000 3.5%
E9 1,500,000 2.9%
Total 51,300,000 100.0%
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example E1 transactions made up 37% x 800,000 = 288,000 transactions.  The 
transactions were randomly sampled from the natural population until the 
representative volume for each country was reached.  As discussed in A.5, page 397 
most humans develop habitual behaviours that are true of their financial 
transactions.  To utilise the temporal, spatial and sequential dimension of the data 
“global features” (derived variables) were created as new input fields that encapsulate 
this behaviour based on input from the fraud experts from the large European issuer.  
These required up to 90-days prior history given in Figure 5-56. 
Month 1 to Month 3 
 
Month 4 to Month 7 
  
History period  
(90 days) 
Dataset Time Period 
(120 days) 
Figure 5-56 – Diagram of Real-E dataset derived field periods. 
Data covering this period was gathered and together this created a sampled 
transaction dataset that was then used in the experiments by creating the new fields 
given in Table 5-6.  This sampled transaction dataset represents a 2% random 
sample from the natural population containing 100% of the marked (known) fraud. 
Table 5-6 – List of derived fields for Real-E dataset. 
Derived Field Period 
Average spend on card 1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Total product spend on card 1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Number product transactions on card 1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Average product spend on card  1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Number pin-less transactions on card 1,7 days 
Total spend on card 1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Number transactions on card 1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Average spend  1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Total product spend  1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Number product transactions  1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Total spend  1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
Number transactions  1, 7, 30, 8-14 days 
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These derived fields are more expensive computationally to calculate than the 
standard fields and therefore the pre-processing attempts to remove derived fields 
that do not have a significant effect on the accuracy of the results through a 
weighting.  Derived fields that are highly linearly correlated with one another are 
removed.  The dataset record sizes are given in Table 5-7 where the ratio between 
the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍, 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐄 and 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 datasets is set based on previous experience (see 
“phenomenological adjustment of constants” in 4.2.1, page 206). 
Table 5-7 – Number of records in the train, validate and test real-world datasets. 
 
[A] – Real-K=Republic of Korea credit card issuer. 
 
 
[B] – Real-E Large European issuer. 
All the sparse fraud examples are included in the datasets and in doing so it is argued 
that an almost Bayesian prior effect is introduced in the model.  The fraud examples 
can be seen as considerably more “expensive” as errors caused by the 
misclassification of genuine transactions hence encouraging the neural model to 
learn to perform better on the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 class than the 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 class notwithstanding 
the Bayes’ Principle of Equidistribution of Ignorance.  Results are adjusted to reflect 
what would be reasonably expected had the full natural population been used for 
testing.  The key conversion factors are calculated in Table 5-8. 
Real-K Total
Genuine Records 112,000 6.6% 48,000 2.8% 1,549,796 90.6% 1,709,796
Fraud Records 507 49.1% 217 21.0% 309 29.9% 1,033
Total 112,507 48,217 1,550,105 1,710,829
Train Validate Test (Unseen)
Real-E Total
Genuine Records 28,000 2.4% 12,000 1.0% 1,130,165 96.6% 1,170,165
Fraud Records 1,651 49.0% 707 21.0% 1,009 30.0% 3,367
Total 29,651 12,707 1,131,174 1,173,532
Train Validate Test (Unseen)
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Table 5-8 – Natural population sampling conversion factors for real-world datasets. 
 
Key: Ref Real-E=Large European issuer, Real-K=Republic of Korea credit card issuer. Sg= 
Eq.(5-1), Rt= Eq.(5-5). 
While not a key constituent of this thesis it is necessary to train a neural network to 
assess the efficacy of the SOAR algorithm and with such large datasets this was 
found to be problematic.  The next section details the experiments undertaken to 
train a classifier upon which SOAR can be tested on large-scale datasets. 
5.2.4 Deep neural network training 
As previous experimental parameters in 4.2.6, page 214 an advanced deep learning 
classifier is selected with regularisation approaches to reduce overfitting as the 
default black-box classifier.  The unbalanced and sparse dataset was difficult to 
model and led to what could be argued as a poor accuracy of the neural network 
classifier in Table 5-9.  The communal random patterns in the sparse subclass of the 
fraud class can cause problems with convergence in the Deep-MLP neural network.  
This is particularly true near decision boundaries.  Insufficient examples of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 
will cause the neural network to learn from the noise.  This noise could be common 
among a large fraction of that class.  If the characteristics of a subclass of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 
place it in a position in data space that is isolated from the other subclasses then 
many training examples from that subclass are required to avoid fitting the random 
patterns common to members of that subclass.  Despite these drawbacks, SOAR 
extracted rules from the deep MLP that will be shown to discover fraud 
characteristics not previously known and to outperform benchmarks.  The R code 
described in Appendix D that was used in the small datasets in Chapter 4 was found 
to be too time-consuming to be used with these large datasets and so the more 
efficient C++ language was used to implement the pre-processing and SOAR 
algorithms.  The underlying classifier was trained and the best performing model 
Ref Sg Rt
Real-E 52.3 0.04
Real-K 99.9 0.10
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was chosen as previously described.  A confusion matrix was produced and is given 
in Table 5-9 using the 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 dataset.  In practice 𝜃 is typically determined based on a 
range of business factors to balance the number of alerts per day and the number of 
fraudulent transactions correctly alerted.  A ROC analysis previously described 
4.2.6, page 214 is used unless stated to select the value of 𝜃 as “the point closest to 
the top-left of the plot indicating the best sensitivity and specificity.  An ROC chart 
for Real-E is given in Figure 5-57.  This chart shows that the neural network is a 
sufficient classifier in the context of real-world values. 
  
Figure 5-57 – ROC for the trained classifier for Real-E dataset. 
Table 5-9 – MLP classifier confusion matrix test results for transactions in real-world 
datasets. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻.  𝜃 set as described in 5.2.4. 
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Ref↓ %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC
Real-E 63.103 11.596 63.080 0.032
Real-K 99.891 0.018 99.909 0.294
Deep MLP (TEST) 
| Chapter 5 - Real-World Data Empirical Evaluation | 
 | 274 |  
For Real-E the neural network classifier achieved an 𝑀𝐶𝐶 of only 0.03 with 63% 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 with a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 63% so that 892 out of 1,009 fraud transactions (see Table 
5-7 [B]) were correctly classified (88%) which is a reasonable result given the sparse 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset.  For Real-K the 𝑀𝐶𝐶 is 0.29 and the 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is 99.89% with a 𝑇𝑃𝑅 of 99.91% only 34 out of 309 fraud transactions (see Table 5-7 [A]) in test 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset were correctly classified (11%).  In both cases the neural network is 
conservative as it misclassifies a large number of genuine transactions as fraud due to 
the sparse examples of fraud.  
5.2.5 Performance measures 
Table 4-3, page 213 details the measures used in the experiments that are calculated 
using the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset created through cross-validation.   The SOAR algorithm 
was applied to Real-E and Real-K datasets and 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 were generated.  These 
results are presented in two parts (1) confusion matrix measures as described in 
Chapter 4 and (2) payments industry measures.  Each of these is described in the 
next two sections. 
5.3 Confusion Matrix Experimental Results 
Results are presented in this section using confusion matrix measures as described in 
Chapter 4 to allow comparison between the results for the small UCI datasets and 
those in this chapter. 
5.3.1 Ruleset soundness and support 
Soundness and support of the extracted rulesets is an important measure defined in 
Eq. (2-25).  Results are tabulated in Table 5-10 for Real-E and Real-K datasets. 
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Table 5-10 – SOAR ruleset soundness and support for Real-K and Real-E. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set as described in 5.2.4. 
The SOAR algorithm has a high level of 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, which is independent of the high 
skew in these datasets.  This indicates that the SOAR rules (that will be described in 
detail in 5.4.5, page 287) closely represent the underlying classifier – a key aim of the 
SOAR algorithm. 
5.3.2 Ruleset comprehensibility 
Comprehensibility of the extracted rulesets is defined in Eq. (2-27)and discussed in 
Table 2-45.  Results are tabulated in Table 5-11. 
Table 5-11 – SOAR ruleset comprehensibility for Real-K and Real-E. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.   𝜃 set as described in 5.2.4. 
The SOAR extracted rules are compact with 7x fewer rules and 2.7x fewer literals 
than benchmarks detailed in 5.4.2, page 283.   
Ref  ↓ Soundness Support
Real-E 69.4 89.2
Real-K 68.4 94.4
SOAR  (TEST)
Ref  ↓ Comprehensibility #Rules
Real-E 414 44
Real-K 2448 199
SOAR (TEST)
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5.3.3 Ruleset performance 
For ease of comparison, the performance of the extracted ruleset is assessed using the 
quality, accuracy, FPR and TPR measures (as in Chapter 4, Table 4-3, page 213) 
and the results tabulated in Table 5-12. 
Table 5-12 – SOAR performance for Real-K and Real-E. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set as described in 5.2.4. 
Real-E SOAR extraction has a TPR of 91% compared to 63% for the neural 
classifier in Table 5-9.  Counterintuitively, the rules outperform the neural classifier.  
It is suggested that the rules are able to outperform the neural classifier as the 
boundaries located are crisp boundaries so that the (inaccurate) generalisation of the 
neural model is not captured in the extraction.  This tends to create rules that do not 
cover the decision boundary correctly as evidenced by the reduced false-positive rate.  
Pruning those rules that exhibit a high false-positive rate contributes to improved 
accuracy but will reduce the TPR.  There is no such equivalent process for the 
neural network.   
5.3.4 SOAR benchmark performance 
A DT C5.0 was generated as previously for Real-K and performance measures 
calculated so that the SOAR extraction algorithm can be placed in context of this 
well-established knowledge extraction technique.  It was not necessary to repeat the 
experiment for Dataset-E due to the large size of the dataset.   
Ref  ↓ %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC
Real-E 91.267 13.082 91.271 0.082
Real-K 82.668 28.155 82.724 0.103
SOAR  (TEST)
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Table 5-13 – SOAR benchmark for Real-K. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set as described in 5.2.4, page 272. 
In Table 5-13 for Real-K the DT size, that is the number of equivalent conjunctive 
rules is only 3xfewer than the number of frauds in the dataset that it is classifying. 
That is 975 rules whereas the full dataset had 1,033 fraud examples given in Table 
5-7 [B].  The DT rule-induction method is unable to find the common boundaries 
that separate the fraud from the genuine examples within each fraud vector resulting 
in a large number of rules and a poor performance.  The DT algorithm is unable to 
find weak inter-relationships in the data in order to create rules sufficient to detect 
the frauds without a high false-positive rate.   
5.4 Payments Industry Experimental Results 
Results are formatted in this section as is typical within the payments industry.  This 
is important so that SOAR can be understood in terms of its application in the real-
world.  Further graphs and analysis that are in common use within the payments 
industry are given in Appendix G. 
A payment processor has a fixed resource available to review alerts from their FMS.  
Therefore it is important to understand the number of alerts that are likely to be 
generated by the model (neural classifier or rules.) when used in the real-world.  
Thus the measures calculated on the model using the smaller sampled dataset must 
be projected to the natural dataset as an estimate of real-world performance.  All 
records marked as being known fraud in the natural population are included in the 
sampled datasets so that Eq. (5-2) and Eq. (5-3) are simplified using Eq. (5-1) in Eq. 
(5-4) to convert the performance measures into figures representing the natural 
population. 
Ref  ↓ #Rules Comprehensibility MCC
DT C5.0 975 475,800 0.002
SOAR 199 2,448 0.294
Real-K
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𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠!"#$%& = 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠!"#$% # 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠# 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 	 (5-2) 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠!"#$%"& =  𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠!"#$%& . 𝑆𝑔 (5-3) 
Using Eq. (5-1) this is reduced to 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠!"#$%"& =  𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠!"#$% (5-4) 
The sampled dataset is itself sampled to create three datasets that are of a size that 
the computationally intensive training algorithms converge within a reasonably short 
period.  A segmentation rate is calculated in Eq. (5-5) and Eq. (5-6).  
𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑡 = # 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡# 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 	 (5-5) 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑅𝑡 = # 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡# 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  (5-6) 
The measures used in 5.3 are those typically used in calculating the performance of a 
classifier in research work.  To provide meaningful performance measures in the 
real-world a set of business metrics is used.  Within payment transactions there are 
specific entities that relate to one another.  These entities are a one-to-many 
relationship linked by a common key and are used to provide summary metrics.  
Typical entities are given in Table 5-14. 
Table 5-14 – List of entity relationships within the Real-E dataset. 
Level Entity Denoted Description Linked  
1 Transaction T An individual transaction. None. 
2 Card C 
A set of transactions for a unique 
payment card ID normally 
sorted in ascending order by the 
date/time of each transaction.  
When a single transaction is 
alerted the entire card is 
considered as being alerted. 
Encrypted 
PAN. 
3 Account A 
A set of cards that belong to a 
unique account number, such as 
multiple payment cards issued to 
a single business.   
Unique 
Account ID. 
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These entity relationships are illustrated in Figure 5-58. 
 
Figure 5-58  – Illustration of entity mapping within the Real-E dataset. 
As results are calculated by entity, indexes need to be formed for each entity so that 
this information can be efficiently calculated.  For example with the card entity, the 
transactions per unique PAN are collated and then sorted in date order with the 
oldest first so that a ‘statement’ for that particular card can be produced that lists all 
transactions starting at the oldest.  For a specific entity a set of metrics can be 
calculated using the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset and then adjusted using the factors in Table 5-8 
to reflect what would be reasonably expected had the natural population been used.  
These metrics are given in Table 5-15 where the metric is denoted using 
<Type><Entity><Period> so that <Type> is F=Fraud, G=Genuine, <Entity> is 
T=transaction, C=card, A=account and <period> is D=day, Y=year. 
Table 5-15 – Real-World metrics used to evaluate performance on the real-world 
datasets. 
Metric Equation 
Percent of 
fraud [entity] 
detected 
The ratio of the number of fraud [entity] alerted to the total number 
of fraud [entity] for the period. %𝐹[𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝐷 = #𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦#𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 . 100% 
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Metric Equation 
Fraud $ 
detected for 
[entity] 
The sum of the amounts corresponding to the fraud [entity] 
detected. 𝐹$[𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦] = $𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 .𝐹𝑅𝑡 
FRt is in Eq. (5-6). 
Percent of 
Fraud $ 
Alerted for 
[entity] 
The ratio of fraud $ alerted to the total amount of fraud dollars. %𝐹[𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝐷 = #𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦#𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 . 100% 
Opposable $ 
Saved for 
[entity] 
The sum of all transactions amounts following the first alerted 
transaction in a [entity].  For example if there is an alert on the nth 
transaction then none of the transactions up to and including the nth 
transaction is considered savings only transactions after the nth 
transaction are considered as savings. 𝑂$𝐷 = $𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡.𝐹𝑅𝑡  
FRt is in Eq. (5-6). 
Percent of 
Opposable $ 
Saved for 
[entity] 
The ratio of opposable $ detected to the total amount of opposable $.  
The total opposable amount is the sum of all amounts of the second 
through the nth transaction for all alerted transactions. %𝑂$𝐷 = 𝑂$𝐷. 100% 
[entity] False 
Negative 
Ratio 
The number of good [entity] alerted for each fraud [entity] alerted. [𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝐹𝑁𝑅 = #𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑆𝑔. Rt#𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑆𝑔. Rt + #𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
[entity] alerts 
per Day 
The average number of [entity] to review each day. [𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦]𝑅𝐷 = #genuine entity alert. Sg. Rt + #fraud entity alerted. Rt#𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  
It is not the aim of this thesis to create an improved fraud detection classifier model 
although it will be seen that the SOAR rules outperform the existing issuer FMS 
systems.  However it is important to understand the performance of the neural 
network classifier in terms of real world metrics.  When 𝜃 is varied a range of 
individual classifiers is created each of which have differing performance measures. 
Tables and graphs are calculated to allow the business user to select this point.  The 
next section analyses the performance of the neural network classifier for a single 
dataset where Real-E is chosen. 
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In the real-world a trade-off table is typically used to select the 𝜃 against #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷.  
A good ruleset will permit 𝜃 to be chosen that corresponds to a manageable number 
of account alerts per day that contain as many of the frauds and saves as much 
transaction value as possible.  A trade-off table for Real-E is given in Table 5-18. 
The benchmark in 5.4.2 reports that the current FMS solution produces #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 =2,500.  The following analysis θ set at 750 out of 1,000 to give #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 = 1,000 to 
reduce the review team size to 10 is calculated on the same basis as previously.  The 
shaded row in Table 5-18 indicates this approximate point.   
Table 5-16  – Classifier trade-off table for Real-E dataset. 
 
Key: Shaded row is 𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000 selected in experiments to generate 1,000 Card 
Alerts. 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000. 
5.4.1 Payment card based performance 
The issuers that supported this work requested that the measured entity is based on a 
card as once a transaction has been alerted then the entire card is alerted in their 
From account_metrics
Card Alerts % Fraud Cards Detected % Opposable Saved
0 1,391 100 100
100 1,256 99 97
200 1,210 98 97
300 1,177 98 97
400 1,148 98 96
500 1,113 98 95
600 1,064 98 95
700 1,018 97 94
800 978 96 94
900 852 95 92
999 443 64 66
Data-E per day
Operating Point
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FMS and subsequent transactions on that card are blocked and not further alerted. 
These results are used to calculate performance, which is given in Table 5-17.   
Table 5-17 – SOAR performance measures for payment cards for real-world data 
using 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000.. 
For both datasets the TPR has improved over the transactions in Table 5-12 that 
was expected as more than one alert on a card is counted as just one alert.  However, 
this had led to an FPR is considerably worse for Real-E which indicates that the 
SOAR rules cover a wider area in this experiment.  These measures can be 
misleading as when the real-world performance is calculated in Table 5-18 both rulesets produce results that substantially exceed the benchmarks in Table 5-19.  
Since the results were obtained using the 𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇 dataset this signifies that the SOAR 
extracted rules have a good ability to generalise.  Although not the aim of this work it 
is expected that the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 extracted by SOAR will provide a robust fraud 
detection ability if deployed within the issuers FMS. 
Real-world measures are important to issuers and further payments industry 
meaningful performance measures are calculated in Table 5-18 for both datasets and 
are projected to the natural dataset using the metrics and method described. 
Ref  ↓ %Acc %FPR %TPR MCC
Real-E 66.382 33.635 96.500 0.032
Real-K 98.442 1.558 87.000 0.017
SOAR USING CARD ENTITY (TEST)
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Table 5-18 – SOAR real-world performance metrics using 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset. 
 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000. 
The issuer could further tune the SOAR rule performance by selecting a different 𝜃. 
The real-world results have a good performance when compared to benchmarks.   
For Real-E under 900 alerts per day were generated by the SOAR extracted rules 
which is !! the number of alerts of the existing FMS to correctly detect 95% of the 
fraudulent card transactions.  For Real-K around 4,000 alerts per day are generated 
to correctly detect almost all the fraudulent card transactions.  This is 4x the number 
of alerts of the existing FMS but the SOAR rules detects more than twice the card 
fraud and so saves more than twice the value of transactions.   
5.4.2 Benchmarks 
An external benchmark is difficult to define due to the confidential nature of the 
datasets.  Limited performance figures were given that can be published.  Table 5-19 
details those for Real-K from their existing vendor FMS solution based on a neural 
network in situ at Republic of Korea credit card issuer.  The Real-E issuer provided 
figures based on their current FMS solution based on rules in situ at large European 
issuer. 
SOAR Real-E Real-K
Per day Key Cards Cards
Operating Point selected 750 900
Alerts reviewed CRD 1,000 4,123
Alerts per fraud A/F 588 3,012
Fraud cards detected 1.7 1.4
Missed frauds 0.1 0.2
%Fraud detected %FCD 96.5% 87%
$Opposable fraud saved O$D 614,000$    NA
% $Opposable fraud saved %O$D 92% NA
$Fraud detected F$C 307,000$    NA
% $Fraud detected %F$C 95% NA
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Table 5-19 – Benchmarks used for real-world datasets. 
 
[A] – Existing vendor FMS solution – neural.  
 
[B] – Existing vendor FMS solution – rules. 
Key: FMS=Supplied figures for exisiting in situ FMS. 
Comparing Real-E figures, SOAR generated 1,000 alerts per day against the 2,500 
of the existing system with 44 SOAR rules (see Table 5-11, page 275) compared to 
900 human written rules.  Other comparative figures cannot be published but the 
issuer confirmed that the 1,000 alerts per day contained more fraudulent 
transactions than the current system and that SOAR would allow them to reduce 
their fraud management costs.  For Real-K, SOAR produced 199 rules that detected 
87% of the fraudulent transactions against just 40% of the incumbent neural 
network classifier system.  Using the SOAR rules would have saved 92% of the 
possible fraud write-off compared to just 40.8% of their existing FMS.  
5.4.3 Rule depth analysis 
The research hypothesis that generalising symbolic knowledge can be extracted from classifiers 
that were trained on highly dimensional, sparse, large-scale transactional data to detect payment card 
is focused on extracting symbolic information for knowledge discovery and in doing 
so aiding human understanding of fraud vectors.  Therefore the comprehensibility of 
the extracted ruleset is important.  As previously discussed the extracted rules are 
processed one at a time and in order and if a rule evaluates to true then fraud is 
Real-K FMS
Card alerts/day 1,000
%Card fraud detected 40.0%
%Opposible saved 40.8%
Real-E FMS
Card alerts/day 2,500
#Rules 900
Review Team 26
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indicated and no further rules are processed for that transaction.  The rule-depth has 
a direct influence on the performance of the classifier.  Figure 5-59 details the depth 
of rules in the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 for each dataset and calculates the accuracy for correct fraud 
detection and genuine recognition on a per transaction basis.   
 
 
Figure 5-59  – Line chart of number of extracted rules compared to percentage of 
correctly detected fraud for real-world datasets. 
At the issuer it is a decision made by the business experts to determine the depth of 
rules to deploy.  For Real-K all 199 rules correctly detect 72% of the 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 (82% 
genuine).  Selecting the first 103 rules reduces this by around 10% to 63% correct 
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detection of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 (84% 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒).  In this case the 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 measure is 
improved by 50% to 1,266.  For Real-E the full 44 rules are needed to achieve 87% 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 detection precision (88% 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒) but by selecting the first 20 rules it detects 
80% 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 (94% 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒) with a 7% reduction of accuracy; shorter and simpler 
rules are more straightforward to understand than complex rules and so by reducing 
the number of rules the 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 measure is improved from 422 to 188 
(57%). 
5.4.4 Confidence 
This unexpected poor performance of the classifier despite using a deep learning 
algorithm led to a greater focus on measuring the confidence of the classifier in these 
experiments.  It is likely that a vendor FMS solution that uses a fraud detection 
neural network model should implement some form of confidence filter that 
separates transactions into high and low confidence transactions.  The method 
described in 3.5.7, page 196 is used to assign a confidence score to the output of the 
neural network classifier of a single value in the range 0%-100% based on whether 
the neural network has seen similar examples during training.  If the approach is 
used to as a filter so that only high confidence classifications are used then the results 
for transactions are in Table 5-20. 
Table 5-20 – High confidence using transactions results for Real-E datasets. 
 
[B] – Transaction performance. 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000. 
If the approach is used to filter the transactions by high confidence 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$%&'"!!" then then the results are estimated in Table 5-21. 
Ref %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR %TPR MCC
Real-E 99.98% 99.98% 100.00% 24.44% 100.00% 0.87
SOAR High Confidence  Transactions (TEST)
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Table 5-21 – High confidence using cards results for Real-E dataset. 
 
[A] – Classifier card performance. 
 
[B] – Classifier real-world performance. 
Setup: Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. Clustering Gaussian.  𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000. 
Key: Comparison is for !!"! !"#$%&'#!' !"#$%&%' !"#$%&"!"#$%&'(') !"##$%" , and shown as a multiple. 
Using the output of the high confidence filter to generate the SOAR rules creates !! 
fewer alerts per day with no missed fraud transactions and without any substantial 
loss in fraud detection accuracy [C].  This is a considerable reduction and would 
enable significant savings to the issuer.  
5.4.5 Extracted rules analysis 
The rules extracted by SOAR are analysed for each large-scale dataset in the 
following sections. 
5.4.5.1 Real-K Republic of Korea issuer  
This dataset is unusually sparse; there is a large quantity of transactional data, which 
contain only a small number of example frauds of the period.  This is perhaps a 
Ref %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR %TPR MCC
Real-E 99.95% 99.95% 100.00% 8.22% 100.00% 0.96
SOAR High Confidence  Cards (TEST)
Classifier Compare
Per day Key All High Confidence High C/All
Alerts reviewed CRD 1,000 256 1/4
Alerts per fraud A/F 588 184 1/3
Fraud cards detected 1.7 1.4 4/5
Missed frauds 0.1 0.0
%Fraud detected %FCD 97% 91% 9/10
$Opposable fraud saved O$D 614,000 587,296
% $Opposable fraud saved %O$D 92% 88%
$Fraud detected F$C 307,000 293,484
% $Fraud detected %F$C 95% 91%
False positive rate FPR 0.2 0.0
Real-E Cards
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unique feature of the Republic of Korea region (see item 9 in Table A-11, page 406) 
with a low rate of payment card fraud (RGF=165,518) for local transactions 
compared to the rest of the word (RGF=4,800).  This makes the rule extraction task 
particularly difficult as so few examples of fraud vectors are not likely to cluster well 
into common themes which explains the larger number of rules extracted by SOAR.  
199 rules were extracted that generated over 4,000 alerts per day to correctly detect 
almost all the fraudulent card transactions.  The top five SOAR extracted rules are 
presented Table 5-22 as an illustration of the rules.  From these top rules it was 
quickly distinguished that PointServiceEntryMode=(1) and 
InstallmentMonths=(IM2) appears common in the rules indicating a possible 
“root cause” in common fraud vectors.  This knowledge suggested to the fraud 
experts that that fraud is most likely when the payment card has had no payments or 
has a longer outstanding credit balance for less than six months, that is cards with a 
longer outstanding balance appear more likely to be genuine and that it is a domestic 
transaction.  The fraud experts also used the rules to quickly determine that specific 
affiliated payment cards appear to be higher risk, for example an airline-affiliated 
credit card.  CardProductType indicates that a “gold” or “blue” card has a 
higher risk of fraud than the premium brand “platinum” payment card.  There is no 
reference to the merchant types indicating that fraud is not specific to a particular 
group of product types, merchants or location.  Overall the SOAR rules discovered 
that domestic transactions with accounts of a short outstanding balance where they 
are specifically affiliated to a brand, are not a platinum card, and are independent of 
merchant or location have the highest risk of fraud.  It was agreed that important 
relationships had been discovered about the current fraud vectors, which would lead 
to the issuer taking additional measures.  New and emerging fraud vectors can be 
discovered using SOAR extracted knowledge and this can then inform the payment 
fraud lifecycle so that a range of preventative steps can be taken. 
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Table 5-22 – List of top five rules extracted by SOAR for Real-K dataset. 
# Rule 
1.  
InstallmentMonths=(IM2) AND PointServiceEntryMode=(1) AND 
AffiliatedCardCode=(ACC2) AND CardProductType=(2)+(9) AND 
LifetimeHighCashAmount=(LHCA4) 
2.  
InstallmentMonths=(IM2) AND PointServiceEntryMode=(1) AND 
AffiliatedCardCode=(ACC3) AND MCC=(MCC4) AND 
MerchantMCCName=(1) AND CardProductType=(3) AND 
LifetimeHighCashAmount=(LHCA4) AND TAmount=$100-$1.5k AND NOT 
AvailableCredit=$100-$5k AND NoCardLastMnthTxns=5-187 AND 
AmountTotalTxns>$6.1k AND NOT NoCardLastMonthTotalTxns=36-101 
AND NOT TotalAmountCardLastMonthTxns>$1.5k AND 
DeviationCardAveUsage>$5k AND LfetimeHigPurchaseAmount=$100-
$4k AND NOT LifetimeHighBalanceAmount>$4k AND 
NoMerchantLastMonthTotalTxns=3,520-22,910 AND 
AmountMerchantLastMonthTotalTxns=$0-$500 OR 
AmountMerchantLastMonthTotalTxns>$50k AND 
DeviationMechantAveUsageAmount>$10k 
3.  
InstallmentMonths=(4)+(3) AND PointServiceEntryMode=(1) 
AND AffiliatedCardCode=(ACC2) AND OnlineUser=(0) AND 
SMSUser=(0) AND CardProductType=(2)+(9) AND 
LifetimeHighCashAmount=(LHCA4) 
4.  
InstallmentMonths=(4)+(3) AND PointServiceEntryMode=(1) 
AND AffiliatedCardCode=(ACC2) AND MCC=(MCC3) AND 
MerchantMCCName=(1) AND OnlineUser=(0) AND 
CardProductType=(3) AND LifetimeHighCashAmount=(LHCA4) 
AND NOT TAmount>$1k AND NOT NoCardLastMonthTotalTxns=36-
101 AND NOT LfetimeHigPurchaseAmount=$100-$200k OR 
LfetimeHigPurchaseAmount=$100-$4k OR 
LfetimeHigPurchaseAmount=$16k-$30k AND NOT 
NoMerchantLastMonthTotalTxns=[0-30k] OR 
NoMerchantLastMonthTotalTxns=[0-577] OR 
NoMerchantLastMonthTotalTxns=[22,910-1,044,201] 
5.  
InstallmentMonths=(IM2) AND PointServiceEntryMode=(1) AND 
AffiliatedCardCode=(ACC3) AND OnlineUser=(0) AND 
CardProductType=(2)+(9) AND 
LifetimeHighCashAmount=(LHCA4) 
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For confidentiality a full key to the fields cannot be provided and some values have 
been altered.  The values enclosed in brackets are a list of symbols automatically 
grouped together by the pre-processing step and the symbol key is given in Table 
5-23. 
Table 5-23 – Key to symbols in Real-K ruleset. 
Symbol Values 
IM1 (12)+(43)+(6) 
IM2 (5)+(2)+(0) 
ACC2 (00070)+(00350)+(00332)+(00373)+(00360)+(00333)+(00011)+(000
10) 
ACC3 (00288)+(00013)+(00238)+(00221)+(00372)+(00270)+(00127)+(000
76)+(00009)+(00148)+(00361)+(00027)+(00003) MCC3 (1104)+(4105)+(2103)+(1202)+(4408)+(2106)+(1306)+(6102)+(6202
)+(3106)+(6103)+(4409)+(4401)+(4114) MCC4 (2203)+(6104)+(4407)+(4203)+(6107)+(4204)+(7603)+(4101)+(4205
)+(4301)+(1206) 
LHCA4 (1000000)+(200000000)+(0) 
5.4.5.2 Real-E Large European issuer  
44 rules were extracted that generated over 900 alerts per day to correctly detect 
95% of the fraudulent card transactions.  This is approximately !! the number of 
alerts of the existing FMS.  This performance could be further tuned by selecting a 
different 𝜃, which has not been undertaken here.  The top five rules shown in Table 
5-24 sorted by most accurate is responsible for 55% of the fraud transactions 
detected.  For confidentiality these have been altered.  Fraud analysts were able to 
look at each rule and discover previously unknown key relationships.  The rules have 
a high level of comprehensibility.  The fraud analyst at this issuer determined from 
these rules target fraud on specific POS type transactions with record type “A” 
occurring in a list of specific countries – which were already known to be higher risk.  
Each rule individually breaks down patterns by looking at specific POS located 
countries and the purchasing patterns and values of the transactions in them.  Rule 
two for example deals with “electronic goods” transactions at high-risk sites from 
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French, Polish, Slovenian and Slovakian cards.  Rule 3 selects most of the high-risk 
product items.   
Table 5-24 – List of top five rules extracted by SOAR for Real-E dataset. 
# Rule % 
1.  
RECORDTYPE=(A) AND COUNTRY=(L1) AND 
CODE=(CODE1) AND PRDCODE=(10) AND NETW=(ID1) 
AND TRANSTYPE=(5) AND IND=(1) 
30.6 
2.  
RECORDTYPE=(A) AND COUNTRY=(COUNTRY3) AND 
CODE=(CODE1) AND DISS=(DISS1) AND 
PRDCODE=(30) AND NETW=(NETW1) AND 
TRANSTYPE=(1) AND IND=(1) 
7 
3.  
RECORDTYPE=(A) AND COUNTRY=(COUNTRY1) AND 
CODE=(CODE1) AND DISS=(DISS1) AND 
PRDCODE=(PRDCODE1) AND NETW=(NETW1) AND 
TRANSTYPE=(1) AND IND=(1) AND NOT 
AVERAGE_SPEND=[$0-$1569] OR 
AVERAGE_SPEND=[$0-$5] OR AVERAGE_SPEND=[$100-
$604] AND NOT AMOUNT=[$0-$1331] OR 
AMOUNT=[$0-$200] OR AMOUNT=[$467-$2000] 
5.8 
4.  
RECORDTYPE=(A) AND COUNTRY=(COUNTRY2) AND 
CODE=(CODE2) AND DISS=(DISS1) AND 
PRDCODE=(37)+(12) AND NETW=(E)+(S) AND 
TRANSTYPE=(1) AND IND=(0) AND 
AVERAGE_SPEND=[$0-$504] 
5.8 
5.  
RECORDTYPE=(A) AND COUNTRY=(COUNTRY2) AND 
CODE=(CODE2) AND DISS=(DISS1) AND 
PRDCODE=(37)+(12) AND NETW=(E)+(S) AND 
TRANSTYPE=(1) AND IND=(0) AND 
AVERAGE_SPEND=[$0-$504] 
5.5 
The values enclosed in brackets in the rules are a list of symbols automatically 
grouped together by pre-processing, such as a list of countries.  For confidentiality a 
key cannot be provided.  Fraud analysts were able to review each rule to understand 
the key relationships.   
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The issuer made the following statement on the above results obtained using SOAR: 
“At the point that Nick undertook the work one of my responsibilities was to look after 
Shell's card fraud team.  Quick detection of card fraud is imperative to our business - every 
day that it goes unnoticed costs us a substantial amount of money.  The key issue that we 
face is detecting this small amount of 'bad' activity in amongst hundreds of millions of 
'good' transactions.  Nick's work provided us with a vision for how this could be achieved 
using neural technology - allowing us to detect this fraud with minimal manual 
involvement (i.e. a cost effective solution for us).  Having managed a neural team for 18 
months myself and worked on fraud prevention for 10 years I know that there are many 
types of neural solutions to tackle this problem - it therefore impressed me how far 
advanced Nick's thinking and technology is compared to the market place.  He presented to 
us a truly industry changing approach.  In addition, despite the complexity of the subject, 
he was able to present it to us in such a way that clearly showed the outcomes and business 
benefits - enabling any audience member to make sense of a difficult subject.” - (Johnson, 
2010). 
5.5 Summary 
It is established that SOARs effective at extracting knowledge for real-world 
payment card fraud.  It has produced a small set of accurate rules with a manageable 
number of card alerts per day that detect a high level of fraud.  Used on a regular 
basis SOAR has the promise of enabling payment processors to be more dynamic 
and to respond to the changing patterns of fraud through a better understanding of 
the fraud vectors.  The experiments show that symbolic rules can be automatically 
extracted from a trained neural network using the SOAR extraction algorithm that 
are comprehensible and can be used within a fraud environment.  The SOAR 
extraction algorithm captures the generalisation ability of the neural network and is 
sufficiently sound.  Although performance is not the key aim, the SOAR extracted 
rules outperformed the best DT method and both existing FMS deployed within 
well-known issuers.  One extension to the SOAR algorithm was explored by 
calculating the confidence of the neural network output and then extracting SOAR 
rules.  As just two large datasets have been tested it is suggested that further large-
scale datasets could be tested as part of future research (see 7.2.2, page 320). 
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Chapter 6 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
“All parts should go together without forcing.  You must remember that the parts you are 
reassembling were disassembled by you.  Therefore if you can't get them together again, 
there must be a reason.  By all means, do not use a hammer.” – IBM maintenance 
manual (1925). 
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6.1 Introduction 
The hypothesis is that knowledge in symbolic form that captures general characteristics of 
payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, imbalanced, high-
dimensional transactional data.  The objectives of this thesis are: 
§ To test the hypothesis through a verifiable evaluation of one proposed 
novel approach.  This is based on experiments using ten publicly 
available small datasets and two issuers provided large-scale, sparse, real-
world datasets. 
§ To create a novel symbolic rule extraction algorithm to extract rules from 
exisiting trained classifiers with little imposition on their function. 
§ To evaluate the history of payment cards, the methods used for fraud 
detection, new technologies and their impact on the patterns of fraud 
thereby understand the growth of payment card fraud and why this is an 
important area of research. 
§ Disseminate scientific results to promote the practical application of new 
fraud management methods which need to translate into a real-world 
deployed applications.   
The hypothesis is supported through the empirical experiments in Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 and an analytical analysis of the SOAR and SOAR extraction algorithm.  
For the small datasets the extracted rules have a high level of comprehensibility 
although the accuracy is variable.  Using large-scale real-world datasets the extracted 
rules outperform benchmarks and existing FMS performance figures and discovered 
new fraud vectors.  The payments industry fraud experts confirmed the extracted 
rules had a high utility and had added to their knowledge.  The SOAR algorithm 
has some unique features when compared to other published pedagogical 
approaches to extracting rules.  The algorithms used in the experiments require a 
number of constants that have been listed and because they cannot be eliminated 
there may be some doubt or bias introduced in the interpretation of results.  SOARs 
ranked 1 out of the 41 cited works in terms of payment card fraud detection 
performance measured by 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  The SOAR algorithm has been positioned using 
the best results obtained in Chapter 5 using the literature review in 2.5, page 62 and 
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based on a recalculation of published results to compare to a typical Tier 1 Issuer 
previously discussed.  Table 6-1 places the results within the results from the 
literature review. 
Table 6-1 – Ranked comparison of all reviewed FMS methods and SOAR results. 
 
Key: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  Rank=Position against all methods.  
Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: See 2.4, page 61.  Shading indicates results from SOARn 
Chapter 4.SOARKey: %Miss=%frauds missed.  A/F=alerts raised per actual fraud.  
Rank=Position against all methods.  Table sorted by rank.  Re-calculation assumptions: see 2.3.1, 
page 53.  Shading indicates results from SOAR in Chapter 4.	
* Sorted
Work Descr A/F #Alerts MCC  RGF #Records Rank ⬇  
SOAR II - Real-E (high) Rule Extraction 1              1,010        0.958 17,206 59,344,649,000 1
(Ghosh & Reilly, 1994)+RulesEcc - Rule+Neural 1              354           0.495 666 2,000,000,000 2
(Correia et al., 2015), Expert 5              4,400        0.400 1,999 5,600,000,000,000 3
(Carminati et al., 2014) Ecc - semisupervised 10           10,579      0.317 ? 460 4
(Wong et al., 2012) Genetic 8              6,357        0.296 3,904 640,000,000 5
(Brause et al, 1999) DT 14           14,497      0.250 93 500,000,000 6
(Salazar et al., 2012) Ecc - Non G+Discr 16           10,658      0.192 4,988 10,002,005,000 7
(Ghosh & Reilly, 1994). Neural 11           4,946        0.188 666 2,000,000,000 8
(Soltani et al., 2012) AIS 65           71,500      0.123 ? ? 9
Example 2013 System 77           50,649      0.087 4,800 ? 10
(Dheepa & Dhanapal, 2012) SVM 120         118,727     0.085 38 591,000 11
(Duman & Elikucuk, 2013b) AIS 150         150,959     0.077 22,494 22,000,000 12
(Bahnsen et al., 2013) Bayes 100         66,000      0.076 4,000 80,000,000,000 13
(Ramaki et al., 2012) Ecc - Ontology 153         150,950     0.075 6 11,555,000 14
(Guo & Li, 2008) Ecc - Conf+MLP 234         236,485     0.061 ? ? 15
(Bentley, 2000) Genetic 264         290,536     0.060 3 2,671,000 16
(Sahin & Duman, 2011a) Neural 355         386,505     0.051 22,495 22,000,978,000 17
(Jha et al., 2012) Ecc - Agg+Logit 299         226,571     0.046 11 50,000,000,000 18
(Bhusari & Patil, 2011a) HMM 414         400,880     0.045 ? ? 19
(Kundu et al., 2009 Ecc - Sequence 326         250,715     0.044 ? ? 20
(Brause et al, 1999) Neural 351         240,634     0.040 93 548,708,000 21
(Mahmoudi & Duman, 2015) Ecc - Fisher 166         45,839      0.038 9 9,300,000 22
(Minegishi & Niimi, 2011) DT 395         254,020     0.036 ? ? 23
(Chetcuti & Dingli, 2008) HMM 617         400,561     0.035 ? ? 24
(Gadi et al., 2008) GENETIC 617         400,561     0.035 26 42,000,000 24
(Stolfo et al., 1997) DT - BAYES 739         650,737     0.030 ? 500 26
(Aleskerov et al., 1997) Neural 803         750,770     0.029 1 112,000 27
(Maes et al., 2002) Bayes 669         500,638     0.029 ? ? 28
(Olszewski et al., 2013) SOM 1,011       1,000,770 0.026 9 10,000,000 29
(Dorronsoro et al., 1997) Neural 873         700,649     0.025 ? ? 30
(Kundu et al., 2006) Ecc - Sequence 1,024       900,682     0.024 ? ? 31
(Cabral et al., 2006) Ecc - Rough Sets 621         204,955     0.019 20 40,495,000 32
(Seeja & Zareapoor, 2014) Ecc - itemset 1,421       1,250,605 0.019 ? 100 33
(Lee, 2013) Ecc - autoregressive 1,248       610,111     0.015 ? 0 34
SOAR II - Real-K Rule Extraction 3,012       4,123        0.012 165,518 170,979,600,000 35
(Leonard, 1993) Expert 1,345       432,726     0.011 21 12,709,000 36
(Wheeler & Aitken, 2000) CBR 2,001       1,100,308 0.010 4,544 700,000 37
(Krivko, 2010) Ecc-Anom+Rules 1,878       570,178     0.008 6 11,555,000 38
(Vatsa et al., 2009) Expert 1,624       1,250,495 0.007 ? ? 39
(Richardson, 1997) Neural 4,500       4,500        0.000 ? 5,000 40
Coin	Flip Example 4545.455 2,500,000 0.000 ? ? 41
(Brabazon et al., 2010) Genetic 5,349       202,993     0.000 239 50,000,000 42
(HaratiNik et al., 2012) Expert 1,117       1,125,760 -0.001 ? ? 43
(Zaslavsky & Strizhak, 2006) SOM 86,346     3,275,179 -0.019 ? 100 44
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When the sparse dataset of Real-K is compared without a confidence filter it is 
ranked 34 out of the 41 cited works.  This indicates the difficulty of comparing 
different methodologies that each use different datasets.  The aim of this work is not 
to produce an improved fraud detection classifier but to create generalising rules that 
explain the patterns of fraud that can add to the knowledge of human experts.   
The small public datasets in Chapter 4 have been widely used in the pedagogical 
rule extraction literature reviewed.  Using 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 as a metric is known not to be a 
reliable metric when the dataset is unbalanced and sparse as in real-world fraud 
datasets.  The reviewed works use this as a common published performance measure 
and often do not provide sufficient detailed results to calculate a more reliable metric 
such as 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  The machine learning community do not have an agreed set of 
metrics with which to compare works making it difficult to benchmark SOAR.  As 
designed the SOAR search method eschews precision of locating the decision 
boundary for more generalising rules which are easier to understand.  
From the results SOARs shown to be a valuable symbolic rule extraction algorithm 
that can extract rules from exisiting trained classifiers with no imposition on their 
function.  SOAR has contributed to the body of work as it performs well with the 
real-world data and is able to explain fraud in terms that the fraud experts 
understood.  SOARs suitable to be used within the payment processor FMS. 
The following sections analyse the significant findings of the experiments, review the 
extracted 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 and then compare the SOAR method to related published work.   
6.2 Small Datasets 
The experiments with the small publically available datasets only partially support 
the hypothesis.  The datasets were small and so a 10 fold cross-validation technique 
was used to produce all the results.  To practically reduce fraud it must first be 
understood by those in payment processing in such a way as to add to the knowledge 
of the human experts.  It was claimed in Chapter 3 that the SOAR extraction 
algorithm would provide a higher level of abstraction compared to other common 
techniques.  The experiments in Chapter 4 confirm that in 7 out of 10 datasets the 
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SOAR extracted rules have a good 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 and therefore cover the fraud surface of 
the classifier.  On average 5.9 rules were extracted with a FPR of less than 5% in 6 
out of 10 cases and an MCC over 0.5 in 4 out of 10 datasets.  Small datasets do not 
generally perform well with the SOAR method as their low ratio of records to fields 
and low RGF are such that there are few examples from which to apply the 
algorithms.  Despite this mis-match the SOAR algorithm extracted rules that are 
compact and cover a large area of the fraud space.  The pedagogical SOAR 
extraction method claimed that the rules would cover the largest cardinality of the 
input space and the largest area of “interest” for each rule.  The measure of 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 and 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 were used in the experiments to determine this claim and 
for all datasets the measures were high.  It is claimed in A1 that the SOAR algorithm 
is independent of the architecture of fraud classifier, which is important as it is 
known that deployed FMS make use of a range of classifiers.  Experiments selected 
the UCI-B dataset and then trained four different common classifiers on this data 
(Deep-MLP, SVM, RBF, DT C5.0).  Once the black-box classifier was trained the 
SOAR algorithm was applied and measures calculated to the extracted rules.  The 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks pairs statistical significance test (Wilcoxon, 1945) indicated 
that there is not a significant difference between the classifier methods and the 
performance of the rules.  While the performance of the underlying different 
classifiers was different the SOAR extracted rules had a similar or better MCC in all 
cases for the chosen dataset.  This experiment confirmed the original assumption of 
classifier independence.  A2 required the use of the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset, which was 
originally used to train the underlying classifier to be available so that the search 
space is reduced.  In 4.4, page 247 an analytical analysis highlighted the limitation of 
the SOAR implementation that uses the Euclidean distance as a measure of 
similarity between example vectors within the cluster.  Fraud examples in the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset are used as initial search space “seeds”.  A prototype is created to 
represent a single fraud vector using clustering and locating the centre of the cluster 
as being the most representative using the Euclidean distance.  Since all fields are 
discretised into a binary value then the binary value of a literal does not indicate any 
sensible measure between these two categories.  For improved accuracy some form 
of conversion between categories is required or an external ontological knowledge 
base that links such concepts and can provide a measure of similarity.  It was not 
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necessary for the purpose of this work to solve this problem in the small datasets.  For 
the large-scale datasets the implementation was amended so as to use the real-world 
values where available to calculate the similarity.  This is an area of suggested future 
research (see 7.2.3, page 320).  To establish if the choice of clustering algorithm is 
important three clustering algorithms were tested with all datasets and the results 
compared.  The results show that this initial clustering step of the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset is 
important as it impacts on the performance of the extracted rules.  This is due to the 
number of clusters formed and noot the clustering algorithm.  The more initial 
prototypes that are formed up to some optimum then the greater the area of feature 
space that is explored by SOAR which in turn leads to superior rules with an 
improved 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  Due to the small size of these datasets the different clustering 
algorithms all have similar difficulties in locating meaningful clusters.  There is no 
reason that any clusters should naturally form in these small datasets whereas it has 
been established that in real-world payment card fraud datasets it is likely that such 
clusters do exist as fraud vectors.  Using the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset, which is typically 
available within payment processors, reduces the issue of the large search space 
required for a sound pedagogical rule extraction.  The SOAR algorithm made an 
assumption (A3) that the dataset must be large-scale to contain sufficient examples to 
form decision boundaries.  It is assumed (A4) that the dataset is highly unbalanced so 
that fraud examples are sparse.  A further important factor was the preprocessing of 
the datasets as real-world datasets contain a mixture of continuous numeric (A5) and 
symbolic fields (A7) that are not necessarily normal or exhibit homoscedasticity.  
Many real-world fields are nominal (categorical) and may be ordered or unordered 
or represent a ratio.  The SOAR algorithm been developed to integrate 
preprocessing steps.  The initial experiments illustrated the effectiveness of this 
automated approach.  The results reveal that some of the small datasets had input 
fields that were either highly correlated with one another or had high entropy and so 
could be removed.  The symbolic fields are analysed and converted into groups of 
common symbols.  The SOAR algorithm requires that the inputs to the underlying 
classifier are discretised to further reduce the search space (A5).  The discretisation 
step generated many more fields than the original datasets especially when the field is 
symbolic and contains a large number of different symbols.  With the increase in the 
number of input fields the intrinsic dimensionality of the problem grows and so the 
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number of examples required to sufficiently train the classifier increases which was 
problematic in the small datasets.  The SOAR algorithm assumes that the resulting 
fields are able to adequately describe a fit to the decision boundary within a 
tolerance (A8).  The results in Chapter 4 confirm that this is true for seven of the rulesets extracted.  All of these datasets have among the lowest ratio of discretised 
input fields to the number of records, which may in part explain the acceptable 
performance so that the classifier will be able to learn robustly and with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy.  It is the unusually small number of records in these datasets that 
do not match the preprocessing approach.  A cross-validation approach was 
necessary for these experiments but the results between each fold varied considerably 
and so there is doubt that the estimated results can be taken as a reasonable estimate 
of general performance.  A requirement of SOARs that the underlying classifier 
output generates a 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 indicating probability of fraud (A9).  The score is assumed 
to be monotonic in relation to an estimate of the probably of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑.  𝜃 is assumed 
and this then defines the performance of the classifier.  Each of the classifiers tested 
(Deep-MLP, SVM, RBF, DT C5.0) generate a score.  It is known that 𝜃 can be 
sensitive but it was not necessary for these tests to explore this beyond the ROC 
analysis and experiments in Chapter 5 explored this further.  The results from 
Chapter 4 partly uphold the hypothesis but further experiments were required using 
large-scale, real-world datasets of payment transactions that include examples of 
payment card fraud for which the SOAR algorithms were created.   
6.3 Large-Scale Datasets 
The results from the large-scale datasets support the hypothesis.  Although only two 
datasets have been tested and so these have a limitation of not representing all the 
different types of payment processors and their transactions. 
In Chapter 5 SOAR was tested on two large-scale and real-world datasets (1) from a 
large European issuer with 59m records and (2) from a Republic of Korea credit 
card issuer with 171m records.  Random sampling was used to produce smaller 
datasets to train, validate and test the underlying black-box classifier.  The 
worldwide average in 2013 for RGF is 4,800 that compared to the supplied datasets 
of 17,206 and 165,518 is atypically low making it a difficult task to train the classifier.  
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With such large datasets preprocessing is a critical step.  Each dataset included 
discrete literal fields with a large number of unique literals.  Conditional probability 
grouping was used and found to be effective in reducing the dimensionality of the 
dataset so that it was of a size suitable for neural network training and to improve the 
explainability of the rules through fewer fields.  While it is not the aim of this thesis to 
create an improved fraud detection classifier model it was a necessary step to 
undertake the SOAR experiments.  As previously a Deep-MLP neural network was 
selected as the highest performing for a set of input parameters.  The trained black-
box classifier substantially outperforms the benchmark figures given by the issuers for 
their existing FMS.  For the initial SOAR experiments the Deep-MLP classifier θ set 
at 750 out of 1,000 but it is known this value can be used to substantially change the 
performance of the underlying classifier and therefore any rules extracted using 
SOAR will have a changed performance.  The Deep-MLP has a low MCC for both 
datasets as it misclassifies a large number of genuine transactions as fraud due to the 
weak decision boundaries of the sparse fraud examples.  An analysis of the classifier 
was undertaken whereby a trade-off table was used to select a 𝜃 against the number 
of card alerts per day #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷.  This value is typically chosen by the payment 
processor so as to correspond to a manageable number of account alerts per day that 
contain as many of the frauds and saves as much transaction value as possible.  
Selecting θ at 750 out of 1,000 would produce 1,000 alerts per day detecting 96.5% 
of the fraudulent cards.  It can be seen that selecting an optimal 𝜃 prior to rule 
extraction will produce SOAR rules that are optimised.  Real-world datasets contain 
uncertainty and so too does the trained underlying classifier.  The inclusion of neural 
model uncertainty estimation was shown to be important to give a measure of the 
generalisation accuracy by calculating a confidence score on the output of the 
classifier.  Four methods were reviewed and a Bayesian method was chosen that 
produces a single value in the range 0% to 100% as an output measure of confidence 
in the output score of the underlying black-box classifier.  As this is computationally 
intensive a novel implementation method of estimating the confidence through 
interpolation was proposed that improves the calculations over the entire dataset by 
6,500x faster from almost 40 minutes to 0.4 seconds.  Further a novel approach was 
proposed to extract SOAR rules from high confidence scores that represent well-
established fraud vectors and those from low confidence scores that characterise new 
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and emerging fraud vectors.  These two different 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 will have different fraud 
vectors that will provide new knowledge and give important insights to human fraud 
experts.  For one dataset when considering the performance on a transaction basis 
SOAR extraction has 0.88% precision on fraud accounts detected compared to 
0.21% for the neural model.  Counterintuitively the SOAR rules outperformed the 
underlying black-box classifier.  The boundaries located are crisp boundaries and so 
the generalisation of the neural model is not fully captured in the rule extraction.  
This cultivates rules that do not cover the decision boundary correctly as evidenced 
by the reduced precision, which tends to reduce the false-positive rate suffered by the 
neural network.  Reviewing performance on a card basis for the European issuer 
dataset the rules extracted by SOAR produced a compact set of rules that captured 
and explained the fraud vectors while substantially improving the accuracy of fraud 
detection over existing FMS systems and that of a DT 5.0 benchmark.  SOAR 
produced 80x fewer rules that created less than a tenth the number of alerts and 
correctly alerted 90% of the fraudulent payment cards per day compared to the 
existing FMS.  Since these results were obtained using the unseen records in the 𝐓𝐄𝐒𝐓 dataset of over 1m randomly sampled records this indicated that the SOAR 
extracted rules have a good ability to generalise.  The South Korean dataset 
generated more rules but had a reasonable 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 and MCC and generated over 
4,000 alerts per day to correctly detect almost all the fraudulent card transactions.  
This is 4x the numbers of alerts of the existing FMS but the SOAR rules detect more 
than twice the card fraud and so save more than twice the value of transactions.  The 
hypothesis that knowledge in symbolic form that captures general characteristics of payment card 
fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, imbalanced, high-dimensional 
transactional data is focused on knowledge discovery.  It is through this discovery of 
fraud knowledge that human understanding of the fraud vectors will be improved.  
For each transaction SOAR rules are processed one at a time and in order so that 
when a rule evaluates to true (𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑) then no further rules are processed.  Therefore 
the rule-depth has a direct influence on the performance of the classifier and the 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 measure and reducing the rule-depth while maximising 
performance was proposed.  For Real-K all 199 rules correctly detect 72% of the 
fraud (82% genuine).  Reducing this to the first 103 rules reduces this by around 
10% to 63% correct detection of fraud (84% genuine).  In this case the 
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𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 measure is improved by 50%.  For Real-E the full 44 rules are 
needed to achieve 87% fraud detection precision (88% genuine) but by selecting the 
first 20 rules it detects 80% frauds (94% genuine) with a 7% reduction of accuracy; 
shorter and simpler rules are more straightforward to understand than complex 
rules.  It is a business decision on how many rules in the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 are deployed.  
There is always a trade-off between the number of frauds correctly detected and the 
number of genuine correctly detected which directly leads to the real-world metric of 
the number of alerts generated in a period.  The SOAR extraction algorithm does 
not guarantee that the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 is sound since it uses a sampling technique to locate 
decision boundaries.  Such a technique does not cover the entire search space and 
therefore some relationships may not be captured.  Moreover in this implementation 
of the algorithm the sampling is based upon the 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐈𝐍 dataset, which with sparse 
data examples may not provide the best “seed” with which to start the search.  The 
performance results were calculated in terms of real-world values that it is known are 
used by issuers to determine the effectiveness of their FMS and its efficacy.  Some 
benchmark indicative figures were provided for the current FMS system in use by 
each issuer.  For Real-E SOAR rules produced 2.5x fewer alerts with 20x fewer 
rules.  Real-K SOAR generated over 4x the number of alerts per day but captured 
over twice the number of fraudulent cards.  If SOAR rules are extracted from high 
confidence scores then a quarter of alerts per day would be generated with a lower 
rate of fraud cards detected and the savings from the detection remains similar 
indicating that a substantial improvement can be made in performance by including 
confidence in the process.  
6.4 Extracted Rules and Knowledge 
The initial results in Chapter 4 support the claim from Chapter 3 that the extracted 
rules have a high level of abstraction.  It was assumed that any symbolic fields from 
the datasets must be transformed through meaningful groupings that can be 
linguistically named.  This is important if the rules extracted from the classifier are to 
be understandable.  Where the dataset included meaningful field labels the extracted 
rules were simple to understand for example for UCI-M contains the features of 23 
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species of gilled mushrooms, where a ‘gill’ is a radiating vertical plate on the 
underside of the cap.  The SOAR rule is:  
IF StalkColourAbove={b,n,p,w} AND 
StalkColorBelow={b,n,p,w} AND 
SporePrintColour={h,w}  
This can be expanded using linguistic descriptors to:  
If the stalk colour of the mushroom above or below the ring is buff, brown, pink or white 
and the colour of the spores is chocolate or white then don’t eat the mushroom as it is 
definitely poisonous or of unknown edibility and not recommended for consumption.   
The extracted rule is compact and straightforward to understand and could add to 
the knowledge of edible mushrooms.  In the context of fraud knowledge such 
generalisation may not be specifically accurate but must be sufficiently accurate to 
hold true for most cases and so provide a wider understanding of fraud vectors and 
how these change over time as new disruptive technologies grow towards the argued 
pivotal event. 
The real-world datasets in Chapter 5 produced English-like SOAR extracted rules 
that discovered new and interesting fraud characteristics not previously known to the 
experts at the issuers.  For Real-K their expert discovered a possible “root cause” in 
common fraud vectors.  High-risk transactions were domestic transactions with 
accounts that had a short outstanding credit balance where they were affiliated to a 
brand and were not a platinum card.  The issuer agreed that important relationships 
had been discovered about the current fraud vectors, which would lead to them 
taking additional measures.  For Real-E the fraud analyst determined that fraud was 
targeted on specific POS type transactions occurring in a list of countries and with a 
list of product types.  Knowledge gained from the extracted rules can be used to take 
action to pre-empt further attacks.   
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6.5 Related Work  
A pedagogical approach to extracting rules from a SVM was proposed in (Barakat & 
Diederich, 2004a).  A labelled dataset was used to train a SVM as a classifier to 
satisfactory accuracy and once trained a synthetic dataset was derived from the 
support vectors from the trained SVM with the target class being generated by the 
SVM then using K-means clustering to reduce the number of synthetic examples.  
Rules were extracted from the synthetic dataset by mapping to association rules.  
Some common features between SOAR and this approach can be discerned: the 
SVM is used as an Oracle to produce the synthetic datasets.  The approach was 
updated in (Barakat & Diederich, 2005) where the clustering step was omitted and 
the DT C5.0 algorithm was used to extract the rules from the synthetic dataset but 
this was found not to scale well.  As earlier established in large-scale problems such 
as fraud detection DTs generate a large number of rules and are affected by noise.  A 
large number of rules where each rule has many conditions are difficult to 
understand.  Therefore this approach will fail to create comprehensible 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
that adequately capture the generalisation of the classifier.  The work in (Zhang & 
Liu, 2005) is based on an SVM and proposes a Decision Boundary Analysis (DBA) 
using sensitivity analysis as the search method approach.  Work in (Ren & d'Avila 
Garcez, 2009) replaces the extraction step in (Barakat & Diederich, 2005) with an 
approach called GSVMORC based on locating the points on the SVM classification 
boundary by constructing hypercubes using a binary search.  None of the related 
approaches use large-scale datasets or are optimised for use within payments fraud.  
SOARs more general than these approaches and it are effective on any classifier.  It 
assumes that the null hypothesis is reasonably sparse which in most real-world 
classification problems is often so.  The SOAR algorithm in Chapter 3 uses a 
standard Deep-MLP as the Oracle, which was chosen to produce good 
generalisation and noise-tolerance.  Each variable is first discretised using ART2 so 
that the subsequent step of DBA no longer needs a binary search of the support 
vectors to find a hypercube since the Deep-MLP has no support vectors as in 
GSVMORC but creates an n-polytope by expanding each binary-discretised field in 
a method similar to sensitivity analysis.  The null hypothesis examples are clustered 
and then used as the basis for the DBA search.  This is computationally efficient and 
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scales well.  For each expansion in this search the Oracle is used to produce a 
classification so that the bounds on each field that make up the rule can be efficiently 
located.  Once a 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 is extracted the rules are optimised by removing (1) 
duplicates and (2) where any discretised field elements have overlapping real-ranges.   
6.6 Summary 
SOAR is effective at extracting knowledge for real-world payment card fraud.  This 
conclusion affirms the hypothesis that knowledge in symbolic form that captures general 
characteristics of payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, 
imbalanced, high-dimensional transactional data. 
The limitations have been analysed and it is suggested that these form future 
research (discussed in 7.2, page 319).  The majority of published work reviewed in 
Chapter 2 was tested on small datasets that do not necessarily reflect the difficulties 
of real world data.  SOAR extraction has been tested on large-scale and unbalanced 
datasets using real-world datasets and produces comprehensible rules.  The black-
box property of neural networks has often hampered the uptake of the technology in 
the payments sector.  It is natural when a system is used in a critical part of the 
business for an FMS manager to wish to understand how the decisions are obtained.  
In the context of FMS or risk, knowledge explanation may discover emerging 
patterns of fraud so that action can be taken to pre-empt further attacks.  One 
method to open the black-box has been presented that provides English-like 
symbolic rules derived from learnt models.  The type and variation in fraud vectors 
will become ever more diverse driven among other factors by the ease of sharing of 
information between criminals.  Fraud will become more dynamic in an attempt to 
avoid detection as is already so for many payment processors.  The current approach 
of manually updating rules or a model within a live FMS does not sufficiently 
capture this changing fraud landscape.  Payment processors will benefit if rules can 
be derived from the transactions themselves on a regular basis and after due checks 
are deployed within the live environment more rapidly.  SOAR will improve fraud 
detection and increase the responsiveness of current FMS approach and so seems to 
be a step forward. 
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Next a conclusion to this thesis is presented along with suggested future areas of 
research. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
“We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be 
done.” – Alan Turing (Turing, 1950). 
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7.1 Conclusions 
This thesis was motivated by the substantial growth of payment card fraud 
reported at $16.3bn in 2014 (Nilson-Report, 2015a) and the true cost of fraud 
calculated at $179bn.  Every individual act of fraud has a human cost including 
violent criminals (2009a), suicides (Palmer, 2009) and business failures (Bressler, 
2009).  Examining available sources emphasised the link between payment card 
fraud and OCGs where the proceeds are reported to pay for terrorism, arms, drugs 
and people trafficking.  Thus the economic health, day-to-day government social 
and cultural existence of citizen’s is threatened by the continued growth in payment 
card fraud as payment technology continues to advance. 
The hypothesis is that knowledge in symbolic form that captures general characteristics of 
payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, imbalanced, high-
dimensional transactional data.  This led to three key motivations that form the objectives 
of this research:  (1) test the hypothesis through a methodological and verifiable 
evaluation based on experiments on publicly available small datasets and large-scale, 
payments industry provided sparse, real-world datasets, (2) create a novel symbolic 
rule extraction algorithm suitable to extract association rules from exisiting vendor 
FMS with little imposition on their function to aid the improvement of human 
knowledge of exisiting, new and emerging payment card fraud, (3) evaluate the 
history of payment cards including the methods used for fraud detection and new 
technologies and their impact on the patterns of fraud and thereby the growth of 
payment card fraud, (4) dissemination of scientific results to promote the practical 
application of new fraud detection research methods which must translate into a 
real-world deployed applications.   
These objectives led to the question why are payment card fraud detection methods not more 
effective?  To answer this it was necessary to review the history of payment cards and 
their supporting technology.   Fraud losses have grown every year since 1971 despite 
the preventative and detection methods put in place.  These methods have not been 
sufficiently successful either in the literature or in deployed solutions.  It is concluded 
that the simplest explanation for the failure of these methods is that there is little 
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incentive to improve them while fraud levels are judged as a cost of business and are 
seen as normative; where academic work in this area is difficult and marginalised.   
An interpretation of the history in the development of payment cards given in 
Appendix A casts new light on why preventative and detection methods are not 
sufficient.  The early issuers were shown to have prioritised gaining market share 
over considering the longer-term impact of new payment methods by not taking into 
account how these methods are used for fraud or how the proceeds of fraud is then 
used to fund immoral activities.  As their profits grew so in addition did fraud but at 
a disproportionately small level and the liability is spread among the different 
participators and is normative.  Technical innovation was focused on improving the 
payment experience with fraud treated as a write-off similar to bad debt on loans.  
Criminals used payment cards for crime while the public and lawmakers became 
accustomed and accepting of these values.  In constructing this past it seems 
heterodox to suggest that banks and the payments industry consider the wider 
societal effect of payment card fraud.  There was little incentive for research into 
improved methods to detect fraud beyond simple rule-based systems as this required 
perceptions to be challenged and for further expenditure that had perceived 
associated risks.  With the earlier introduction of the magnetic stripe on the payment 
card and the exponential growth in available computing power and storage it was 
not long until criminals could read data from and write data to this magnetic stripe 
so that criminals took a technological approach.  After 20 years the payments 
industry introduced a new technology to secure the physical payment card (EMV).  
While this was effective at reducing one method of CP fraud the criminals soon 
found a range of methods to compromise this security.  EMV was designed in the 
late1980s to reduce the CP fraud that was prevalent at that time and did not foresee 
the growth of the Internet and e-commerce.  It took from 1990 to 2002 with $20bn 
of fraud worldwide write-offs until the first country adopted EMV.  It took a further 
13 years and $113bn of worldwide write-offs before it was adopted in 163 countries, 
which still mostly excludes the USA.  The payments industry failed to analyse their 
market sufficiently and so fraud moved online and grew as the Internet flourished 
from 16m in 1995 to 3bn users in 2014.  The rapid growth in the use of e-commerce 
changed payment card fraud patterns that became less understandable by experts 
who relied on their previous decades experience of evolving fraud vectors.  Fraud 
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detection continued to rely on rules written by human experts.  As the ruleset 
became larger and more complex and the transaction volume grew the computing 
power required for the FMS increased.  This required more expenditure and larger 
teams costing around 70% of the direct fraud write-offs suffered.  In an attempt to 
reduce fraud and associated costs nine methods were devised by the payments 
industry but this was only at the point where fraud costs already had substantial 
impact on business and were funding criminal enterprise.  For each method the 
criminals adapted and devised a range of techniques to continue with relative ease 
their fraudulent activities.  Fraud detection systems were improved to use pattern 
recognition and machine learning and these were able to detect probable fraud 
transactions.  Fraud BP continued to fall driven by an increase in ATV and volume 
but not the preventative or detection measures.  The investment in fraud 
management continued to decline where today it is 1,200x less than forty years ago. 
Nine innovations are disrupting the payments industry based on transformative 
technology and will have a substantial impact on fraud levels, fraud vectors and the 
payment card fraud lifecycle.  Together this forms a pivotal event that is challenging 
the effectiveness of current payment fraud detection.  As crime migrates to these new 
technologies it will do so more rapidly than before as criminals use the same 
technology to share information.  This is significant as it is established that there is a 
timely need for gaining an understanding of new fraud vectors as they occur and that 
this is fundamental to the effective prevention and detection of payment fraud.  
When a civilisation is at a point of crisis it is only then it seems forced to make 
changes and innovation.  In the 7th century BC, Pittacus of Mytilene is attributed to 
the aphorism, “necessity is the mother of invention” (“Aνάγκα καὶ θεοί πείθονται”) so that the 
pivotal event may finally influence those in the payments industry including 
governments and lawmakers into making changes to bring about new prevention 
and detection in payment card fraud.  In general a new skill or technology is unlikely 
be accepted by a society (or payment processors) unless it confers a sufficient 
advantage or eliminates a threat.  Improved fraud management is not seen as 
conferring a sufficiently competitive advantage within the payment industry. 
Improved fraud management such as SOAR will only be put in place and become a 
mainstream accepted approach when there is the realisation of a significant risk 
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event or crisis to stimulate change and innovation.  It is concluded that now is that 
time.  Exisiting methods focus on the detection of fraud at or after the time of a 
transaction using a mixture of fixed rules and slowly updated machine learning and 
fraud levels continue to rise.  It was determined that there is a pivotal event where 
patterns of fraud are more dynamic due to disruptive technologies such as 
smartphones, real-time mobile payments and contactless payments occurring over a 
short period of time.  These disruptive technologies are directly responsible for a 
growth in more sophisticated payment card fraud.  Current methods for detection 
and prevention of payment card fraud are becoming increasingly ineffective.   
To practically reduce payment card fraud it must first be understood so as to add to 
the knowledge of human experts.  Through automated knowledge extraction of new 
and emerging patterns of fraud the payments ecosystem can be informed so as to 
promote understanding and to pre-empt further fraud.  Therefore the hypothesis is 
important.  The purpose of this work is to provide a new class of solution that can 
explain criminal patterns of payment card fraud in English-like rules based on real-
world payment processor data.  
The fraud-lifecycle can be informed so as to help prevent fraud through an 
understanding of the extracted high-level abstract descriptions of fraud vectors.  It is 
evident that there is a gap in current research after reviewing 375 proposed methods 
on fraud detection, 351 methods on rule extraction and 27 vendor FMS solutions.  
The size of the datasets, unbalanced classes, noise and non-homosedacity make the 
extraction of compact knowledge from fraud detectors a challenging problem.  To 
make a pratical difference any new method must be deployed within the payments 
industry.  Research methods must translate into a real-world application to have 
impact and to integrate with the varying vendor solutions with as little imposition as 
possible.  The Sparse Oracle-based Adaptive Rule (SOAR) extraction algorithm was 
proposed as one such method. 
Using ten publically available small datasets the SOAR algorithm demonstrated that 
in 7 out of 10 datasets the rules were shorter while at the same time covering a large 
area of the minority class.  The extracted rules were compact and straightforward to 
understand and could add to human knowledge – a key objective.  It was found that 
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the algorithm lacked precision as it used a Euclidean distance as a measure of 
similarity that did not adaquatley represent the discretised fields.  The algorithm is 
sensitive to the ordering of the fields, which were arbitrary and therefore in some 
datasets with a certain ordering of input fields it fails to adequately represent the 
decision boundaries.  It was established that the algorithm is independent from the 
underlying classifier and can therefore be integrated into existing solutions meeting 
one of the key objectives.  Using real-world datasets the extracted rules outperform 
benchmarks and existing FMS performance figures and discovered new fraud 
vectors that the payments fraud experts confirmed had added to their knowledge.  
For one dataset comparing SOAR to the pedagogical cited works ranked it top out 
of 41 works in terms fraud detection performance measured by 𝑀𝐶𝐶.  The other 
dataset was ranked at 34.  In all cases SOAR outperformed in terms of creating the 
most comprehensible 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠.  These results are significant and meet the 
objectives. 
The implications of these results suggest that a straightforward deployment of SOAR 
within an existing FMS will start to explain the patterns of fraud to aid in detection 
and the knowledge of the fraud experts within merchants, issuers and the acquirers.  
This work could alter how fraud management is undertaken which is discussed in 
detail in Appendix A.  There is an underreporting of fraud losses in the headline 
payments industry statistics where it was shown that the true cost to merchants is 
27.5x and issuers 1.2x the payments industry reported direct fraud write-off costs 
and including acquirers costs this was put at $149bn using 2013 figures.  If 
merchants implemented knowledge extraction to improve their understanding and 
detection with a small targeted 1% reduction in payment fraud this would cut the 
economic loss by $1.3bn.  The greater knowledge gained through the automated 
extraction of abstract rules from complex and changing patterns of data using SOAR 
has the potential to reduce this cost.  Improved understanding of fraud vectors will 
lead to a more secure payment process through informed prevention steps.  This will 
affect the criminals who have been able to compromise payment systems with 
relative ease and a low chance of punitive measures.  Understanding new and 
emerging fraud vectors will aid in the understanding of the dependencies that these 
criminals have on legitimate payments infrastructure and providers and will allow 
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their model to be disrupted by making it harder to perpetrate fraud and more likely 
to be caught.  Therefore the funding of terrorism, arms, drugs and people trafficking 
can be reduced.  This improved understanding, when disseminated by the payment 
processors can inform law enforcement organisations and regulators so as to put in 
place a more effective approach and focused on fraud, remembering that payment 
card fraud was shown to be 70% of the reported illegal Heroin trade in 2003 and in 
2013 it was the same as all proceeds from cocaine, opiate and heroin drug crime was 
in 2003. 
The work contributes to the advancement of knowledge and the promotion of 
applied research in payment and cyber-fraud detection.  The results of the research 
are of relevance to the academic artificial intelligence community as it seeks to 
reconcile the symbolic and neural paradigms and move towards the next generation 
of intelligent systems.  Disparate academic research is at a point where it can be 
united to make fraud detection more effective.  The results are relevant to 
professional specialists on pattern recognition in general and fraud investigators in 
particular.  SOARs provided as open source code that can be readily adopted by 
researchers, payments industry and vendors.  This thesis provides a benchmark for 
other researchers with a comparison to important published works for fraud 
detection and for pedagogical rule extraction methods.  Standard measures are 
established in 4.2.5, page 212 and 4.2.5, page 212.  This will permit other 
researchers to position their own work. 
The proceeds of fraud crime are used to pay for terrorism, arms and drugs and 
involve the threat of violence including murder.  Knowledge is a key asset to be used 
against the criminals for better prevention and detection measures perhaps for the 
first time to have a long-lasting reduction on fraud levels.  SOARs a new class of 
solution that can automate fraud knowledge extraction to aid and work with human 
experts.   
   
 
| Chapter 7 - Conclusions | 
 | 319 |  
7.2 Future Research Directions 
Following these conclusions it is suggested that the listed subsequent research areas 
will be useful: 
§ Use of a deep learning classifier to create the prototypes in SOAR. 
§ Test on further large-scale payments industry datasets. 
§ Improve the similarity measure used in SOAR. 
§ Reduce use of manually set constants. 
§ Extend the SOAR algorithm so that the DBA is more accurate. 
§ Multiple-Instance Learning and how knowledge is extracted using 
unlabelled data. 
Each of these is briefly discussed in the following sections. 
7.2.1 Deep learning classifier  
Research that improves the placement of the prototypes within the instance space 
will improve the accuracy of SOAR while maintaining the abstraction.  Combining 
the SOAR algorithm with a deep classifier operating in a generative phase (as in 
Hinton’s “sleep” phase) so that stochastic prototypes are generated based on the 
values in the highest layer is one such area of research.  A deep classifier is made up 
of a number of individual layers of a neural network such as the Restricted 
Boltzmann Machine where the lower layers feed into those above it to form a 
hierarchy (Bengio, 2007; Hinton, 2007).  The levels are trained individually and then 
together produce a set of top-level neurons that are argued to respond to key features 
within the lower levels.  These levels in the deep architecture represent “precepts” 
but there is no reason why these should necessarily map to human explainable 
features (such as “high spender” or “weekend shopper”) unless they are designed to 
do so.  Deep learning methods attempt to train this hierarchy so that the higher level 
features are formed by the composition of lower level features.  Rather than trying to 
add labels through the addition of an output layer and then adjusting the entire deep 
architecture through a learning-step an approach is suggested where an additional 
supervised stage is separately added.  This then does not attempt to ground the deep 
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learning architecture with fraud labels.  This avoids the need for joint training of the 
entire model, which in earlier experiments has been slow.  A potential update using 
one step of Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984) (Chen & Murray, 2003) so that 
the time-consuming search is reduced during training is another area of potential 
research.  An alternative area to research will be the extraction of rules from each of 
the layers and to determine if the hierarchy of rules sets can be combined to be 
comprehensible.  It may be that the learning of lower level precepts will need to be 
directed in some way to provide meaningful internal labels for these rules.  Deep 
architectures show promise in terms of accuracy when used for classification and in 
providing knowledge about fraud vectors.   
7.2.2 Analysis on further large-scale datasets 
The payment processors that hold large-scale datasets that could be used for further 
analysis and testing need to be encouraged to obfuscate these and allow them to be 
publically available to encourage researchers.  These datasets could be made 
available at the UCI repository or other machine learning resources.  The SOAR 
algorithm was tested on two unusually sparse issuer datasets, further testing would 
help to understand its efficacy and limitations.  A publically available real-world 
dataset from a data-mining contest of e-commerce transactions (FICO, 2009) is 
already available. 
7.2.3 Improve the similarity measure 
All fields are discretised and therefore a method is required to determine how close 
one set of literals is to another (similarity).  SOAR used a simple Euclidean distance  
that was shown to have a weakness as the magnitude of the discretised bins is not 
taken into account in the distance.  In SOAR this was replaced so that any inputs 
that were originally numeric were de-normalised into real-world values before 
calculating a distance.  This does not take into account the majority of the input 
fields that are categorical literals.  This is a dificult problem where categorical literals 
are present and for example represent “jewellery” and “haberdashery”.  The binary 
representative value of the literal does not signify any sensible measure of similarity 
between these two categories.  For accuracy some form of conversion between 
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categories is required or an external perhaps ontological knowledge base that links 
such concepts and can provide a measure of similarity.  This is an area of future 
research to improve the placement of the initial clusters which in turn may more 
accurately locate decision boundaries.  
7.2.4 Reduce use of manually set constants 
Not all assumptions or manually set constants have been removed in the 
experiments.  Further research into areas where these constants can be eliminated 
from the algorithms or determined by calculation or heuristics to avoid doubt and 
possible human bias in the results. 
7.2.5 SOAR DBA extension 
The SOAR algorithm can be updated so that every combination of 𝑏!, 𝑏!, 𝑏! →𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 in the previous fields is used when searching for combinations in the current 
field.  This may result in multiple rules being generated at this stage.  While this 
approach is increasingly sound it may result in many more rules that while more 
accurate may not help comprehensibility.  As an alternative to this approach is to 
determine an ordering of the fields based on their sensitivity to the output of the 
classifier.  A sensitivity algorithm uses the first order (partial) derivatives from the 
output of the classifier to determine the sensitivity of the predictor (input) fields by 
measuring the rate of change of the output (neuron) through its range.  A boundary 
is located at a point in input space where a small perturbation to the value of an 
input neuron causes the value of the output to change from indicating 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 or 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒.  If each input neuron is taken through its entire range of values while the 
other input neurons are held at some nominal value (or say the value of a prototype) 
then values can be calculated as to the general strength/sensitivity of each field.  This 
approach can only approximate the input sensitivity as the surface of the classifier 
will be highly nonlinear over an area of high dimensionality.  Sensitivity analysis has 
attracted considerable research in the past for example (Goh, 1993; Engelbrecht & 
Cloete, 1998; Fidalgo & Lopes, 2001).  It is suggested that if this approach was 
applied prior to the SOAR extraction so that the input fields were ordered with the 
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highest strength first then SOAR may discover more important decision boundaries 
and therefore improved rule performance. 
7.2.6 Multiple-Instance Learning (MIL) 
SOAR extraction could be used to extract symbolic but unlabelled relationships.  An 
FMS capable of learning from both unlabelled and labelled fraud data on the fly and 
that is able to explain new patterns of fraud only as they become known.  Multiple-
Instance Learning is an approach that requires further research so that when an 
unlabelled transaction is finally determined to be fraudulent this information is used 
to label an entire “bag” of similar transactions previously learnt (Dietterich et al., 
1997) which in turn may be sufficient to produce an explanation of the fraud using 
an extended SOAR approach. 
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Appendix A History and 
Growth of payment 
card Fraud 
“It is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the dominant factor in society 
today.  No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not only 
the world as it is, but the world as it will be.  This, in turn, means that our statesmen, 
our businessmen, our everyman must take on a science fictional way of thinking.”  
– Professor Isaac Asimov.   
“My Own View” in The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction (1978). 
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A.1 Introduction 
nderstanding the role of history in the development of payment cards is 
essential so as to be able to understand the state of the art in fraud 
detection and why a new method of knowledge extraction is important 
to help understand new patterns of fraud.  Payment cards are inherently 
insecure and criminals found and continue to find techniques to undertake fraud.  
Fraud vectors have only changed slowly over the last 60 years.  In response to this 
systems were developed to focus on detecting and blocking known fraud.  As the 
uptake of payment cards grew so too did the profits of the banks and fraud levels 
grew but were a disproportionately small portion of these profits.  The banks viewed 
the fraud write-off as similar to bad debt and therefore as a “cost of business”.  This 
led to the fraud levels being seen as normative.  Innovation such as the magnetic 
stripe and the Internet transformed the way the payments were processed but they 
transformed the methods used to defraud the payment participators. 
Industry statistics used throughout this Chapter contain uncertainties and errors that 
are discussed in A.4, page 392. 
A.2 History of Payment Cards 
A payment card can be used to purchase goods or services without the need for 
physical tender.  There are up to seven key participants that are involved when such 
a cashless transaction takes place given in Table A-1. 
A cardholder is an individual consumer who is legitimately linked to a payment card 
which has been issued to them by an issuer and who is liable for any transactions 
undertaken on that payment card at a merchant.  An issuer provides a branded 
payment card to a cardholder for a specific payment association or card scheme.  
The issuer authorises a transaction and assumes the liability for any credit extended 
to the cardholder.  A payment card association is a network of acquirers and issuers 
that accept payment cards from a card scheme.   
U 
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Table A-1 – Payment participants. 
 Participant Icon 
1.  Cardholder 
 
2.  Merchant 
 
3.  Payment Service Provider 
 
4.  Acquirer 
 
5.  Issuer 
 
6.  Payment card Association  
7.  Card Scheme 
 
A card scheme is a scheme that has a specific brand of which an issuer or acquirer 
can become a member allowing access to the network for that card scheme.  Where 
the issuer and acquirer are the same financial institution, this is known as a three-
party scheme and examples include Diners Club, American Express and Discover 
Card.  Where the issuer and acquirer are different institutions this is known as a 
four-party scheme and examples include Visa, MasterCard and UnionPay.  A 
merchant is a business such as a retailer or an individual that accepts a payment card 
in return for the sale of goods or services.  The merchant may be a physical 
merchant (“bricks and mortar”) where a cardholder can typically enter a shop to 
physically view and touch the goods before a purchase.  This merchant will process 
the payment card transactions using their acquirer.  An acquirer processes payment 
card transactions on behalf of a merchant.  It accepts payment cards from the issuers 
within a card scheme, authorises the transaction and pays the merchant and debits 
the appropriate issuer.  An acquirer may be a bank or a non-banking institution.  
The merchant may be an online merchant or virtual merchant who has an online 
shop using the Internet where cardholders can purchase goods or services by 
entering their payment Card Holder Details (CHD) into a web site.  The details on a 
payment card (later described in Table A-2 can be used to purchases goods or 
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services without being present at the merchant, such as ordering by Mail Order, 
Telephone Order (MOTO) or Internet (IMOTO).  This is called Cardholder Not 
Present (CNP) transaction or when undertaken on the Internet (e-commerce).  This 
merchant will process payment card transactions using a payment service provider 
or payment gateway.  A payment gateway provides online authorisation for a 
payment.  The payment gateway accepts the payment card details, ensures that these 
are secure using encryption between the cardholder and the merchant and between 
the merchant and the Payment Service Provider (PSP) or acquirer.  A PSP or 
Processor provides the online merchant with a method to accept payment cards and 
other cashless methods using a payment gateway to which the merchant connects.  A 
PSP will connect to multiple acquirers and payment networks and manages these 
connections and relationships.  PSPs may offer other services such as fraud 
management and reporting.  When a payment card is used to purchase goods or 
services at a bricks and mortar merchant it is called a Cardholder Present transaction 
(CP).  Figure A-1 illustrates the typical process when such a merchant wishes to take 
payment from a cardholder’s payment card.  The details of that transaction are 
passed to the merchant’s acquirer.  The acquirer then requests authorisation from 
the cardholder’s payment card issuer and the transaction is approved or declined.  
This decision is then passed back to the merchant to complete the transaction.  If the 
transaction is authorised then the sale is completed and the goods are taken.   
 
Figure A-1  – Payment card authorisation process. 
Figure A-2 shows how funds are cleared to the payment participants involved in a 
payment card transaction. 
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Figure A-2  – Payment card clearing/settlement process. 
Retail merchants have extended short-term credit to customers whose business is 
valued for centuries (Baxter, 1983).  As forerunners to modern payment cards it was 
retail merchants and fuel companies that issued proprietary charge cards in the 
early1900s, which were only accepted at the businesses that issued them.  These 
charge cards were used to purchase goods by charging them to the card and at the 
end of a period the merchant produced a statement and the cardholder then paid 
the whole amount.  The cards were developed as a means of creating customer 
loyalty and improving customer service (Sienkiewicz, 2001).  In 1946 the first bank to 
issue a payment card was the Flatbush National Bank in Brooklyn, USA (Hyman, 
2011).  John C. Biggins created this early card scheme called Charge-It (see Figure 
A-3).  This was the first credit card where the cardholders did not have to pay the 
whole balance each month and any remaining balance accrued interest (revolving-
debt).  The Charg-It credit card could only be used by the customers of Flatbush 
National Bank and was used in participating local stores who had to pay 8% of the 
transaction value to the Flatbush National Bank (compare to the Merchant Service 
Charge (MSC) of 1% to 3% in 2015 in Table A-21.  This allowed smaller stores who 
did not have their own proprietary cards to attract new customers that could 
purchase items and spread the cost.   
| Appendix A - History and Growth of payment card Fraud | 
 | 371 |  
 
Source: (Hyman, 2011). 
Figure A-3  – Charg-It (1946). 
As described in (Mann, 2006b) the first more generally accepted payment cards were 
developed by four organisations that started the global cashless society by creating 
card scheme, where the payment for goods or services could be made using a 
physical payment card at many varied merchant locations.  In 2016 over 32m 
merchants worldwide accept these general payment cards. 
These four formative card schemes all exist today and are listed below with other 
later payment card schemes given in Table A-4. 
1. Diners Club 
2. National BankAmericard (to become Visa) 
3. American Express 
4. InterBank Card Association (to become MasterCard) 
As illustrated in Table A-9 the uptake of these modern payment cards was rapid 
growing from 26m cards issued worldwide in 1971 to 10.8bn payment cards in 2013 
which is a CAGR of 15%.  Later in this thesis it will be shown that this rapid growth 
left the banks, the payments industry and especially merchants without adequate 
protection from those who discovered methods to abuse them with fraud write-offs 
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growing to $13.9bn in the same period, which is a CARG of 22%.  The evolution of 
each of these card schemes is discussed in the following four sections.   
A.2.1 1950 – Diners Club 
In 1950 carrying cash to pay for goods and services in New York had the physical 
risk to an individual citizen of aggravated assault stated to be 20 crimes per 100,000 
residents (Federal-Bureau-of-Investigation, 1950)2.  As reported in (Grossman, 1987) 
it was partly in response to this crime that Diners Club was formed as a method to 
pay restaurants in the New York area using a charge card in place of having to carry 
cash3.  A Diners Club payment card was first used in a restaurant, at an event that is 
known in the payment card industry as “the first supper”.  The Diners Club card 
was made of cardboard and was typed on one side with information that identified 
the cardholder (see Figure A-4): 
§ Cardholder name 
§ Cardholder address 
§ Account number 
§ Signature of the cardholder 
By the end of 1950 Diners Club had issued 20,000 payment cards in five USA cities.  
Over the following five years the number of Diners Club issued cards grew at a 
CAGR of almost 60% with 200,000 payment cards in circulation (Chakravorti, 
2000) that had grown to 76m in 2013 (see B.6, page 543).  
                                                
2 By 2012, this figure had increased to 242.3 crimes per 100,000 head of population, Federal-Bureau-
of-Investigation. Crime in the United States 2012. (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C., 
USA, 2012).  The risk of physical crime has significantly increased despite the wide uptake of 
payment cards. 
3 There is disagreement over the historic events as it is reported that Frank X. McNamara to become 
a founder of Diners Club forgot his wallet to pay for a meal and it was this event that led to the idea 
of a charge card, reported in Grossman, P.Z. in American Express: The unofficial history of the 
people who built the great financial empire, 261-293, The Poo-Bah and the Card (Random House 
Value Publishing 1987). 
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Source: (Rosenberg, 2015). 
Figure A-4  – The first general payment card was printed on cardboard (1950). 
A.2.2 1956 – National BankAmericard/Visa 
In 1956 the Bank of America was the first bank to use an electronic computer.  To 
that date computers had been mostly used in defence, scientific and academic 
applications (McDonald, 2011).  The computer was called the Electronic Recording 
Method of Accounting (ERMA) which was based on solid-state transistors and a 
magnetic core memory (Stanford-Research-Institute, 2008).  It was not until 17 years 
later that computing had reached a point where it was used in the processing of 
payment cards.  In 1958 the bank launched its charge card called the National 
BankAmericard, Inc. (NBI).  The BankAmericard (see Figure A-5) was initially 
issued and accepted only in California and was to eventually to become Visa (Akers 
et al., 2005).  In 2013 there were with 2.6bn cards issued Visa cards that were 
accepted by over 32m merchants (see B.6, page 543).  
In 1958 to gain market share NBI posted unsolicited payment cards to 60,000 USA 
individuals regardless of their credit status or if the payment card had been requested 
or not (O'Neil, 1970; Stein, 2004).  Later in this thesis it will be determined that the 
payments industry continues to this day to prioritise gaining market share over 
considering the longer-term impact of new payment methods, not necessarily taking 
into account how these methods can be used for fraud and how the proceeds of such 
fraud might be used to fund immoral activities. 
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Source: (AllWeb.Ru). 
Figure A-5  – National BankAmericard (to become Visa) payment card (1958). 
A.2.3 1958 – American Express 
In 1958, American Express (Amex) launched its charge card (see Figure A-6).  Over 
the following five-years the number of American Express cards issued grew at a 
CAGR of almost 120% so by 1963 there were 1m payment cards issued that were 
accepted at over 75,000 merchants (Grossman, 1987) and by 2013 this had grown to 
98m cards issued (see B.6, page 543).  
 
Source: (AllWeb.Ru). 
Figure A-6  – American Express payment card (1959). 
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A.2.4 1966 – InterBank Card Association/MasterCard and 
Barclaycard 
In 1966 a new general-purpose credit card was formed by a group of credit-issuing 
banks that together created the InterBank Card Association (ICA) that was become 
MasterCard (see Figure A-7).  In 1996 Europe joined the cashless society when 
Barclaycard was launched in the UK using this card scheme (Consoli, 2003).  By 
2013 there were 1.9bn MasterCard payment cards issued (see B.6, page 543). 
 
Source: (AllWeb.Ru). 
Figure A-7  – InterBank  (to become MasterCard) payment card (1975). 
A.2.5 Early Payments Market 
Other payment methods were developed with the Automatic Teller Machine 
(ATM)4 being launched in 1967 by Barclays Bank in London, UK on 27th June as 
the first.  The ATM is a self-service terminal that dispenses cash and can accept 
deposits.   
                                                
4 Also known as a: “cashpoint”, “hole-in-the-wall”, “automatic banking machine”, “all-time money” 
and “minibank”.  
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Source: touchPoint21.com. 
Figure A-8  – First ATM, 27th June 1967, Barclays Bank, London. 
The ATM was invented in the UK by Mr John Shepherd-Brown who was frustrated 
that his own bank was closed when he needed to withdraw cash and proposed a self-
sufficient machine (Hayashi et al., 2003).  He was also the inventor of the PIN which 
he proposed as being the same as his six-digit “army number” but his wife is 
attributed to suggesting the use of a shorter four-digit version, in use today.  The 24-
hour self-service cashpoint dispensed a single £10 note (around £250 value in todays 
value) when a paper voucher was entered and a four-digit PIN typed on a PIN entry 
keyboard.  The voucher was impregnated with Carbon 14, which is a mildly 
radioactive chemical, which was detected by the cashpoint.  As magnetic-stripe-and-
signature payment cards were subsequently introduced cashpoint technology 
advanced and in the USA Mr Don Wetzel is credited with first modern ATM in 
1968 with much of the development due to developing standards to encrypt 
information on the magnetic stripe and the creation of plastic ATM cards.  
Chemical Bank installed the first modern ATM in 1969 at their Rockville Centre, 
New York, USA.  This is important as the ATM was to lead to a range of modern 
fraud vectors that were created by the inventive criminals.  ATM fraud has grown 
significantly with the earliest reported significant frauds were in the 1990s (Kevin 
Curran, 2009).  It was reported that criminals will make at least 1.5m ATM cash 
withdrawals in 2015 compared with the 5.8bn total ATM withdrawals in 2012 
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totalling $687bn (Sidel, 2015).  The value of fraud is small compared with the value 
of the service.  At the same time as the development of the ATM the Bank of 
Delaware, USA, launched the first debit card in 1966.  The debit card which could 
be used to purchase goods and services using a PIN terminal at a merchant and the 
transaction value is automatically debited from the cardholders’ bank account at the 
time of the transaction.  There must be sufficient funds in the account or an agreed 
overdraft to cover that transaction.  A debit card functioned for both ATM cash 
withdrawals and as a debit card so that the development of the ATM and that of 
debit cards and their terminals were linked.  Other debit cards include pre-pay 
where a fixed value of cash is loaded onto the payment card and off-line where the 
debit card was processed similar to a cheque transaction and did not require a PIN.  
Throughout the 1970s a number of banks launched debit cards but the uptake was 
slow.  It was not until the 1980s that the infrastructure allowed the uptake and use of 
debit cards to grow substantially (Caskey & Sellon, 1994; Hayashi et al., 2003).  
Global debit card transactions has grown at CAGR of 15% since 2005 to over 
100bn transactions in 2013 (Bidness, 2015; Lassignardie & Higgins, 2015).  The 
criminals have targeted debit cards with a range of fraud vectors.  According to the 
Federal Reserve debit card fraud was at $1.57bn in 2012 accounting for 30% of 
payment card fraud (Payment-Card-Mobile, 2015).  
The context of this early payments market is important to understand as: 
1. Criminals were informed to the possibilities of using the new payment cards 
for crime. 
2. The payments industry, media and the public became accustomed to the 
reported level of fraud from $12.18m in 1971 to $13.9bn in 2013.  It has 
been reported that to most individuals these large numbers are almost 
incomprehensible and therefore do not have the impact that they should 
(Fulcher, 2003).  
3. Lawmakers and regulators had to step in to stop questionable credit practices 
of the payments industry rather than being able to rely on them to self-
regulate.  Such regulation is often slow to be enacted due to the process of 
law and therefore provides a period of time where criminals can continue to 
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practice specific fraud vectors that takes advantage of such regulatory delays 
that in most advanced jurisdictions regulations take an average of two years 
to enact (Davis, 2013). 
4. (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005c) describe how in 1971 it was evidently 
problematic to process 240m transactions using only paper and human 
resources where every transaction was processed using paper documents that 
were posted as Figure A-9, page 379.  This manual process created a 
substantial delay between when the transaction was completed at a merchant 
and the merchant knowing if the issuer was to honour the transaction so that 
they finally received cash into their account.  There was a similar delay in 
producing a statement for the cardholder to pay what they owe.  This delay 
was often measured in weeks and created easy opportunities for criminals to 
steal money using a variety of scams.   
In the 1970s there remained the belief that cashless methods of payments would be 
safer than cash and reduce crime, in (Hendrickson, 1972): 
“Unlike a cash transaction, the credit transaction is traceable, revocable, cancellable, 
limitable and recoverable through the credit mechanism, all without the necessity of seeking 
redress in overburdened courts.  There is no gainsaying that credit and credit cards lead to 
abuses and theft, but such abuses involve a different order of danger to person and property 
than crime against the person inspired by the bait of money as cash…A general condition 
of cashlessness in society would open up the possibility of eliminating all violent crimes 
against the person except crimes of passion by making them unprofitable as well as illegal” 
This view of the use of payment cards did not take into account the scale or the use 
of criminal proceeds from payment card fraud.  Nor did it consider the growth in 
computing, the advent of e-commerce and the apparent ease of obtaining cardholder 
data sufficient to gain from such criminal activities all of which will be discussed in 
this Chapter. 
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Figure A-9  – Manual payment card processing (prior to automation). 
In (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005c) by the late 1970s the card schemes were facing a 
list of problems that were damaging their brands: 
§ High level of write-off due to fraud (a fraud BP of 220¢ in 1971). 
§ Delinquent cardholders and merchants. 
§ Slow authorisations. 
§ A large quantity of paper, processing, paper filing and storage. 
§ High cost of manual processing. 
§ Merchants becoming dissatisfied as much of the cost of fraud was born by 
them. 
§ Most issuers were making a loss from their payment card business in 
1970s from the write-offs and from the high costs of marketing and 
manual operations.  There was a reported $440m total loss in 1970 for all 
USA issuers ($4.58bn in 2015 value, see B.4, page 539) and Issuers were 
even questioning whether to continue with the payments card business. 
§ Cardholders were concerned due to fraud and inaccurate or late entries 
in their statements. 
There continued to be a need for greater automation to reduce operating costs and 
to improve on providing timely information.  The cardboard printed payment card 
and manual processing needed to be replaced with an automated method.  New 
plastic payment cards that used a magnetic stripe to store cardholder data were 
proposed (see Figure A-10).  The magnetic stripe stored information on the 
cardholder and the card scheme that could be automatically read by terminals at the 
Point of Sale (POS) (see Table A-2).  Hence, the process could start to be automated, 
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now that the information was available as digital data that was stored in and 
transmitted to a computer.   
 
Source: (Southerby's, 2012). 
Figure A-10  – Prototype for magnetic-stripe-and-signature payment card (c.1960). 
In 1966 the London Transit Authority installed a magnetic stripe system for tickets 
in the London Underground5.  NBI (to become Visa) and American Express had 
become aware of the use of the magnetic stripe used on a card.  Information 
encoded on the stripe could be used to identify the cardholder and so in 1970 NBI 
worked with IBM to establish a standard for the magnetic stripe (ANSI, 2006).  As 
narrated in (Svigals, 2012) in 1970 American Express was the first card scheme to 
embrace plastic payment cards with a magnetic stripe and issued 250,000 cards (see 
Figure A-11). 
                                                
5 An historical point of note is that in (IBM-Archives. Magnetic Stripe Technology, <http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/magnetic/words/> (2015b).  It is claimed that 
Jerome Svigals at IBM was the first to use the magnetic stripe on a card in1969 however it was the 
UK that led the way three years earlier using a magnetic stripe on train tickets as reported in Field, 
D.L. & Agnew, N.P.  (1996) London Underground's ticketing, past, present and future. Public 
Transport Electronic Systems, 1996., International Conference on (Conf. Publ. No. 425). p. 77-80. 
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Source: (Southerby's, 2012). 
Figure A-11  – Example first plastic magnetic-stripe-and-signature card (c. 1970). 
In 1964 IBM created a computerised system for the encoding and embossing of 
magnetic stripe cards using their earlier announced IBM 360 Model 30 computer 
(IBM-Archives, 2015a).  As reported in (Quora, 2012) it was not until 1980 that 
magnetic stripe payment cards were fully adopted due to the $2 cost per card 
compared to 2015 cost of c.25¢ per physical card that was considered high at the 
time by the payments industry.  The growing fraud losses, the cost of operations and 
the inability of manual system to spot suspicious transactions combined with a lack of 
understanding of the fraud vectors more than justified this additional cost.  The 
magnetic stripe and signature payment card was to become a standard throughout 
the world – See Figure A-12. 
 
Figure A-12  – Magnetic-stripe-and-signature payment card usage. 
In 1973 NBI (to become Visa) deployed the first computerised payment system to 
process authorisations called Bank Authorisation System Experiential (BASE I) and a 
year later this was followed by a computerised clearing and settlement system (Mayo 
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& Nohria, 2005).  The remaining card schemes and payment participants were to 
follow automating their payments processing.   
Table A-2 – Contents of payment card magnetic stripe (track 1). 
Magnetic Stripe Characters Description 
% Start 
B Format Code (B=Bank) 
5XXX XXXX XXXX XXX2 
Primary Account Number (PAN) 
(see Table A-3) 
^ Separator 
RYMANTUBB Last Name 
/ Name Separator 
NICHOLAS First Name 
^ Separator 
15 Expiration Year 
03 Expiration Month 
101 Service Code 
000000001000000003000000 Discretionary Data 
? End 
Table A-3 – 16-Digit PAN decoded 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
MID IIN IIN IIN IIN IIN AC AC AC AC AC AC AC AC AC CHK 
 
Key Description 
MID Major Industry Identifier.  1,2=Airlines, 3=Travel and entertainment, 4, 
5=Banking and finance, 6=merchandising and banking, 7=petrol, 
8=telecommunications, 9=national assignment. 
IIN Issuer Identification Number previously known as Bank Identification 
Number (BIN).  E.g. 4=Visa, 51 to 55=MasterCard, 6011,644,65=Discover, 
34,47=American Express. 
AC 9-digit cardholder account number, which is 1012 unique numbers. 
CHK Check digit calculated using the Luhn algorithm (Luhn, 1960) and used to 
verify the PAN number. 
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It is the data in Table A-2 that uniquely identifies the payment card to a cardholder 
and is sufficient to complete a transaction.  It is essentially the same information as 
printed on the 1950s payment card.   
It is important to consider the transformation of electronic computing into a utility as 
later in the thesis (see A.15.8, page 524) it is argued that this transformation is 
matched by the growth in payment card usage and of fraud.  In 1971 Intel had 
launched the first microprocessor (Jackson, 1997) and in 1974 a home computer the 
MITS Altair 8800 based on Intel’s 8080 microprocessor was launched that is widely 
regarded as initiating the rapid growth and widespread use of computers as a utility. 
This was to be the starting point for both Microsoft Inc. and Apple Inc.  As discussed 
in (Laing, 2004) the following ten years was a period in computing history when a 
new computer was regularly launched and there was unprecedented variety and 
innovation.  The first IBM PC was launched, Dell Computers were formed, the 
Apple Macintosh was launched and Apple Inc. was the first company to hit $1bn in 
sales, Microsoft Inc. launched the Windows operating system and in the UK Sir 
Clive Sinclair launched the first computer for the home for under £1006. 
While Diners Club, National BankAmericard (to become Visa), American Express 
and InterBank Card Association (to become MasterCard) started the generally 
accepted payment cards, others were to follow.  While it is not necessary for this 
Chapter to analyse all individual card schemes for completeness Table A-4 lists the 
major card schemes in order of the number of payment cards issued worldwide in 
2013.  It shows there was 10.8bn payment cards in circulation by the end of 2013.  
This was a rise of 11% from 2012 (Hirsch, 2014b). 
                                                
6 An historical point of note, Sir Clive Sinclair was reported to have said on the IBM PC when it 
launched in 1981, “I hated the operating system; it was a complete and utter kludge and the whole bloody design 
was just a mess.  I wouldn't go anywhere near it.”, Myers, W. (1996) The Gaget Pusher Wired. Condé Nast 
UK .  The IBM PC and derivatives was to go on to be the ubiquitous computer platform worldwide 
whereas Sinclair was to sell the business in 1986 that was to close by 1990. 
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Table A-4 – Card schemes market share by cards in circulation (2013). 
Card Scheme Launched 
ê  Source 
% Market 
share  
by cards 
#Cards 
Diners Club/ 
Discover 1950 
(Discover, 
2015) 0.7% 76m 
Visa 1956 A.2.2 24.0% 2.6bn 
American 
Express 1958 A.2.3 0.9% 98m 
MasterCard 1966 A.2.4 18.0% 1.9bn 
JCB 1981 (JCB, 2015) 0.7% 76m 
China Union Pay 2002 (UnionPay, 2015) 38.0% 4.1bn 
Domestic n/a (Hirsch, 2014a) 9.8% 1.1bn 
Private Label n/a (Hirsch, 2014a) 7.9% 853m 
   Total 10.8bn 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
A domestic card scheme includes credit cards and debit cards and is set up in a 
country and accepted only in that country rather than the international card 
schemes, with the aim of reducing transaction costs (Payments-Cards-and-Mobile, 
2014).   Notable domestic card schemes include: ELO in Brazil, RuPay in India, 
CMI in Morocco, DinaCard in Serbia, Verve in Nigeria and Carnet in Mexico.  A 
private label card scheme is a credit card that is branded for a specific retail 
establishment, manufacturer or special interest groups, similar to the proprietary 
charge cards that were established as early as the 1900s that were only accepted at 
the businesses that issued them.  For example a Ticketmaster credit card issued by 
MasterCard applies only to purchases in the UK.  When viewing the card schemes 
by the number of transactions, the market share is different reflecting different usage 
around the world (Nilson-Report, 2015b) in Table A-5. 
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Table A-5 – Card schemes market share by transactions (2013). 
Card Scheme #Transactions Total % Market share  by transactions Credit Debit 
Visa 37.3bn 64.6bn 60.5% 
MasterCard 24.4bn 20.9bn 26.9% 
China Union Pay 6.9bn 6.1bn 7.7% 
American Express 6.3bn - 3.7% 
JCB 1.9bn - 1.1% 
Diners Club/ Discover 154m - 0.1% 
 76.9bn 91.6bn  
Total #Transactions 168.5bn 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
The total worldwide number of transactions for domestic and private label schemes 
is not known.  The transaction volume that is known is substantial and shared 
among the top four card schemes.  Payment cards are only convenient for consumers 
when they are widely accepted by merchants and remain secure.  Payment cards are 
more efficient than paper forms of payments including cash tender.  As reported 
(MasterCard, 2013) it is generally in the interest of countries to encourage the use of 
cashless payments: 
§ Reduce the risk of carrying cash to the individual. 
§ Reduce the burden of cash production. 
§ Claimed to help to boost economic growth. 
To ensure that cashless payments continue to be adopted worldwide consumers must 
have confidence in the payment method used and especially in the security of their 
transactions.  To date most countries have allowed the payment card industry to 
create and develop standards and procedures to ensure that this is so without 
resorting to regulation or law.  The move away from cash as a primary means of 
payment towards a cashless society has provided criminals with an opportunity to 
make money from fraud.  The reliance on self-regulation has seen the payment 
industry being slow to put in place sufficient measures to curb the criminals.  
Different countries have adopted cashless payment methods at different rates (see 
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Figure A-13) where the darker the area on the chart the higher the proportion of 
non-cash payments and is described in Table A-6. 
Table A-6 – The cashless world. 
Stage Description 
Nearly 
Cashless 
These countries are nearing a point of cashlessness.   
Transitioning 
In these countries cash accounts for 40%-60% of the value of 
consumer payments.  Some of these countries have developed a 
modern payments infrastructure to enable the move to cashless and 
are growing quickly. 
Tipping 
Point 
These countries have converted most large cash-based payments to 
cashless (such as direct debits).  Some countries are progressing in 
cashless payments while others have stalled. 
Inception 
These countries are at the start of a move away from cash.  In some 
countries a lack of payments infrastructure and unbanked 
individuals means even large payments have to be completed with 
cash.   
Source: (MasterCard, 2013). 
It is here argued that those countries that are not “nearly cashless” could bypass the 
now out-dated physical payment card with its inherent security vulnerabilities and 
move to alternative payment methods such as using smartphones with improved 
security (see A.15.1, page 503).  It can be appreciated that there remains a 
substantial market for cashless payment adoption.  It is contended that there is 
therefore a large new market for the criminals to undertake both CP and CNP fraud, 
even as EMV adoption continues as will be argued in A.12.1, page 458.  Cashless 
innovation will require new infrastructure and computer systems and as history has 
shown, when new technology systems are rapidly adopted it provides the criminal 
with opportunity and the means to compromise those systems (Nuth, 2008).   
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Source: (MasterCard, 2013).  
Figure A-13  – The cashless society market penetration (2013). 
The history of the development of payment cards and cashless payments has been 
detailed to put these in context.  The growth of payment card fraud and the types of 
fraud undertaken is now examined. 
A.3 Growth of Payment Card Fraud 
In 1966 which was the same year as ICA (to be MasterCard) was formed the first 
crime linked to a computer was recorded when Mr Milo Arthur Bennett was 
brought to justice.  Bennett was a programmer for the National City Bank of 
Minneapolis, USA and programmed the banks’ computer to clear all his cheques 
and ignore his overdraft flag (Parker, 1972; Carroll, 1996).  From that point forward 
computers and fraud were to be inexorably linked.  It will be argued that the 
availability of computing to become a utility enabled new cashless payment methods 
and at the same time enabled new fraudulent activity. 
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Payment card fraud is a criminal act of deception.  Some payments such as money 
laundering, gambling or terrorist funding may be illegal in a particular jurisdiction 
but are not considered fraud if the cardholder has approved them.  Fraud can be 
cash generating directly or generate cash by purchasing commodities that can be 
exchanged for cash (monetisation).  Fraud comes in many forms and regardless of 
the form it always leads to financial loss to those that participated in processing the 
payment.  Fraud can have significant non-financial impacts; it can damage the trust 
between a business and its most important stakeholders so seriously damaging its 
reputation.  For a business that is dependent on a limited number of customers or 
suppliers this can lead to loss in a significant revenue stream especially when the 
business is operating in a strong competitive environment.  When fraud is constantly 
reoccurring within a business an atmosphere of distrust is created which can have a 
demoralising effect on the employees that may inevitably impact their performance 
and customer service.  Fraud can lead to fines from the card schemes and even the 
withdrawal of card scheme facilities that can in turn lead to business failure 
(Payments-Cards-and-Mobile, 2015b).  On a wider scale fraud can have a serious 
effect on competitiveness and in the end it can damage the economy of the region 
and the market in which it occurs.  In (BBC, 2005) it is stated: 
“Fraud is fundamentally fuelling the growth of organised crime in the UK, earning more 
from fraud than they do from drugs.” 
There is an acknowledged link between payment card fraud and Organised Crime 
Gangs (OCG) where the proceeds pay for terrorism, arms, drugs and people 
trafficking (Greene, 2008; Ryman-Tubb & Krause, 2011; Europol, 2012; Financial-
Fraud-Action-UK, 2014).   
In (Financial-Action-Task-Force, 2008): 
“Terrorist use of criminal activity to raise funds ranges from low-level fraud to 
involvement in serious and organised crime…Described below are criminal activities 
terrorists are known to have engaged in, including selling narcotics, credit card fraud, 
cheque fraud and extortion… The two cases studies in this report related to credit card 
fraud shows the vulnerability of credit cards to misuse for terrorist financing purposes and 
other illegal activities.  There is a market for illegally obtained personal details, including 
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credit card account numbers as well as personal information such as the card holder’s full 
name, billing address, telephone number, start and expiry dates, the security number on the 
rear of the card, etc.” 
In the two case studies (1) was investigated by the United States Secret Service in 
2003 where stolen credit card details were purchased from shadowcrew.com and 
then used to fund terrorists’ activities in Bosnia and (2) a North African terrorist 
funding group accumulated details of nearly 200 stolen cards and raised more than 
£200k to fund the al-Qaeda terrorist network through credit card fraud committed 
not in the country of origin but in Spain and the Netherlands.  While these are two 
examples there is an undisputed link between payment card fraud, OCGs and 
terrorism.  A respected criminologist Sir Leon Radzinowicz the founding director of 
the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge stated (Radzinowicz, 
1966), 
“A society that applauds innovation in the world of business can hardly expect to escape 
innovation in the world of crime.” 
Using 2003 figures reported in (Organisation-of-American-States, 2012) the global 
payment card fraud problem is now put in the context of global crime.  The United 
Nations reported that in 2003 the illicit drug trade was estimated to be $320bn and 
represented 1/5th of all worldwide criminal proceeds giving an estimate of $1.6tn for 
proceeds from all forms of crime (United-Nations, 2012).  At the same time the true 
cost of payment card fraud which includes all costs along with the direct write-offs 
has been calculated in this thesis (see B.10, page 546.) as $2.5 in every $100 of 
proceeds from all forms of crime as can be seen in Figure A-14.  In 2003 the true 
cost of payment card fraud was 70% of the reported illegal Heroin trade and in 2013 
it is almost as much as the aggregate proceeds from cocaine, opiate and heroin drug 
crime in 2003. 
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Source: Illicit drug trade in 2003 described in 0, page 554.  2003 Payment Fraud in B.10, page 
546. True cost of Fraud in B.15, page 553.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see see B.2, page 535.  
Figure A-14  – Payment fraud market in context of drug crime (2003). 
Payment card fraud is significant in terms of all forms of crime and therefore an 
important subject that requires research.  With all of the preventative and detection 
methods in place payment card fraud continues to grow and funds criminals and 
OCGs.  A detailed argument as to the social impact of payment card fraud and why 
law enforcement appears not to be a priority is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
As described in (Shen et al., 2007) there are two general schemes of payment card 
fraud described as inner and external, given in Table A-7. 
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Table A-7 – Schemes of payment card fraud. 
1.  Inner (acquirer) 
This fraud is committed by the merchant or in collusion 
with a merchant. 
2.  External (issuer 
or merchant) 
Off-line 
fraud 
Cardholder Present (CP) fraud – 
committed using the physical payment 
card at a merchant.  Fraud types include 
interception of new credit cards in the 
mail, stolen/lost cards or the copying of 
card information onto counterfeit physical 
cards or employee fraud at the issuer. 
Internet 
fraud 
Cardholder Not Present (CNP) fraud – 
committed using stolen card information. 
 
Source: (Shen et al., 2007). 
These two schemes are described in the following sections. 
A.3.1 Inner fraud (acquirer) 
When it is the merchant that undertakes the fraud or the fraud occurs using the 
merchant making use of a Point of Sale (POS) terminal it is called inner fraud.  
Acquirers carefully check merchants before underwriting their credit risk and 
providing them with a merchant account.  There are a number of inner fraud types 
such as merchants knowingly submitting transactions using stolen payment cards or 
criminals establishing themselves to look like a legitimate merchant and enter into 
acquiring relationship for committing fraud. 
A.3.2 External fraud (issuer/merchant) 
In external fraud it is the cardholders’ details (CHD), which are used with a physical 
payment card or a CNP transaction to undertake fraud.  Criminals target specific 
merchants, where the merchant receives orders, which appear legitimate business 
until they receive a charge-back, which reverses the transaction value and includes a 
fine (described in A.8.1, page 425).  Merchants can find themselves using their 
banking credit facilities to fulfil these orders that later turn out to be fraudulent.  This 
puts a significant stress on the merchant and can jeopardise sustainability as it may 
have used all its available credit to fulfil the orders.  A case study in (European-
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Federation-of-Accountants, 2005) details how one family-run business almost went 
bankrupt due to a credit card order for €47,000 where the business had to borrow 
money to fulfil the order that was discovered to be payment card fraud.  In another 
case (Microscope, 2010) three merchants unknowingly delivered £20,000 of laptops 
to a fraudster using a stolen credit card and lost both the £20,000 and the value of 
the laptops. 
A.4 Worldwide Payment Card Statistics 
To help understand growth in fraud losses the key reported industry statistics are 
reviewed.  These industry statistics contain uncertainties and errors that are 
discussed in B.2, page 535 and are not shown as error-bars on graphs or estimates in 
tables.  Payment card statistics from reputable industry sources are presented to give 
a broad understanding of the environment for the development of fraud detection 
systems.  These have been compiled in this thesis from a wide range of sources that 
are not always reported on the same basis and these have been adjusted to give a 
consistent comparison (see Appendix B).  Specifically figures from 1971, 1982, 1993 
and 2013 have been used as representative of those periods.  In 2013 the write-off 
due to payment card fraud was put at $13.9bn and $16.3bn in 2014 despite the 
measures put in place to date.  The key industry statistics reported on payment cards 
are described using the measurements in Table A-8 and are used throughout this 
thesis. 
A prefix of # for a variable denotes the number of transactions for that variable.  A 
prefix of $ indicates the USA dollar value of the same transactions (see B.4, page 
539). 
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Table A-8 – Reported industry statistics. 
Description Definition 
The Cardholder Expenditure Volume in a period. $𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%& 
Write-off due to fraud in a period. $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& 
Fraud loss as a percentage of $CEV in a period. %𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%& 
Fraud Basis Point.  The number of cents per $100 of $CEV 
that was fraud over a period.   
$𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#$%& 
The Average Transaction Value of all cardholder transactions 
in a period. 
$𝐴𝑇𝑉!"#$%& 
The number of transactions in a period #𝑇!"#$%& 
The number of genuine or fraudulent transactions in a period 
#𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒!"#$%& #𝑇𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& 
Where not reported directly in the industry statistics then estimates are calculated 
using Eq. (8-1) to Eq. (8-3) 
$𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& ≅ $𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%& .%𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%&  (8-1) 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#$%& ≅ %𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%& . 10 (8-2) #𝑇!"#$%& ≅ $𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%&$𝐴𝑇𝑉!"#$%&  (8-3) 
An approximation for the number of fraudulent and genuine transactions in a year is 
given in Eq. (8-5) and Eq. (8-6). 
Let Fraudulent Transaction Value ($𝐹𝑇𝑉) be the median value stolen by a criminal 
on a single payment card in a period and assuming this value remains a constant 
during the period. 
𝑓𝑚 ≅ $𝐹𝑇𝑉!"#$%&$𝐴𝑇𝑉!"#$%&   (8-4) 
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#𝑇𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& ≅ $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!!"#$%𝑓𝑚  (8-5) #𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒!"#$%& ≅ #𝑇!"#$%& − #𝑇𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%&  (8-6) 
For 2013 $FTV was reported as $350 (Graves et al., 2014) and calculating this as a 
proportion of the reported ATV of $126 (Kiernan, 2015) gives 𝑓𝑚 of 2.8.   
The Ratio of Genuine to Fraud transactions (𝑅𝐺𝐹) transactions.  This is the number 
of genuine transactions per fraudulent transaction and is given by Eq. (8-7). 
𝑅𝐺𝐹 ≅ #𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒!"#$%&#𝑇𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%&  (8-7) 
Table A-9 reproduces the reported industry statistics that are used as a basis for 
comparison throughout this Chapter along with their sources from Appendix B, 
page 535. 
Table A-9 – Summary payment card statistics. 
 See 1971 1982 1993 2013 Sparklines $𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%& B.5 $4bn $59bn $1,400bn $16.3tn 
 $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#$%& B.9 30¢ 220¢ 7.14¢ 8.53¢ 
 $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& B.10 $12m $1.3bn $1.0bn $13.9bn 
 𝑅𝐺𝐹 B.8 1,400 200 5,600 4,800 
 
Payment cards 
issued B.5 26m 98m 3bn 14.4bn  
Number of 
merchants B.14 1.07m 3.70m 12.74m 32m  
Number of 
issuers B.12 3,978 13,683 23,000 40,000  
Average 
Transaction 
Value $𝐴𝑇𝑉!"#$%& B.16 $17 $40 $67 $87  
Number of 
transactions #𝑇!"#$%& B.6 240m 1.49bn 3.75m 188bn  
0.0211%
4,800%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%14,440,500,0&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
14,441$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
32.0%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%40,151
40,151&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
87$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
87$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $
188,000,000,000
188.00%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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 See 1971 1982 1993 2013 Sparklines 
Number of 
fraud 
transactions #𝑇𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& B.6 179k 8.17m 3.75m 40m  
Source: See Appendix B, page 535.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are 
omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1, page 535 with axis omitted; x-axis is 
priod, y-axis as per key. 
Figure A-15 shows the growth in payment card expenditure ($CEV) on one y-axis 
and direct fraud write-off ($Fraud) on another y-axis due to scale differences.  This 
has been forecast from 2015 to 2020 (see B.3, page 538).  
 
Source: Table A-9 for 1971, 1982, 1993, 2013 values.  For other periods see B.5, page 546 for 
$CEV and B.9, page 546 for $Fraud.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain 
errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-15  – Worldwide payment card volume and fraud write-off by value. 
The fraud BP for the same period is shown in Figure A-16 and has been forecast 
from 2015 to 2020.  In 2013 the USA accounted for 51% of global payment card 
fraud that grew by 29% over the previous year with the rest of the world growing by 
11% (Heggestuen, 2014). 
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Source: See: Table A-9 for 1971, 1982, 1993, 2013 values.  For other periods see B.5, page 546 
for $CEV and B.9, page 546 for $Fraud.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-16  – Worldwide payment card fraud by Basis Points. 
The practice of posting unsolicited physical payment cards started by NBI (to 
become Visa) in 1958 continued in the USA unabated with a reported 100m 
payment cards being posted from 1958 to 1970 (O'Neil, 1970).  Criminals had taken 
notice of these new payment cards and a range of simple fraud vectors was devised 
(see A.7, page 404).  (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005d) report that the earliest payment 
card fraud was the theft of the physical payment card from the post.  Large numbers 
of to be delivered payment cards were stolen from the postal service leading to an 
underground-market in the trafficking of stolen cards.  Other criminals simply stole 
the cards from the mailboxes outside an individual’s home.  Since these individuals 
had not asked the payment card to be delivered it was not until they were presented 
with an unexpected statement for payment from the issuer that a crime was 
discovered.  𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃 on these payment cards was 300¢ during this period (Nocera, 
2013).  There was public outrage at the “irresponsible” banks (Burton, 2012) and in 
1970 the US Federal Trade Commission as a regulator was forced to put in place the 
Trade Regulation Rule on the unsolicited mailing of credit cards that banned the 
practice (Weinberger et al., 1970). There was a large volume of payment cards now 
in circulation where little or no basic credit checks had been undertaken.  This led to 
an unprecedented level of payment defaults and fraud that can be seen as a spike in 
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the 1982 industry statistics as fraud BP of 220¢ in Figure A-16.  Both small-time 
criminals and the Mafia were trafficking in stolen cards and working with dishonest 
merchants to submit fraudulent sales (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005d).  During this 
period the liability for fraud was with the cardholder and not with the issuer or 
merchant as it is in 2015.  In (Block, 1983) a Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
reported before the USA Senate Banking subcommittee an estimate for all types of 
payment card fraud including merchants and consumers to be $1bn in 1982.  This is 
substantially more than industry statistics at the time, which was argued by the 
Deputy Assistant to not include the true fraud cost to all participants.  It is not 
disputed that the practice of unsolicited mailing was necessarily bad business practice 
as the economics of two-side markets indicates that to get one or both sides 
profitable, both risk and investment is needed (Rochet & Tirole, 2006); it is unclear if 
the banks could have grown their market share of the payments industry in some 
other way without incurring similar bad debt and fraud write-offs that funded 
criminal activity.  This culture in the banks and payments industry to innovate and 
to create new products that have a rapid uptake but insufficient security lead to a 
wider societal impact that appears to be a repeating theme that continues to provide 
opportunities to criminals to commit fraud.  
The growth of fraud and the use of payment cards have been reviewed to present the 
problem of preventing and detecting payment card fraud in context and to establish 
that this is an important problem.  This problem will be discussed and a working 
definition established.   
A.5 Data Available to the Classifier 
The data available to a fraud detection system depends on which payment 
participant has deployed the system.  A merchant only has data on the transactions 
that have occurred at their firm and does not have information on other transactions 
that have been undertaken by a particular cardholder (see Figure A-17).  They have 
access to detailed information on the goods or services that were purchased through 
their POS or other interconnected devices, which could include a list of every item 
purchased as might appear on a receipt or invoice.   
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Figure A-17  – Data available to a merchant (CP). 
The merchant may have access to data such as email addresses, IP, device 
fingerprint, etc. for a CNP transaction (see Figure A-18).   
 
 
Figure A-18  – Data available to a merchant (CNP). 
Conversely the issuer only has data on the transactions that have been undertaken 
on their issued card by the cardholder and has no information on any transactions 
that have been carried out by other means by their customer on the products or 
services purchased.  The issuer will have access to the application information 
provided when the payment card was originally applied for by the cardholder and 
may have a complete history of every transaction completed by that cardholder.  
Where the issuer has a banking relationship with the cardholder the issuer has 
information to their credit worthiness and their other transactions (see Figure A-19).  
| Appendix A - History and Growth of payment card Fraud | 
 | 399 |  
 
 
Figure A-19  – Data available to an issuer. 
The acquirer typically only has the transactional information from the merchant 
along with information they keep on their merchants such as the original application 
data and statistics on their transactions over a period (see Figure A-20).   
 
 
Figure A-20  – Data available to an acquirer. 
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The card schemes only see the transaction data that is passed to them for clearing 
and switching, illustrated in Figure A-21.   
 
 
Figure A-21  – Data available to card schemes. 
Each participant only has access to only a part of the picture of any particular 
transaction.  Real-world data (natural data) available for fraud detection consists of a 
set of records that contain fields gathered from the available sources.  This real-world 
data is a rich data structure with a diverse set of information including fields that 
appear mundane such as a card reader response status codes.  Such fields may be 
found to identify important details of a transaction so as to more precisely make a 
decision (Juszczak et al., 2008).  A transactional message must comply with an 
interchange message specification for financial transactions (ISO, 1993). This 
specification allows for up to 192 fields of data relating to a transaction.  The data on 
each transaction consists of both numeric and symbolic fields.  The symbolic fields 
contain a number of values such as a list of merchant codes.  These fields are broadly 
categorised as: 
§ Transaction authorising 
§ Transaction posting 
§ Non-monetary 
§ Inquiry data  
Most humans develop habitual behaviours and this is true of their financial 
transactions where reoccurring patterns of expenditure on certain goods, shops, 
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brands, amounts can be observed over time.  To utilise the temporal, spatial and 
sequential dimension of the data “global features” (derived variables) are created as 
new input fields that encapsulate this behaviour.  Statistics such as the total number 
of transactions on the card that day over the past five days, the average transaction 
amount in the same day over five days, etc. (Kokkinaki, 1997).  Information will be 
lost inter alia by “flattening” any sequence and related temporal data.  Alternatively 
transactions can be viewed as consisting of a number of timed events in a sequence 
(“event feature”) and the detector then analyse a sequence of transactions (Kundu et 
al., 2008).  Data is spread among many different interconnected computer systems.  
Data stored on cardholders or merchants is stored and maintained.  It is likely that 
some payment processors do not strictly adhere to the data standards and so data 
can contain errors, contradictions and missing values.  The fraud detection system 
will need to access this data, check for errors in the data and calculate statistics.  The 
data processed by the payment participators is large; for example in 2010 JP Morgan 
Chase bank processed $491bn transactions by value, which is around 5.6bn 
transactions (Banks-around-the-world, 2010) and the Royal Bank of Scotland, which 
is the largest acquirer in Europe processed over 1bn transactions (Bolton & Hand, 
2002).  The data is sparse and it contains many more 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 transactions that 
those of 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑.  The ratio of 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 to 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 transactions is highly unbalanced 
or skewed.  As argued in (Bolton & Hand, 2002) a fraud detection method that 
correctly alerts 99% of 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒 transactions as genuine and 99% of 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 
transactions as fraudulent may be considered as effective.  If 1-in-4,800 transactions 
are fraudulent only 1 will be fraud, which means to identify that 1, requires the 
detailed examination of all 4,800, at considerable human cost.  A decision system 
that generates too many false alarms is susceptible to the human “base-rate fallacy” 
(Bar-Hillel, 1980) as where human reviewers have a tendency to start ignoring the 
information produced by the decision system.  Estimating class membership 
probability rather than a simple classification is a difficult problem to model.  Given 
a particular accuracy of a fraud detection system the actual level of fraud can be 
reduced to as low as wished but only by a corresponding level of cost of resource.  
Commercially a compromise is reached between the cost of detecting the fraud and 
the savings made by detecting the fraud (Bose, 2006).  This is further complicated as 
“disturbing good customers” (Leonard, 1993) by contacting them about an alerted 
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transaction that is not fraud does not inspire customer confidence; implying to the 
innocent customer that there is the suspicion of fraud is likely detrimental to good 
relations.  To put the task of detecting a single fraudulent transaction in context a 
Tier-1 issuer needs to correctly detect 1,100  fraudulent transactions out of 5m 
transactions every day, 24x7 and 365 days a year – illustrated in Figure A-22. 
 
Each transaction is represented by a single grey dot and there is one green dot that represents the 
single fraud transaction.  RGF in 2013 was 4,800, see Table A-9. 
Figure A-22  – “Spot the payment fraud”. 
Payment card fraud is significant in terms of all forms of crime worldwide.  The 
fraud detection problem and the knowledge extraction problem have been defined.  
The data available at the various payment participators for automating fraud 
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detection has been discussed and shown to be large, complex, noisy, unbalanced and 
incomplete.  It has been argued that as this data is sensitive which has hampered 
research.  To understand the state of the art in fraud detection an understanding of 
payment card growth, the cost of fraud to the different participants and how 
criminals undertake fraud is required, which is discussed in the next sections.  
The fraud detection problem has been discussed and defined as either a fraud 
detector using a classifier or an anomaly detector.  The data available at the different 
payment participators has been examined in this context.  Desiderata have been listed 
for such a payment card fraud detection system.  Next criminal behaviour and the 
types of fraud vectors will be considered. 
A.6 Payment Fraud Vectors and Criminal Modus 
Operandi (MO) 
Since the introduction of general payment cards criminals have sought to obtain 
cash illegally from these cards and have devised a range of fraud vectors with this 
aim.  A fraud vector consists of a specific sequence of operations that have been 
subsequently recognised or detected by law enforcement or fraud experts and 
reported.  The fraud vectors may be publicly reported if criminals are apprehended 
or the may be publicised to make the public aware of possible scams.  As described 
in (Turvey, 2011) most criminologists believe that repeat offenders such as those that 
undertake payment card fraud tend to develop characteristic behaviours from which 
they rarely depart.  This criminal MO remains mostly static if the previous crime 
yielded results, which is further reinforced if they were not brought to justice.  The 
criminals are agnostic as to whom they defraud and will update their MO to the 
easiest target that involves the least risk and the least cost – the weakest link in the 
payments process.  When fraud vectors are discovered as part of the payment card 
fraud lifecycle (see Table A-22, page 437) the method of fraud must be understood.  
To date this understanding only occurs after fraud has become known and requires 
considerable human skill, time and expertise.  It is evident in 2016 that traditional 
forms of payment fraud are giving way to Generation Z fraudsters who are highly 
computer literate and have led to a growth in sophisticated payment card fraud.  
Payment card fraud is highly lucrative to criminals.  It is not necessary for this thesis 
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to understand the criminal’s cognitive ‘model’ and the dependencies that they have 
on legitimate infrastructure.  Payment participators must understand these to allow a 
holistic method for countering payment card fraud to be developed that seeks to 
disrupt their model and make it harder to perpetrate and so more likely to be caught.  
It is through understanding fraud vectors that the vulnerabilities in the payments 
systems can be identified and reduced.  As (Choo et al., 2007) described the technical 
security of all participants in the payments process is enhanced then the risk of 
criminals using alternative strategies to obtain sufficient data to undertake payment 
fraud increases – such as the use of violence, bribery and corruption against 
individuals.  It is suggested that criminals will increase the risks to internal payments 
staff that have access to system information, passwords or cryptographic keys and in 
doing so will create new complex fraud vectors.  Three steps are involved in payment 
fraud given in Table A-10. 
Table A-10 – Payment fraud steps. 
Fraud steps Description 
1. Theft 
To obtain sufficient payment card details, that is PAN, expiry 
date, CVV and/or cardholder details, that is name, address, 
telephone, email, PIN – together called Cardholder Data (CHD) 
to be able to undertake fraud. 
2. Carding 
The criminal tests the payment card details typically for a low 
value, for example an on-line merchant such as a donation to a 
charity or at an ATM to ensure that the card has not been 
blocked and will be authorised. 
3. Monetise The criminal uses the CHD so that they receive cash/goods. 
A.7 Taxonomy of Fraud Vectors 
This section presents taxonomy of common fraud vectors and a discussion of 
common criminal methods.  It is important to understand known fraud vectors as it 
will be argued that they have only slowly evolved to date and so the methods to 
prevent and detect them have only slowly evolved.  It is not necessary for this to be a 
comprehensive review as it is sufficient to show how these have evolved over time.  
There are at least twenty-seven publicised fraud vectors used by the criminal for 
CHD theft and these are summarised in Table A-11 along with an example of the 
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publicly reported crime.  There are known to be more fraud vectors than listed but 
these are unpublished and include fraud against the acquirer: 
§ The merchant obtains an account from the acquirer by lying about the 
nature of their business that is for high-risk services/goods or those that 
are forbidden. 
§ The merchant accepts transactions from a third party that cannot obtain 
a merchant account for themselves typically due to the risky nature of 
that business. 
§ If a merchant cannot receive an authorisation for a single larger 
transaction then they attempt multiple lower values to gain an 
authorisation. 
§ A merchant repeatedly re-submits a declined purchase over an extended 
period in the hope that it is one day accepted. 
§ The criminal creates a web site that offers goods at high discounts to 
obtain orders and the CHD.  Other stolen CHD is used to purchase the 
items and send to the original customer. 
§ If an authorisation is declined due to fraud then the merchant continues 
to re-submit the transaction over a period (sometimes months) in the 
hope it may be authorised at some point. 
This is not a comprehensive list of all fraud vectors but illustrates those fraud vectors 
in the public domain.  The number of fraud vectors continues to evolve as the 
criminals adapt to those measures put in place to prevent, detect and reduce 
payment fraud.  As noted in (Bose, 2006) fraud vectors often use superimposition 
where a legitimate account will have legitimate activity but includes fraudulent 
activity that is then superimposed by a criminal where the aim is to look legitimate so 
as to not arouse suspicion.   
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Table A-11 – Taxonomy of common fraud vectors. 
Fraud vector Liability MO Example crime 
1. Accommod
ation fraud 
A
cq
ui
re
r Similar to false merchant web sites where 
accommodation is offered 
and bookings taken for 
non-existent properties. 
“Report reveals fraudsters conning 
travellers out of £2.2 million a 
year”, (ABTA, 2015). 
2. Account 
takeover 
M
er
ch
an
t The criminal 
masquerades as the 
genuine cardholder to 
change account 
information. 
“The New Face of $1 Trillion in 
Cybercrime on Business – Account 
Takeovers, Credit Card Fraud”, 
(Corbell, 2016). 
3. Application 
fraud Is
su
er
 A new payment card 
account is opened using a 
false identity. 
“18 charged in $200m credit card 
fraud scam that created 7,000 new 
identities”, (Kumar, 2013). 
4. Botnet 
malware 
M
er
ch
an
t 
A number of computing 
devices are compromised 
over a network so that 
they can be controlled 
and malware used to 
obtain many CHDs.  This 
data is used either online 
or to create fake physical 
cards. 
“How Would You Have Stopped a 
$1 Billion APT Attack?”, (Kessem, 
2015). 
5. Card 
generators 
M
er
ch
an
t 
The criminal creates/uses 
software to create a large 
number of technically 
valid CHD that are then 
validated before being 
used online. 
“Consumers bilked for $49 
million”, (Maximum-PC, 1999). 
6. Card 
skimming 
M
er
ch
an
t An electronic device is 
used to read the magnetic 
stripe on the payment 
card. 
 
“British tourists hit by £150m 
credit card scam”, (Taylor, 2001). 
7. Counterfeit 
payment 
cards 
(cloning) 
Is
su
er
 
The criminal modifies or 
creates a physical 
payment card using the 
stolen CHD and readily 
available equipment. 
“Contactless card fraud is too easy, 
says Which?”, (Bachelor, 2015) 
8. Cramming 
Is
su
er
 The criminal makes a 
small charge $5-$40 on 
many stolen CHD with a 
fake merchant name. 
“Cramming Fraud Targets 
Consumer’s Credit Cards”, 
(Hardekopf, 2013). 
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Fraud vector Liability MO Example crime 
9. Data 
breach / 
hacking I
ss
ue
r 
The criminal undertakes 
technical steps to infiltrate 
legitimate computer 
infrastructure to get access 
to CHD or to make 
changes to the system to 
allow fraud. 
“Most South Korean Credit Card 
Holders Have Details Stolen in 
Massive Breach”, (Campbell, 
2014). 
10. Digital 
pickpocketi
ng M
er
ch
an
t 
The criminal reads a 
contactless payment card 
data without the 
cardholder being aware.  
This data is used either 
online or to create fake 
physical cards. 
“Meet the pickpocket gang who made 
over $1.5 million a day stealing 
from passengers”, (Mirror, 2016). 
11. E-wallet 
provisioning Is
su
er
 Registering stolen card 
with an e-wallet (card 
provisioning). 
“Fraud comes to headlines about 
Apple Pay”, (Fleishman, 2015b). 
12. Email 
phishing 
M
er
ch
an
t 
C
ar
dh
ol
de
r Communications appear to be authentic and aim to 
convince the recipient to 
divulge CHD.  This data 
is used either online or to 
create fake physical cards. 
“The 'bogus boss' email scam 
costing firms millions”, (Keyworth 
& Wall, 2016). 
13. False 
merchant 
sites A
cq
ui
re
r 
The criminal creates a 
web site that offers low 
cost goods or services to 
attract payment card 
orders but these do not 
exist. 
“Students falling for fake Internet 
merchants and check 
scams”,(ITRC, 2016). 
14. Financial 
fraud Is
su
er
 
The criminal produces 
false information about 
their financial status and 
credit standing to obtain a 
high credit rating on their 
payment card. 
“'Massive' Credit Card Fraud 
Steals $200M (Katersky, 2013). 
15. Flash attack 
Is
su
er
 
The criminal uses are 
large number of 
individuals to 
simultaneously withdraw 
small sums of money each 
from single compromised 
account. 
“Credit card 'flash attack' steals up 
to $500,000 a month”, (Goodin, 
2010). 
16. Friendly 
fraud Is
su
er
 Cardholders use their 
own payment card to 
undertake fraud. 
“Friendly Fraud is a Real 
Problem”, (Rampton, 2015). 
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Fraud vector Liability MO Example crime 
17. Merchant 
bait-and-
switch A
cq
ui
re
r The criminal assumes the 
identity of legitimate 
merchants and enters into 
acquiring relationships. 
“Business falls victim to Britain's 
biggest-ever telephone banking scam 
as it hands over more than 
£1million to conman”, (Online, 
2015). 
 
18. Merchant 
collusion 
A
cq
ui
re
r The merchant obtains 
their customers CHD to 
use in subsequent fraud. 
“Donald Trump's hotels examine 
credit card breach claim (BBC-
News, 2015a). 
19. PIN 
skimming Is
su
er
 The criminal captures the 
PIN number known by 
the cardholder. 
“Debit card fraud suspects nabbed in 
$1m bank ATM scam”, (CBC-
News, 2014). 
20. POS 
malware 
M
er
ch
an
t 
The criminal creates/uses 
software that is designed 
to intercept CHDs for 
each transaction that is 
available from within a 
POS.  This data is used 
either online or to create 
fake physical cards. 
“Home Depot: Card breach put 
56M cards at risk”, (Weise & 
Woodyard, 2014). 
21. Post 
intercept/ 
Not-
Received-
Items  
Is
su
er
 
Payment cards are 
intercepted from the 
postal service before the 
intended recipient 
receives it. 
“Mail non-receipt’ fraud has 
increased 10% to £5m in the first 
half of 2014.”, (Action-Fraud, 
2014). 
22. Social 
engineering 
M
er
ch
an
t o
r 
C
ar
dh
ol
de
r 
The criminal obtains 
personal information 
about individuals 
gathered from social 
media to create a new 
payment card account or 
to supplement other data.   
“Wells Fargo Bank Gives Scammer 
Three Tries”, (Novack, 2012). 
23. Stolen card 
M
er
ch
an
t The physical payment 
card is stolen from the 
cardholder. 
 
 
“Stolen credit cards used in 
$240,000 designer-label shopping 
spree on Collins Street”, 
(Calligeros, 2015). 
24. Telephone 
vishing 
M
er
ch
an
t o
r 
C
ar
dh
ol
de
r 
A telephone call is made 
posing as a legitimate 
business with the aim to 
convince the recipient to 
divulge CHD.  This data 
is used either online or to 
create fake physical cards. 
“'Fraudsters hijacked our phone line 
and then stole tens of thousands 
when we called the bank': Customers 
scammed and then left stranded by 
their banks”, (Boyceq, 2014). 
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Fraud vector Liability MO Example crime 
25. Web site 
cloning 
(“Bait-and-
switch”) A
cq
ui
re
r The criminal creates a web site that is an almost 
exact copy of a reputable 
web site to attract 
payment card orders. 
“Fake websites boost credit card 
fraud”, (Bamber, 2001). 
26. ATM fraud 
Is
su
er
 
The criminals have 
deployed a range of 
methods to obtain CHD 
or attack the IT 
infrastructure. 
“How Hackers Stole $45 Million 
in Two Days”, (Santora, 2015). 
27. Pharming  
Malicious code is installed 
on a personal computer 
or server without 
knowledge or consent to 
gather personal 
information or 
intercept/redirect 
legitimate use. 
“Online attackers steal £20m from 
UK bank accounts”, (BBC-News, 
2015b). 
Once the criminal has access to valid CHDs the information needs to be monetised.  
There are six publicised methods used for this monetisation: 
1. Purchase and resell gift cards 
2. Purchase and refund airline tickets 
3. Cash advance/balance transfers to fake accounts 
4. Sale of CHDs on the criminal underground market 
5. Purchase and resell physical goods 
6. Purchase and resell digital goods 
It is important to understand fraud vectors and how the criminal operates to 
appreciate the problem of detecting and explaining the patterns through knowledge 
extraction.  It is for this reason that some of the common fraud vectors are discussed 
in the following sections. 
A.7.1 Card skimming 
The criminal skims a payment card when information from a stolen physical 
payment card is obtained using an electronic device that can read and store the 
information stored on the magnetic stripe or contactless (Zimmerman, 2014): 
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§ A reader device is retrofitted at a legitimate ATM or self-service kiosk. 
§ A complete fake ATM is setup. 
§ At the merchant (such as at a restaurant, shop/department store, etc.) 
where the card is taken away and is then read. 
§ A reader device is fitted at self-service POS such as at petrol pumps or in 
supermarkets.   
The electronic reader device required is readily available for legitimate use for 
around $20.  Modern reader devices can be purchased to include a mobile phone 
data connection so that the skimmed payment card data can be transmitted to the 
criminal in real-time.  This eliminates the need for the criminal to return to where 
the device is being used and substantially reduces the ability for law enforcement to 
apprehend the criminal.  This method is prevalent in regions that rely on the 
magnetic stripe payment card and has been substantially reduced in those countries 
that have adopted EMV.  As one example in (Taylor, 2001) it was reported that 
criminal gangs used waiters or shop staff who had a small electronic reader to read 
payment card details of British tourists not yet converted to EMV payment cards 
and to then make a copy of those cards.  This one fraud was estimated to have 
generated £150m income to these criminal gangs over the period of one year. 
A.7.2 PIN skimming 
The criminal captures the PIN number known by the cardholder as well as the other 
card details (Zimmerman, 2014).  This can occur as: 
§ A small electronic camera is secreted so that it has a sufficient view of the 
keypad entry device. 
§ A thin electronic overlay is placed on top of a legitimate keypad to 
capture any information the cardholder types. 
§ The criminal watches the PIN being entered (shoulder surfing).   
The captured PIN data is linked to the magnetic stripe data through a timestamp of 
when the card was used so that the criminal now has sufficient data to replicate an 
EMV/debit card transaction where a PIN is required.  As one example in (CBC-
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News, 2014) a $1m debit card scam operated in Quebec and Ontario was reported 
where a card-reading device and a camera was installed by criminals at over 200 
ATMs.  Stolen CHD and PIN data is used to create physical counterfeit payment 
cards that are then used in a non-domestic country to purchase items that can be 
easily turned into cash. 
A.7.3 Application fraud 
The criminal obtains personal information about an individual with the intention of 
opening a new payment card account using this information (Bhatla et al., 2003).  
The payment card is then used so that eventually the individual receives a bill of 
which they were unaware.  In one example a confirmed $200m was lost through a 
criminal gang of 18 people creating over 7,000 fake identities with a network of 
1,800 addresses including houses, apartments and post office boxes along with fake 
merchants that obtained credit card terminals to create charges on the newly issued 
credit cards.  The criminals obtained 25,000 new credit cards over a period of years 
and moved the cash generated through using these into many different countries 
(Katersky, 2013). 
A.7.4 Post intercept/Not-Received-Items (NRI’s) 
The criminal intercepts physical payment cards from the postal service before the 
intended recipient receives it (Barker et al., 2008).  This occurs either at the postal 
sorting stage or from the payment cardholder’s own letterbox.  One of the earliest 
reports on payment card fraud (Dunn, 1977) reported: 
“Credit card fraud is perpetrated not only through use of the cards but in obtaining them.  
Twenty Percent (20) of fraud losses are due to issuance of cards after false application; 
Twenty Percent (20) of losses due to cards issued to but not received by legitimate 
applicants; and sixty Percent (60) from cards lost by or stolen from cardholders.” 
Despite this fraud vector being the earliest payment card fraud type, it remains 
prevalent today and in the UK in (Action-Fraud, 2014) the Financial Fraud Action 
UK (FFAUK) highlighted that residents of apartment blocks and flats were a target 
for fraudsters stealing mail from their letter boxes to commit card fraud and ID theft 
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and in particular those letters containing debit and credit cards were used to 
fraudulently buy high-end goods or withdraw cash.  It was reported that post 
intercept fraud had increased to £5m in the first half of 2014. 
A.7.5 Lost or stolen card 
A payment card is lost/stolen when the legitimate account holder receives a payment 
card and loses it or someone steals the card for criminal purposes (Bhatla et al., 2003; 
Barker et al., 2008).  This type of fraud is a straightforward method for a fraudster 
to obtain a credit card without investment in technology.  In one example, a 
criminal obtained a number of stolen credit cards and then spent over $240,000 over 
a few days on luxury goods and clothes.  Despite CCTV footage of the criminal the 
criminal was not apprehended.  This demonstrates how easy it is for criminals to get 
large gains over a short period from a few stolen cards (Calligeros, 2015). 
A.7.6 Account takeover 
This type of fraud occurs when a fraudster illegally obtains a valid customers’ 
personal information to masquerade as the genuine cardholder and make changes 
to their payment card account (Bhatla et al., 2003).  The fraudster takes control of 
(takeover) a legitimate account by either providing the customers account number 
or the card number.  The fraudster then contacts the card issuer masquerading as 
the genuine cardholder to ask that post be redirected to a new address.  The 
fraudster then reports that the payment card has been lost and asks a replacement to 
be sent to this new fake address. 
A.7.7 Merchant collusion 
The criminal obtains the customers’ cardholder accounts and/or personal 
information to then either use directly or to sell on to fraudsters (Bhatla et al., 2003). 
A.7.8 Merchant triangulation 
This fraud requires three steps (Bhatla et al., 2003): 
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1. The criminal creates a web site that appears to be a legitimate auction or 
sales web site.  Goods are offered at highly discounted rates to entice 
customers to place orders using their payment card.  The customer provides 
information such as their name, address and valid payment card details, that 
is PAN, expiry date, CVV to order the goods.   
2.  The criminal uses a previously stolen payment card to order those goods 
from a legitimate web site at full price and these are shipped to the customer 
in step 1. 
3. The CHD obtained in step 1 is then used to continue the scheme with a 
different customer or is used to order goods that the criminal can easily 
exchange for cash. 
This process is designed to cause confusion and the criminal can operate long 
enough to accumulate considerable volume of goods purchased with stolen credit 
card numbers. 
A.7.9 Web site cloning/spoofing 
The criminal clones an entire web site or the pages from which an order is placed 
(Bhatla et al., 2003).  A legitimate customer has no reason to believe they are not 
dealing with the company that they wished to purchase goods or services from as the 
web pages that they are viewing are identical to those of the real site but are hosted 
by the criminal.  A cardholder will provide information such as their name, address 
and valid credit card details, that is PAN, expiry date, CVV, while placing an order 
on this cloned web site.  When the criminal receives the order the unsuspecting 
customer will receive an emailed receipt to ensure that there is no suspicion.  The 
criminal receives these details and can then use them in subsequent payment card 
fraud.  It is only sometime later when the customer does not receive the goods that 
the fraud is detected.  Many of the cloned sites are hosted in the USA or Third 
World countries which make them harder to police and they are typically operated 
for a few days to avoid detection.  For a few hours' work cloning a legitimate site, 
criminals can make $100k+.  Some sites cloned include a major bookseller and a 
sportswear firm (Bamber, 2001). 
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A.7.10 Fake merchant web site 
The criminal creates a web site that offers a low cost or free service, for example for 
media content and to access the content the customer is asked to place a small value 
order using their payment card “to verify their age” (Bhatla et al., 2003).  The 
customer then provides information such as their name, address and valid credit 
card details, that is PAN, expiry date, CVV.  These web sites are set up to 
accumulate as many credit card numbers as possible over a period of time.  The web 
sites themselves do not charge for the services they provide but are usually part of a 
larger criminal network that either uses the payment card details it collects to raise 
revenues by other means or sells the valid credit card details to other fraudsters. 
A.7.11 Accommodation fraud 
Similar to web site cloning, a criminal creates fake accommodation typically through 
a web site and takes reservations by requesting cardholder information such as their 
name, address and valid credit card details, that is PAN, expiry date, CVV.  The 
unsuspecting customer will receive an emailed confirmation of the reservation to 
ensure that there is no suspicion.  The criminal receives the payment card details and 
can then use them in subsequent payment card fraud.  It is only sometime later when 
the customer arrives only to find that no such accommodation/hotel exists that the 
fraud is discovered.  There are a number of variations on this theme. 
A.7.12 Card generators/BIN attack 
Payment card number generators use software that aim to generate valid PANs and 
expiry dates (Bhatla et al., 2003).  These generators work by generating lists of 9-digit 
payment card account numbers typically for a single issuer (IIN or previously known 
as Bank Identification Number (BIN)).  The software is widely available to download 
from the Internet.  The criminal targets smaller issuers and those that are not up to 
date with AVS systems do not have real-time authorisations, or they may have set up 
automatic authorisations for transactions below a fixed amount.  The fraudster will 
find such weaknesses and then use the generator software to generate as many 
numbers as desired for a specific BIN assigned to the issuing bank’s assigned credit 
card number range.  These are created as valid PANs and will be valid in terms of 
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the encoded PAN data but they will not be honoured if such a card has not already 
been issued.  The criminal must therefore try each generated number without 
arousing suspicion and only keep those that are returned as valid to then use for 
fraud through carding.  This type of fraud is typically detected using rules that look 
at the velocity of transactions with small changes in the transaction characteristics, 
such as the payment card expiry date with the other details such as delivery address 
remaining the same as the criminal must try each generated PAN multiple times 
with differing expiry date until it is authorised.  In one example (Maximum-PC, 
1999) a single criminal and his wife in California, USA earnt an estimated $49m 
from fraud.  They generated card numbers using software and then billed $19.95 
from “N-Bill” to each valid card they found for adult content.  The fake charges 
were spread internationally and less than 100 cardholders reported the charge as 
unknown out of more than 2.5m fraudulent transactions. 
A.7.13 POS malware 
The criminal creates software that is designed to intercept CardHolder Data (CHD) 
that is available from within a POS operating environment and to then forward this 
intercepted data to the criminal known as POS malware.  To accomplish this the 
criminal must identify a point or points at which CHD is in clear text within the 
POS systems.  Once this area of opportunity has been pinpointed the criminal will 
typically deploy one of three types of malware described in the following sections. 
A.7.14 Keylogger 
A keylogger is malware software that monitors the input devices on the target POS 
system and is installed on the POS terminal (Goodin, 2013; Sullivan, 2015).  The 
input monitored can be the POS keyboard or any attached input device including a 
payment card reader.  Once data has been entered into the POS terminal, the 
keylogger software records that data and sends it to an output file.  Many keyloggers 
can take screenshots of the infected POS.  Screenshots give context to the captured 
data and help a criminal determine which information might be a password, 
username or payment card number.  The output file is stored in the POS as 
encrypted or as clear text and is obtained by the criminal by: 
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§ Exfiltration to a connected system controlled by the criminals by an 
automated software mechanism or,  
§ The criminal must physically retrieve the file from the infected POS 
terminal.  
There are two types of keyloggers that have been reported by law enforcement: 
1. Homemade or customised electronics that may be packaged with other malicious 
components or,  
2. Commercial off-the-shelf keyloggers that provide a rich feature set and enable 
criminals to accomplish their goal without writing any software or needing to 
understanding the technical complexities such devices available include: 
Ardamax Keylogger or Perfect Keylogger. 
A.7.15 Memory dumper 
A memory dumper is malware software that captures CHD when it appears in the 
memory of the target payment system and sends it to an output file.  This target 
system is typically the POS terminal, the payment processing back-office systems or 
on the payment switch.  When a magnetic payment card is swiped the CHD that 
was recorded on the magnetic stripe is read into internal memory before being 
processed by the payment application.  Depending on the system this data may be 
copied to multiple memory locations or may be rapidly erased once processed.  
Many vendors may claim that their application encrypts CHD at the point of the 
swipe; this can only be securely undertaken using hardware.  In software before the 
CHD can be encrypted it must reside in a buffer in memory even if only 
momentarily before it passes to the portion of the payment application performing 
the encryption.  The memory dumper operates at this point by recognising the data 
and copying the contents of that buffer into an output file.  Memory dumper 
software has become increasingly sophisticated and is created by highly computer 
literate individuals.  
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A.7.16 Network sniffer 
A network sniffer is malware software that captures network traffic on a specific 
portion of a network connected to the infected system to obtain any CHD that is 
transmitted over the network (Cheney, 2010).  It is installed in the POS terminal the 
payment processing back-office systems or on the payment switch.  This malware 
operates by placing the connected network hardware into a mode whereby each 
network packet is recorded (called promiscuous mode).  When a legitimate device on 
the network transmits CHD data the malware recognises this, copies it from the 
recorded network packet and sends it to an output file.  The criminals then obtain 
this output file in the same way as for keyloggers. 
A.7.17 Botnet malware 
A botnet is a collection of compromised devices that can be controlled by a criminal 
organisation through the Internet (Sullivan, 2010; Goodin, 2013; Sullivan, 2015).  
Each individual device can be controlled so that malware can be installed and 
executed from a single location.  A botnet can contain hundreds or even thousands 
of compromised devices.  The malware installed can be used for phishing, 
keyloggers, memory dumpers, network sniffers and are used maliciously to gain 
financial or other personal information.  The criminals can control multiple 
instances of their memory dumper malware are able to install and execute additional 
malware and update their memory dumpers and read the output file of CHD from a 
single location.  This control is known as command-and-control (C&C) and operates 
through compromised networked systems.  Notably this has allowed criminals to 
create an infrastructure of compromised devices that can be used to control and 
infect other devices examples include Dexter, Alina, vSkimmer, etc.  
A.7.18 Email phishing 
The criminal aims to obtain personal information such as usernames and passwords 
from individuals that can then be used when combined with other data sources, to 
undertake payment fraud (Gates & Jacob, 2008).    Criminals send communications 
using emails, letters, instant messages or text messages.  These appear to be an 
authentic communication from a legitimate and respected organisation.  Phishing 
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messages try to convince the recipient that they are from this trusted source.  
Typically the message embeds web-links that direct the victim to a fake website 
where login or personal details are requested.  These websites may install malware or 
viruses onto the victims’ computer.  Once information has been obtained from the 
victim it is then used by the criminals to gain access to cardholder or bank accounts 
or in some cases obtain a payment card PIN.  To improve the fake legitimacy of the 
message criminals use personal or business information they have already obtained 
to earn trust and lower the victim’s defences to increase the chance that attachments 
or embedded links are opened (spear-phishing).  Phishing applies to businesses where 
messages are sent to look like legitimate customer feedback, requests for information, 
staffing or a legal notice. 
A.7.19 Telephone vishing 
This is similar to email Phishing where the criminal aims to obtain information, 
including CHD, usernames and passwords from individuals over the telephone.  A 
call will be made to the victim claiming to be from a well-known computer vendor, 
such as Microsoft, Apple or Dell and will then claim they have detected a problem 
with the victims device and ask for cardholder information to “validate your 
software” or similar at no cost.  They may ask for other information such as user 
names and passwords and ask a number of technical questions aimed at creating 
confidence. 
A.7.20 Social engineering 
The criminal aims to obtain personal information about individuals gathered from 
social media that can be used, when combined with other data sources to undertake 
payment fraud.  This information is typically obtained from an individual’s public 
account on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, etc.  Many 
individuals inadvertently publicly provide information such as birthday, address, 
previous name, telephone and email contact information, family details without 
realising the security implications of providing such information into the public 
domain. 
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A.7.21 Digital pickpocketing  
The criminal uses a RFID device that can be readily purchased online for c. $30 to 
obtain contactless card details without the cardholder being aware.  The contactless 
card (NFC) should encrypt the sensitive data but in some cases this is not so and in 
others the PAN and expiry details are in clear text that combined with other 
information on the cardholder can then be used.  The payment processors have 
denied this method but it has been publically demonstrated and the information is 
sufficient to make an online purchase within minutes (Greenberg, 2012).  
Researchers have shown that it is also possible to extract CHD by eavesdropping 
from a distance of over 1m (Diakos et al., 2013).  Although the one-time iCVV is 
generated per transaction and can be captured it is not the same as the CVV and so 
cannot be used.  Other researchers have found that the same information as on the 
magnetic stripe is repeated in the chip and demonstrated on a video that this was 
sufficient for a purchase to be made on Amazon where a CVV was not required 
(NFC-Mobile-Technology, 2012).  
A.7.22 Financial fraud 
The criminal produces false information about their financial status and credit 
standing to open a payment card account or to obtain a higher credit limit without 
intention of paying the debt. 
A.7.23 Counterfeit payment cards 
There are four main methods in the creation of counterfeit physical cards (Bhatla et 
al., 2003) that are each discussed below. 
The criminal creates a payment card by erasing the magnetic stripe with a powerful 
electro-magnet and puts details on the face of the payment card to match details of a 
valid but stolen payment card that they have obtained.  When the criminal uses the 
counterfeit card, the merchant will swipe the card through the terminals magnetic 
card reader where it will not work.  The merchant will then proceed to manually   
input the card details into the terminal as a fall-back option.  This form of fraud has 
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higher risk of detection of the criminal because the cashier will be looking at the 
card closely to read the numbers. 
The criminal can create a complete fake plastic payment card using embossing and 
printing machines using details of a valid but stolen payment card that they have 
obtained.  Modern payment cards have many security features that are designed to 
make it difficult for fraudsters to make good quality forgeries.  Holograms have been 
introduced in almost all payment cards and are difficult to forge. 
A criminal modifies a payment card by either re-embossing by applying heat and 
pressure to the information originally embossed on the card or by re-encoding 
them using computer software that encodes the magnetic stripe data on the card. 
A criminal produces a plastic payment card that looks like a “white plastic” hotel 
room key but contains legitimate magnetic stripe data using details of a valid but 
stolen payment card that they have obtained.  The criminal can use this card at 
unmanned locations that do not require card validation or verification such as at 
ATMs, petrol pumps and vending/parking machines. 
A.7.24 Telecoms fraud 
The criminal aims to use telecommunications networks as a method of converting 
stolen payment card details into cash, such as: 
Premium rate scam where a criminal establishes an expensive premium rate dial-in 
subscription service often in an overseas location for example South Africa.  Stolen 
payment cards are then used to obtain mobile phones that then repeatedly dials this 
service so that the call volume is high.  A single call can amount to £100s that is then 
billed to the stolen credit cards.  The telecoms firm credits the fake subscription 
service with all these fees typically daily and the criminals withdraw the cash from 
that business and move on before it is detected. 
In Call Shop Fraud the criminal uses stolen payment cards to obtain a large number 
of mobile phones.  These mobile phones are then set up to call-forward to specific 
countries where such calls are expensive, for example from the UK to India or the 
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Middle East.  The criminal then sells a legitimate low-cost service to call those 
destinations and routes the calls through these mobile phones so that customers pay 
them for this connection not knowing it is being undertaken by subscriptions to 
services paid for by stolen credit cards.  The criminals aggregate all the fees from the 
service and move on before it is detected. 
A.7.25 Friendly fraud 
Cardholders using their own payment card can undertake friendly fraud.  There are 
two types of friendly fraud:  
1. Deliberate friendly fraud is when once goods have been ordered and received 
by the cardholder they then dispute the charge with their issuer claiming to 
have no knowledge of the transaction or,  
2. Accidental friendly fraud occurs when a customer does not recognise the 
charge but it is later determined to be legitimate. 
A.7.26 Cyber fraud and data breach 
Cyber-crime occurs when fraudsters target legitimate computer systems to obtain 
large quantities of exposed sensitive data that can then be used in subsequent fraud, 
including payment card fraud –known as a data breach.  Where a large amount of 
stolen data is available many smaller valued transactions can be automated and 
spread among a large number of merchants within a short period of time (Hoffman, 
2010) making it hard to detect.  It is reported in (Krebs, 2014b) that OCGs have set 
up worldwide networks for selling stolen payment card data.  The following are three 
examples of such fraud in the public domain and their costs:  
1. $9m.  1.5m payment card details were stolen from RBS-Worldpay in the 
USA by compromising the computer system in 2008.  Both payment card 
details and their PIN numbers were stolen.  This information was 
distributed to a worldwide network of criminals who then created 
physical payment cards using the data.  On 8th November 2008 in one 
day these criminals used the counterfeit payment cards in 280 cities and 
obtained $9m from using them in legitimate ATMs (Roman, 2014). 
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2. $53.7m.  40m payment card details and 70m customer records were 
stolen from Target Inc. in the USA in November 2013 the details were 
analysed by the criminals so that non-US card details were sold at a 
premium price and that specific batches of card details were then sold in 
such a way as to overcome some geographic fraud detection methods.  
This virtual fraud factory reported in (Sullivan, 2015) is a decentralised 
OCG that has agents in different locations and is able to harvest large 
sums of money from such stolen data.  It was further reported that large 
volumes of counterfeit payment cards have been manufactured using the 
same stolen data (McAllen, 2014).  In (Krebs, 2014a) it has been 
estimated that the criminals earnt $53.7m from the sale of the credit card 
details and it cost the issuers $200m to re-issue payment cards to 2014. 
3. $80m.  In 2016 the UK TalkTalk phone and broadband provider, 
which has over four million UK customers, had 156,959 customers’ 
personal details stolen, including 15,656 whose bank account numbers 
and sort codes were hacked.  Two teenage boys were arrested and bailed 
in connection with this attack.  The ease of the attack allegedly carried 
out by a 15 and 16 year old perhaps highlights the lack of priority that the 
security of customer and payment data is given within organisations.  
Something that their shareholders certainly noticed with a drop of over 
7% in their share value (Farrell, 2015). 
A.7.27 Cramming 
Micropayments are payments of less than $5 (or €5) that have traditionally been 
completed at the POS (including vending machines, car parking, etc.) with cash.  E-
commerce micropayments are similar small payments typically used for the purchase 
of content (such as music or video-on-demand) or for other virtual goods (such as 
online gaming and social networks) and are made with payment cards or other on-
line methods.  This poses a complex problem for fraud detection as criminals can use 
a large number of micropayments spread across many payment participators to 
generate large aggregate incomes.  By diffusing the fraud among many issuers and 
fake merchants with acquiring accounts, it is problematic to detect this fraud vector 
in the mostly siloed data environments of fraud detection.  In one example a single 
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OCG stole over $9.5m through micropayment transactions between 2006-2010, 
with values ranging from $0.25 to $9 per transaction where less than 10% of the 
1.35m compromised cardholders reported the unrecognised transactions (Hoffman, 
2010).   
A.7.28 Summary 
The history, the growth of fraud, the fraud detection problem, criminals and the 
types of common fraud vectors have been examined for payment cards.  This has 
been necessary to put the hypothesis that knowledge in symbolic form that captures general 
characteristics of payment card fraud can be extracted from classifiers trained on large-scale, 
imbalanced, high-dimensional transactional data in context as an important and difficult 
problem.  There is a substantial problem within the payments industry in terms of 
increasing fraud where fraud is prolific and generating funds for nefarious use.  Next, 
an analysis of the cost of payment card fraud to industry will be evaluated. 
A.8 Cost of Payment Fraud 
To understand the motivation of payment participants to prevent and detect fraud 
their financial liability for payment card fraud needs to be understood as well as the 
cost of such fraud.  Table A-12 sets out in simple terms the liable party when 
external fraud is committed in 2016.  There is no requisite to provide a detailed 
examination of liabilities as this changes across jurisdictions, is complex and changes 
historically.  Notably there is a shift of liability (EMV liability shift) with the 
introduction of new physical payment card technology called EMV (Eurocard, 
MasterCard, Visa) or “chip-and-pin” that is discussed in A.12.1, page 458.  It is 
surprising that the Card Schemes themselves take little liability for fraud undertaken 
using their card schemes and through their payments infrastructure while being in 
the best position to do so.  In 2010 facing this growing criticism and the threat of 
greater regulation Visa acquired the fraud vendor Cybersource for $1bn (Martin, 
2010) followed by MasterCard purchasing Datacash for $333m (MasterCard, 2010) 
and American Express acquiring accertify for $150m (American-Express, 2010).  
These acquisitions appeared to have little impact on fraud prevention and detection 
and it could be argued it further limited the choices available to merchants and 
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issuers in the choice of their FMS.  The Card Schemes continue not to work together 
and share data to tackle the problem together and so fraud continues to grow each 
year. 
Table A-12 – Simplified liability on payment participants for fraud (2015). 
EMV 
liability 
shift? 
Payment participators 
Fraud Liability Cardholder Merchant POS 
Yes 
Cardholder Present with 
EMV + PIN card. 
Swipe and 
signature Merchant 
Chip and PIN 
terminal 
Issuer (or cardholder if 
PIN compromised) 
Cardholder Present with 
EMV + Signature card 
Swipe and 
signature Merchant 
Chip terminal Issuer 
Cardholder Present with 
Magnetic Stripe 
Chip terminal Issuer 
Swipe and 
signature Merchant 
No Cardholder Present with Magnetic Stripe 
Swipe and 
signature Issuer 
Yes or No Cardholder Not Present Internet Merchant7 
It can be seen that it is the merchants or issuers that are responsible for the fraud 
liability and therefore have the most to gain through a better understanding of fraud.  
This cost of this liability is: 
§ The direct loss (write-off) value from the fraudulent payment transaction. 
§ The consequential loss for the participants who processed the fraudulent 
payment transaction. 
§ The operational costs of preventative and detection systems. 
The ideal measure of card payment fraud is the value of all fraudulent payments and 
associated costs/fees for all participants in the processing of that transaction – the 
true cost of fraud.   
                                                
7 The merchant liability depends on whether the merchant has deployed a card scheme security 
system (see A.13.4, Page 151) and if their fraud chargeback levels are below a defined level. 
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The total operational cost to the payment participants is given in Eq. (8-8) and the 
true fraud cost in Eq. (8-9). 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡≅ MerchantFraudCost + IssuerFraudCost+ AcquirerFraudCost (8-8) 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ≅ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + $Fraud (8-9) 
A.8.1 Merchant Costs 
This section analyses the cost of payment car fraud to a merchant.  The fees that the 
merchant pays for each transaction they accept using a payment card is given in 
Table A-13 shown in Figure A-23.  These fees are due regardless whether the 
transactions is found to be fraudulent or not.   
Table A-13 – List of costs to merchant to accept a payment card. 
Fee Typical Description 
Interchange 
fee ($𝐼𝑉) 
0.05% to 
3.35% of the 
transaction 
value plus a 
fixed fee of 
up to $0.75 
This is a fee paid by the merchants’ acquirer to the 
issuing bank or payment processor of the 
cardholder.  This fee is charged to the merchant by 
their acquirer and may be negotiated separately or 
be the standard published rate for the card scheme.  
The rate varies depending on the merchants 
category code, e.g. airline, supermarket, restaurant, 
etc., the type of payment card, e.g. credit card or 
debit card and turnover of the merchant 
(MasterCard, 2015). 
Merchant 
Service 
Charge  
($MSC) 
1% to 3% of 
the 
transaction 
This is a fee paid by the merchant to its acquirer for 
providing debit and credit card services.  The rate is 
determined based on factors such as volume, 
average sales price, risk and industry.  The typical 
rate is between 1% and 3% but for Internet 
transactions this rate can be higher.  The fee 
includes the interchange fee and the assessment fee. 
Card 
association 
assessment fee 
($𝐶) 0.13% of the transaction Charged to the acquirer from the card schemes (sometimes called the network fee). 
The total of these fees, 𝑀𝐹 is given in Eq. (8-10) for transaction 𝑡. 
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Let t be the fraudulent payment transaction, now for transaction t, let $𝐼𝑉! be the 
variable component and $𝐼𝐹! be the fixed component of the interchange fee, $𝑃! be 
the payment processor fee, $𝐶! be the card association assessment fee, $𝑀𝑆𝐶! be the 
Merchant Service Charge.  
𝑀𝐹! = $𝐼𝑉! + $𝐼𝐹!  + $𝑃! + $𝐶! + $𝑀𝑆𝐶!  (8-10) 
Figure A-23 illustrates example payment card fees for a merchant on a $200 
purchase. 
 
Figure A-23  – Example payment card fees for a merchant. 
When a cardholder disputes a transaction on their payment card account where they 
do not recognise a transaction as being genuine this initiates a charge-back.  Some 
time after the initial dispute the merchant’s acquirer informs the merchant that the 
genuine cardholder claims they were not responsible for the transaction.  To 
understand charge-backs Figure A-24 illustrates the process that is undertaken.  
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Figure A-24  – Charge-Back process. 
If the transaction is determined to be fraudulent, then a fixed Charge-Back Fee is 
charged to the merchant that may range from $10-$100 and there can be additional 
penalties and commissions for currency conversions (Global-Processing-Systems, 
2015).  There is an operational cost to the merchant of preventing, managing and 
detecting fraud including the staff, systems and software tools that that merchant 
requires.  The cost of a fraudulent transaction for a merchant is therefore given in 
Eq. (8-11). 
Let t be the fraudulent payment transactions, now for transaction t, Let $𝑅! be the 
operating cost to review and investigate the fraud, 𝑀𝐹! as defined in Eq. (8-10), $𝑓! 
be the (fraudulent) value of the transaction, $𝐶𝐵! be the charge-back fee, $𝐶𝑃! be 
any additional penalty that may be charged by the acquirer, $𝐶𝐶! be any adjustment 
required for currency conversion and $𝐺! be the cost to the merchant of the goods 
sold.   
𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑎u𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = $𝑅! +𝑀𝐹!! + $𝑓! + $𝐶𝐵! + $𝐶𝑃! + $𝐶𝐶! + $𝐺! (8-11) 
From Eq. (8-11) there are ranges of fees that the merchant is liable when a 
fraudulent transaction occurs and an example is given in Table A-14.  
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Table A-14 – Example cost of fraud to a merchant. 
Sale     
Merchant sells goods     $200.00 
Merchants cost of sale  $𝐺! 66%  ($132.00) 
Interchange fee (variable)  $𝐼𝑉! 2.0%* ($4.00)  
Payment processor fee  $𝑃! 0.25%& ($0.50)  
Interchange fee (fixed)  $𝐼𝐹!  ($0.75)  
Card association assessment fee  $𝐶! 0.11%+ ($0.22)  
Total Fees    ($5.47) 
Acquirer’s fee  $𝑀𝑆𝐶!   ($1.00) 
Net Profit    $61.53 
Charge-back     
Refund to cardholder  (sale price) $𝑓!  ($200.00)  
Charge-Back Fee  $𝐶𝐵!  ($25.00)  
Total cost of charge-back    ($225.00) 
Net Loss    ($163.47) 
Source: * (Visa-Europe, 2015), &(Purch, 2015), +(Börestam & Schmiedel, 2011). 
In Table A-14 the merchant would need to sell three of the same goods, that is 
3x$200 sales price, gives 3x$61.53=$184.59 net profit to pay for the one loss 
($163.47) due to fraud.  This illustrates the risk to merchants and why they are 
motivated to control their charge-backs and therefore their need to understand 
fraud.  If the merchant is considered a high-risk by the acquirer then the charge-back 
fee can be as much as £100 (The-Fraud-Practice, 2015) although this is reported as 
rare.  The merchant may receive an increase in their fees 𝑀𝐹 given in Eq. (8-10) if 
charge-backs exceed a set threshold typically set as a percentage of sales.  An 
operating cost for merchants has been calculated in Table A-15 as an estimate for all 
merchants in 2013.   
Table A-15 – Operating costs to merchants (2013). 
Worldwide merchants 2013 
Lost fees / Charge-back fees $15.8bn 
CNP operations $38.6bn 
CP operations $78bn 
Total merchant operating costs $132.0bn 
 
 
Assumptions: See B.14, page 552.  Stated values in the table may contain errors;  
error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
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Using industry statistics for worldwide fraud and the operating costs estimated in 
Table A-15 the true fraud cost to merchants for 2013 has been approximated in 
Table A-16.   
Table A-16 – True payment fraud cost merchants (2013). 
  2013 Source 
Direct payment 
card fraud write-
off for merchants 
Merchants (and 
acquirers) (37% of total 
$13.9bn direct fraud) 
$5.1bn  B.14, page 552 
Operating Costs $132.0bn From in Table B-25. 
Merchant true cost of payment fraud $137.0bn 
Compare to $190bn 
estimate in 
(Shaughnessy, 2011) 
for 2011. 
   
Calc. merchant true payment fraud cost BP 84.2¢  
Merchant reported fraud cost BP 3.16¢ $5.1bn /$16.3tn 
Calculate multiple 25.7x  
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
The true payment fraud cost to merchants is 25.7x the merchant portion of industry 
reported direct fraud write-off costs.  It is therefore in the merchants’ interests to 
improve prevention and detection methods.  
A.8.2 Issuer Costs 
Issuers process all transactions on the payment cards that they have issued and can 
be held liable for fraud.  The cost of a fraudulent transaction for an issuer is given in 
Eq. (8-12) that has been modified from (Graves et al., 2014). 
Let k be the affected cardholder’s account, r be 1 if all the payment cards associated 
with account k have to be cancelled and new payment cards re-issued otherwise let r 
be 0, let 𝑖 be the issuer, ℎ be the cardholder, 𝑚 be the merchant who processed the 
payments for account k, then $𝑐!" is the cost to the issuer to re-issue card(s), $𝑐!! is 
the cost to the cardholder and $𝑐!" is the cost to the merchant, $𝑓! be the value of 
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fraud and $𝑅! be the operating cost to review and investigate the fraud where this 
assumes that the liability of the fraud loss rests with the issuer.  Let 𝜌! be the 
probability that account k will be used fraudulently.   
𝐼𝑠𝑠u𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡= $𝑅!!+ 𝑟 $𝑐!" + $𝑐!! + $𝑐!" + $𝑓! + 1− 𝑟 .𝜌! . $𝑓!  (8-12) 
When the issuer is liable it is assumed that the merchant incurs no significant fees 
($𝑐!") that the cost to the cardholder is the time spent dealing with the compromised 
payment card ($𝑐!! = 0) and that the issuer makes the decision to cancel the 
payment card and re-issue a new card (r = 1) then an estimate of the cost per 
fraudulent transaction for an issuer is given in Table A-17. 
Table A-17 – List of costs to issuer per fraudulent transaction (2013). 
Variable Description 
Value per 
fraud 
transaction $𝑐!" The cost of re-issuing physical payment cards varies depending on volumes and has been 
put at $3-$30 per card (Graves et al., 2014). 
$47 
$𝑓! Calculated average value of a fraudulent payment transaction.  This is $8.8bn from B.12, page 548)/number of fraud 
transactions of 188bn in B.7, page 543. 
$221 
$𝑅! Calculated average fraud operations spend per fraudulent transaction.  This is a BP of 0.6¢ from B.31, page 564 giving $0.9bn total 
issuer fraud operating cost/number of fraud 
transactions of 188bn in B.7, page 543. 
$9 
𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒓𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 $276 
 
  
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 
535.   
$9
$276
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Let k be all affected cardholder’s accounts for each 𝑖 issuer, then the total issuer 
fraud cost is given by Eq. (8-13). 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!!!!  (8-13) 
Based on Table A-17 and using Eq. (8-13), the true fraud cost to issuers for 2013 has 
been approximated in Table A-18. 
Table A-18 – Calculating true payment fraud cost issuers (2013). 
Worldwide issuers  2013 Source 
Number of fraudulent 
transactions for issuers  40m B.7, page 543 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  $276 Table A-17 
Issuer true cost of payment fraud $11.0bn 
Compare to 
$11bn reported in 
in (Shaughnessy, 
2011) for 2011. 
Calculate Issuer true payment fraud cost BP 6.7¢  
Issuer reported fraud cost BP 5.4¢ B.12, page 548 
Calculate multiple 1.2x 6.7/5.4 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
The true fraud cost to issuers is calculated in Table A-18 as 1.2x the issuer portion of 
industry reported direct fraud write-off costs.  This true fraud cost is not explicitly 
stated in industry statistics.  To place this true fraud cost to issuers in context and 
therefore understand their motivation to prevent detect and understand fraud their 
revenue and costs are further analysed: 
§ Finance Charges are charged to the cardholder where interest on any 
outstanding balance is typically accrued daily until the balance is zero. 
§ Interchange Fee is fee that the acquirer pays to issuer per transaction. 
§ Penalty Fee is a fee charged to the cardholder for late payment or non-
payment of a specified minimum balance. 
§ Cash Advance Fee is a fee charged to the cardholder if cash is withdrawn 
using the cardholders’ account. 
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§ Annual Fees is a fee charged by some issuers to the cardholder per year for 
the use of the card. 
These issuer revenues are shown in proportion in Figure A-25.  
 
Source: (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005b).  Figures from 2002.  Plotted points and values shown 
on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-25  – Bar chart illustrating issuer revenue source. 
An illustration of typical issuer revenues and operating costs along with the average 
cost of fraud in 2013 is given in Table A-19.   
Table A-19 – Calculating illustrative issuer interchange revenue and costs (2013). 
 Revenues (per $100)  Balance % $𝐼𝑉! Interchange Fee* 103.5¢   
 Account Fee* 1.0¢   
 Total revenues  104.5¢  
 Costs    $𝐶! Assessment Fees* (11¢)  33% 
 Processing Fees* (5¢)  15% 
 Rewards Programs* (6¢)  18% 
%Fraud Fraud Direct write-off! (8.5¢)  26% 
 Fraud operations cost%  (0.6¢)  2% 
 Re-issue of payment card* (1.8¢)  6% 
 Total costs  (32.9¢)  
 Operating profit  71.6¢  
Source: *(Kiernan, 2015). ! Table A-9. %B.31, page 564.  Stated values in the table may contain 
errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
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Figure A-26 illustrates these costs based on Table A-19 as a percentage of Issuer 
revenue.  
 
Source: See Table A-19.  Points and data may contain errors. Error-bars or accuracy bounds are 
omitted. See B.2, page 535. Issuer total costs=8.7%+1.7%+4.8%+5.7%+10.5%=31.4%. 
Figure A-26  – Bar chart of typical issuer f costs and operating margin. 
Figure A-26 illustrates that the costs associated with fraud are 8.7% of issuer 
revenues that are calculated to be 28% of issuer total costs.  It is evident that the 
issuers can grow their operating margin by reducing this true fraud cost.  
A.8.3 Acquirer Costs 
The cost of a fraudulent transaction to an acquirer (including Independent Sales 
Organisations (ISO) which serve as resellers of acquirer services) is difficult to 
quantify at the transaction level as a loss due to fraud is reported to an acquirer and 
is passed on to the merchants for whom the payment was processed (Sullivan, 2010).  
There is a range of fraud vectors shown earlier in Table A-11 for which the acquirer 
is likely to suffer a loss dependent on the specific liability in each case.  The cost of 
acquirer fraud is given in Eq. (8-14). 
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Let k be the affected merchants’ account $𝑅! be the operating cost to review and 
investigate suspicious merchant accounts 𝜌! be the probability that merchant 
account k will be used fraudulently, $𝑓! be the value of loss due to fraud, $𝐶𝑃!  be the 
value of any penalty from the card schemes for excessive fraud, $𝐶𝐵! be any 
unrecoverable charge-back fee. 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = $𝑅! + 𝜌! . ($𝑓! + $𝐶𝑃!)!  (8-14) 
These statistics are not directly reported so a conservative estimate for acquirer costs 
and losses has been made in Table A-20, combining published figures and assuming 
the acquirer in (Feedzai, 2013) was in the top-15 of USA acquirers in 2013 so that 
the calculated losses are averaged over the mean number of transactions processed 
by such an acquirer.  It is assumed that the acquirer’s process the same number of 
transactions as the issuers so that the operational costs to review these transactions 
from merchants will be similar to those incurred by the issuers, previously calculated 
in Table A-18. 
Table A-20 – Calculating acquirer true payment fraud cost (2013). 
 2013 
Fraud loss on all merchant transactions  $809m 
Operating costs to manage fraud  $0.9bn 
Acquirer true cost of payment fraud $1.7bn 
 
 
Acquirer true cost of payment fraud BP  1.0¢ 
Assumptions: See B.15, page 553 values in the table may contain errors;  
error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
A.9 True cost of fraud 
Table A-21 summarises the true cost of payment fraud for the main payment 
participators. 
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Table A-21 – Summary true cost of fraud (2013). 
 Reported  True    
Participant Cost BP Cost BP 
Multiple  
of 
reported 
 
Merchants  $5.1bn  3.2¢ $137.0bn 84.2¢ 25.7x  
Issuers  $8.8bn 5.37¢ $11.0bn 6.7¢ 1.2x  
Acquirers  - - $1.7bn 1.0¢ n/a  
Total $13.9bn 8.53¢ $149bn 92.3¢ 10.8x  
       
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
Comparing the total true cost of payment fraud in Table A-21 and Figure A-27 it 
can be seen that in 2013 the true cost of fraud is an average of 10.8x that of reported 
industry statistics (see B.15, page 553).  There is a significant underreporting of fraud 
losses in the headline industry statistics.  If this multiple remains the same over future 
years then the total true cost of fraud could exceed $390bn per year by 2020. 
 
Source: Table A-21 and B.10, page 546.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-27  – The true cost of payment fraud. 
The cost of fraud to the different participants has been established.  Each participant 
has a need to reduce their true cost of fraud and therefore to improve prevention and 
detection and so reduce their operating costs.  It is evident that it is the merchants 
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who have the most to gain through improved understanding of fraud so as to 
improve their fraud management. The growth in the use of payment cards, other 
cashless methods and fraud has been shown to be substantial and is forecast to 
continue to grow.  Worldwide direct fraud write-off was reported at $16.3bn in 2014 
and is forecast to be $21.3bn in 2016 (see Figure A-27).  The criminals continue to 
target the weakest link in the payment process with a range of different fraud vectors 
and it has been argued that more sophisticated fraud including data breaches has 
started to be reported.  Payment card fraud is highly lucrative to criminals and there 
seems t be little that has curtailed their activities. 
To understand the “state of the art” in fraud detection over the history of payment 
cards, the next section reviews the history of payment card fraud detection along 
with examples of approaches used. 
A.10 History of Payment Card Fraud Detection Methods 
Understanding the performance of fraud detection methods, from the earliest 
computerised fraud detection system to current technology is relevant to determining 
that a new method is needed to improve the “state-of-the-art”.  In (Wilhelm, 2004) it 
is proposed that there are eight processes in the lifecycle of payment card fraud that 
form the majority methods used to understand, manage and mitigate fraud within in 
the payment industry.  This lifecycle is illustrated in Figure A-28. 
 
Figure A-28  – Payment card fraud lifecycle. 
In general, the cost of each stage in the lifecycle increases as the lifecycle progresses 
with “Fraud Deterrence” being the least cost and “Fraud Prosecution” being the 
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most costly.  Each component of the lifecycle informs the next and is detailed in 
Table A-22. 
Table A-22 – Descriptive list of the stages of the payment fraud lifecycle. 
Step Stage Description 
1. Deterrence 
This stage aims to discourage fraud before it is attempted.  
An example is the requirement for a new payment card to 
be activated by the cardholder before it can be used.  To 
put in place deterrence measures an understanding of fraud 
vectors and patterns is needed so that these can be 
addressed. 
2. Prevention 
This deploys protective, processes, systems and cardholder 
verification, etc. that make fraud difficult to commit.  To 
design such security features, the fraud vectors and how 
these are undertaken need to be first understood. 
3. Detection 
Deploying processes and systems that are able to identify a 
fraudulent transaction.  This may occur during the 
transaction so that it can be blocked prior to completion 
(real-time detection) or after the event (batch detection) 
where it is used to reveal fraudulent activity and 
subsequently block further attempts at fraud.  For example 
a computer system that calculates usage statistics and 
executes rules to find understood patterns of fraud.  These 
rules are created by fraud experts, who understand the risks 
in the particular payment system and the types of fraud that 
are likely to be perpetrated based on their industry 
experience and that of their organisation. 
4. Mitigation 
The aim is to stop the loss due to payment fraud from 
continuing to occur – such as blocking a payment card, 
payment to a merchant or shipping of goods.  This stage 
will involve a review of the fraud case before putting in 
measures to stop any reoccurrence.  The speed at which 
mitigation can be put in place is important to reduce losses 
due to fraud. 
5. Analysis 
An understanding of the patterns of fraud and new 
emerging patterns is gained through analysis of the factors 
that lead to payment card frauds.  It is important to 
understand the root cause of payment fraud so that steps 
can be taken to stop or reduce the exposure to such frauds. 
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Step Stage Description 
6. Policy 
Through understanding current frauds, emerging payment 
frauds and trends in the industry this can inform business 
policy that needs to balance a number of factors such as the 
inconvenience to legitimate customers, regulatory 
requirements, reputational damage, the ability to reduce the 
incidence of fraud and the total cost of fraud.  Such fraud 
policies need to be created and communicated to the 
business so that resources can be allocated to successfully 
combat fraud. 
7. Investigation 
An investigation into fraudulent transactions requires 
obtaining sufficient evidence and information in a method 
that is consistent with legal evidentiary requirements such 
that the courts accept it.  A range of methods is used 
including the involvement of law enforcement or covert 
surveillance to identify a suspect criminal. 
8. Prosecution 
The aim of prosecution is to recover assets or obtain 
restitution against the identified criminal(s).  Importantly by 
securing a conviction a strong deterrent is sent to criminals 
with the aim of increasing their perceived risk of being 
caught undertaking payment card fraud and therefore 
requiring them to change their MO and move away from 
criminality.  The conviction needs to be sufficiently punitive 
to outweigh the gains made by such criminals. 
Source: (Wilhelm, 2004). 
In the following sections industry statistics are used to ground the performance of 
fraud detection at the time of the reported statistics.  The performance measures in 
Eq. (2-3) to Eq. (2-8) are common measures used throughout the research literature 
and are used as a comparison between different fraud detection methodologies.  The 
industry statistics report payment fraud losses; after the payment processor has 
already used whatever processes it has in place to prevent or detect fraudulent 
transactions and has investigated such transactions.  It is argued that the majority of 
cardholders will identify and report a fraud on their payment card and it is likely that 
merchants will do likewise if the amount is significant (ActionFraud, 2014).  
Therefore any underreporting of direct payment fraud loss in the industry statistics is 
minimised and it is reasonable to assume for the purposes of this Chapter that the 
fraud loss reported is close to the actual total fraud that will not be recoverable 
(write-off).  The reported payment fraud loss ($𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%&) is therefore a 
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combination of TN (fraudulent transactions that are correctly detected) and FN 
(fraudulent transactions that are missed but subsequently reported) as in Eq. (8-15). 
Let underreporting be 0 and $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%&  be the total value of fraudulent 
payment transactions in period.  
$𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& + underreporting = $𝑇𝑁!"#$%& + $𝐹𝑁!"#$%&  (8-15) 
Let 𝑟 be the proportion of payment fraud losses that were not identified by the fraud 
detection system.  
To calculate meaningful performance figures of a fraud detection system over 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 an assumption needs to be made on how many fraudulent transactions were 
missed but $𝐹𝑁!"#$%& is unknown and not reported.  Payment fraud detection 
systems are typically configured to be optimistic, that is as much unusual behaviour 
as possible is alerted, thus minimising 𝑟 – see Eq. (8-16). 
$𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& = 𝑟. $𝐹𝑁!"#$%& + 1− 𝑟 . $𝑇𝑁!"#$%&  #𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑!"#$%& = 𝑟.#𝐹𝑁!"#$%& + 1− 𝑟 .#𝑇N!"#$%&  (8-16) 
There is further difficulty using industry statistics to calculate the performance of a 
payment fraud detection system as the fraud detection system is already place so that 
the industry statistics are measured after the effect of the fraud detection system.  
There is therefore an inherent error in calculating performance using the reported 
figures as a measurement cannot be made of the system without affecting the system.  
This is a dilemma similar to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Heisenberg, 1930).  
The payment fraud detection system works on all transactions but the industry 
statistics only include those transactions that have been identified through 
investigation as fraudulent.  By estimating performance based on statistics that are 
only the identified fraud loss, the estimate will be biased when applied to all 
transactions in the real-world.  For example when a fraudulent transaction is 
identified by a fraud detection system and it is then blocked then any subsequent 
fraud by that same means is blocked but not reported.  The industry statistics do not 
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record the future fraud losses that would have occurred had the transaction not been 
identified and therefore they have an error in recording the total possible fraud loss.  
Preventative measures will be in place prior to the fraud detection system, such as 
checking a balance and may decline the transaction.  These transactions (𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) 
are not recorded in the statistics.  In the field of credit scoring this sampling bias is 
corrected through reject inference (Crook & Banasik, 2004).  It has been shown in 
research that even if the proportion of 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 is high it has a non-significant affect 
on using reported figures for comparison.  Due to this sampling bias and errors 
introduced through the assumptions in this Chapter, figures are rounded to give a 
reasonable but conservative estimate of performance. 
A review is undertaken of automated payment card fraud detection methods from 
the first simple computerised reporting systems in 1970s to date as illustrated in 
Figure A-29. 
 
Figure A-29  – Block diagram of payment card fraud detection methods over period 
1971 to 2013. 
Each fraud detection method necessarily improved on the previous method as the 
volume of transactions rapidly grew while at the same time available computing and 
computer storage increased in power and exponentially reduced in cost (discussed 
later in A.15.8, page 524). 1970s 
By 1971 the issuers had automated their payment card authorisation process (using 
BASE I) and the funds clearing process.  The data on the cardholder and each 
transaction was stored in a simple computer file-store.  The acquirer had automated 
the settlement process and data on the merchant and their transactions was stored in 
a computer file-store (Mayo & Nohria, 2005).  It is likely that the issuers used a 
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mainframe computer such as the IBM System/3708.  Mainframe computers had 
limited memory (for example 32k characters), were slow to access stored data and 
were expensive (IBM-Archives, 1970).  These computers were physically large (see 
Figure A-30) and a full system had a purchase price of c.$5.5m in 1971 ($60m in 
2015 value) (see B.30, page 563).  
 
Source: (IBM-Archives, 1970).   
Figure A-30  – The IBM 360/370 computer used for payment card processing 
(c.1970s). 
A.10.1 Fraud Report 
The FORTRAN or COBOL language was likely used to write a fixed program that 
would process transactions to generate alerts of suspicious activity and create printed 
reports (IBM-Archives, 1974).  This program was first compiled before it could be 
executed on the computing platform.  To help manage fraud levels this printed fraud 
report (see Figure A-31) was created by: 
                                                
8 In 1961 IBM invested $5bn ($69bn in 2015 value as B.4, Page 300) to develop the IBM/360 
mainframe that took seven years to develop and was launched in 1970.  It is reported to be the 
biggest corporate investment to date.  By 1966, IBM had sold 4,000 mainframes and had another 
20,000 on order.  Today IBM continues to support the IBM/360 and its successors code in its latest 
IBM System Z mainframes – that is 50 years of backward software compatibility which may partly 
explain why large banks and payment processor continue to use these systems (Morgan, T.P. IBM 
System/360: The Original Enterprise Tech <http://www.enterprisetech.com/2014/04/08/ibm-
system360-original-enterprise-tech/> (2015).  The IBM System/360 was popular in banking 
applications and was used to process transactions and to store them since there was few business 
computing platforms at that time. 
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§ The issuers and larger merchants typically executed in batch overnight 
listing all those cardholders who triggered simple rules with a fixed 
threshold value and this was then sorted by the value of the transaction 
(Lenard & Alam, 2009).   
§ The acquirers, who were interested in their merchants, typically reviewed 
their total transaction values and took a similar method by assessing 
volumes against those expected when the merchant was first accessed and 
accepted. 
Table A-23 – Simple rules (1970s). 
Example Cardholder Rules Description 
Total number of 
transactions in a 
day > x then fraud 
These simple tests were chosen by 
human analysts and had manually set 
threshold values based in part on an 
understanding of past fraudulent 
behaviour. 
Ttotal value of 
purchases in a day 
> y then fraud 
 
 
Figure A-31  – Fraud Report (1970s). 
In Table A-23, the feature space has two example numeric fields: (1) number of 
transactions in a day and (2) total value of purchases in a day, shown as a two-
dimensional space that is limited by the maximum values that each field can take.  
| Appendix A - History and Growth of payment card Fraud | 
 | 443 |  
The example rules create a 2-polytope that contains one class here called “ALERT” 
that indicates a suspicious transaction.  It is important to note that by using simple 
rules only straight line boundaries can be created in the feature space as it is known 
that the relationships between fields are not linear (Ryman-Tubb, 1998).  In the real-
world many more fields are needed (see example data in Appendix C) to improve 
accuracy and so the feature space will become a 𝑑-polytope and with 𝑑 dimensions 
the complexity increases so the processing required increases and the explainability 
of the alert becomes more difficult.   
Logical disjunction Logical conjunction 
  
Let N=Number of transactions in a day and P=Total value of purchases in a day. 
ALERT=  (N > x) ∨  (P > y) ALERT
= 
(N > x) ∧  (P > y) 
 clause 1 clause 2  clause 1 clause 2 
Fortran:  
IF 
((N.GT.X).OR.(P.GT.
y)) GOTO ALERT 
Fortran: 
IF 
((N.GT.X).AND.(P.GT.
y)) GOTO ALERT 
Figure A-32  – Rule Report feature space. 
Each conditional is shown as a clause in the rule in Figure A-32.  Each clause is 
known as an antecedent in a rule.  These simple rules therefore form a binary 
classifier ℂ 𝐫  given an input record 𝒓 of data available with ℂ as the result.  These 
rules form a decision boundary (see 1.5, page 33), which comprise a number of 
disjoint regions.  A rule ‘fires’ when all the antecedents are evaluated to TRUE. 
As fraud vectors become a known so new rules were created and added.  It is argued 
in the literature that expert systems have the advantage of transparency since rules 
are easy to read.  This is important as it is argued that understanding why a decision 
                             ALERT
ALERT ALERT
0                         x                       x-max
y-max
        y
        0  
ALERT
0                         x                       x-max
y-max
        y
        0  
| Appendix A - History and Growth of payment card Fraud | 
 | 444 |  
system indicates a fraud is necessary for fraud prevention through informing the 
fraud-lifecycle.  With simple rules it is likely that there were a proportion of payment 
cardholders whose behaviours deviated from the average such as high spending 
individuals that were not fraudulent but erroneously appeared on the Fraud Report.  
The assumptions for calculating the performance for the Fraud Report are given in 
Table A-24 along with the sources. 
Table A-24 – Assumptions (1971). 
Tier-1 issuer  Value. Source 𝑇𝑃𝑅  80%  𝐹𝑃𝑅  30%  
Transactions/day 7,000 B.12 
Fraud Transactions/day 6 B.12 
The confusion matrix for the performance of the Rule Report for Tier-1 issuer is 
calculated applying Eq. (2-21) to (2-24) and #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷!"#$! from Eq. (2-16) and is 
given in Table A-25. 
Table A-25 – Tier-1 issuer Fraud Report per day (1971). 
 Actual  Performance   
Genuine Fraud  %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR! %TPR! A/f AlertsD 
D
ec
is
io
n 
Reported  
79.991 99.968 0.300 30.000 80.000 1 1,403 Genuine 5,595 2  
Fraud 1,399 4  
   
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Assumptions: See Table A-24. 
While the 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!"#$% are poor it can be seen that by reviewing 
1,403 alerts a day on the Fraud Report 4 fraud transactions would have been 
correctly identified.  Nearly all the alerts generated are not fraud but misclassified 
genuine transactions (FP).  To review these alerts a review team size has been 
calculated in Table A-26 using Eq. (8-17). 
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Assuming an 8-hour working day, let the number of minutes in an 8-hour day be 
8x60 and assume each human review of an alert takes an average of 5-minutes, then 
the size of the review team is given by Eq. (8-17). 
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 ≅ #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷!"#$!8𝑥60 5  (8-17) 
Table A-26 – Tier-1 issuers review team size (1971). 
  1971 
Fraud report (1970s) #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷!"#$! 1,403 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 15 
Assumptions: 8-hour day, 5-minutes per review.  See Eq. (8-17). 
A review team of 15 would have been required to review and investigate suspicious 
transactions, based on the Fraud Report.  Estimated operational costs for the 
required fraud detection hardware software, support and review team are estimated 
in Table A-27.  
Table A-27 – Tier-1 Issuer operational costs (1971). 
1971 Issuer Cost p.a. 
Hardware $6.0m 
Support & licences $6.0m 
Review team (15) $1.4m 
Total Operational Cost $13.8m 
 
 
Assumptions sources, errors and calculations in B.31, page 564.  Costs 
shown in 2015 value (see B.4, page 539). 
During this decade it can be seen (see Table A-28) that the cost of operations to 
detect payment fraud was 22.18x the value of the fraud write-offs reflecting the high 
costs of computing at that time.   
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Table A-28 – Compare fraud BP and operations (1971). 
Fraud BP Operations BP Multiple  Operations: Fraud BP 
30¢ 665¢ 22.18x 
Assumptions and sources in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 (see B.4, page 539). 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535. 
A.11 1980s 
As the number of transactions grew throughout the previous decade from 240m to 
1.49bn so did the computing power available and an Improved Fraud Report was 
generated.  The market for databases was growing and the Structured Query 
Language (SQL) became a standard query language for database access (Connolly & 
Begg, 2005).  With more flexible access to stored data the fraud rules could now use 
SQL (or similar) and calculations such as the average spend or total value of 
transactions over the last month.  These rules aimed to capture cardholder 
behaviour more precisely than the previous FORTRAN type rules.  These rules 
were set so as to reduce the number of alerts generated while still attempting to 
capture at least the same proportion of fraud as previously despite the volume 
increase of more than 6x.  The payment processors continued to use mainframe 
computers such as the IBM 3084 that was launched in 1982.  This system had twice 
the memory and was considerably faster than its predecessors (IBM-Archives, 1970).  
These computers remained physically large (see Figure A-33) and a full system had a 
purchase price of $3.3m ($33.0m in 2015 value as in B.4, page 539).  This 
represented a reduction in equivalent computing hardware cost of 45% over the 
previous decade. 
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Source: (IBM-Archives, 1970).  Colour for ease of visualisation. 
Figure A-33  – The IBM 3084 Computer used for payment card processing (c. 
1980s). 
Fraud monitoring remained batched based that is the system was run at the end of 
the day to produce a report (Leonard, 1993).  There remained a lack of investment 
in research or innovation in fraud detection beyond a report and both commercial 
and academic research to improve existing methods was limited.   
A.11.1 Improved Fraud Report 
An Improved Fraud Report was based on the previous Fraud Report and was 
developed using the available computing.  The assumptions for the performance for 
this Improved Fraud Report are given in Table A-29 along with the sources. 
Table A-29 – Assumptions (1982). 
Tier-1 issuer  Value Source 𝑇𝑃𝑅  80%  𝐹𝑃𝑅  30%  
Transactions/day 40,000 B.12 
Fraud Transactions/day 300 B.12 
The confusion matrix for the performance of this Improved Fraud Report is 
calculated applying Eq. (2-21) to (2-24) and #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷!"#$! from Eq. (2-16), page 57) 
is given in Table A-30. 
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Table A-30 – Tier-1 issuer improved fraud report per day (1982). 
 Actual  Performance   
Genuine Fraud  %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR! %TPR! A/f A/d 
D
ec
is
io
n 
Reported  
79.991 99.717 2.577 30.000 80.000 1 8,150 Genuine 31,760 90  
Fraud 7,940 210  
 
  
 
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Assumptions: See Table . 
Table A-31 has been calculated to illustrate the typical size of the team of reviewers 
required to process all the alerts from the Improved Fraud Report on the same basis 
as previously defined in Eq. (8-18). 
Table A-31 – Tier-1 issuer review team size (1982). 
Detection System  1971 1982 
Fraud Report 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 15  
Improved Fraud Report 
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚  85 #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷!"#$!  8,150 
  
 
From Table A-31 the review team size required is 85 for a Tier 1 Issuer.  It suggested 
that not every alert was reviewed and so perhaps only a proportion of the estimated 
team size was required.  Therefore the Improved Fraud Report appears to be 
sufficiently effective over this period.  A typical operational cost for the payment 
fraud detection hardware software, support and the review team is estimated in 
Table A-32 along with assumptions and sources. 
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Table A-32 – Payment fraud detection operational costs (1982). 
1982 Issuer Cost p.a. 
Hardware $3.3m 
Support & licences $3.3m 
Fraud Software licence (Improved Fraud Report) $100k 
Review team $8.5m 
Total Operational Cost $15.3m 
Assumptions and sources in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 (see B.4, page 539). 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
The fraud write-off for a Tier-1 issuer had grown substantially (from $120k to 
$12.63m a year) along with the transaction volumes from 2.3m to 14.3m a year.  
Computing power had halved in cost over the previous decade and exponentially 
increased in power so the cost of the operations to detect fraud was now a sixth of 
that previously, from an operations BP of 665¢ in 1971 to 89¢ (see Table A-33).  
Table A-33 – Compare fraud BP and operations (1982). 
Fraud BP Operations BP Multiple  Operations: Fraud BP 
220¢ 89¢ 22.18 
Assumptions and sources in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 (see B.4, page 539). 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
Comparing the results for 1982 to those of a decade earlier (illustrated in Table 
A-34) the accuracy and precision for both classes 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 , 𝐹𝑃𝑅 and 𝑇𝑃𝑅 
measures have all remained largely the same.  The number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷 and the 
review team has increased substantially by almost six times.  The fraud BP during 
the period considerably increased as previously discussed.  This is in part the reason 
for the increased 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷.  The operational cost BP has substantially reduced, despite 
the increase in the team size reflecting the reduction in hardware costs and the 
increase $CEV over the period. 
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Table A-34 – Compare fraud detection performance 1971 to 1982. 
Acc Pg Pf FPR TPR Alerts Team Fraud BP Ops BP 
(2-3) (2-5) (2-6) (2-7) (2-8) (2-16) (8-17) (8-2) (8-8) 
         
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, 
see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted.  Assumptions: See Table 
A-24.   
It is reasoned that the Improved Fraud Report was an acceptable fraud detection 
method during the period as knowledge on fraud vectors from the previous decades 
could continue to be used with only minor changes needed for new vectors.  The 
volumes continued to increase and detection performance needed to be further 
improved to reduce the high level of false alerts and growing costs of the review 
team.  A list of key influencers is given in Table A-35. 
Table A-35 – Key influencers (1982). 
Key influencer Description 
1. Transparent and 
explainable 
Decisions made to block a payment 
card/transaction or merchant must be transparent 
and explainable. 
2. Static fraud vectors 
The type of fraud perpetrated remained simplistic 
and mostly static. 
3. Consumer 
consumption 
There was a large upward trend of consumer 
consumption and the use of credit cards and their 
revolving-debt that was making issuers substantial 
profits and so focus was on gaining new 
cardholders. 
4. Real-world payment 
fraud datasets not 
available 
The data held is confidential and therefore 
organisations were reluctant to provide these large 
real-world datasets for research. 
Each of these four influencers is studied in the following sections. 
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A.11.2 Transparent and explainable process 
Fraud detection is only applied after all fraud prevention measures have already 
failed (Bolton & Hand, 2002).  The simple rules in the fraud report were easy for 
non-experts such as senior managers to understand.  It was straightforward to 
explain to a cardholder, merchant or management why a payment had been delayed 
or a payment card blocked by reporting which of the simple rules had been broken.  
For fraud experts it is argued that comprehensible models are essential to guide them 
towards a particular type of investigation and towards creating prevention that is 
more effective.  There was a general societal distrust of computers during this decade 
succinctly put by the quote from 1969: 
“To Err is Human; To Really Foul Things Up Requires a Computer” (The-Yale-Book-
of-Quotations, 2006). 
It was important that there be an explainable process in the detection of payment 
card fraud to create trust with all stakeholders.  
From (Pasquale, 2015): 
“Gaps in knowledge, putative and real, have powerful implications as do the uses that are 
made of them.  Alan Greenspan, once the most powerful central banker in the world, 
claimed that today’s markets are driven by an ‘unredeemably opaque’ version of Adam 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ and that no one (including regulators) can ever get ‘more than a 
glimpse at the internal workings of the simplest of modern financial systems’.” 
This thesis will demonstrate using current computing technology and the proposed 
SOAR extraction method in Chapter 3 that the fraud detection black-box can be 
opened so that its workings are transparent and explainable. 
A.11.3 Static fraud vectors 
Banks had always understood bad debt where there was no prospect of recovering 
money owed (nonperforming loans) and provisioned this as a cost of doing that 
particular business as a write-off (Pond, 2002).  It therefore follows that the issuers 
who were all banks during this period saw the payment card business as similar to 
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their normal lending practices.  From 1971 to 2013 $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃 ranged from a low of 
8.53¢ to a high of 220¢ and given the 42-year period it is argued that these levels of 
write-off were seen as an unavoidable cost of business.  In 2012 the Group Head of 
Fraud, at HSBC stated that: 
“…payment card fraud costs an average of six to eight basis points on sales [$CEV] 
…the industry needs far more support from the technology community to minimise fraud in 
the future…real-time monitoring and analysis to enable the bank to capture the crooks.  
Real-time is key as you only get one chance to catch the criminals, never a second chance.” 
(Wylde, 2012). 
The payment card fraud loss of $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃 6¢ to 8¢ quoted above is of a similar 
order to the worldwide average of 8.53¢ in 2013. 
In (Baxendale, 2013): 
“For a social problem to become apparent three basic conditions need apply; that a 
verifiable objective social condition exists; that it be amenable to removal or at least 
attenuation or solution and that it is subjectively defined as a problem being recognised by 
a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some norm which they cherish”. 
It is argued that payment card fraud losses have become normative; large write-off 
values are not seen as deviating from the norm already reported by banks during the 
previous decades and is therefore generally accepted by society.  With this 
acceptance there was little incentive for further research into improved methods to 
detect fraud, which would require expenditure and have associated development 
risks.  As a result it was heterodox to suggest that banks and the payments industry as 
a whole consider the wider societal effect of these “acceptable” fraud write-offs; 
$1.3bn in 1982 (B.10, page 546) with the proceeds going to criminals to fund a range 
of illicit activities.  Without challenging these perceptions the fraudsters will continue 
their crime and the payment participants continue to pay for this.  In a Europol 
report (Europol, 2012): 
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“Private industry as the money-driven entities, focus on products and services which bring 
profit in the first instance.  Such companies can accept a certain level of fraud without 
making any effort to identify the individuals responsible for that fraud.  From the law 
enforcement perspective it is increasingly suggested that, since losses caused by payment 
card fraud can be easily covered by private industry, there is no point in investing resources 
on (sic) investigations.  The problem is even bigger as investigations must be performed on 
an international level so the investment must be higher and comes with no guarantee of 
final success or seizure of assets.  All that leads to the dangerous situation in which the 
illegal income for members of organised crime groups, reaching 1.5bn euros a year, is not 
identified and recovered.” 
If as stated as above, “…accept a certain level of fraud without making any effort to identify the 
individuals responsible…”, then it follows that the same business is tacitly accepting that 
it is funding crime and so on to terrorism.  Fraud is reported as one of the major 
ethical issues in the payments industry along with the moral complexity of fraudulent 
behaviour (Delamaire et al., 2009).  To reduce payment card fraud there must be 
prosecution of criminals and for this to be successful there must be precise 
understanding of the fraud vector(s), clear explanations and an evidential chain of 
custody that is accepted by the Courts.   
A.11.4 Consumer consumption, credit cards and revolving-debt 
From 1980 to 1982 there was a recession in the USA (Palley, 2011) and in the UK 
(Thomas et al., 2010).  Following this recession the costs of funds available to the 
banks significantly dropped, which encouraged banks to lend more money and at 
high interest rates, particularly on credit cards due to regulatory changes interest rate 
ceilings were no longer an issue.  As depicted in (Attanasio & Weber, 1994; 
Guttmann & Plihon, 2010) there was a substantial upward trend of consumer 
consumption and at the same time the national savings rate was rapidly declining, 
encouraging consumers to spend rather than save.  Between the end of the recession 
and 1990, USA consumer spending rose from $3.4tn to $4.8tn ($41,170 to $51,280 
per household) and retail spending from $1.8tn to $2.3tn ($21,380 to $24,760 per 
household), which led to the growing use of credit cards and their revolving-debt.  
The banks and the payments industry the use of the credit cards and there was a 
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large increase in the number of issuers growing from 4,000 in the previous decade to 
almost 14,000 worldwide (Stearns, 2011) with large profits being generated from the 
interest and other finances charges incurred by the cardholders as they were 
encouraged to spend.  For the first time non-banks such as AT&T, General Electric 
and General Motors issued their own credit cards.  Initially they used the 
MasterCard card scheme but later the other card schemes joined.  These non-banks 
used their cards to offer a loyalty bonus to their customers.  For example frequent 
flyer credit cards were launched along with affinity programs or co-branding where 
company names and logos were printed on the credit card (Johnson, 2005).  Other 
card schemes were launched, the most notable was the Discover Card in 1985 in the 
USA, which over two years issued 22m credit cards.  The number of credit cards per 
USA household grew to where 62% had more than one card.  Credit cards were 
used to fund larger purchases that could be paid off over time using revolving credit, 
which grew in the USA from $50bn to $225bn debt (per household $580 to $2,430) 
in the same period.  The banks as issuers had considerably more experience in 
lending than merchants and credit cards offered easy instant credit at the POS to 
potential customers.  As an example in the period 1992-2001, bad debt became 
substantial with Visa issuers writing-off $114bn of bad debt out of a $CEV of $3.6tn 
(a BP of 316¢) while fraud write-offs over the same period is estimated at $318bn 
direct losses (from B.10, page 546) 8% of what was being written off as bad debt 
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2005a).  By the end of the decade 70% of the USA 
population had a payment card with 40% having revolving-debt after each month’s 
statement.  Worldwide transaction volume grew from 1.5bn in 1982 to 21bn in1993 
an average CAGR of 26%.  The higher fraud levels peaking at 220¢ in 1982 were 
due to overselling and lack of credit checks in the 1970s and the lack of effective 
payment fraud prevention and detection technologies.  During the 1980s there was 
greater availability of cost effective computing so that an Improved Fraud Report 
with an improved 𝐹𝑃𝑅 was in place.  There was a greater understanding of payment 
fraud and fraud vectors gained over the decade so that the fraud BP dropped to 
7.14¢.  It is argued that with more transactions on a cardholder statement it was 
more time-consuming for the cardholder to check each entry and so unreported 
fraud is likely to have increased.  Thus the assumption that underreporting is zero 
made in Eq. (8-15) is no longer true.  The probability of risk to the cardholder due to 
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fraud, 𝑃 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  is given in Eq. (8-18) exposure is equivalent to the transaction 
volume per cardholder.  Therefore if the likelihood of fraud remains constant then 
the risk increases the more the payment card is used.  It is not known if this is 
significant. 
𝑃 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 ≅ exposure.𝑃 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 ≡ #𝑇.𝑃 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑  (8-18) 
The bank issuers had an advantage in issuing credit cards as they had an existing 
relationship with a customer and so could better access their creditworthiness before 
issuing a new credit card.  Improved underwriting standards were put in place so 
that applicants were refused if they had a poor credit history.  Credit cards were 
being marketed to the banks’ customer-base and consumers were encouraged to 
spend on items they could not normally afford (Feinberg, 1986).  As the 1980s 
progressed the issuers were making substantial profits from their payment card 
business.  As in Figure A-25 the finance charges and the interest charged on the 
revolving-debt are the largest portion of issuer revenue at 70%.  The issuers 
persuaded their cardholders through a mixture of incentives and marketing to use 
their credit cards for spreading the cost of a purchase that in turn further increased 
issuer profits from the finance charges (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005c).  The issuers 
promoted the use of their payment cards to be used more often, for smaller everyday 
purchases and this increased issuer profits from the interchange fees.  This is 
important in the context of payment fraud as the issuers were now highly profitable 
and the significantly smaller cost of fraud was offset against these larger profits.  As in 
(Evans & Schmalensee, 2005b) the issuers are reported to have spent an average of 
$72 on marketing and approval per new cardholder.  For issuers between 1982 and 
1993, 533m cardholders were gained.  So calculating an average spending of $38bn 
on marketing can be compared to fraud write-offs in the same period of $7bn.  
While the fraud write-off value is significant it is 18% of the marketing expenditure.  
The issuers typically incentivise their management and sales teams based on the 
number of new cardholders gained and so it is argued that their management 
focused on this aspect of the business leaving fraud management to small back-office 
operations.  There were limited regulatory reporting requirements on payment fraud 
and most issuers either did not report the payment fraud levels or reported it 
combined with all charge-offs (such as bad debt and bankruptcy) where it appears to 
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have been accepted as a normal cost of business (Gates & Jacob, 2008); this  implies 
that even the public if they were aware  accepted this level of perceived risk (Kosse, 
2013).  The convenience and facilities offered by the payment cards plus the on-
going marketing outweighed any perceived security risks.  In the 1980s payment 
cards were inherently insecure and it was straightforward to copy their details and 
use them in a number of different scams.  The payment industry had determined 
from the fraud lifecycle discussed earlier that investment in fraud prevention is more 
effective than in fraud detection particularly as detection occurred in batch sometime 
after the fraud has occurred so losses are still incurred.  It is argued with this as 
background that investment in improved payment fraud detection remained a low 
priority in the back-office.  
A.11.5 Real-world payment fraud datasets not available 
The data held on each transaction, the cardholder and merchant is highly 
confidential.  It would be straightforward to use this data to perpetrate fraud.  
Cyber-crime (discussed in A.15.6, page 516) relies on being able to access such data 
by nefarious means to then undertake fraud.  This makes it difficult for the payment 
processors to provide data for researchers to assess new detection methods.  There 
are methods of obfuscation that could be used while maintaining the relationships 
within the data but this process requires the data-holder to be assured that the 
original data could not be recreated or imputed (Shokri, 2015).  There are laws in 
different jurisdictions that forbid such data from leaving their borders as well as data 
protection and other laws that make this process more difficult (Yuen, 2008).  It is for 
this reason that those that hold such large-scale real-world datasets are reluctant or 
unable to make them available for research where the results can be subsequently 
published for the wider research community.  Many researchers have had to use 
synthetic datasets that try to replicate real-world data (Lopez-Rojas & Axelsson, 
2014).  As the profiles of normal and fraudulent behaviours change over time, 
synthetic data may be insufficiently rich and is perhaps unable to realistically 
replicate the same non-linear inter-relationships between the fields that are present 
in the real-world data.  Therefore there is no reason to suspect that results cited using 
such data would necessarily be the same when scaled to using real-world data.  
Researchers have reported that the exchange of ideas in fraud detection and 
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specifically in payment card fraud detection is severely limited due to these security 
and privacy concerns.  Even when datasets are available from industry the results are 
censored making it difficult to assess the work as a whole, for example (Sahin et al., 
2013).  These difficulties have contributed to the slow progress in improved and 
transparent detection methods making the research area challenging.   
A.12 1990s 
The above four influencers in Table A-35, page 450 from the previous decade are 
important to understand leading into the 1990s.  (Edelberg, 2003) described that in 
the early 1990s there was an almost saturated payment card market in the US and 
UK.  To continue to grow their market share the issuers started to change their 
underwriting standards to again allow more individuals to qualify for a payment 
card.  Most of their business growth was to come from accepting riskier individuals.  
Payment cards were issued to those who would not have qualified in the previous 
decade.  The use of credit scoring was introduced, not to stop the issue of cards but 
to alter the finance charges on certain cards to compensate for an individuals risk 
and so again payment cards were pushed into the market.  With the earlier 
introduction of the magnetic stripe and the exponential growth in available 
computing power and storage it was not long until the criminals were able to both 
read data from and write data to this magnetic stripe using low cost electronic 
components and computers, making it easy to clone a physical magnetic stripe and 
signature payment card and then use it at a merchant using a POS terminal.  Since 
the 1970s introduction of the magnetic stripe there had been limited technical 
progress in the payments industry.  After twenty years two substantial events were to 
dominate the payments industry during this decade: 
1. EMV (“Chip and PIN”) 
2. The Internet (e-commerce) 
These are discussed in the following sections. 
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A.12.1 EMV (“Chip and PIN”) payment card technology 
Fraud from physical stolen or counterfeit (cloned) payment cards based on the 
ageing magnetic strip technology was prevalent (Hardie, 2001).  A more secure 
payment card was required (Svigals, 2012).  From (EMVCo, 2011): 
§ A secure method of authenticating that a payment card was genuine and 
not cloned or stolen. 
§ A method to confirm that it was the actual cardholder at the physical 
point of transaction. 
The development of new physical payment card technology was created to prevent 
prevalent fraud at that time.  It will be shown that despite methods that are put in 
place to prevent fraud the criminals will find a weak point to compromise and in 
doing so their fraud vectors may change but the result will be the same – the 
criminals continue to earn money.  In the mid-1990s the payments industry decided 
that a preventative method was needed that would make it difficult and costly for 
criminals to clone a physical payment card (by any means).  The smart card had 
already been developed as a physical plastic card with a built-in microprocessor and 
storage (“chip”) (Dethloff, 1978).  A new standard was created by the card schemes 
called EMV (EMVCo, 2015a).  The EMV card securely stores encrypted cardholder 
data where two cryptographic keys are required for a decryption algorithm to 
combine to then decrypt the data stored on the card (Cryptomathic-A/S, 2015).  
The issuer holds one key and the POS terminal manufacturer holds the other key.  
The 3DES algorithm was chosen as the encryption algorithm and has a key length of 
168-bits so a brute-force attack to assess all 2168 combinations can be calculated to 
take around 1x1018 years and this is therefore considered to be secure even using 
todays most powerful Von Neumann architecture supercomputers (Von Neumann & 
Oxtoby, 1988).  It is known that this particular algorithm is susceptible to certain 
types of attacks using cryptanalysis that the key can be derived through chosen-
plaintext where the criminal can inject known clear text so that it is encrypted to 
determine the relationship between the two and therefore reduce the search space 
for the key) or known-plaintext where the criminal already knows some or all of the 
payment card information, such as the expiry date that can then be used to reduce 
the search space for the key (Oorschot & Wiener, 1990).  If the cryptographic key 
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were lost or compromised then the criminal has immediate access to the data.  The 
encrypted data stored on the EMV card is called a cryptogram and includes: 
§ The cardholder’s account, which is the PAN, expiry date, etc. 
§ A Personal Identification Number (PIN). 
§ An internal counter mechanism that is incremented with each sequential 
transaction. 
§ A dynamic-CVV or iCVV that changes each time the card is read. 
Table A-36 details the information stored on an EMV card and compares this to the 
information stored on a magnetic stripe card.  The magnetic-stripe-and-signature 
payment card was to be replaced with this EMV card.  The EMV card was 
originally envisioned to require the cardholder to enter a four digit PIN known only 
to the cardholder at the merchant POS (EMV-and-PIN).  The POS terminal 
connects to the chip in the EMV payment card and can verify the PIN, which is 
entered using a PIN Entry Device (PED).  When the POS terminal is connected to the 
payment processor servers the authenticity of the EMV card is confirmed.  There are 
four security measures listed in order of their effectiveness (Cryptomathic-A/S, 
2015): 
1. Static Data Authentication: A cryptographic algorithm is used to encode 
an issuer certificate and a unique key that is stored in the card.  This 
cardholder account information is digitally signed by one half of a private 
key of the issuer.  The POS terminal can verify this information using its 
key and that of the card. 
2. Dynamic Data Authentication: A cryptographic algorithm is used to 
encode transaction data, which is the date, time, amount, type of sale, etc. 
that is signed by the card using its own unique private key.  Since this 
data is dynamic and unpredictable this measure is designed to stop 
“replay attacks”.  The POS can verify this dynamically created data using 
its key and that of the card. 
3. Combined Dynamic Data Authentication-Application Cryptogram 
Generation: Once the card has been authenticated in (1) and (2) the 
actual transaction needs to be authorised.  The card is used to make a 
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decision based on parameters stored in the card.  The decision is to 
accept, decline or to be referred to the issuer for approval.  This decision 
is encrypted along with (1) and (2) and the POS terminal can then verify 
this dynamically created data using its key and that of the card. 
4. Sequential Transaction Counter:  The card has an internal counter 
mechanism that is incremented with each sequential transaction so that a 
duplicate counter value or one that skips when the transaction is sent to 
the issuer for approval may indicate data or card copying or other types 
of fraud. 
EMV-and-PIN card use is illustrated in Figure A-34. 
 
Figure A-34  – EMV-and-PIN payment card. 
These security measures were to become part of the evolving EMV standard and 
were then adopted by different countries.  Previously criminals have tried capturing 
the data messages sent between the payments processors in a magnetic stripe 
transaction, then adulterating them and replaying them.  With EMV the payment 
processor can detect if such a fraud is being undertaken and can block the 
transaction.  If cardholder data is stored or transmitted as a cryptogram in the 
payment processors systems and if this data were stolen it will be of no use assuming 
3DES algorithm remains secure.  In some circumstances the POS may decrypt the 
payment card information into clear text in such a way that it can be passed into a 
merchant’s other processes.  In some EMV implementations the switch that links the 
merchant to its acquirer may use unencrypted data and so the data is vulnerable.  
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EMV makes it impossible to clone an existing EMV card or create one from stolen 
data without both the cryptographic keys.  The EMV security measures are 
considerably more sophisticated than the magnetic-stripe-and-signature payment 
card.  In 2012 research revealed that the authentication protocol implemented in 
some POS terminals or ATMs did not generate an unpredictable random number 
for each transaction and used counters, timestamps or own-written algorithms to 
supply the number.  This exposes them to a pre-play attack.  The research stated 
that cloning an EMV card was then possible, “one vulnerability after another has been 
discovered and exploited by criminals.”(Bond, 2012). 
It is a substantial undertaking for issuers to migrate all their cardholders to EMV-
and-PIN cards and replace all their physical payment cards and to educate their 
cardholders to use a PIN.  The merchants have to replace or upgrade all their POS 
terminals to work with the new EMV-and-PIN technology at their cost.  From 
(APACS-Card-Payments-Group, 2005) the payments industry expected that this new 
EMV-and-PIN payment card would extensively cut payment card fraud.  Industry 
figures from (Yapputro, 2011) at that time showed that over 70% of fraud took place 
during a CP transaction at a retail POS terminal.  The payments industry went to 
some lengths to publicise how fraud would be cut both for the cardholder and the 
merchants as part of their campaign to encourage EMV-and-PIN uptake (Saad, 
2003).  Crucially to incentivise the uptake of the new EMV-and-PIN card there was 
an EMV liability shift where merchants were to be liable for fraud loss only if they 
had not updated their POS terminal to EMV-and-PIN and the customer had a new 
EMV-and-PIN payment card; the liability was with the issuer if the merchant had an 
EMV POS terminal but the customer had not been issued with an EMV-and-PIN 
payment card (see Table A-12).  In Figure A-35 an example physical payment card is 
given with the location of the EMV chip, magnetic stripe and other features shown.  
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Source: (PCI-Security-Standards-Council, 2010). 
Figure A-35  – Location of EMV payment card data. 
The EMV chip stores similar information as the magnetic stripe plus the iCVV but it 
typically does not include the cardholder name (ISO, 2013) – see Table A-36. 
Table A-36 – Contents of magnetic stripe compared to EMV. 
Magnetic Stripe EMV (unencrypted) Description 
% % Start 
B B Format Code 
(B=Bank) 
5XXXXXXXXXXXXXX2 5XXXXXXXXXXXXXX2 Primary Account 
Number (PAN) 
^ ^ Separator 
RYMANTUBB SUPPLIED* Last Name 
/ / Name Separator 
NICHOLAS NOT* First Name 
^ ^ Separator 
15 15 Expiration Year 
03 03 Expiration 
Month 
101 502 Service Code 
000000001000000003000000 000000001000000003000000 Discretionary 
Data 
? ? End 
The Discretionary Data contains the CVV1 on magnetic stripe and on EMV it contains a dynamic-
CVV or iCVV.  *These words appear as above as per the standard. 
In 2002 France was the first country to begin the migration to EMV-and-PIN 
followed in 2004 by the UK and both countries completed the process by the end of 
2006.  In France CP fraud reduced in 2004 from 40% to 15% in 2009 and in the 
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UK it was reduced from 43% to 16% and it stayed at this level until 2011 when CP 
fraud was back at the same level as before EMV-and-PIN was introduced.  These 
figures show that EMV initially reduced CP fraud as anticipated.  The widely 
anticipated reduction in total fraud loss was not to be; in the year following 
completion France saw a 13% increase in total payment fraud loss (see Figure A-36) 
and in the UK it was an increase to 20% (see Figure A-37).  Since the total fraud loss 
continued to grow it follows that the criminals must have changed their MO to 
target payment card fraud elsewhere now that the new EMV-and-PIN card was 
technically difficult to clone in countries that had adopted EMV-and-PIN.  
‘EMV Migration’ is the year in which the legal liability for payment fraud shifted 
towards the merchants if they had not updated their POS or to the issuers if they had 
not provided EMV-and-PIN payment cards as described in Table A-12, which was 
2006 for the UK and France.  ‘Internet Growth’ is defined as the year where over 
25% of the world population are users of the Internet, which is 2008 (as described in 
B.21, page 557).  
 
Source: (UniBul-Merchant-Services, 2013).  See B.18, page 555. Plotted points and values shown 
on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535.  In 2004, 
CP fraud was 40%, $83m/(83m+$125m) reducing to 15% in 2009, $54m/($54m+294m). 
Figure A-36  – CP and CNP fraud loss on French issued payment cards (2004-2009).  
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Source: (Financial-Fraud-Action-UK, 2014).  See B.19, page 555.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535.  In 
2004, CP fraud was 43%, $376m/($376m+$492m) reducing to 16% in 2009, 
$123m/($123m+$633m). 
Figure A-37  – Fraud loss on UK issued payment cards (2004-2013). 
The initial increase in CNP transactions following the EMV adoption in 2006 in the 
UK is shown in Figure A-38.  
 
Source: (Financial-Fraud-Action-UK, 2014).  See B.19, page 555.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-38  – Fraud migrates to CNP on UK issued payment cards (2004-2013). 
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The fraud losses from UK issued EMV-and-PIN payment cards being used outside 
of the UK sharply spikes from 23% prior to the introduction of EMV to 71% 
($305m) in 2006 (see Figure A-39 and Figure A-40).  
 
Source: (Financial-Fraud-Action-UK, 2014).  See B.19, page 555.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-39  – UK fraud loss as percentage of cross-border transactions (2004-2013). 
The criminals’ MO was initially to move from their domestic environment to those 
countries that relied on the older magnetic-stripe-and-signature card technology 
(such as in the USA) so that their fraud vectors remained the same.  Without an 
agreed global strategy for the migration to EMV cards the criminals found the 
weakest link.  Nevertheless the cross-border fraud loss in the UK reduced to 39% in 
2009 and remained at a similar level; it is reasoned in A.12.2 that it was rapid 
growth and ease of use of the Internet for CNP payments that had this impact on 
fraud vectors with the criminals returning to domestic fraud but now predominately 
using Internet payments.   
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Source: (Financial-Fraud-Action-UK, 2014).  See B.19, page 555.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-40  – UK fraud write-off by domestic and cross-border transactions by 
value (2004-2013).  
The migration to EMV cards by different country regions is given in Figure A-41 
with the darker regions representing higher adoption.  As can be seen the USA has 
not yet fully migrated to EMV cards there was an EMV liability shift in October 
2015 as detailed in A.15.3, page 508. 
It took until 2013 for EMV to be adopted at over 80% in 163 countries out of 2069 
but without an agreed global EMV strategy the criminals simply adapted their MO.  
To June 2014 29.74% of worldwide transactions were using EMV (EMVCo, 2015b).  
The criminals were adapting fraud vectors and making use of the old and insecure 
technology of magnetic-stripe-and-signature payment card in regions that had not 
been secured with EMV or moved their MO to CNP.  Even with the more secure 
EMV it has been reported that cardholders have been found to write their PINs on 
their actual payment card or keep a note of it in their wallet or on their computer 
making it easy for criminals to use those cards.   
                                                
9 This is defined by membership within the United Nations. 
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Europe Zone 
1 
Canada, Latin 
America, Caribbean 
Africa and 
Middle East 
Europe 
Zone 2 Asia USA 
 
96% 83% 80% 51% 19% 0.03%  
       
Source: (EMVCo, 2015b).  
Figure A-41  – Worldwide EMV uptake (2014).  
As reported in (The-Scotsman, 2006) 15% of cardholders admit that they have 
written down their PIN and keep it with their payment card making it vulnerable to 
simple theft.  The criminals have devised other reasonably simple fraud vectors to 
obtain EMV payment card data such as: 
§ A fake card reader can be fitted over a legitimate ATM or POS to 
electronically capture card information including the entered PIN. 
§ Video cameras carefully placed can capture PIN numbers as they are 
entered. 
§ Emails sent to millions of individuals in the hope that some of the 
recipients will be deceived into revealing sensitive account or payment 
card information (phishing). 
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§ An individual is called on the telephone and then deceived into revealing 
card and PIN information. 
In France it has been reported (Sedghi, 2014) that the theft of PINs through a range 
of methods such as watching the cardholder or fake PEDs has increased and that this 
has seen an increase in CP fraud and CNP which have both increased in value by 
70% since the introduction of EMV. 
A.12.2 The Internet 
The payments industry had focused in the mid-1990s on EMV technology to secure 
the physical payment card from the 70% CP fraud prevalent at that time (Yapputro, 
2011).   Meanwhile the use of the Internet grew from 16m in 1995 to 3bn users in 
2014 that is 42% of the world’s population and is forecast to reach 80% of the 
world’s population by 2020 (see Figure A-43).  The introduction of EMV had no 
effect on the use of CHD for Internet fraud.  The information on an EMV payment 
card can as easily be written down, typed or copied as previously and then used on 
the Internet to make a payment.  The criminals were experts in using stolen payment 
card details; they had been undertaking this fraud vector since 1950.  A transaction 
can be undertaken using the Internet through an online merchant web site by 
entering payment card and other details onto a web based form.  The physical card 
is not required just the CHD, see Figure A-42. 
 
Figure A-42  – E-commerce Internet payment card usage. 
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Source: Internet (Sanou, 2014).  World population (The-World-Bank, 2015).  R2 defined in B.3, 
page 538. See B.21, page 557 and B.22, page 558.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph 
may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-43  – Growth of Internet and world population (2004-2020). 
As e-commerce grew so too did the proportion CNP fraud.  There was now little 
physical risk to a criminal or need for cloned physical plastic cards at a physical 
merchant location.  Therefore criminals moved their MO to using the Internet.  
Committing payment fraud was made more rapid, even easier and less risky.  The 
number of e-commerce transactions increased at a CAGR of 17% from 2011 to 
forecast 84bn transactions in 2020 shown in Figure A-44.  
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Source: (Lassignardie & Higgins, 2014) – see their figure 4.  R2 defined in B.3, page 538.  
Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph 
– see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-44  – Growth of e-commerce payments by transactions volume (2011 to 
2020).  
The growth in e-commerce (CNP) spending and the growth of the Internet follow a 
similar pattern given in Figure A-45.   
 
Source: (Sanou, 2014).  R2 defined in B.3, page 538.  Plotted points and values shown on the 
graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-45  – Growth of Internet and UK CNP spending (2004-2020). 
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In Figure A-46 CNP fraud losses as a proportion of CP fraud losses are shown and 
have grown at the same time as the growth of Internet users.   
 
Source: (Sanou, 2014).  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars 
are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-46  – Growth of CNP fraud in UK (2004-2013). 
It is concluded that the rapid growth in the use of e-commerce changed payment 
card fraud patterns and their underlying vectors.  These fraud vectors were evolving 
as the criminals tested the defences of the e-commerce payment systems.  It is likely 
that the rate of new fraud vectors became less understandable by fraud experts who 
relied on their previous experience of the more slowly evolving fraud vectors and 
that it took some time for their rules to be updated.  This is relevant as it will be 
reasoned that fraud detection technology needed to evolve from using the slowly 
updated and human created rules to more complex rules and then to the use of 
machine learning.   
A.12.3 Real-Time Fraud Management System (FMS) 
For a Tier 1 issuer the number of transactions (#𝑇𝐷!"#$!) had grown from 7,000 in 
the 1980s to 560,000 a day in 1993 (see B.12, page 548).  The rules from the 
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too many misclassifications as alerts.  Thus, the Improved Fraud Report method was 
extended into what was to become a Fraud Management System (FMS) typically 
that operated in real-time.  A real-time FMS receives a transaction and then makes a 
decision as part of the payment card authorisation flow and returns this decision to 
accept/block or decline/refer the transaction as a message to a merchant.  An 
example is illustrated in Figure A-47. 
 
Figure A-47  – Real-time issuer FMS (1990s). 
An FMS processes a set of complex rules against data stored in a database and if 
there was a rule-break then a message is returned as part of the transaction 
authorisation process to automate the decision without human intervention and a 
fraud ticket is created.  This fraud ticket contained sufficient information so that a 
human reviewer could review and understand the transaction and history after the 
transaction.  A team of reviewers check each fraud ticket and if determined to be 
suspicious a “fraud ticket” is created.  Each fraud ticket is investigated, which might 
include calling the cardholder or merchant (see Figure A-48). 
 
Figure A-48  – Fraud management process. 
The real-time functionality was particularly important to the issuers and merchants 
where a card transaction can be stopped during authorisation in real-time based on 
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the output of the fraud decision process.  This is because the loss due to fraud is 
incurred at the moment of the transaction.  With the acquirers they typically did not 
settle their balances with their merchants within 24-48 hours giving time to manually 
review suspicious transactions (Herbst-Murphy, 2013).  The FMS did not replace the 
standard authorisation process performed by the primary banking/processing 
platform but provided an additional input to the decision making process.  The 
authorisation will only be impacted if a suspicious transaction is detected by the 
FMS.  A response code is generated in (3) and sent to the switch in (4) as shown in 
Figure A-49. 
 
Figure A-49  – Real-time authorisation request/response sequence. 
The FMS supported more complex rules and as new fraud vectors were discovered 
and then understood by human experts it required a more refined method to 
detection without generating a disproportionate number of false-positives and false-
negatives.  While the logical evaluation to true/false of the earlier simple rules 
continued to be supported individual rules could now evaluate to a numeric score.  
The sum of each rule 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is calculated for the rule-set of 𝑛 rules.  If the total score 
is over a user set value 𝜃 then an alert is triggered – see Eq. (8-19). 
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𝑇𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!!!  𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑇𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 > 𝜃) 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑇𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≤ 𝜃) 
(8-19) 
In this way the 𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓 could be adjusted by the user to try to balance the number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷 – especially during busy periods of operation or on a seasonal holiday 
where patterns may change.  Using the same assumptions as in Figure A-32, if a 
threshold value of 100 is set then Figure A-50 highlights the areas in feature space 
that would generate an alert.  This is an example of  2-dimentional-feature space. 
 
If P<=5 score=40 
If P>7 AND <P<10 score=75 
If P>=10 AND P<15 score=100 
If P>=15 AND P<20 score=75 
If P>50 AND P<60 score = 65 
If P>=60 AND P<70 score=100 
If P>=70 score=50 
If N<5 score=40 
If N>10 AND N<30 score=30 
If N>=30 score=75 
Figure A-50  – FMS feature space defined by rules.  
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From this simple example it can be seen how difficult even a small set of rules are to 
understand.  If more rules and fields are added as antecedents then the feature space 
becomes further prescribed to try to accurately locate the boundaries between 
transactions that are genuine and those that are fraud.  A complex rule is typically in 
the format given in Table A-37. 
Table A-37 – Typical complex rule format. 
IF [<STATEMENT>] [AND|OR <STATEMENT>] [AND|OR]… 
<STATEMENT>… THEN <[TRUE|FALSE][SCORE] 
Where, 
STATEMENT=[<FIELD>|<STATISTIC>]<EXPRESSION>[<NUL
L>|<VALUE>|<FIELD>|<STATISTIC>|[<VALUE><OPERATOR
>[<FIELD>|<STATISTIC>]]] 
and:  
<EXPRESSION> 
<,<=,=,>,>=,IN,LIKE,NOT 
IN,NOT LIKE 
<FIELD> Any field from database. 
<NULL> 
Having no value or not 
being defined. 
<OPERATOR> +  -  /   *   % 
<STATISTIC> 
Any statistic that is 
calculated. 
And <VALUE> 
is: 
Date, Time, Numeric, 
String, etc. 
Creating complex rules was a time-consuming task requiring a high degree of skill 
both in terms of the developers and the fraud experts and it therefore became a 
higher cost to the business.  The performance of the fraud detection system 
remained dependent upon the skill of the human experts and how their 
understanding of fraud vectors was converted into rules.  Experts are often subjective 
and can only deal with a limited number of variables (fields).  Human payment card 
fraud experts were likely in high demand and found it hard to explain clearly the 
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processes they use when looking for fraudulent transactions, which makes the 
generation of logical rules difficult.  The main strength of the earlier fraud reports 
had been that it stored and used knowledge in a transparent way that is easy for an 
expert to modify or for a non-expert human to interpret; decisions can be explained.  
It is evident that this would only be true for small 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠.  The 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 now had 
hundreds of rules and the system became difficult to maintain and understand.  This 
was the start of black-box fraud detection. 
A.12.4 The black-box 
By adding more complex rules to try to capture more fraud vectors and reduce the 
number of false alerts (FN+FP) the FMS became difficult to maintain and to 
understand.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that: 
§ Shorter (fewer antecedents) and simpler individual rules are more 
straightforward to understand.  
§ A smaller 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 is more straightforward to understand. 
To provide a measure of comprehensibility in a rule-set of 𝑟 rules a measure 
comprehensibility is proposed in Eq. (8-17) as the total number of individual literals 
expressed in the rules.  This differs from a more common measure of the number of 
rules multiplied by the average number of antecedents for all rules, which is not a 
sufficient measure.  A single antecedent could contain 100 literals that would 
measure the same as an antecedent with two literals.  Clearly the latter is more 
comprehensible. 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = #𝑙!!"#$%$&  (8-17) 
As 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 increases the FMS becomes more opaque to fraud experts, 
reviewers and investigators.  It was no longer straightforward to explain why a 
certain subset of rules was broken for a specific transaction especially if the rules 
themselves were poorly documented or non-consistent.  
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A.12.5 Fraud is reflexive 
As discussed criminals stay with their MO until their method is no longer generating 
a sufficient reward.  When a rule is put in place in the FMS to try to detect a 
particular new fraud vector the criminals find that their MO needs to be adapted to 
overcome the rule.  Fraud is reflexive since the rules are static over a defined period 
and use fixed parameters the criminals use trial-and-error or information gained 
from compromised internal staff or systems to determine them.  Once the criminals 
learn the parameters, for example keeping below a threshold value or completing the 
transaction at a certain time then the criminals update their MO to take account of 
the rule.  In response some time later the static rules are updated or new rules added 
to try to detect this altered MO while minimising 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  So it becomes a conflict 
between the criminals and how rapidly the FMS can be updated by human experts 
and deployed again.  The period to detect a new fraud vector and sufficiently 
understand it so that rules can be created is an important factor to effective fraud 
detection. 
A.12.6 Increased volume and rule complexity 
As the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 became larger and more complex, the transaction volume grew and 
the computing power required for the FMS increased as did the storage 
requirements.  The payment processors that were banks continued to use mainframe 
type computers such as the IBM ES/9000 that was launched in 1990 and remained 
compatible with earlier mainframes (see Figure A-51).  This system had eight times 
the memory and was considerably faster than its predecessors (IBM-Archives, 1970).  
These computers were now physically smaller and had a purchase price of c.$1.3m 
($4m in 2015 value, see B.31, page 564).  This represented a reduction in cost of 
85% over the previous decade. 
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Source: (IBM-Archives, 1970). 
Figure A-51  – The IBM ES/8604600 computer (1990s). 
As an alternative to the mainframe-computing platform many non-banking payment 
processors moved to a server method based around a group or cluster networked 
computers (see Figure A-52).  As an example, typically three IBM RS/6000-930 
servers had a purchase price of c. $180k in 1992 ($400k in 2015 value, see B.31, 
page 564).  This represented a reduction in cost of 92% over the previous decade.  
 
Source: (IBM-Archives, 1970). 
Figure A-52  – The IBM RS/6000 rack of servers (c.1990s). 
As an illustration of how costs were changing a Tier-1 issuer was processing 203m 
transactions a day, which assuming the 192 fields described in 1.5, page 33 are each 
16 bytes wide, gives 1.0Gb of storage required a day.  Assuming 14 days of 
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transactions are required to generate useful statistics in the rules, 14Gb minimum 
storage was required.  From B.30, page 563, the direct cost of this storage (not 
including backups or infrastructure) is estimated to be c. $2.4m whereas in 2015 it 
would be less than $10.  As the complexity of the rules and the statistics grew it is 
reasonable to assume that the 𝑇𝑃𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 improved.  The assumptions for the 
performance for this FMS are given in Table A-38 along with the sources. 
Table A-38 – Assumptions (1993). 
Tier-1 issuer  Value Source 𝑇𝑃𝑅  99%  𝐹𝑃𝑅  40%  
Transactions/day 40,000 B.12 
Fraud Transactions/day 300 B.12 
The confusion matrix for the performance of this FMS is calculated by applying Eq. 
(2-21) to (2-24) and #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷!"#$! from Eq. (2-16) given in Table A-39. 
Table A-39 – Confusion matrix for Tier-1 issuers per day (1993). 
 Actual  Performance   
Genuine Fraud  %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR! %TPR! A/f AlertD 
D
ec
is
io
n 
Reported  
98.986 99.986 2.099 40.000 99.000 2 5,718 Genuine 554,202 80  
Fraud 5,598 120  
 
  
 
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Assumptions: See Table A-24, page 444. 
From Table A-39 the number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 is estimated at 5,718 and would require a 
team of 60 reviewers to process all the alerts (see Table A-40) where 48 alerts would 
need to be reviewed to find one fraudulent transaction.  
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Table A-40 – Review team size for Tier-1 issuers (1971 to 1993). 
  1971 1982 1993 
Fraud Report  𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 15   
Improved Fraud Report  𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚  85  
FMS-Rules 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚   60 
FMS-Rules  #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷!"#$!   5,718 
   
 
Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted. 
A typical operational cost for the required fraud detection hardware software, 
support and the review team, for a Tier-1 issuer are estimated in Table A-41. 
Table A-41 – Fraud detection operational costs (1993). 
1992 Cost p.a. 
Hardware Servers $1.3m 
Support & licences $750k 
Fraud Software licence (FMS-Rules) $1m 
Review team $6.0m 
Total Operational Cost $9.1m 
 
 
Assumptions and sources in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 value (see B.4, page 539).  
Hardware cost based on server method.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds  
are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted. 
The third party software licence costs for the operating systems with the necessary 
database software had grown to be significant.  During this time third party vendors 
of FMS software had been established and their software was licenced on an annual 
basis (see A.15.11, page 530).  With the continued growth in volumes and the 
previous decades open credit policies replaced with improved credit checks along 
with greater awareness of fraud, fraud was substantially reduced to a fraud BP of 
7.14¢ (see Table A-28, page 446). 
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Table A-42 – Compare fraud BP and operations (1993). 
Fraud BP Operations BP Multiple  Operations: Fraud BP 
7.14¢ 5.2¢ 0.72 
Assumptions and sources in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 (see B.4, page 539). 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
Comparing the results for 1993 in Table A-42 to those of a decade earlier the 
accuracy is improved due to the increase in volume skewing this measure precision 
for both classes has been maintained while 𝑇𝑃𝑅 has improved which is largely 
responsible for the drop in the number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐷.  The fraud BP during the period 
had substantially reduced resulting in the classes being more unbalanced.  The 
operational cost BP has reduced due to hardware price reduction and review team 
costs combined with the increased $CEV over the period. 
Table A-43 – Sparklines compare fraud detection performance (1982 to 1993). 
Acc Pg Pf FPR TPR AlertD Team Fraud BP Ops BP 
(2-3) (2-5) (2-6) (2-7) (2-8) (2-16) (8-17) (8-2) (8-8) 
         
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud.  Assumptions: see Table A-24.  Stated values in the table may contain 
errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis 
omitted; x-axis is 1971 to 1982. 
It is argued that the more sophisticated FMS continued to increase in detection 
performance although more fraud transactions were being missed due to the higher 𝐹𝑃𝑅.  As fraud vectors remained mostly static it is probable that the knowledge 
gained within the now maturing payment industry could still be used in the new 
FMS.  In Table A-44 assuming the same FMS but now using 2013 transaction 
volumes a confusion matrix is calculated.  This unrealistic calculated FMS generates 
50,649 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 that would require a team size of 528 reviewers. 
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Table A-44 – Confusion matrix FMS-Rules from 1993 using 2013 volume. 
1993). 
 Actual  Performance   
Genuine Fraud  %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR %TPR A/f AlertD 
D
ec
is
io
n 
Reported  
98.991 99.991 1.303 40.000! 99.000! 77 50,649 Genuine 4.9m 440  
Fraud 49,989 660  
 
  
 
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Assumptions: See Table A-24, page 444. 
From this hypothetical FMS for fraud detection to have remained effective and 
practical a considerable performance improvement was required over the 1990s 
FMS.  The rule-based FMS needed to be significantly improved: 
§ To produce more accurate alerts while minimising false-positives and 
false-negatives. 
§ Computationally efficient. 
§ Able to cope with noisy data. 
§ Easy to update as fraud vectors evolve without having to define 
increasingly explicit rules. 
§ Ability to generalise – so that previously unseen and unknown fraud 
vectors are detected. 
A.13 2000s 
The preceding sections have revealed that there was limited innovation in 
prevention or detection methods while fraud vectors remained similar.  Fraud BP 
was at its lowest 7.14¢ and so were operational costs.  Fraud losses continued to fund 
criminals from $1.0bn in 1993 that climbed to $2.5bn by the end of the decade.  
There was one significant event that was to drive change: that of the growth of the 
Internet previously discussed in A.12.2, page 468.  With e-commerce growing, new 
fraud vectors emerged that could be undertaken more rapidly than before.  The 
levels of fraud grew and the industry had to respond with new preventative measures 
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and improvements.  It is apparent that the payment participants particularly those 
with the highest liabilities bring about change only at the point that the problem has 
already had a substantial impact on their business.  It will be argued that these efforts 
were too late.  They were designed to tackle growing CNP fraud and data breaches 
and have mostly proved ineffective evidenced by the increasing value of fraud writes-
offs during the period.  
Nine key methods were devised by the payments industry that are complementary to 
one another with the aim to improve security and fraud prevention during 2000s 
(Table A-45). 
Table A-45 – Fraud prevention (2000s). 
Fraud Prevention Area 
1. Address Verification System (AVS) 
CNP 
2. Use of Card Verification Value (CVV or CVV2) 
3. Negative and positive files 
4. 3D Secure 
5. Multi-factor authentication 
6. Pattern recognition 
7. Payment Card Industry (PCI) Council standards 
Data Breach 8. Point-to-point encryption (P2PE) 
9. Account/PAN tokenisation 
The following sections will elucidate on each of the nine key prevention methods.  
See A.7, page 404 for details of fraud vectors. 
A.13.1 Address Verification System (AVS) 
Created for e-commerce AVS confirms that the billing address (held by the issuer) 
entered in an Internet form is the same as the address for the payment card that has 
been entered (Bhatla et al., 2003).  Only the numeric portions of the addresses are 
checked due to differences between the card schemes and how the textual part of the 
address is stored.  When a transaction occurs the information entered on the Internet 
form is passed to the issuer for comparison with their records.  The results are then 
returned as a numeric value representing the level of match between the Internet 
form address and that on file so a decision to accept the order or not can be made.  
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entered in an Internet form being in a different format from that on file at the issuer, 
people move address and there is a delay with updating the information.  Fraudsters 
can gain access to cardholder’s names and addresses through various means and can 
therefore pose as the legitimate cardholder using these details and therefore may not 
be detected by AVS.  
A.13.2 Card Verification Value (CVV) 
Created for e-commerce as described in (Burns & Stanley, 2002) the CVV or CVV2 
consists of three or four numeric digits that are printed on a payment card.  The 
premise of CVV is that the payment card must be physically present at the time of 
the transaction to read the printed numbers.  CVV or CVV2 numbers must not be: 
§ Embossed on the payment card. 
§ Encoded on the magnetic stripe. 
§ Printed on receipts. 
§ Stored in the merchants database. 
Thus it is made more difficult for the criminal to obtain these numbers by simply 
skimming or taking an imprint of the physical payment card.  The CVV is normally 
requested with the payment card details in an Internet form before payment can be 
authorised.  Since most CNP fraudulent transactions result from stolen payment 
card numbers rather than the actual theft of the physical card a customer that 
supplies this number is more likely to be in possession of the payment card and 
therefore to be genuine.  The CVV has limited effectiveness as the CVV digits can 
be human read and copied from the payment card and there have been a number of 
scams where the criminals obtain these values.  In (Bachelor, 2015) researchers were 
able to make purchases without the cardholder’s name or CVV code and ordered 
two items, one a £3,000 TV from a mainstream online merchant using stolen card 
details combined with a false name and address.   
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A.13.3 Negative and positive files 
Negative files are a collection of known fraudulent data such as: 
§ Compromised PAN numbers.  PAN numbers distributed by the card 
schemes that lists cards that could be in use by fraudsters, for example 
System to Avoid Fraud Effectively (SAFE) (MasterCard, 2014a).  
§ Email accounts and shipping addresses previously used for fraud. 
§ Cards that have produced a large number of chargebacks in the past. 
§ High-risk origin countries. 
§ IP (Internet Protocol) addresses that have resulted in fraud. 
These files are based on experiences by the issuer, the acquirer or at the merchant.  
Before a transaction is authorised it is checked against the negative file and if there is 
a match the transaction will be declined.  It can take some time for new data to 
appear in a negative file.  As fraud activities evolve criminals are likely to 
continuously change data such as their email and addresses so this measure has a 
limited effectiveness.  Positive files are a collection of recognised and trusted 
customers and their data that are used to authorise the transaction without the need 
for further checks.  Criminals could use the plain data but it would need to be 
combined with other sources such as the customers name to be useful and then used 
in a CNP transaction.  An interesting question arises as to how this data is distributed 
and if it is to be shared. 
A.13.4 Three-domain (3D) secure  
Created for e-commerce as described in (Barker et al., 2008)  3D-Secure requests a 
password to be typed by the user after they have completed their purchase process. 
This occurs after the cardholder authentication process has completed and increases 
delays in completing the order checkout process.  The request for the password is 
typically through a pop-up window from a third-party site.  The main card schemes 
that adopted this feature are listed in Table A-46. 
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Table A-46 – Card schemes and 3D-Secure  
Card Scheme 3D-Secure 
MasterCard SecureCode 
Visa Verified by Visa 
American Express SecureKey 
If a transaction is completed using this system and the password is verified then there 
is no liability to the online merchant.  The password system causes additional friction 
for the user as the passwords required can be forgotten resulting in an incomplete 
sale for the merchant.  It is reported that users dislike the extra step.  If users wrongly 
enter the password then their payment card can be subsequently blocked for all 
future transactions (Pasupathinathan et al., 2006).  MasterCard has announced it is 
stopping using 3D-Secure (MasterCard, 2014b) and is reviewing other technologies, 
such as authorising a transaction using a cardholder fingerprint or other biometric 
measurement rather than relying on the cardholder to recall a password.  Criminals 
have found simple ways to overcome 3D-Secure passwords, for example: 
§ For new payment cards the first person to use the card online sets the 
3D-Secure password.  The criminals will find a cardholders date of birth 
or last digits of a social security number required for activation with the 
issuer. 
§ Criminals telephone cardholders and obtain the password. 
§ Criminals have determined how to reset the password without cardholder 
knowledge. 
A.13.5 Device fingerprinting 
For e-commerce transactions a device fingerprint is information that is collected 
about a remote computing device such as that used by a consumer during a payment 
transaction.  Device fingerprints can be used to identify individual users through 
their devices.  There are a number of techniques that are used that gather 
information, for example operating system, version, IP address, firewall status, 
applications loaded on the system, system time variation.  These factors are then 
used to construct a device fingerprint that is associated with a particular unique 
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cardholder.  If payments using a particular card have been genuine in the past and 
are associated with the same device fingerprint then it is more likely to be a genuine 
transaction and can be authorised (Kohno et al., 2005; Nikiforakis et al., 2013). 
A.13.6 PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) 
Responding to data breaches of CHD the card schemes created the payment card 
Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council in 2006 (Payment-Card-Industry-
Security-Standards-Council, 2015).  A standard was created that aims to provide 
improved protection of payment card sensitive data for all participants in payment 
processing.  The standard sets out the following requirements: 
§ Securing computer networks. 
§ Strong access controls. 
§ Data encryption. 
§ Firewalls. 
§ Antivirus programs.  
§ Security policies.  
§ Regular network penetration tests and audits. 
Each of these requirements is designed to establish an effective internal control 
environment.  Protecting sensitive data is important as the criminals use it to create 
fraudulent transactions (discussed in A.15.6, page 516).  As with any standard it must 
be properly implemented to be effective and there are significant costs to comply 
with the standard (Sullivan, 2010).  There are examples of businesses that were 
certified as being PCI compliant but had sensitive payment card data stolen, for 
example: 
§ Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. had a reported 130m payment card 
data records stolen but was certified as PCI compliant (Cheney, 2010). 
§ Network Solutions, Inc. had a reported 573,928 payment card data 
records stolen but was certified as PCI compliant (McGlasson, 2009). 
(Plato, 2014) has reported that this has led to some in the payments industry 
questioning the quality of the standards, given the high cost to be PCI compliant.  
| Appendix A - History and Growth of payment card Fraud | 
 | 488 |  
The card schemes can fine acquirers up to $100,000 per month for PCI compliance 
breaches.  This cost is typically passed down by the card scheme to the acquirer and 
from the acquirer to the merchant as fines each month for those that are not certified 
PCI typically of between $25 and $1,000.  In some circumstances the relationship 
can be terminated. 
A.13.7 Point-to-point encryption (P2PE) 
P2PE encrypts all data from the POS terminal through to the acquirer and payment 
card issuer so that there is no clear text cardholder data stored or transmitted and 
therefore it has no value if it is intercepted or copied without a key (CreditCall, 
2015). 
 
Source: (CreditCall, 2015). 
Figure A-53  – Point to point encryption. 
Payment data may be vulnerable within a merchant or at the acquirer when it is not 
encrypted over the local network (see Figure A-53).  This is in part due to the PCI 
DSS standard only requiring sensitive data to be encrypted over a public network to 
gain PCI certification.  As of 2012 the PCI Council put in place an optional program 
that lists PCI certified P2PE third party solutions that payment participants can use 
to reduce the scope of their PCI DSS assessment and therefore the cost as an 
incentive to secure their payment data (PCI-Security-Standards-Council, 2013).  
However, it remains non-mandatory. 
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A.13.8 Account/PAN tokenisation 
To remove the need to store any CHD it can be replaced with a unique code (a 
token) that is linked to the cardholder in a separate secure system after a payment 
has been authorised so that the token is not useful if it is intercepted or copied.  This 
enables a merchant to store only the token without the need for the sensitive CHD 
that could be used elsewhere for payment fraud.  This token can be recalled by the 
merchant for further purchases by the cardholder.  Typically a CNP transaction 
where the user has logged on but is not required to re-enter their sensitive payment 
CHD.  The system that stores the tokens and the system that stores the cardholder 
data are separate and secured.  This method makes it more difficult for stolen data to 
be useful to a fraudster (Williams, 2010). 
A.13.9 Multi-factor authentication 
Multi-factor authentication also known as two-factor authentication requires the 
identity of the person originating a transaction to be verified through a channel 
different from the one that has initiated the transaction (out-of-band authentication).  
For payments not only must the payment card information be available but 
something that only that cardholder knows and has been previously linked to their 
account, such as their smartphone ID or a physical key fob that has a specific code 
(Council, 2005).  Out-of-band authentication has been established for Internet 
banking access for some time and some payment processors have put this in place for 
payment cards.  Where a smartphone as part of the payment process: 
§ The cardholder will receive a text message with a code that is then used 
at the point of payment or,   
§ The cardholder receives a message to which they must reply or,   
§ The cardholder has an application (app) on the smartphone provided by 
the issuer, which is used to provide a code that is then used at the point of 
payment.  Most applications require a biometric measurement or 
password to be entered as an additional authentication step before they 
can be accessed. 
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A.13.10 Pattern recognition and machine learning 
Nine preventative methods that were devised by the payments industry have been 
reviewed and it has been established that each had an effect on the fraud vectors.  As 
fraud is reflexive the criminals modify their MO and devise methods so that they can 
continue their crime.  These new methods are reflected in new fraud vectors, which 
needed to be understood before being detected and as previously discussed the 
decisions and prerogatives that the FMS now enacted were hidden inside hundreds 
of often interacting and sometimes overlapping complex rules.  This thesis argues 
that a more transparent FMS is required that can explain its decision with a logical 
and understandable rationale and can interact with a human investigator.  It is 
through this rationale that new and emerging fraud vectors can be detected by the 
FMS then understood.  That knowledge can be used for preventative steps to be 
taken.  Many of the improvements to the rule-based FMS required are the attributes 
of machine learning such as neural networks and so focus turned to methods for how 
neural networks could be used to undertake fraud detection and a literature review is 
undertaken in Chapter 2.  Neural networks are mathematical models inspired by 
biological processes in the brain.  There are many types of neural networks and it is 
not necessary for this Chapter to detail these but to give an overview.  Unlike the 
rule-based systems neural networks are not explicitly programmed to perform a 
particular task.  Instead they are trained on data using a learning algorithm.  Once 
trained the neural network interprets new data in a way that is consistent with the 
experience gathered during training.  The method for performing a task need not be 
known in advance; instead it is automatically inferred from the data, which makes it 
ideal for changing fraud vectors.  Once neural networks are trained they are more 
efficient in their storage requirements and operation so that a single neural network 
can replace a large number of rules.  The more compact mathematical 
representation introduces a natural form of regularisation or generalisation that 
makes neural systems robust to noisy, imprecise or incomplete data.  The 1982 John 
Hopfield paper on neural networks (Hopfield, 1982) started the interest in the 
practical application of neural networks to real-world problems.  At the Neural 
Networks for Defence meeting in (Anderson & Rosenfeld, 2000) Dr Bernard Widrow 
an early neural network pioneer told the research community: 
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 “You are engaged in World War IV, World War III never happened…where the 
battlefields are world trade and manufacturing.” 
Neural computers moved out of academic research and into commercial 
applications – such as fraud detection.  In the early-1990s the availability of cost-
effective computing led to a new growth period for research in neural computing.  It 
had already been shown that neural networks could provide accurate and robust 
solutions for complex non-linear tasks.  There are two main training methods of 
neural computing: 
1. Unsupervised. 
2. Supervised. 
Unsupervised neural networks only require input data and typically organises it as 
clusters that represent the high-dimensional input data into a lower dimensional 
space.  The training algorithm uses competitive learning; this is an iterative process 
that adjusts the weights to cause different parts of the network to respond similarly to 
certain input patterns therefore creating clusters.  An early unsupervised neural 
network was the Self-Organising Map SOM (Kohonen, 1984) that was created as a 
biological model of sensory neurons.  The SOM organises itself into clusters that 
represent high-dimensional input data as a two-dimensional map while maintaining 
the topological properties of the input space.  The two-dimensional map can be 
thought of as a regular array of neurons that are updated using a repeated heuristic 
learning algorithm so that a single neuron is more likely to “fire” for specific patterns 
of data.  It is not straightforward to assess convergence of a SOM as there is no 
guarantee of self-organisation and it is dependent upon the initialisation and setting 
of parameters.  There are many types of unsupervised neural networks but it is not 
necessary for this chapter to detail them. 
Supervised neural networks are trained using data examples where there is a set of 
input values with a corresponding output value (called a training vector).  Supervised 
neural networks are typically constructed from a number of simple processing 
elements (neurons) interconnected by weighted pathways to form networks.  Each 
element computes its output as a non-linear function of its weighted inputs.  Figure 
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A-54 compares a simplistic biological neuron with an artificial neuron.  When 
combined into networks these neurons can implement complex non-linear functions 
that are used to solve classification, prediction or optimisation problems.  Knowledge 
is encoded and distributed throughout the neural network architecture using an 
iterative learning algorithm.  The neural network is therefore polythetic – all inputs 
are simultaneously considered to produce an output.   
 
 
Figure A-54  – Neural networks inspired by biological processes in the brain. 
The learning algorithm changes the functionality of the network to suit the problem 
by modifying the values of the connection weights between processing elements, that 
is 𝑊!,𝑊!,𝑊!. 
A.13.11 Advanced FMS (Neural) 
The seminal payment card fraud detection paper based on machine learning used a 
supervised neural network to learn patterns of fraud (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994)(R6).  It 
describes a feasibility study undertaken for an issuer Mellon Bank in the USA to 
detect payment card fraud using a supervised neural network called a Probabilistic-
Restricted Coulomb Energy (P-RCE) neural network.  This is relevant as it was to 
set a benchmark for using neural networks as a payment fraud detection method.  It 
was to go on to be used as part of an advanced-FMS adopted by the payments 
industry and vendors of FMS solutions (see A.15.11, page 530).  The results are 
reported using a two-month dataset and are summarised in Table A-47. 
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Table A-47 – Neural network FMS results (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994). 
Measure Reference Value #𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑒! !"#$!! Eq. (8-6) 2m #𝑇𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑! !"#$!! Eq. (8-5) 1,20010 𝑇𝑃𝑅 Eq. (2-8) 91.91% 𝐹𝑃𝑅 Eq. (2-7) 60.00% 
Calc. 𝑅𝐹𝐺 Eq. (8-7) 666 
Calc. 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 Eq. (2-3) 99.82% 
Calc. 𝑝! Eq. (2-5) 99.91% 
Calc. 𝑝! Eq. (2-6) 40% 
In the Tier-1 statistics the worldwide average proportion of fraud transactions to 
genuine transactions is calculated as a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 4,800 (see Table A-9).  In (Ghosh & 
Reilly, 1994) it is a 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 666, that is the prior probability distribution between the 
two datasets where each have been determined by the dataset that is subsequently 
used to train the neural network are substantially different in their class distribution.  
Therefore when calculating the performance of the decision system using the 2013 
Tier-1 statistics the performance measures calculated will be different; 𝑝! is expected 
to be worse as the number of examples of fraud are fewer.  The rule-based FMS was 
well established and to improve its performance over the calculated impractical 
50,649 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 in Table A-44 a neural network was combined as shown in Figure 
A-55.   
                                                
10 It was reported that 50 alerts per day were generated of which 40% were correctly identified 
fraudulent transactions.  This is generates a TN of 20 a day or 1,200 over the two months of 30 days 
each. 
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Figure A-55  – Real-time issuer advanced-FMS with neural scoring (2013). 
To calculate a new confusion matrix it is derived from the performance in Table 
A-44, page 482 from the previous rules method where the alerts generated by the 
rules are subsequently passed to the neural network for scoring operating as a filter.  
The assumptions for the performance for the neural stage of this FMS are given in 
Table A-48 along with sources. 
Table A-48 – Assumptions (2013). 
Tier-1 issuer  Value Source 𝑇𝑃𝑅  91.91% (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994) 𝐹𝑃𝑅  60.00% (Ghosh & Reilly, 1994) 
Transactions/day 5m B.12 
Fraud Transactions/day 1,100 B.12 
The confusion matrix for the performance of this FMS-Advanced for Tier-1 issuer is 
calculated applying Eq. (2-21) to (2-24) and #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷!"#$! from Eq. (2-16) given in 
Table A-49. 
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Table A-49 – FMS-Advanced (combined) performance (2013). 
 Actual  Performance   
Genuine Fraud  %Acc %Pg %Pf %FPR %TPR A/f AlertD 
D
ec
is
io
n 
Reported  
99.983 99.983 87.276 71.904 99.999 1 354 Genuine 4,998,855 791  
Fraud 45 309  
 
  
 
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud. Assumptions: Table A-24, page 444. 
By complementing the rules with a neural network to score alerted transactions the 
number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 has reduced from 50,649 to 354 a multiple of 11x – as can be 
seen in Figure A-56 (R4 and R5). 
 
Figure A-56  – Two stage rules and neural network FMS. 
If the review team size is calculated then a manageable team of 57 is estimated.  
There are FN transactions from Table A-44, page 482 plus FN transactions from 
Table A-49 of the fraudulent transactions that would be missed based on these 
assumptions.  The number of 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 has been kept low but captures only 24% of 
the fraudulent transactions (264 transactions).  A typical operational cost for the 
advanced-FMS required fraud detection hardware software, support and the review 
team are estimated in Table A-50.  
TP     FP     FN    TN
4.9m   440   50k   660
AlertD= 51,000
TP   FP   FN   TN
4.9m 791  45  309
AlertD=309
Human 
Review
Rules 
 
Neural 
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Table A-50 – Issuer fraud detection operational costs (2013). 
2013 Cost p.a. 
Hardware (Server) $50k 
Support & licences  $1.5m 
Fraud Software licence (Advanced Neural FMS) $1.5m 
Review team $5.7m 
Total Operational Cost $8.8m 
 
 
Assumptions in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 value (see B.4, page 539). 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  
Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted   
The calculated average operational cost of $8.8m for a Tier-1 issuer is similar in 
magnitude to that reported in (LexisNexis, 2012) of “up to $13m”.   Hardware costs 
are now small.  Third party vendors structured their licence pricing to be based on 
the number of processor cores, which are in use in the system which has led to an 
increase in the software costs for the high performance servers required (Microsoft, 
2012).  As volume continued to grow throughout 2010s and the FMS was more 
effective as has been illustrated then the detection systems were likely considered 
sufficient.  Table A-51 illustrates that fraud BP was reduced and the operations cost 
of detecting fraud is now a small overhead. 
Table A-51 – Compare fraud BP and operational costs (2013). 
Fraud BP Operations BP Multiple  Operations: Fraud BP 
8.53¢ 0.6¢ 0.06x 
Assumptions and sources in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015, see B.4, page 539. 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
Comparing the results for 2013 to those of the 1990s illustrated in Table A-52 the 𝐹𝑃𝑅 has deteriorated resulting in more fraud being missed and 𝑇𝑃𝑅 has 
deteriorated increasing the misclassification of genuine transactions.  The fraud BP 
and operational cost BP have both reduced. 
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Table A-52 – Compare fraud detection performance 1993 to 2013. 
Acc Pg Pf FPR TPR AlertD Team Fraud BP Ops BP 
(2-3) (2-5) (2-6) (2-7) (2-8) (2-16) (8-17) (8-2) (8-8) 
         
Key: A/f=Alerts per fraud.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, 
see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted.  Assumptions: See Table 
A-24.   
A.14 Summary Fraud Detection (1971, 1982, 1993, 2013) 
It has been established that from 1971 to date each improvement in fraud detection 
technology has had the following objectives: 
§ Stop fraud occurring at the earliest possible point, that is reduce $Fraud. 
§ Reduce 𝐹𝑃𝑅. 
§ Increase TN, that is detecting as much fraud as possible. 
§ Reduce FN, that is miss as few fraudulent transactions as possible. 
§ Keep or reduce the review team size. 
§ Reduce overall operating costs. 
This is a nontrivial multi-objective optimisation problem where there is no single 
solution that simultaneously optimises each objective.  The relationship between 
each is non-linear and complex.  Viewing Table A-53 a Pareto front (Apolloni et al., 
2007) can be seen although it is unlikely that this is optimal as it has been driven by 
financial budget constraints and the operational cost of managing fraud against 
recovering or reducing losses due to fraud.   
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Table A-53 – Summary fraud detection performance and costs (1971 to 2013). 
 Eq. 1971 1982 1993 2013 Spark 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (2-3) 79.991 79.991 98.986 99.983  p! (2-5) 99.968 99.717 99.986 99.983  𝑝! (2-6) 0.300 2.577 2.099 87.276  𝐹𝑃𝑅 (2-7) 30% 30% 40% 60.00%  𝑇𝑃𝑅 (2-8) 80% 80% 99% 91.91%  𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷 (2-16) 1,403 8,150 5,718 354  
%Fraud 
transactions 
missed 
 30% 30% 40% 76%  𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 (8-17) 445 85 60 57  
Operational 
Cost (Tier-1 
issuer) 
(8-8) $15.9m $15.3m $9.1m $8.8m  $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#$%& (8-2) 30¢ 220¢ 7.14¢ 8.53¢  
Operations cost 
BP  665¢ 89¢ 5.2¢ 0.6¢  
Multiple of 
operations: 
fraud 
 22.18x 0.41x 0.72x 0.06x  
Computing cost 
per MIP  $60m $1m $63k $0.1  
Cost of 
computer 
storage 
 $2.5m $12k $8k $18k  𝑅𝐹𝐺 (8-7) 1,400 200 5,600 4,800  
Source: 1971 Table A-24, page 444 to Table A-28, page 446.  1982 see Table A-29, page 447 
to Table A-33, page 449.  1993 see Table A-38, page 479 to Table A-42, page 481.  2013 see 
Table A-48 to Table A-51.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, 
see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis is period, y-axis as per 
key. 
As with any optimisation problem there are a number of different combinations of 
the objectives, which will result in a similar outcome.  It is likely that one objective 
cannot be improved further without degrading another.  Subjective human decision 
makers have created this natural front over the period.  As each fraud detection 
method has improved over the previous one the number of human reviewers has 
necessarily been kept at a manageable level.  The operational cost associated with 
detecting fraud when compared in real terms has stayed relatively static – except for 
2013
90.68%90.68%
99.14%99.14%
5.75%
5.75%
60.00%
60.00%
91.35%
91.35%
4,588**********
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57%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
57#################
8,800,000$#
8,800,000$% %
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the earliest computer system which had a disproportionately high hardware cost due 
to the non-utility nature of the “new” electronic computing in 1971.  It can be seen 
that the cost of the review team has grown significantly and it is now the largest 
operational cost – see Figure A-57.  
 
Source: Assumptions in B.31, page 564.  Costs shown in 2015 value (see B.31, page 539).  
Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph 
– see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-57  – Car chart illustrating issuer fraud operational cost breakdown of 
fraud detection (1971 to 2013). 
It has been established that the cost of detecting and managing fraud has changed 
driven in part by the exponential growth in payment card transaction volumes and 
the conversion of computing into a utility.  In Figure A-58 it can be seen how the 
operating costs have exponentially reduced at a greater rate than the fraud losses due 
to write-offs.  
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Source: See B.31, page 564.  Note log scale.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-58  – Line chart of operational cost for fraud detection. 
It is argued that the operational costs to the payment processors represent in part an 
investment in fraud detection methods.  The more that is invested by the payment 
participators than the more vendors will be encouraged to engage in further research 
and fraud detection improvements.  In Figure A-59 comparing to the investment 
made in the 1970s the investment per transaction has continued to decline where 
today it is over 1,200 times less than forty years ago in real terms.  
It has been shown that the payment participators had limited incentive to further 
invest in research into new fraud management techniques as fraud BP has been 
falling but this is driven more by the increase in ATV and transaction volume rather 
than industry preventative measures.  There is no underlying reduction in fraud 
write-off value, which has continued to increase.  As is evident criminal patterns have 
remained slowly evolving and so the FMS approaches have only slowly evolved and 
focused on the detection of fraud and blocking transactions.   
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Source: See B.31, page 564.  Operational costs compared to those estimated in 1970s.  Plotted 
points and values shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see 
B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-59  – Line chart illustrating the falling “investment” in fraud detection. 
The operational cost BP has fallen from 665¢ in 1971 to 0.6¢ in 2013 (see Table 
A-53).  It is argued that the existing FMS methods will become increasingly 
ineffective as a pivotal event in the payments industry occurs, which is discussed next 
(see A.15).  This will disrupt what has been mostly static to date and will see 
substantially more new fraud vectors that are dynamic and that need to be quickly 
understood so they can be detected and prevented to avoid a disproportionate 
increase in fraud. 
The history of the development of payment cards, the growth of fraud and fraud 
vectors, the cost of fraud to the payment participants and to society and the history 
of payment card fraud detection has been reviewed.  It has been established that 
while payment cards remain inherently insecure, criminals will continue to find 
methods to undertake fraud despite preventative measures put in place.  A method is 
needed to provide greater understanding of fraud vectors as they are learnt by the 
fraud detection systems.  The next section establishes a working definition of the 
knowledge extraction problem and puts this in context of payment card fraud 
detection.  
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A.15 The Pivotal Event and Disruptive Technologies 
Some innovation can undermine existing products, businesses or entire industries 
(Cortez, 2014) – a disruptive event.  This occurs where the new innovative market 
entrant ultimately displaces industry incumbents.  It will be demonstrated that at 
least nine such innovations are disrupting the payments industry based largely on 
transformative technology.  Each of these has a substantial impact on fraud levels, 
fraud vectors and the payment card fraud lifecycle (described in Table A-22, page 
437).   
These disruptive events together form what is defined now as a pivotal event, which 
challenges the effectiveness of current payment fraud detection: 
1. Smartphone, e-commerce and m-commerce 
2. Contactless payments 
3. EMV and liability shift in the USA 
4. E-wallet 
5. Near Field Communications (NFC) 
6. Cyber-crime 
7. Commoditised high power computing  
8. Virtual currencies 
9. Micro payments 
As the pace of change increases and these technologies reach a certain market 
penetration being in use by a significant proportion of the world population, they 
point the way to how payments are conducted that will change forever.  It is 
contended that the banks, payment processors, regulators and the public remain 
unprepared for the impact this will have on security and fraud both in terms of value 
and in scope.  As has been previously demonstrated FMS methods become 
increasingly ineffective as transaction volumes increase and the fraud vectors change 
leading to a lower 𝑇𝑃𝑅 Eq. (2-8), page 53 and higher 𝐹𝑃𝑅 Eq. (2-7), page 53.  This 
in turn generates too many alerts that are misclassifications.  It is challenged that as 
crime migrates due to these disruptive events, it will do so more rapidly than in the 
past facilitated itself by innovative technology.  If this is so then current FMS will 
become less effective and operational costs will significantly increase.  There is a 
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window of opportunity where innovation in FMS can be implemented so as to take 
into account these rapid changes (Knapp, 2014).  It is reasoned that such an FMS 
needs to learn from multiple data sources and be transparent.  It must be able to 
explain the reasons for decisions and highlight emerging new fraud vectors to lead to 
human understanding and then to prevention measures.  It has earlier been 
established that the timely understanding of new fraud vectors so that effective 
prevention can be put in place is fundamental for effective fraud management.  A 
complete review of the history of each of these innovations is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  The following nine sections summarise and examine how the disruptive 
event influences payments and critiques fraud detection methods.  An understanding 
of these disruptive events is important to highlight why a new class of solution in 
fraud management is required. 
A.15.1 Smartphones (m-commerce) 
(Lindström et al., 2013) claims that smartphones are disrupting the payments industry 
and are changing the relationship between individuals and how they purchase goods 
and services.  It was after the Apple iPhone was launched by in 2007 that 
smartphones started to disrupt payments through the use of e-commerce (Laugesen 
& Yuan, 2010).  Smartphones had already changed the way that information, media 
and entertainment are consumed.  The iPhone had a multi-touch colour screen, 
128Mb memory, a range of sensors and a camera and used a 32-bit RISC processor.  
500,000 iPhones were sold on the first day.  This was to set the scene for the growth 
of smartphones averaging a 31% CAGR to 2015. 
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Source: Forecast smartphones, mobile PC/tablets (Ericsson, 2014), see Table B-38, page 559. 
Population forecast see B.22, page 558.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain 
errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-60  – Growth of the smartphone and world population penetration. 
In 2014 smartphones represented 40% of all mobile telephone users (Ericsson, 2014; 
European-Travel-Commission, 2015).   Figure A-60shows the growth of 
smartphones along with tablets and mobile PCs and the percentage of the world’s 
forecast population that owns one of these technologies.  In 2015 this disruption has 
reached an inflection point with 51% of the world population owning a smartphone, 
tablet or mobile PC.  As smartphones have penetrated the global market the way 
that their owners are making payments has changed; making a payment using a 
smartphone is called m-commerce.  It is predicted (Gupta & Roy, 2013) that as more 
people use smartphones and tablet computers that e-commerce and m-commerce 
will converge.  From (Lassignardie & Higgins, 2014) in 2010 total value for m-
commerce was $3bn (1% of e-commerce) and grew to $133bn (21%).  It is forecast 
that by 2018 it will account for $626bn (47%) that is as much as all e-commerce was 
in 2013 (see Figure A-61).  This rapid growth of m-commerce can perhaps be 
attributed to the many individuals that are reported to not own or have access to a 
conventional desktop computer but do own a smartphone.  In 2010 (Murphy & 
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Meeker, 2011) reported that 27% of mobile subscribers in USA were shopping only 
using m-commerce and were not visiting physical stores or using e-commerce.   
 
Source: See B.24, page 559.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may contain errors; 
error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-61  – Growth of m-commerce. 
It is reported that m-commerce is growing at an average CAGR of 50% and it is 
disrupting the way consumers are conducting their payments.  With m-commerce 
technology it is argued that new fraud vectors will emerge with a rapidity that will 
leave existing fraud prevention and detection methods vulnerable to compromise.  
Table A-54 shows the point where it is forecast that the number of smartphones and 
tables owned exceeds 50% of the world population.  This is argued to be a key event 
that will considerably impact the payments industry and therefore fraud vectors. 
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Table A-54 – Smartphone/e-commerce event. 
 Year Value Population %Population 
2012-2015 
Smartphones/tablets unit 
ownership at over 50% of 
world population. 
2015 3.7bn 7.3bn 
 
Source: See B.22, page 558.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds 
are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis 
is period, y-axis as per key. 
Table A-55 shows the point where it is forecast that m-commerce will start to 
converge with e-commerce such that there will be more transactions completed 
through m-commerce. 
Table A-55 – m-commerce and e-commerce event. 
 Year m-commerce e-commerce %  2012-2020 
m-commerce at over 
50% of e-commerce by 
transaction value. 
2020 $809bn $1.4tn  
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  
Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis is period, y-axis as per key. 
Table A-56 is a forecast based on current industry trends, which may not necessarily 
hold true.  It indicates that m-commerce will be the prevalent payment method by 
2031 substantially replacing current insecure physical payment cards. 
Table A-56 – m-commerce event “replacing” physical payment cards. 
 Year m-commerce $CEV %CEV 2012-2031 
m-commerce at over 50% 
of $CEV 2031 $48tn $101tn  
Source: See B.24, page 559.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds 
are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis 
is period, y-axis as per key. 
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A.15.2 Contactless payment  
Contactless payments are where a cardholder can place their payment card or 
device close (closer than 4 cm) to a POS terminal and using Radio-Frequency 
Identification (RFID) technology a transaction can be completed without the need 
for the payment card to be swiped, a signature or PIN entered making the 
transaction significantly faster to complete (less friction); referred to as “touch-and-
go” (UKcards-Association, 2010) – see Figure A-62. 
 
Figure A-62  – Contactless payment card usage. 
RFID technology was first developed in 1997 and it took ten years until payment 
cards had been developed to embed a RFID chip and antenna into the plastic 
payment card enabling cardholders to complete a contactless transaction.  In most 
countries the maximum value for a contactless transaction is regulated to a low per 
transaction value to limit the risk of fraud.  In the UK this transaction value limit was 
initially £20 and was increased to £30 in 2015 (Boden, 2015).  From (Light, 2013): 
“Contactless transactions are growing at rates of 200% to 300% a year in some markets.  
Visa, for example, reported a rise of 46% in contactless transactions across Europe to 
19m a month in the first quarter of 2013, with the UK, Poland and Spain leading the 
way…Contactless adoption is a profound yet largely unrecognised trend in payments that 
is driving new consumer behaviours and expectations away from cash and towards 
electronic interactions with merchants.” 
A contactless payment card has similar security measures to an EMV transaction.  
The contactless payment card creates a cryptogram that uniquely identifies itself and 
the transaction.  A contactless transaction should not include personally identifiable 
data, such as the cardholder name therefore removing another source of data from 
the criminal.  It has been found that some issuers have included this information, see 
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A.7.21, page 419.  Some contactless payment cards do not hold the encrypted 
cardholders PAN but use an alternate token that only works directly with the issuer 
system (see A.13.8, page 489) and cannot be used elsewhere such as on the Internet if 
compromised (Smart-Card-Alliance, 2006).  Contactless payments grew in the UK 
in 2014 to 319.2m transactions with total spend more than trebling to £2.32bn over 
the previous year (Boden, 2015).  If this substantial growth in the UK is 
representative of all markets as they adopt contactless payments and the reported 
average spend per contactless transaction (Gerdes et al., 2013; Deloitte, 2015) is 
increasing it is anticipated that contactless adoption will continue until it becomes 
the standard method of making a payment of any value.  It will converge with m-
commerce.  This is important as it demonstrates a rapid change in the payments 
industry that will become the habitual method of payment for many consumers 
shown in Table A-57 and this will cause the fraud vectors to again change.   
Table A-57 – Contactless event. 
 Year % cards  
contactless 
%cards 
2012-2016 
Over 50% of all payment 
cards are contactless 2016 63%  
Source: See B.26, page 560.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; 
error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
A.15.3 EMV adoption in the USA  
In the USA the card schemes required all payments participants to switch to EMV-
compliant payment cards and on 1st October 2015 there was an EMV liability shift.  
This EMV liability shift creates a strong incentive for the merchants to upgrade their 
POS terminals although this is at their cost and for the issuers to issue the EMV 
cards.  In (Figliola, 2015) it is reported that the cost in the USA to switch to EMV 
cards is between $6bn-$8bn and that 75% of this cost will be paid by merchants 
making this switch three times as expensive for merchants as for the issuers.  As 
(Groenfeldt, 2015; Kossman, 2015) unlike most EMV adopted countries the USA 
has deployed signature authorisation on an EMV payment card as EMV-and-
signature rather than require a PIN.  It has been stated that, “the vast majority” of new 
issued EMV cards will continue to use a signature only rather than the PIN required 
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in most other countries.  In (Heggestuen, 2014) figures show that the USA accounted 
for 51% of worldwide payment card fraud losses in 2013 a growth of 19% over the 
previous year and in (Conroy, 2015) CP fraud is put at 55% (67% in the UK) which 
places the USA in a different position from other countries.  To June 2014, 29.74% 
of worldwide transactions (99.4bn) were using EMV-and-PIN (EMVCo, 2015b).  As 
reported in (Federal-Reserve-System, 2014) in 2012 the USA processed 43m EMV-
and-signature transactions (0.04% of all USA transactions) while at the same time 
the number of magnetic-stripe-and-signature CP transactions was reported at 76.5bn 
(93%).  If it were assumed that all these CP transactions are converted to EMV 
transactions of any type, which is unlikely given the slow adoption by the USA then 
post USA EMV liability shift the worldwide EMV transactions will increase to 
176bn (53%) of worldwide transactions.  This implies that almost half the world’s 
transactions will remain not using any kind of EMV security and are therefore 
insecure for CP transactions.  It has earlier been established that criminals will make 
use of this weak security and target those countries and locations where the simple 
magnetic-stripe-and-signature remains sufficient to authorise a CP payment.  It is 
argued that the USA criminals will slowly move into non-domestic CP fraud as has 
been observed with EMV liability shift around the world.  With CP fraud currently 
straightforward to undertake in the USA, the largest single payments card market it 
is difficult to predict an overall trend for fraud vectors post USA EMV adoption.  
Experience in other countries has shown an increasing total fraud value; initially 
with CP fraud reducing and CNP fraud increasing, in particular cross-border 
transactions and after a period this trend reverses.  The USA is unusual in that is 
adopting EMV-and-signature that will only have an impact on physical card cloning 
type frauds and the adoption is slow. 
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Table A-58 – EMV adoption and fraud in non-USA countries. 
 UK France Canada Australia Netherlands 
Fraud value trend ì é î é î 
Proportion CP Fraud ì é î ? ? 
Proportion CNP Fraud î ê é é ? 
Cross-border î é é ? ? 
Source: (Figliola, 2015), (King, 2012). 
 
Key Description 
ì After initial reduction now increasing 
î After initial increase now reducing 
é Increasing 
? Not reported 
If the use of EMV-and-sign payment cards in the USA leads to a fraud loss similar to 
those seen in France, UK and Australia then it is argued that there will be no 
reduction on the total value of fraud as criminals are forced to move into non-
domestic CP fraud or CNP fraud.  EMV was designed in the early 1990s combined 
with PIN entry to cut physical payment card fraud that was prevalent at that time.  
The payments market is different in 2016 where the use of the Internet and 
alternative payments methods such as m-commerce is reported as widespread and 
growing.  There was an opportunity for the USA to explore newer technologies such 
as account/PAN tokenisation, P2PE and multi-factor authentication as discussed in 
A.13.7, page 488 as part of a new preventative standard that addresses both CP and 
CNP security.  This opportunity was not to be and so the inherent weakness in 
choosing EMV-and-signature as a method to reduce CP fraud remains as too does 
EMV that will have no impact on the security of CNP.  As has been seen in other 
adopters EMV payment cards only succeed in reducing physical counterfeit cards, 
which it was originally designed to do as in other countries.  It may be that CP fraud 
increases in the USA as the criminals specifically steal physical EMV-and-signature 
cards and forge signatures.  It is questionable that the reported $6bn-$8bn invested 
by the USA payment processors in EMV (Figliola, 2015) will help to reduce USA 
total fraud value.  Based on this evidence it is argued that fraud will increase as if 
signatures continue to be accepted for card payments rather than the more secure 
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PINs.  Until the authentication processes for CNP are improved with alternative 
technology for fraud prevention then CNP will remain the weak link in payments 
and criminals attack the weakest link.  EMV will not protect against cyber crime 
where CHD in plaintext remains vulnerable (Daly, 2014).   
At a series of USA hearings in 2014, Target Inc.’s CFO said it would spend $100m 
to adopt EMV in its own store-issued credit cards and in POS devices to accept 
them.  Given the large-scale data breach at Target Inc. the previous year that 
reportedly cost the firm over $1bn with $400 million of this charged by banks and 
credit unions to issue card replacements and forced the CEO to resign (Vomhof, 
2014).  It seems that large firms only finally take action to secure payments at a point 
that is too late and it is only after such a loss that this particular business took 
sufficient notice of payment fraud to take action.  If an assumption is made that 
despite the USA EMV liability shift that the uptake of EMV cards takes five years 
and that transaction volumes worldwide continue to grow as forecast (B.7, page 543) 
then Table A-59 indicates that over 50% of worldwide transactions will be secured 
by EMV-and-Pin or EMV-and-signature or its derivative by 2017 and over 80% by 
2020. 
Table A-59 – EMV event. 
 Year %transactions 
EMV 
%EMV 
2012-2020 
Over 50% of all payment card 
transactions are EMV. 2017 54% 
 Over 80% of all payment card 
transactions are EMV 2020 83% 
Source: See B.20, page 557.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, 
see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis is period, y-axis as per 
key. 
As in (Sullivan, 2013) it is concluded that because the weak-link in EMV-and-
signature and the weak security in CNP globally then overall fraud in the USA and 
other non-adopted countries will continue to increase over the next decade and 
beyond with new fraud vectors being attempted unless further investment is made in 
new preventative and fraud management methods. 
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A.15.4 e-wallet 
An e-wallet is a software application that allows the user to: 
§ Pre-load cash into their e-wallet account from selected sources. 
§ Associate the e-wallet with various payment sources such as payment 
cards or linked to their bank account that are then selected and used at 
the time of a transaction. 
There are three types of e-wallet given in Table A-60. 
Table A-60 – e-wallet types. 
Type Description 
1. Closed 
This e-wallet is issued by a company for use only for products or 
services provided by the company – similar to store cards. 
2. Semi-
Closed 
This e-wallet is issued by a company for use at a limited number of 
merchants that have a contract with the company. 
3. Open 
The e-wallet is issued by a bank or payment processor and can be 
used for e-commerce or in a physical store where a payment card is 
normally accepted.  This type of e-wallet can be used to transfer 
funds and used at ATM terminals for cash withdrawals. 
An e-wallet can hold gift coupons, loyalty cards and special offer coupons.  To some 
extent an e-wallet acts much as a retail bank account.  For Internet transactions e-
wallets have the advantage of the user not having to type all their details onto a form 
each time to make a purchase or bill payment reducing friction due to frustration 
and lost orders.  Table A-61 are the major e-wallets available in 2015. 
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Table A-61 – e-wallets (2015). 
Company e-wallet 
American Express Serve 
Apple Passbook 
Google Google Wallet 
MasterCard MasterPass 
PayPal PayPal 
Square Square Wallet 
Verizon Wireless,  
AT&T and T-Mobile 
ISIS 
Visa V.Me 
There will likely be other e-wallets launched from larger merchants, processors and 
banks.  Every e-wallet has its own, non-transferrable, digital wallet software 
application; there are currently no published standards or agreed interoperability.  
Google Wallet was an early e-wallet being launched in 2011 but it has not yet made 
consumers lives much simpler or brought value to the merchants and so its adoption 
has been slow.  With the combination of new smartphones enabled with contactless 
technology discussed below industry forecasts predict the global e-wallet market to 
reach $5tn in 2020 growing at a CAGR of 128% from 2013 to 2020 (Allied-Market-
Research, 2013).  The point at which most payments by value are made is given in 
Table A-62.  E-wallets present another new payment method and therefore further 
opportunities for new fraud vectors to emerge. 
Table A-62 – e-wallet event. 
 Year % value %EMV 
2012-2020 
Over 50% of all payments by value are 
using an e-wallet 2022 58%  
Source: Table B-42, page 561.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are 
omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis is period, y-
axis as per key. 
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A.15.5 Near Field Communications (NFC) 
In 2014 the RFID technology used for contactless payment card was added to 
smartphone functionality.  This permits the smartphone owner to select a method of 
payment using an e-wallet application whose details are securely stored in the 
smartphone.  It permits a transaction to be completed in a similar way to contactless 
(see Figure A-63).  Unlike contactless payment card additional user authentication is 
built-in to smartphones.  Biometric methods such as fingerprint, eye scan, face 
recognition or even heart rate (Charlton, 2015) sensors all aim to make the 
transaction more secure by identifying that it is the genuine cardholder and only the 
genuine cardholder that is undertaking the transaction.  NFC does not require the 
regulated low transaction value limit of a contactless payment card due to the 
additional security measures.  It can be set to the credit limit of the selected payment 
method depending on the issuer or merchant.  As most contactless POS terminals 
are already contactless compatible or a small POS upgrade is required then the 
uptake of NFC as a new payment method has been rapid (Marketandmarkets, 2013).  
In October 2014 Apple launched the iPhone 6 and Apple Pay as their combined e-
wallet and NFC payment system and within 72 hours over 1m payment cards had 
been registered to its e-wallet (called Passbook).  By the end of November 2014 
Passbook had grown to represent 1.7% of all m-commerce, whereas Google Wallet 
which was launched in 2011 was 4% (Investment-Technology-Group, 2014; Smith, 
2014).  Industry figures indicate that ApplePay has encouraged more merchants to 
upgrade their POS terminals to accept ApplePay and therefore enabling other NFC 
smartphone payments (ITG, 2014).  Like the original Apple iPhone that disrupted 
the smartphone market the payment contactless market is being disrupted (see 
Figure A-63).  As a competitor Samsung Pay was launched late 2015 and supports 
NFC and a separate wireless technology that can mimic a magnetic card swipe so 
that merchants will not be forced to upgrade their POS terminals to work with NFC.  
Other mobile payment platforms are likely to be launched.  
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Figure A-63  – NFC payment use 
With any payment method comes the risk of payment fraud and given the rapid 
adoption of contactless m-commerce it follows that there will be new fraud vectors 
associated with that innovation.  In 2016 Apple announced that that its ApplePay 
would soon be available to withdraw cash from ATMs initially with both Wells 
Fargo and Bank of America (Calimlim, 2016).  ApplePay is helping with CNP 
transactions where typically online customers are frustrated during the checkout 
process so that they abandon their online shopping cart without buying anything.  
By using ApplePay businesses have reported that the faster and streamlined payment 
option results in a significant improvement in order completions.  A further business 
model allows for online ordering at physical merchants using ApplePay to streamline 
purchases.  Apple's retail stores permit buyers to complete a transaction without 
waiting for a register or a card transaction (Dilger, 2016).  This highlights 
convergence of technologies within payments.  Here the combination of improved 
security through a cardless method of ATM withdrawals and convenience to the user 
will see such methods replace the out-dated and vulnerable ATM cards. 
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Source: Contactless payment card (Yankee-Group, 2012), NFC (Marketandmarkets, 2013), see 
Table B-40, page 560. R2 defined in B.3, page 538.  Plotted points and values shown on the 
graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-64  – Growth of contactless and NFC payments. 
The growth of NFC is linked to that of the e-wallet, which in turn is linked to m-
commerce.  The convenience of using an e-wallet is facilitated by the near 
frictionless transaction when using NFC as a contactless transaction.  Therefore it is 
argued that the NFC event is on the same timeline as that predicted for the e-wallet. 
A.15.6 Cyber-crime and data breach 
The number of records that have been publicly reported as stolen by criminals in 
cyber crime has grown from 96m (14%) in 2010 to over 1bn in 2014 (9%) – see 
Figure A-65.  84% of these breaches are reported to have originated from outside the 
organisation.  Criminals have a good incentive to target data that contains payment 
card information in plaintext as this can be easily monetised and such criminals are 
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already increasing in their operational scale and their organisational structure 
(Sullivan, 2010).  With the growth of the Internet it has been reported that criminals 
make use of chat-rooms and other forums where they can reveal payment system 
vulnerabilities software tools, viruses and malware and trade sensitive information 
(Anderson et al., 2008).  The number of incidents where CHD was directly stolen has 
an upward trend growing at a CAGR of 20% since 2010 with 213 incidents in 2013 
and an estimated 274 in 2014 (Sullivan, 2015).  These figures are only the publicly 
reported incidents due to regulatory requirements; it is argued that this figure will be 
higher if similar regulations existed worldwide.  The stolen payment data contains: 
§ Sufficient CHD in plaintext to allow a transaction to occur (for example 
PAN, name, expiry date, etc.), or 
§ Information on individuals that can subsequently used for identity type 
frauds where new payment cards can be obtained or other scams that 
then lead to gaining sufficient payment card information to allow a 
transaction to occur. 
 
Source: (Risk-Based-Security, 2015).  See Table B-58, page 568.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-65  – Chart of growth of data breach incidents and records stolen. 
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Criminals use this stolen data either directly or can repeatedly sell the information to 
other criminals (see Figure A-68).  With the increased of use of e-commerce and m-
commerce this stolen data has increased in value as a fraudulent transaction can be 
initiated from anywhere in the world using only the stolen data containing CHD.   
Cyber-crime attacks are occurring on a regular basis and it has been reported that 
more money is now stolen from banks as a result of data breaches than from physical 
robbery (Gorman & Perez, 2009).  These data breaches must be considered a 
disruptive “innovation” too but this time the innovation is by the criminals as they 
are disrupting the way that the payments system can be compromised on a large 
scale.  By gaining access to not only a few thousand but many millions of card details 
the opportunity is created for fraud to be undertaken at such a level that it could 
damage the payments industry or the economy of a region.  The use of data from a 
breach can take some time to be monetised from fraud as the criminals slowly exploit 
it over time and circulate the information using the Internet.  For this reason it is 
difficult for the source of the data breach to be quickly identified and so there is a 
time delay in reporting and current detection systems do little to help.  For example 
evidence in (Sullivan, 2015) suggests that some of the 1bn stolen data records in 2014 
may be responsible for the increase in fraud losses on debit cards and the increase of 
fraud using cloned physical payment cards created from the data.  A cyber-hack can 
be simple but increasingly more technically sophisticated methods are being 
deployed (Yar, 2013).  The type of data breaches in 2014 is illustrated in Figure A-66 
where the number of records stolen per incident is highest for payment fraud 
(typically insider-related), seizure (data taken forcibly by an official) and hacking 
(external based intrusion).  It can be seen in Figure A-67 that there are relatively few 
individual data breaches reported but that there is considerable exposure to sensitive 
data records in each incident.  
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Source: (Risk-Based-Security, 2015).  See Table B-60, page 569.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-66  – Bar chart of type of data breaches (2014). 
The most notable publicly reported data breaches are given in Figure A-67.  
 
Source: (Information-is-beautiful, 2015). See Table B-62, page 570.  Plotted points and values 
shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-67  – Bar chart of growth of individual significant data breaches (2010-
2014). 
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It can be seen that the origin of data breaches is varied banks appear rarely likely 
due to their better security and it is the non-banks and retail/commerce sector that 
have been responsible for the largest share of data breaches.   
The reported criminal underground market value is given for different types of stolen 
data in Figure A-68.  
 
Source: (Information-is-beautiful, 2015).  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-68  – Bar chart illustrating underground market prices for stolen data 
(2015). 
From 2008 to 2013 payment processors disclosed 1,489 data breaches exposing at 
least 262m payment card records (Information-is-beautiful, 2015).  In Table A-63 
using the stated sources the impact of compromised payment cards due to the data 
breaches that were reported is estimated at $2.3bn that is 21% of the total reported 
direct fraud write-off in that year. 
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Table A-63 – Impact of data breach on payment card fraud. 
 2013 Source 
Payment cards compromised (reported) 80m  See B.32 
Assume 𝜌! (probability cards used to 
undertake fraud) 0.1  
Conservative 
assumption of 1-in-10 
Assume average value per fraudulent 
transaction $350  3xATV (see B.16) 
Calculate value of fraud on 
compromised cards  $2.8bn 80m x 0.1 x $350 
Calculate % of reported $fraud 
($13.9bn in 2013)  21% $2.8bn / $13.9bn 
Cost of re-issuing a single card $47  
(Evans & Schmalensee, 
2005b) 
Cost to re-issue all 80m 
compromised payment cards  $3.8bn $47 x 80m 
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
A.15.7 Economics of reissuing payment cards 
As required by the card schemes once the data holder has discovered a breach, 
compromised card details are passed to the merchants’ acquirer and then to the card 
schemes that will inform the issuers of those cards.  If the reported 80m 
compromised cards (see Table A-63) were all blocked then the cost of re-issuing all 
compromised payment cards is calculated as $3.8bn which is nearly 1.4x the 
estimated cost of the projected fraud loss on those cards of $2.8bn.  It is economically 
more prudent not to re-issue compromised cards.  It has been widely reported that 
some of the 110m payment card details stolen from Target Inc. in November 2013 
(see Figure A-67) continue to be successfully used for fraud in March 2015 
(Fleishman, 2015a).  It can be observed that at least some issuers are not blocking 
their compromised cards despite knowing the card details have been stolen.  The 
decision not to block these stolen cards is based on the economics of re-issuing new 
cards as calculated above.  From Eq. (8-12) the financial cost of not re-issuing a card 
is given when 𝑟 = 0 and is given by 𝜌! . $𝑓!.  That is the probability of a fraud 
occurring on a reported compromised card and the value of that fraud.  If an 
assumption is made that the average value of fraud is fixed then Figure A-69 
| Appendix A - History and Growth of payment card Fraud | 
 | 522 |  
illustrates that there is are a range of costs where it more cost effective not to re-issue 
a card.  This is shown as the area, ‘Re-Issue Cost>Fraud’ (Graves et al., 2014).  Using 
the same value of $47 to re-issue a payment card this is plotted on the x-axis in 
Figure A-69 for all probabilities less than 0.16 (calculating an 𝑅𝐺𝐹 of 1/0.16 that is 
1-in-6.25) then it is of greater economic benefit to the issuer not to block or re-issue 
the card.  In 2013 the 𝑅𝐺𝐹 is 4,800 (from Table A-9) and is considerably smaller 
than the calculated 1-in-6.25 above indicating that in all cases it is more economical 
not to re-issue compromised cards. 
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omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
Figure A-69  – Chart illustrating issuer costs for re-issue of compromised card. 
It is not claimed that the practice of not blocking comprised cards is bad business 
practice as the issuer is required to balance their economics in the interest of their 
stakeholders.  It is argued that the wider societal impact of taking this decision again 
appears not to be considered so that: 
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§ The criminals are encouraged to use data obtained through a data breach 
when little appears to be done to stop them even if such a breach is 
widely publicised and they find that the data can still be used to commit 
fraud for many years. 
§ The value of the CHD obtained through a data breach increases, as it 
becomes known that a significant proportion of the data remains valid 
and can be re-used. 
§ The criminals use the data over a considerable period of time that makes 
it more difficult to detect the root cause of fraudulent card use. 
§ Cardholders feel less safe using their payment cards once they have 
discovered fraud.   
As more individuals move to m-commerce then more data will be stored in new 
systems or in connected smartphones.  Given the demonstrated poor security record 
to date in protecting sensitive CHD and the rapid launching of new services by 
providers is a disruptive event.  This has an unintended consequences and it is 
established that fraud vectors for these will be new, complex and changing and that 
there is an increasing opportunity for data breaches and so profitable fraud.  With 
current black-box FMS methods that operate within each payment processor it is 
unlikely that these will be able to detect such large-scale fraud until it is too late.  In 
2013 the UK National Fraud Authority put all economic UK cyber-fraud at £27bn 
that is 1.5% of the entire UK economic output (Harrison, 2013).  GCHQ reported 
that 8 out of 10 large UK companies have suffered a serious cyber-crime and that 
cyber-fraud is a tier one risk alongside terrorism (Martin, 2014).  In a single attack a 
London firm lost £800m to cyber-fraud (Information-Age, 2012).  These reports 
highlight the growing sophistication of criminals who will attack those systems given 
the forecast ubiquitous nature of these disruptive events.  From the evidence of 
growing fraud value and anticipated increased complexity of these new fraud vectors 
it is contended that existing FMS will find it increasingly difficult to detect these 
sophisticated attacks as they have been designed for previous known fraud vectors 
where payment card fraud was only slowly evolving and the emphasis was on 
detection at the point of the transaction.  These systems do not provide the concise 
information required on these new fraud vectors so that they can be understood.  
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Existing FMS’ are difficult to maintain as more and more rules are added they 
become opaque in their operation.  It is improbable that the criminals be foiled 
unless a new class of FMS are deployed that can be updated rapidly, learn from 
patterns and then identify and explain new and emerging patterns.  In (Martin, 
2014) the Director General for Cyber Security at UK GCHQ stated: 
“We in GCHQ are paid to look at that malevolent side of human nature.  In cyberspace, 
we see threats that more than justify the inclusion of cyber as a Tier-1 national security 
risk.  There are threats out there that could lead to a sudden and severe threat to national 
wellbeing.  And there are threats that could, over time, slowly diminish and degrade our 
way of life and our prosperity.  And these threats are real and serious: … we see highly 
sophisticated criminal enterprises.  Really, really, really sophisticated criminal enterprises.  
Again, a slow burning risk to the overall effectiveness of our economy.” 
In the event that the growth of the number of CHD records stolen continues to grow 
as it has between 2010-2014 then by 2029, almost half of all cardholders’ data will 
have been stolen as shown in Table A-64.   
Table A-64 – Data breach event. 
 Year %Stolen 
CHD 
%Compromised CHD 
2013-2030 
Nearly 50% of all CHD 
are stolen. 2029 49%  
Source: See Table B-62, page 570.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; 
error bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis 
omitted; x-axis is period, y-axis as per key. 
The industry will need to have put in place new technology preventative measures 
before this time.  This can only be effective through first understanding the fraud 
vectors associated with such large-scale data breaches to protect against them. 
A.15.8 Increasing computing power 
The use and misuse of payment cards has been facilitated by the growth and use of 
computers by both the payment participants and criminals.  The availability of cost-
effective electronic computing power has influenced payment fraud throughout its 
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history.  The growth of computational power through the introduction of the 
microprocessor in 1971 approximately doubled every 18-months.  A prediction 
made by the founder of Intel Inc. Gordon Moore that was to become known as 
“Moore’s Law”.  The original prediction was for a doubling every year of the 
number of transistors in a microprocessor as a straightforward measure of computing 
advancements (Moore, 1965).  The growth of payment card fraud has followed an 
exponential growth.  Figure A-70 plots an almost straight line for both computing 
power and fraud on a log-scale with the dotted plot showing the predicted 
exponential trend.  
 
Source:  Computer power see B.26, page 560.  Intel processors shown.  Payment card fraud loss in 
B.10, page 546.  Note log scale.  R2 defined in B.3, page 538.  Plotted points and values shown on 
the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-70  – Line chart of growth of computing and growth of payment card 
fraud. 
The reduction in the price of computer storage is an important factor allowing more 
data and transactional information to be stored over a longer period so that more 
complex statistics can be calculated to detect fraud (see Figure A-71). 
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Source: See B.30, page 563. Note log scale.  Plotted points and values shown on the graph may 
contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 535. 
Figure A-71  – Line chart of the falling cost of computer storage (1980-2008). 
As computing has transformed into a utility the cost of the hardware required to 
automate the detection and management of fraud has exponentially reduced and this 
impact has already been established earlier in terms of operational costs.  Based on 
assumptions on computing power required in a specified year, Table A-65 highlights 
this transformation. 
Table A-65 – Fraud detection hardware (1971 to 2013). 
Year Computer MIPS $/MIP 
1971 IBM S/360-5362 1 $60m 
1982 IBM 3084-QX 31 $1m 
1993 3xIBM RS/6000 930 63 $63k 
2013 8xBlade (Intel i7) 1,018,184 10¢ 
  
  
Source: See B.31, page 564.  Stated values in the table may contain errors, error bounds are omitted, 
see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-axis is period, y-axis as per 
key. 
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A.15.9 Virtual currencies 
Virtual currency is an evolution of traditional electronic currency created by the 
growth of the Internet and available computing power and is not bound by a specific 
country or currency area.  The virtual currency does not involve conventional 
financial institutions such as banks and is a type of money that is issued and 
controlled by its creators who are a non-financial private company (European-
Central-Bank, 2012).  In 1996 the first virtual currency called Bitcoin was created.  
The virtual currency is used and accepted by the members of a specific Internet 
community and has no physical counterpart with a legal tender status as traditional 
currency.  As a non-financial private company issues the virtual currency, it controls 
its denomination and is not regulated.  Some virtual currencies have an exchange 
where they can be converted into traditional currency but law does not currently 
regulate this.  The main virtual currencies in 2015 are given in Table A-66. 
Table A-66 – Virtual currencies (2015). 
Name Market  Capitalisation Share Price 
Bitcoin $4.7bn $349.81 
Litecoin $122m $3.53 
Dogecoin $20m n/a 
Peercoin $15m $0.68 
Darkcoin $11m $2.24 
Primecoin $1m $0.12 
Source: Share price as 10th December 2014 (Bajpai, 2014).   
Stated values in the table may contain errors; error bounds are 
 omitted, see B.2, page 535.   
Virtual currency can be used for anonymous or invisible transactions that are 
difficult to trace.  Some virtual currencies allow their owners to convert the virtual 
currency into real currency and real currency into virtual currency using different 
channels and accounts; unfortunately this makes it ideal for terrorists, criminals and 
money launderers (Villasenor et al., 2011).  If Bitcoin is taken as the general trend for 
all virtual currencies then the number of transactions a year is growing at around 
80% CAGR (since 2013), which is 37m transactions a year compared to 334bn 
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transactions for payment cards.  If this growth were to continue then by 2020 there 
will be 100bn virtual currency transactions a year (see Figure A-72).  The European 
Central Bank notes that such currencies are inherently unstable and if they were to 
be increasingly used by criminals then their general use and so their growth may be 
curtailed.  
It can be seen that this technology is in an early stage of its development and it is not 
known if this method represents a threat to more traditional payments or will 
provide a significant route for payment fraud to be undertaken thus creating new 
fraud vectors.  The current rate of growth of virtual currencies is slower than that of 
traditional payment card transactions and based on that forecast it is likely not to 
impact the use of payment cards.  It may be used increasingly as a method for 
monetisation and complex fraud vectors may arise. 
 
Source: (Blockchain, 2015).  R2 defined in B.3, page 538.  Note log scale.  Plotted points and 
values shown on the graph may contain errors; error-bars are not shown on graph – see B.2, page 
535. 
Figure A-72  – Line chart of the growth of Bitcoin transactions. 
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A.15.10 Micro payments 
Micropayments are payments of less than $5 (or €5).  While the individual 
transaction amount is small, in aggregate the total is substantial and is forecast to be 
between €15.5bn to €34bn ($17.8bn to $39bn) (0.2% of forecast $CEV) in 2015 with 
a CAGR of 18% (Burelli et al., 2011).  For the payment card micropayments market 
to continue to grow: 
§ The user experience for a micropayment must minimise friction so that 
there is no delay in having to enter a PIN, password, etc. ensuring that 
there is no obstacle to completing the purchase (The-Logic-Group, 2011). 
§ The total processing costs need to decrease for all participants.  The cost 
of processing a micropayment still incurs an interchange fee ($IV) of 
around 20¢ per transaction that is a prohibitively high for micro 
payments.  For example a payment of 60¢ from a drinks vending 
machine is a 33% cost to the merchant.  Some payment processors 
recognise these micropayments and have re-structured their costs to 
around 5¢ per transaction a 8% cost to the merchant which is the same 
amount as the original Charg-It scheme in 1942 (Earnst-Young, 2010). 
The volume of micro transactions is high compared to their value and so the cost of 
operations to detect fraud needs to be minimised.  The cost for a human reviewer 
investigating an individual micropayment is unworkable.  Cardholders typically do 
not report micropayment transactions that they do not recognise as the time and 
effort involved exceeds the small individual transaction monetary value (Hoffman, 
2010). In those countries with an existing high use of payment cards or other cashless 
methods there is a trend towards using the convenient micropayments as the 
smartphone, e-wallet and NFC technologies are converging.  While micropayments 
may not replace physical tender for many years if the current forecast growth is used 
it will represent 0.5% by value of all payment card transactions by 2030 (see Table 
A-67).  This represents a considerable challenge to the payment participants in terms 
of the fees that are charged to process such payments and the cost of effective fraud 
detection. 
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Table A-67 – Micro payments event. 
 Year %Micropayments %Micropayments 
2015-2030 
Nearly 0.5% of all 
transactions are less than 
$5 (or €5) – replacing the 
widespread use of physical 
coins/tender. 
2030 0.5%  
Source: See Table B-43, page 562.  Stated values in the table may contain errors; error 
bounds are omitted, see B.2, page 535.  Sparklines as described in B.1 with axis omitted; x-
axis is period, y-axis as per key. 
A.15.11 Pivotal event timeline 
As with the original launch of general payment cards in 1950 when innovation grows 
there is haste by the payment processors for market share and in this haste the 
understanding and preventing of fraud has been shown to be a low priority.  It is 
contended that payment fraud will substantially move from the fraud vectors 
practiced since the introduction of the physical payment card into m-commerce and 
other transformative technologies.  It is argued that to undertake such fraud using 
the more technical and security conscious m-commerce and NFC platforms a more 
sophisticated criminal will look for vulnerabilities in the smartphone hardware and 
software, the network, RFID signals and interface the infrastructure and in human 
nature.  It is likely that the current CNP fraud vectors will be migrated onto m-
commerce and the criminals’ MO will advance.  As these platforms are all connected 
using the Internet and the rate at which a transaction can be completed is measured 
in fractions of seconds there is opportunity to commit payment fraud repeatedly and 
more rapidly than ever before.  It may be that rather than trying to emulate genuine 
cardholders, the more sophisticated criminal will turn to hacking attacks and large-
scale cyber-crime where infrastructure is penetrated and sums moved rapidly with 
little or no chance of recovering the funds as discussed below.   
It has been established in this section that nine events are disrupting the payments 
industry and thus existing fraud prevention and detection methods will become 
increasingly ineffective.  This will be a pivotal event in the payments industry and 
will see substantially more new fraud vectors that are dynamic since the inception of 
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the general payment card.  Figure A-73 illustrates a timeline of the key events within 
the payments industry and are:  
§ The launch of the major payment cards. 
§ Each disruptive event. 
§ Key industry statistics.   
There is a significantly increased density of events between 2010 and 2020.  This 
period is the start of the pivotal event that will increasingly disrupt the entire 
payments industry.   
A.15.12 Understanding fraud vectors 
This history has demonstrated that there is a focus on the detection of fraud as 
though it is a separate activity within an entity.  Fraud detection systems may be 
effective at detecting such transactions but little is learnt from the patterns of fraud.  
In the past this was acceptable as the fraud vectors were mostly known by the fraud 
experts and only slowly evolved: 
“However, unlike application model development, there is less need to build an explanatory 
model, therefore complex structured non-linear models can be considered.” (Missaoui, 
2016) 
It is argued here that this is wrong.  A discursive examination of (1) the history of 
payment cards and the growth in their use, (2) the continued growth of fraud and the 
evolving patterns of fraud (3) the fraud detection problem and its definition, (4) the 
magnitude of the cost of fraud to all participants and society, (5) the history of fraud 
detection including the current state-of-the-art in industry and finally (6) that 
disruptive technologies are coming together to form a pivotal event.  It is established 
that there is a timely need for gaining understanding of new fraud vectors and that 
this will be fundamental to the effective detection of payment fraud and so this thesis 
is timely and important. 
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                                  STATISTICS                                                    KEY EVENTS                    CARD SCHEME LAUNCH 
Figure A-73  – Chart illustrating pivotal event timeline of payment industry events 
(1950-2040). 
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A.16 Summary 
An examination of the of the historical context of the development of payment cards, 
their processing systems and fraud detection methods was undertaken and it has 
been established that current fraud management methods are under pressure from 
new fraud vectors and social imperatives.  This Chapter is concerned with the 
growth of worldwide reported fraud losses, the human cost of such fraud and the 
relationship to fraud prevention and detection.  Thus it is essential to understand the 
technology that is used for fraud prevention and detection both historically and that 
which is state of the art.  This Chapter has further established that through the 
analysis of disruptive technologies there is a pivotal event in payments, which will 
challenge what have been static payment card fraud detection methods that reflect 
the slowly changing fraud vectors.  It has been argued that this pivotal event will see 
fraud vectors rapidly change as more sophisticated criminals exploit an ever-
increasing number of changes in payments industry.  It is therefore evident that 
prevention and detection methods need to protect against these expected new 
exploits and so these new fraud vectors need to be understood.  In establishing this 
foundation there is a requirement to both detect fraud and to explain decisions.  It is 
through this discursive analysis that it has been established that new transparent 
fraud detection systems are needed that provide the adaptability of neural networks 
that can learn from transactional data and can then explain their decisions in English 
with logical and understandable reasoning.  Emerging payment card fraud vectors 
must be understood in a timely manner so that action can be taken to pre-empt 
further fraud.   
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Appendix B Key Statistics 
The payments industry statistics used in this thesis are provided along with sources in 
this Appendix.  Historically there have been either none or a number of different 
financial reporting requirements for the merchants, issuers and acquirers.  
1971,1982, 1993 and 2013 are chosen as the decades analysed as there were readily 
available published figures.  Industry statistics are given in USA dollar currency 
throughout and where necessary to provide a consistent comparison a fixed 
exchange rate has been used averaged over the entire comparison period. 
B.1 Sparklines 
Sparklines were originally proposed as a visualisation method to quickly understand 
datasets within the context and body of text (Tufte, 2004).  In this thesis these consist 
of tiny graphs that do not have labelled axes and eschew accuracy for rapid visual 
assimilation.  These sparklines use consistent x-axes within the context of the datasets 
being discussed, for example a date range within a table.  Where appropriate the y-
axes are kept the same for a set of sparklines that are grouped together within the 
text space to make visual comparison between them obvious. 
B.2 Errors, Error Bars and Underreporting 
Data has been used from a range of payments industry sources as detailed in this 
Appendix.  This data has been collected by various agents and includes variations 
due to sampling, incomplete information, inaccurate records, random errors, missing 
data or unknown small economic shifts.  As in (Hendry & Mizon, 2014) this data has 
the following qualities:  
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§ Intrinsic unpredictability (“known unknowns”) – the data variation may 
indicate that a variable based on the data is unpredictable or at least it 
cannot be forecast better than its unconditional distribution.    
§ Extrinsic unpredictability (“unknown unknowns”) – there may be shifts in 
the distribution of the data itself that is both unanticipated and at 
unanticipated times.  Changes in the means of these distributions are an 
extrinsic unpredictability.   
§ Instance unpredictability (“outlier”) – while all conditional and 
unconditional probabilities are known for a variable, there may be a non-
negligible probability of a discrepant outcome where it is not known 
when this will occur or its magnitude.  Also known as “Taleb's black swan 
theory” (Taleb, 2011). 
It is not necessary for this thesis to examine the unpredictable or unreliable nature of 
the published real-world economic figures as the sources used do not include a 
published estimate of error.  The figures are based on uncertain quantities.  The 
error per data point cannot be considered the same for all points and there is no 
straightforward method to determine such errors or the reliability of published data.  
Error bars are not shown on graphs that include such data and tables do not include 
bounds for accuracy as might be expected as their bounds cannot be simply 
determined.  Graphs and tables must not be interpreted as representing ‘perfect’ 
data points but that a range of values are likely and that they represent a general 
trend over a period.  Any conclusion made with respect to this data in this thesis is 
made on the basis that the data is known to be uncertain but is taken to be 
representative.  Due to the use of various sources some of which conflict there is a 
general underreporting, where the aggregation of some figures by payments industry 
sources are unable to include various payment transactions as these are not reported, 
kept confidential or are simply unknown.  Figures such as the value of write-offs due 
to payment card fraud are the direct known (reported) value of fraudulent 
transactions that were investigated and then reported and therefore do not include 
those transactions that were not investigated.  The figures presented in this thesis 
likely present lower bounds and for the purposes of context this is acceptable.  
Payment processors calculate their individual statistics on write-offs due to fraud by 
summarising the number and value of fraudulent transactions from their computer 
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records in a specific period (Sullivan, 2010).  These computer records are created 
when a cardholder reports a fraudulent transaction and following an investigation it 
is determined to be fraud.  Some payment processors categorise the fraud into types, 
such as “lost or stolen” or “counterfeit” to enable a better understanding of the fraud 
vector.  An industry body gathers these statistics from the payment processors to 
calculate aggregate statistics that are published in reports.  Industry statistics do not 
represent the full cost of fraud for all participants in the processing of a payment card 
and there are differences between country’s laws, regulations and payment/banking 
industry practice (see A.8, page 423): 
§ Most countries report the gross value of an identified fraudulent 
transaction.  The USA reports the net value of fraud after any funds have 
been recovered or stopped.  In the USA, the first $50 of fraud is currently 
the responsibility of the cardholder so long as they report the fraud in a 
timely manner (Electronic-Fund-Transfer-Act, 1978) and this cost is not 
included in the USA net payments industry figures.  It is not known what 
this difference in reporting gross and net figures may be except that the 
USA will be under reporting compared to other countries.   
§ As can be seen in Table A-12, the liability for fraud is not always with the 
financial institution where the fraud was first reported, for example with 
CNP transactions the liability for the fraud is typically with the merchants 
but the fraud is reported to the issuer.  As reported by (Hoffman, 2010) 
the actual loss to a merchant is significantly more than the value of the 
CNP transaction as they have lost their goods and have to give a refund 
but this is not generally reported (see A.8.1, page 425) 
§ There are differences between the liability of personal cardholders and 
business cardholders.  For some card schemes business cardholders are 
typically liable for fraud and often pay insurance to be protected from 
such fraud.  The fraudulent transaction value and the cost of any 
insurance is not reported in the payments industry statistics (Bertagnoli, 
2015). 
§ Where the liability is with the cardholder then fraud losses are not 
reported, for example, when an EMV card is used and the payment is 
authorised when the correct PIN is entered, then the cardholder could be 
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liable for the value of fraud.  It is reported (Tedder, 2009) that 88% of 
issuers apply zero liability to cardholders in this case and so 12% 
cardholders are therefore held liable for not ensuring their PIN was kept 
secure.  This value of this fraud is unknown.  Other cardholder losses 
may be due to unauthorised transactions by family or friends where the 
cardholder accepts that loss for personal reasons and this is not reported. 
§ The acquirers who process payments on behalf of merchants typically 
pass any fraud loss reported to them back to the merchants where it is 
reported in those statistics.  Fraud that involves inner fraud such as fake 
merchants or merchants that purposefully go bankrupt is the liability of 
the acquirer and is not reported. 
§ Industry reported figures may not include the fraud losses experienced by 
American Express, Discover, retailer-issued private label and JCB cards 
because they are not consistently reported by those organisations 
(Wilhelm, 2004). 
Some of the payments industry reports cited in this thesis state that caution is advised 
with their stated figures.  In particular in (Lassignardie & Newstead, 2016) it is noted 
that assessing values for fraud, e-commerce, m-payments, prepaid cards and virtual 
currency by banks and non-banks in emerging regions such as Africa that there is an 
inconsistent reporting of statistics.  This inconsistency is emerging as regions become 
more active and non-banks take an increasing share of the market.  It was reported 
that some figures could be inaccurate by as much as 50% with optimistic estimates 
raising the question of whether centralised data collection is needed.  To achieve 
more accurate estimates, regulated statistical accountability and standardised 
market-sizing estimates are needed. 
B.3 Statistical Projection 
To make a reasonable statistical forecast over a period a line-fit function is chosen as: 
§ An exponential curve given by 𝑦 = 𝑒! . 𝑐  
§ A straight line given by 𝑦 = 𝑚𝑥 + 𝑐 
§ A polynomial typically given by 𝑦 = 𝑎!𝑥 − 𝑏!𝑥 + 𝑐!𝑥 − 𝑑𝑥 + 𝑒, for an 
order of 4. 
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As a measure of goodness of fit 𝑅! is calculated so that 1 represents a perfect fit 
between the data and the fitted forecast line and 0 represents no statistical 
correlation between the data and the fitted forecast line and is calculated as follows: 
𝑌! is an individual data point value, 𝑌′! is the value from the calculated point from 
the chosen line-fit function and 𝑌 is the average of the 𝑌! values. 
𝑅! = − 𝑌! − 𝑌′! !𝑌! − 𝑌 !  
B.4 Relative value of dollar worth 
The historical worth of monetary transactions is difficult to measure.  Where 
required to provide a consistent relative value of an amount of money in a past year 
a GDP per capita method is used to calculate a 2015 figure.  This method uses the 
nominal GDP per head of population representing the average per-person output of 
the economy in the prices of the current year and is described in (Williamson, 2015).    
B.5 Payment card $CEV statistics (1971 to 2013) 
Figures have been based on (Stearns, 2011) where a combination of information 
from press releases some of which were reprinted in banking industry publications at 
the time and reporting by Visa who consistently published fraud loss as 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐶𝐸𝑉!"#$%& from all member banks.  It is not made historically explicit if this 
statistic included cash advances such as from an ATM.  Table B-1are payments 
industry statistics from (Stearns, 2011). 
Table B-1 – Payment card $CEV statistics. 
Yearê $CEV  (USD bn) 
Issued cards 
 (m) 
Merchants 
 (m) Issuers 
1971 $4bn 25.7m 1.07m 3,978 
1972 $5.48 29.1 1.29 4,525 
1973 $7.68 33.3 1.42 5,226 
1974 $10.27 38.1 1.59 6,076 
1975 $12.28 41.4 1.81 6,752 
1976 $15.22 45.2 1.95 7,889 
1977 $20.15 58.7 2.40 9,707 
1978 $24.50 66.6 2.40 10,836 
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Yearê $CEV  (USD bn) 
Issued cards 
 (m) 
Merchants 
 (m) Issuers 
1979 $34.00 79.6 2.40 10,836 
1980 $45.70 94.8 3.10 11,930 
1981 $51.80 93.6 3.40 13,072 
1982 $59bn 98.2m 3.70m 13,683 
1983 $70.00 106.2 3.90 15,485 
1984 $85.00 121.0 4.30 16,724 
1985 $107.00 136.0 5.00 17,700 
Table B-2are payments industry statistics from (Mann, 2006a) for 1993 that were 
calculated using country level data provided for only those countries listed as being 
the major users of payment cards in that period.  This is therefore a lower-bound 
estimate. 
Table B-2 – Payment card $CEV statistics 1993. 
Countryê Credit Card $CEV 
(USD bn) 
Other Card $CEV 
(USD bn) 
Transactions 
(m) 
Australia 9.52 2.13* 155* 
Canada 46.00 5.28* 1,060* 
Finland 4.00 7.00 215 
France 90.23 - 1,560 
Germany 29.27 - 294 
Ireland 2.71 - 37 
Japan 147.00 - 1,987 
Netherlands - 3.66 61 
New Zealand 2.71 - 37 
South Africa 5.29 - 111 
Sweden 5.51 - 68 
UK 62.00 64.16* 2,027 
USA 875.22 23.84 12,970 
Total $1,279 $105.91 20,582 
1993 Est. all cards $1,400bn 21,000 
*1993 figure not available and so 1994 figure used. 
In some cases the number of transactions was not recorded shown underlined in the 
table and so the average transaction value across all the other cards is calculated and 
this is used to estimate the number of transactions. 
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The figures in Table B-3 are used for the number of issued payment cards, number 
of merchants and the number of issuers worldwide in 1993: 
Table B-3 – Payment cards, merchants, issuers in 1993. 
1993 Total Source 
Issued payment cards 3bn (Taylor, 1996) 
Issuers 23,000 Estimated 
Merchants 12.74m (Taylor, 1996) 
For 2013 in (Nilson-Report, 2015d) worldwide $CEV is reported in Table B-4. 
Table B-4 – Worldwide $CEV in 2013. 
Countryê $CEV  (USD bn) 
Asia Pacific $7,400 
Canada $600 
Europe $2,800 
Latin America $700 
Middle East/Africa $300 
USA $4,500 
Total $CEV 2013 $16.3tn 
Table B-5summarises the $CEV, from the figures previously discussed used in the 
chosen decades: 
Table B-5 – Summary $CEV. 
Yearê $CEV 
 (USD bn) 
1971 $4bn 
1982 $59bn 
1993 $1,400bn 
2013 $16.3tn 
The following figures in Table B-6 are used for the number of merchants and the 
number of issuers worldwide in 2013: 
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Table B-6 – Merchants and issuers in 2013. 
2013 Total Source 
Issuers 40,000 Estimated 
Merchants 32m (CreditCardChaser, 2014) 
$CEV has been forecast from the 2013 reported figure (Nilson-Report, 2015d) to 
2030 where it has been forecast to be $49.1tn.  It has been calculated using a 
polynomial curve fitted to reported data points.  These figures are used to forecast 
the $CEV using the equation in Figure B-1. 
 
Figure B-1  – Chart forecast $CEV. 
The figures are given in Table B-7. 
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Table B-7 – Forecast $CEV. 
Yearê $CEV 
 (USD bn) 
2013 $16.3tn 
2014 $18,588 
2015 $20,926 
2016 $23,496 
2017 $26,313 
2018 $29,393 
2019 $32,752 
2020 $36,408 
2021 $40,377 
2022 $44,677 
2023 $49,327 
  
2025 $59,753 
  
2030 $93,319 
B.6 Payment cards in circulation (1971 to 2013) 
Payment cards in circulation are given in Table B-8. 
Table B-8 – Payment cards in circulation (1971 to 2013). 
Yearê In circulation Source 
1971  26m (Stearns, 2011) 
1982 98m (Stearns, 2011) 
1993 3bn (Taylor, 1996) 
2013 10.8bn 
(Nilson-Report, 
2013c; Hirsch, 
2014b) 
B.7 Payment card number of transactions (1971 to 2013) 
Payment card number of transactions is given in Table B-9. 
Table B-9 – Payment card number of transactions (1971 to 2013). 
Yearê #T  per year Source Detail 
1971 240m $CEV/ATV $4bn/$17 
1982 1.49bn $CEV/ATV $59bn/$40 
1993 21bn (Mann, 2006a)   
| Appendix B - Key Statistics | 
 | 544 |  
2013 188bn 
205bn 
169bn 
(Nilson-Report, 2015d) 
(Hirsch, 2014b) 
(Nilson-Report, 2015b) 
 
 
 188bn  Mean value used 
 
 
  
The total number of transactions in a year are based on either payments industry 
statistics or calculated using $CEV/ATV (ATV is described in B.16).  There is 
discrepancy between the number of transactions reported globally in 2013 between 
the sources.  The mean of these figures has been used.  Where the transaction 
volumes have not been reported these are calculated using Eq. (2-13).  It is known 
that the number of transactions varies greatly between one country and another, for 
example from one payment per card per year in Vietnam to 126 in New Zealand 
(Hirsch, 2014b).  Therefore using a global average ATV value to calculate the 
transactions will lead to under reporting. 
These figures are used to forecast the number of transactions using Figure B-2 
 
Figure B-2  – Chart forecast transactions. 
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Table B-10 are forecast figures for transactions volumes based on the equation above 
and are likely to have a large variation over the extended period. 
Table B-10 – Forecast payment card number of transactions. 
Yearê #T Forecast  per year 
2014 205bn 
2015 221bn 
2016 238bn 
2017 255bn 
2018 274bn 
2019 239bn 
2020 314bn 
  
2025 1.3tn 
  
2030 2.8tn 
The number of fraudulent transactions in a year is estimated in Table B-11.  
Table B-11 – Estimated number of fraudulent transactions. 
Yearê #T Fraud  per year Source Detail 
1971 179k $Fraud/ATV*4 $12.18m/ $17*4 
1982 8.17m $Fraud/ATV*4 $1.3bn/ $40*4 
1993 3.75m $Fraud/ATV*4 $1.0bn/ $67*4 
2013 40m $Fraud/ATV*4 $13.9bn/$87*4 
 
 
  
B.8 RGF (1971 to 2013) 
The ratio of fraud to genuine transactions is calculated using the transaction 
numbers in B.6 and is given in Table B-12. 
4
39,714,286***************************
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Table B-12 – Estimated ratio of fraud to genuine transactions. 
ê #T  #T Fraud #T Genuine  RGF 
1971 240m 179k 0.239bn 1,400 
1982 1.49bn 8.17m 1.477bn 200 
1993 21bn 3.75m 20.996bn 5,600 
2013 188bn 40m 187.960bn 4,800 
    
 
B.9 Fraud BP statistics (1971 to 2013) 
Table B-13 are the fraud basis points based on either payments industry statistics or 
as calculated.  
Table B-13 – Estimated fraud basis points. 
Year Source  $𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒖𝒅𝑩𝑷𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅 
1971 (Evans & Schmalensee, 2005c)   30¢ 
1982 (Block, 1983), USA fraud losses $1bn  
 Assume USA market share 70%  
 Calculate worldwide fraud loss $1.3bn  
 $CEV (Stearns, 2011) $59.4  
 Calculate $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#$  220¢ 
1993 (American-Banker, 1994) 0.13  
 $CEV (Mann, 2006a) $1.4tn  
 Calculate worldwide fraud loss $1.82bn  
 Calculate $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!""#  7.14¢ 
2013 (Gupta & Roy, 2013; Nilson-Report, 
2013a) $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#! 5.22¢  
 $𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝐵𝑃!"#$ (see B.10) $13.9bn  
 #Transactions in 2013 (Nilson-Report, 
2015d) 
188bn  
 Calculate Fraud BP  8.53¢ 
B.10 Fraud statistics (1971 to 2020) 
Table B-14 lists the fraud values based on either payments industry statistics or as 
calculated using the fraud BP values.  1971 and 1982 reported write-off values are 
from (Nilson-Report, 1993).  1993 to 2011 are from (Nilson-Report, 2013a), 2011 is 
from (Nilson-Report, 2013b).  The 2013 write-off figure is from (Heggestuen, 2014) 
and the 2014 is from (Nilson-Report, 2015a).  Where figures are not readily available 
a forecast is calculated using the method in B.3.  The true cost of fraud that includes 
0.0211%
4,800%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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the costs to all participants and not the reported write-off values as described in B.31 
are given assuming the average multiple of 10.7x from 2013 remains the same over 
future years.  For the key periods 1971, 1982, 1993 and 2013 fraud write-off is 
$12.18m, $1.3bn, $1.0bn, $13.9bn and in 2000, 2014 it was $2.5bn, $16.3bn.  
Table B-14 – Estimated fraud values. 
 
 
B.11 Payment cards issued (1971 to 2013) 
The number of payment cards issued is based on payments industry figures, from the 
sources listed and are summarised in Table B-15 for convenience, from B.5. 
Year Reported Forecast $True cost Fraud BP
1971 $0.01bn $0.01bn $0.1bn 30.00¢
1972 $0.05bn $0.6bn 95.91¢
1973 $0.06bn $0.7bn 78.44¢
1974 $0.07bn $0.8bn 67.24¢
1975 $0.08bn $0.9bn 64.46¢
1976 $0.09bn $1.0bn 59.61¢
1977 $0.10bn $1.1bn 51.61¢
1978 $0.12bn $1.3bn 48.66¢
1979 $0.14bn $1.5bn 40.19¢
1980 $0.16bn $1.7bn 34.27¢
1981 $0.18bn $2.0bn 34.66¢
1982 $1.31bn $1.31bn $14.4bn 220.00¢
1983 $0.24bn $2.6bn 33.70¢
1984 $0.27bn $3.0bn 31.81¢
1985 $0.31bn $3.4bn 28.97¢
1986 $0.36bn $3.9bn 8.36¢
1987 $0.41bn $4.5bn 8.16¢
1988 $0.47bn $5.1bn 8.11¢
1989 $0.54bn $5.9bn 8.14¢
1990 $0.61bn $6.7bn 8.24¢
1991 $0.70bn $7.7bn 8.36¢
1992 $0.81bn $8.9bn 8.48¢
1993 $1.00bn $1.00bn $11.0bn 9.32¢
1994 $1.10bn $1.10bn $12.1bn 9.04¢
1995 $1.30bn $1.30bn $14.3bn 9.40¢
1996 $1.40bn $1.40bn $15.4bn 8.87¢
1997 $1.60bn $1.60bn $17.6bn 8.85¢
1998 $1.50bn $1.50bn $16.5bn 7.22¢
1999 $2.10bn $2.10bn $23.1bn 8.78¢
2000 $2.50bn $2.50bn $27.5bn 9.05¢
2001 $3.10bn $3.10bn $34.1bn 9.72¢
2002 $3.10bn $3.10bn $34.1bn 8.40¢
2003 $3.50bn $3.50bn $38.5bn 8.21¢
2004 $4.10bn $4.10bn $45.1bn 8.32¢
2005 $4.10bn $4.10bn $45.1bn 7.21¢
2006 $4.90bn $4.90bn $53.9bn 7.49¢
2007 $5.20bn $5.20bn $57.2bn 6.91¢
2008 $6.20bn $6.20bn $68.2bn 7.19¢
2009 $7.00bn $7.00bn $77.0bn 7.09¢
2010 $7.70bn $7.70bn $84.7bn 6.84¢
2011 $9.90bn $9.90bn $108.9bn 7.72¢
2012 $11.27bn $11.27bn $124.0bn 7.75¢
2013 $13.90bn $13.90bn $152.9bn 8.44¢
2014 $16.31bn $16.31bn $179.4bn 8.77¢
2015 $18.61b $204.7bn 8.89¢
2016 $21.33bn $234.6bn 9.08¢
2017 $24.45bn $268.9bn 9.29¢
2018 $28.03bn $308.3bn 9.53¢
2019 $32.12bn $353.4bn 9.81¢
2020 $36.82bn $405.1bn 10.11¢
Values in USD bn
Year Reported Forecast $True cost Fraud BP
1971 $0.01bn $0.01bn $0.1bn 30.00¢
1972 $0.05bn $0.6bn 95.91¢
1973 $0.06bn $0.7bn 78.44¢
1974 $0.07bn $0.8bn 67.24¢
1975 $0.08bn $0.9bn 64.46¢
1976 $0.09bn $1.0bn 59.61¢
1977 $0.10bn $1.1bn 51.61¢
1978 $0.12bn $1.3bn 48.66¢
1979 $0.14bn $1.5bn 40.19¢
1980 $0.16bn $1.7bn 34.27¢
1981 $0.18bn $2.0bn 34.66¢
1982 $1.31bn $1.31bn $14.4bn 220.00¢
1983 $0.24bn $2.6bn 33.70¢
1984 $0.27bn $3.0bn 31.81¢
1985 $0.31bn $3.4bn 28.97¢
1986 $0.36bn $3.9bn 8.36¢
1987 $0.41bn $4.5bn 8.16¢
1988 $0.47bn $5.1bn 8.11¢
1989 $0.54bn $5.9bn 8.14¢
1990 $0.61bn $6.7bn 8.24¢
1991 $0.70bn $7.7bn 8.36¢
1992 $0.81bn $8.9bn 8.48¢
1993 $1.00bn $1.00bn $11.0bn 9.32¢
1994 $1.10bn $1.10bn $12.1bn 9.04¢
1995 $1.30bn $1.30bn $14.3bn 9.40¢
1996 $1.40bn $1.40bn $15.4bn 8.87¢
1997 $1.60bn $1.60bn $17.6bn 8.85¢
1998 $1.50bn $1.50bn $16.5bn 7.22¢
1999 $2.10bn $2.10bn $23.1bn 8.78¢
2000 $2.50bn $2.50bn $27.5bn 9.05¢
2001 $3.10bn $3.10bn $34.1bn 9.72¢
2002 $3.10bn $3.10bn $34.1bn 8.40¢
2003 $3.50bn $3.50bn $38.5bn 8.21¢
2004 $4.10bn $4.10bn $45.1bn 8.32¢
2005 $4.10bn $4.10bn $45.1bn 7.21¢
2006 $4.90bn $4.90bn $53.9bn 7.49¢
2007 $5.20bn $5.20bn $57.2bn 6.91¢
2008 $6.20bn $6.20bn $68.2bn 7.19¢
2009 $7.00bn $7.00bn $77.0bn 7.09¢
2010 $7.70bn $7.70bn $84.7bn 6.84¢
2011 $9.90bn $9.90bn $108.9bn 7.72¢
2012 $11.27bn $11.27bn $124.0bn 7.75¢
2013 $13.90bn $13.90bn $152.9bn 8.44¢
2014 $16.31bn $16.31bn $179.4bn 8.77¢
2015 $18.61bn $204.7bn 8.89¢
2016 $21.33bn $234.6bn 9.08¢
2017 $24.45bn $268.9bn 9.29¢
2018 $28.03bn $308.3bn 9.53¢
2019 $32.12bn $353.4bn 9.81¢
2020 $36.82bn $405.1bn 10.11¢
Values in USD bn
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Table B-15 – Payment cards issued (1971 to 2013). 
Yearê Source Issued cards 
1971 (Stearns, 2011) 25.7m 
1982 (Stearns, 2011) 98.2m 
1993 (Taylor, 1996) 3bn 
2013 See table below.   2012 figure used. 14.4bn 
This gives a CAGR of 15 over the entire period. 
The main card scheme issued cards for 2012 are given in Table B-16 from (Nilson-
Report, 2013c). 
Table B-16 – Main card scheme issued cards for 2012. 
Type Issued cards 
2012 
Forecast 2017 
Private Label 3.5bn 5.3bn 
Visa 2.5bn 3.2bn 
MasterCard 1.2bn 1.2bn 
Maestro 725m 763m 
Amex 102m 129m 
JCB 78m 96m 
Discover 62m 80m 
Diners Club 6m 6m 
Total 14.4bn 20.6m 
B.12 Issuer statistics (2013) 
In (Gupta & Roy, 2013) the portion of direct fraud for which issuers are liable was 
put at 63% in 2013.  Calculating this as a proportion of the reported 2013 $Fraud of 
$13.9bn, gives $8.8bn loss in 2013.  The fraud BP for all issuers is calculated as 
$8.8bn loss / $16.3tn total $CEV, giving 5.37¢. 
In (Nilson-Report, 2015e) the market share by $CEV of all USA issuers was put at 
28.  $CEV for 2013 is $16.3tn and so the USA market share of $CEV can be 
estimated as 28 of this giving $4.564tn.  The $CEV for the top 15 Issuers in the USA 
in 2010 (Banks-around-the-world, 2010) is given in Table B-17, along with 
calculated worldwide market share. 
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Table B-17 – Main issuer statistics for 2010. 
Rankê Issuer $CEV per day $CEV per year  Worldwide  $CEV 
1.  Chase $491.927 $1,347,745,205 3.0 
2.  Bank of America $466.119 $1,277,038,356 2.9 
3.  American Express $409.927 $1,123,087,671 2.5 
4.  Citibank $231.900 $635,342,466 1.4 
5.  Wells Fargo $190.468 $521,830,137 1.2 
6.  Capital One $98.344 $269,435,616 0.6 
7.  US Bancorp $94.413 $258,665,753 0.6 
8.  Discover $91.908 $251,802,740 0.6 
9.  USAA Savings Bank $59.320 $162,520,548 0.4 
10.  GE Capital $56.508 $154,816,438 0.3 
11.  HSBC/Capital One $50.231 $137,619,178 0.3 
12.  PNC $36.154 $99,052,055 0.2 
13.  TD Financial Group $29.375 $80,479,452 0.2 
14.  Barclays $28.893 $79,158,904 0.2 
15.  Regions Financial Corp $26.820 $73,479,452 0.2 
  TOTAL $2,362bn  
The Top-15 Issuers are calculated to be 52% of the USA market by $CEV, which is 
9% of the worldwide market.  The worldwide market share per top USA issuer is 
calculated in the table above that gives an average worldwide $CEV which is used as 
the basis of calculating a typical Tier-1 issuer in Table B-18 in each period. 
Table B-18 – Calculating a typical Tier-1 issuer. 
Typical Tier-1 Issuer 1971 1982 1993 2013 
$CEV per year (bn) $0.04 $0.57 $13.53 $157.49 
$CEV per day (m) $0.11 $2.00 $38.00 $432.00 
#T per year 2.3m 14.3m 203m 1.8bn 
#T per day  7,000 40,000 560,000 5m 
Ave. Fraud Loss per day $330 $35k $27k $386k 
Ave. Fraud Loss per year (m) $120k $12.63m $9.66m $134.3m 
#T (fraud) per year 2k 79k 37k 384k 
#T (fraud) per day 6 300 200 1,100 𝑅𝐹𝐺  1,100 200 2,800 4,600 
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The number of issuers is estimated using payments industry reported figures, for the 
sources listed is given in Table B-19. 
Table B-19 – Estimated number of issuers. 
Yearê Source Issuers 
1971 (Stearns, 2011) 3,978 
1982 (Stearns, 2011) 13,683 
1993 (Taylor, 1996) 22,000 
2013 (Nilson-Report, 2014b) 40,000 
The cost to an issuer of a single fraud transaction is calculated in Table B-20. 
Table B-20 – Cost to an issuer of a single fraud transaction. 
   
Cost to re-issue a single card  $47 
Number of fraud transactions for Issuers 40m  
Calculate average direct fraud value per 
transaction 
63 x CEV of $13.9bn/ 
40m 
$221 
Calculate operational cost per transaction $0.9bn / 40m $23 
Total cost of a issuer fraud transaction $290 
The cost to all issuers to re-issue payment cards that have had reported fraud activity 
is calculated in Table B-21. 
Table B-21 – Cost to all issuers to re-issue payment cards. 
Issuers   Source 
Cost to re-issue a single card $47   
Number of fraud transactions for Issuers 40m   
Calculate cost to re-issue all cards $47 x 40m $1.9bn  
B.13 Acquirer statistics (2012) 
In (Nilson-Report, 2012) the following are given for the USA in Table B-22. 
Table B-22 – USA acquirer statistics. 
Rankê Acquirer  #Transactions  
1.  First Data 15.95bn 
2.  Bank of America 12.94bn 
3.  Vantiv 9.61bn 
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Rankê Acquirer  #Transactions  
4.  Chase 8.2bn 
5.  WorldPay 2.88n 
6.  Heartland 2.8bn 
7.  Global Payments 2.44bn 
8.  Elavon 2.38bn 
9.  Wells Fargo 1.78bn 
10.  TSYS 1.16bn 
 TOTAL 60.11bn 
The true cost of fraud, that includes the costs to the acquirers and not only the 
reported write-off values are calculated in Table B-23 for 2013: 
Table B-23 – Acquirer true cost of fraud. 
  2013  Source 
Fraud reported as 
detected in a single top-
20 USA acquirer 
 $24.6m  (Feedzai, 2013) 
Calculate fraud loss at a 
single top-20 USA 
acquirer 
$24.6m x 80.2 $30.7m  
(Feedzai, 2013) 
reports fraud 
detection rate 
80.2 
2011 Reported top-10 
USA acquirer transaction 
volume 
60.11bn   
See table above 
from (Nilson-
Report, 2012) 
2014 Reported top-10 
USA acquirer transaction 
volume 
76.8bn   (Nilson-Report, 2015c) 
Calculate top-10 USA 
acquirer transaction 
volume using straight-line 
 71.3bn   
Calculate cost to acquirer 
of fraud loss per 
transaction 
$30.7m/71.3bn 0.43¢   
Total worldwide 
transactions  188bn  B.6 
Calculate average fraud 
loss on all transactions  0.43¢ x 188bn  $809m  
Assume operating costs to 
manage fraud is the same 
as for Issuers 
  $0.9bn See Table  
Acquirer true cost of payment fraud $1.7bn $809m+ $0.9bn 
BP 1.0¢ $1.7bn / $16.3tn 
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B.14 Merchant statistics (1971 to 2013) 
The number of merchant that accept payment cards are based on payments industry 
figures for the listed sources, are summarised in Table B-24 for convenience, from 
B.5. 
Table B-24 – Merchants. 
Yearê Year/Source Merchants 
1971 (Stearns, 2011) 1.07m 
1982 (Stearns, 2011) 3.70m 
1993 (Taylor, 1996) 12.74m 
2013 (CreditCardChaser, 2014) 32m 
The true cost of fraud that includes the costs to the merchants and not the reported 
write-off values are calculated in Table B-25 for 2013: 
Table B-25 – Merchants true cost of fraud. 
Worldwide 
merchants Assumptions 2013 Source 
Lost fees / 
Charge-back 
$3.08 x direct fraud 
write-offs for 
merchants of 
$5.1bn (37% of 
total $13.9bn direct 
fraud) 
$15.8bn 
(Gupta & Roy, 2013) 
reported 37% lost by 
merchants and acquirers. 
(LexisNexis, 2014) reported 
each dollar of fraud costing 
$3.08 for USA merchants. 
CNP operations 
5%11 of CNP 
$CEV of $771bn 
(out of $16.3tn) 
$38.6bn 
(Khan, 2013) reported costs 
to manage fraud of 5-11% 
of CNP revenue in the UK.  
(Malik, 2014) reported 
CNP at $771bn. 
CP operations 
0.5% of CP $CEV 
of $15.5tn (out of 
$16.3tn) 
$78bn Assumption that CP costs  are 0.5% of $CEV CP 
Total Fraud Merchant Operating 
Costs $132.0bn 
Compare to the reported 
$190bn total reported for 
USA only merchants in 
(Shaughnessy, 2011). 
   
                                                
11 5% is chosen as a conservative lower estimate of merchant costs based on Khan, A. The Turning 
Point. (CyberSource, 2013). 
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The fraud BP for merchants is calculated as $5.1bn / $16.3tn $CEV, giving 3.2¢. 
B.15 True cost of fraud (2013) 
The figures in B.12, B.13 and B.14 are used in Table B-26 to calculate the multiple 
of the reported direct fraud loss in 2013. 
Table B-26 – Summary true cost of fraud. 
 True Cost Calculate  
 2013 BP Multiple  of reported 
 
Merchants  $137.0bn 84.2¢ 25.7x  
Issuers  $11.0bn 6.7¢ 1.2x  
Acquirers  $1.7bn 1.0¢ n/a  
Total $149bn 91.6¢ 10.7x  
     
B.16 Average transaction value statistics (1971 to 2013) 
The average value per transaction (AVT) is estimated in Table B-27 using available 
payments industry figures that were then projected using a straight line from the 
listed sources as can be seen in the graph in Figure B-3. 
Table B-27 – Average value per transaction (AVT). 
Source AVT 
1971 from (Stearns, 2011) $17 
1982 from (Stearns, 2011) $40 
1993 calculated $67 
Calculated as $CEV/#Transactions, 
$16.3tn / 188bn 
$87 
 
13.90$'''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ' 5.14$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
5.14$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 8.76$&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
2013%Report 13.90$%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %
Total 149$******************************** * 91.6¢
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Note 2012 figure of $88 is from (Papadimitriou, 2015). 
Figure B-3  – Chart average value per transaction. 
B.17 Crime statistics (2003) 
Table B-28 puts payment card crime in context of global crime and illicit drug 
crime.  An assumption is made that the multiple for true cost of fraud for all 
participants in 2013 calculated in B.15, remains the same for 2003 is likely to give an 
underestimate. 
Table B-28 – Crime statistics. 
 2003 2013 Source 
Estimated world-wide drug 
trade $320bn  
(United-Nations, 2012) 
Represents this portion of 
all crime 
1/5th  
(Organisation-of-American-
States, 2012) 
Calculate value of all crime $1.6tn  $320bn x 1/5th 
True cost of fraud 38.5bn 166.8bn 10.7x (2013 multiple from B.15) x $CEV in period from B.5. 
Calculate  2.4  $149bn / $1.6tn 
y = 1.6441x + 19.887
R² = 0.96913
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The United Nations (United-Nations, 2012) reported that illicit drug trade consisted 
of the illegal drugs in Table B-29. 
Table B-29 – Illicit drug trade. 
Drug 2003  True cost fraud  Drug crime 
Cocaine $85bn 45 27 
Opiate $68bn 57 21 
Heroin $55bn 70 17 
Other illicit drugs $112bn 34 35 
Total $320bn   
B.18 French payment card statistics (2004-2009) 
Table B-30 are payments industry statistics from (UniBul-Merchant-Services, 2013).  
The exchange rate is fixed for the entire period to avoid the USD rate skewing the 
comparative results. 
Table B-30 – French payment card statistics (2004-2009). 
 2004 2005 2006 
EMV 
2007 2008 2009 
Total Fraud Loss (€ m) 159.1 161.9 186.1 199.8 249.2 265.6 
BP 4.9 4.6 5.0 4.9 5.7 5.9 
Fraud Loss CP (€ m) 63.5 59.2 59.1 45.4 44.5 41 
€ to USD rate 1.27 1.30 1.20 1.30 1.47 1.33 
Fix € to USD rate as average 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 
Calc. Fraud Loss CP $m $125 $134 $166 $202 $268 $294 
Calc. Fraud Loss CNP $m $83 $77 $77 $59 $58 $54 
B.19 UK payment card statistics (2004-2013) 
Table B-31 are payments industry statistics from (Financial-Fraud-Action-UK, 2014) 
in USD.  The exchange rate is fixed for the entire period to avoid the GBP rate 
skewing the comparative results. 
Table B-31 – UK payment card statistics (2004-2013). 
 2004 2005 2006 
EMV 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 
Fraud Loss 
(£ m) 
504.8 439.4 427.0 535.2 609.9 440m 365.4 341 388.3 450.4 
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 2004 2005 2006 
EMV 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
BP 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Fraud Loss 
CP (£ m) 218.8 135.9 72.1 73.0 98.5 71.8 67.4 120.1 142.3 149.3 
Cross-
border 
Fraud Loss 
(£ m) 
92.5 82.8 177.1 207.6 230.1 122.6 93.9 80 101.3 122 
£ to USD 
rate 1.83 1.82 1.84 2.00 1.85 1.57 1.55 1.60 1.58 1.56 
Fix £ to 
USD rate 
as average 
1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 
Calc. 
Fraud Loss 
CP (m) 
$376 $234 $124 $126 $169 $123 $116 $207 $245 $257 
Calc. 
Fraud Loss 
CNP (m) 
$492 $522 $610 $795 $880 $633 $513 $380 $423 $518 
Calc. 
Cross-
border (m) 
$159 $142 $305 $357 $396 $211 $162 $138 $174 $210 
Calc. 
domestic 
(m) 
$709 $613 $430 $563 $653 $546 $467 $449 $494 $565 
Calc.  
Cross-
border 
22 23 71 63 61 39 35 31 35 37 
Table B-32 are payments industry statistics from (Statista, 2015) for CNP 
expenditure in the UK and converted to USD.  As previously, the exchange rate is 
fixed for the entire period. 
Table B-32 – UK CNP (2004-2013). 
 2004 2005 2006 
EMV 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CNP (£ 
bn) 6.0 7.8 10.4 13.9 17.2 20.1 23.6 27.1 31.1 35.3 
Fix £ to 
USD rate 
as average 
1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 
CNP (bn) $10.3 $13.4 $17.9 $23.9 $29.6 $35.0 $40.6 $46.6 $53.5 $60.7 
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B.20 USA EMV/CP/CNP statistics (2013) 
Table B-33 details the number of transactions by type in the USA. 
Table B-33 – USA transactions by type. 
Transactions  Source 
EMV use (year ending June 2014) 29.74 (EMVCo, 2015b)   
Total worldwide (2014) 334.3tn (Lassignardie & Higgins, 2014) 
Calculate EMV worldwide 99.4bn 29.74 x 99.4bn 
   
USA cashless (2013) 122.8bn (Daly, 2014) 
   
USA payment cards (2013) 82.3bn (Daly, 2014) 
USA CNP (2013) 5.8bn (Daly, 2014) 
Calculate USA CP (2013) 76.5bn  
Table B-34 details the number of EMV transactions in 2012 in the USA (Daly, 
2014). 
Table B-34 – USA EMV transactions. 
Transactions 2012 
EMV debit 29.8m 
EMV credit 13.3m 
Pre-paid 50k 
Calculate total EMV 43.15m 
Calculate EMV transactions 0.04 
Table B-35 the number of EMV transactions in 2012 in the USA (Daly, 2014) that is 
used to estimate the post USA EMV adoption. 
Table B-35 – USA EMV adoption. 
Transactions  
EMV worldwide (2013)  99.4bn 
USA CP (2013) 76.5bn 
Calculate Total 175.9bn 
Calculate EMV transactions worldwide 53 
B.21 Worldwide Internet statistics (2004-2013) 
Table B-36are industry statistics for the growth of the Internet from (Sanou, 2014). 
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Table B-36 – Growth of the Internet. 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Internet 
Users 800m 1bn 1.2bn 1.35bn 1.5bn 1.75bn 2bn 2.25bn 2.5bn 2.65bn 
B.22 Population statistics (2004-2013) 
Table B-37 are world population statistics from (The-World-Bank, 2015), gaps 
indicate no reported figure for that year. 
Table B-37 – Population statistics. 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Population 
(bn) 3.7 3.8 3.8   4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 
 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 1988 1989 
Population 
(bn) 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9   5.2 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Population 
(bn) 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Population 
(bn) 6.1   6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Population (bn) 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.2 
 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Population (bn) 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.7 
The population is forecast from 2015 to 2020 based on the equation given on the 
forecast graph in Figure B-4. 
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Figure B-4  – Chart world population. 
B.23 Smartphone statistics (2010-2020) 
Table B-38 are industry statistics for the growth of the number of Smartphones in 
use from (Ericsson, 2014).  The world population is from (The-World-Bank, 2015).  
2015 is highlighted as greater than 50 of the population is forecast as owning a 
smartphone or tablet device. 
Table B-38 – Smartphone statistics. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Smartphones 
(bn) 
0.5 1.0 1.3 1.9 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.1 
PC/Tablets (bn) 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 
Population (bn) 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.7 
 Market (bn)   22 31 42 51 60 68 75 81 87 
B.24 E-commerce and m-commerce statistics (2012-2018) 
Table B-39 are industry statistics for the growth of e-commerce and m-commerce by 
value of transactions from (Malik, 2014). 
Table B-39 – e-commerce and m-commerce statistics. 
bn 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
e-commerce 545 638 752 886 1,024 1,179 1,346 
m-commerce 61 133 204 298 414 516 626 
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The following graph in Figure B-5 is used to forecast e-commerce and m-commerce 
from 2018 using the equation plotted. 
 
Figure B-5  – Chart e-commerce and m-commerce. 
B.25 NFC statistics (2012-2017) 
Table B-40 are payments industry statistics for the growth of the number of 
transaction made using NFC on a Smartphone from (Marketandmarkets, 2013) and 
the number of payment card transactions from (Yankee-Group, 2012). 
Table B-40 – NFC statistics. 
USD (bn) 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017 
NFC 1.0 3.4 7.8 14.2 21.7 
Payment cards 610 790 970 1,160 1,360 
B.26 Contactless statistics (2008-2017) 
Table B-41 are payments industry statistics for the growth of the number of 
contactless payment cards from (Payments-Cards-and-Mobile, 2015a). 
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Table B-41 – Contactless statistics. 
Contactless cards (bn) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Contactless cards (bn) 580 675 798 898 975 1,245 1,540 
 of Payment cards 11 12 13 15 23 37 40 
The graph in Figure B-6 is used to forecast share of payment cards from 2015 using 
the equation plotted. 
 
. 
Figure B-6  – Chart contactless. 
B.27 E-wallet statistics (2008-2017) 
Table B-42 are payments industry statistics for the growth of e-wallet spend from 
(Allied-Market-Research, 2013) used to calculate forecast spend. 
Table B-42 – E-wallet statistics. 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
e-wallet spend ($bn) 1 4 18 63 188 5,000 11,400 26,000 
% of total $CEV  - 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.57 13.7 28.2 58.2 
The graph in Figure B-7 is used to forecast the e-wallet spend from 2015 using the 
given CAGR which will have a high variability. 
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Figure B-7  – Chart e-wallet. 
B.28 Micro payment statistics (2015-2030) 
Table B-43 are forecast value of micropayments based on (Burelli et al., 2011) figure 
of €34bn in 2015 converted to USD at 1.15, using the stated CAGR of 18. The 
forecast will have a high variability due to the extended period and assumptions. 
Table B-43 – Micro payment statistics. 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Micro payments (USA bn) 39 89 205 468 
$CEV forecast  $20,926 $36,408 $59,753 $93,319 
Calculate of $CEV 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 
B.29 Modern computer power statistics (1971 to 2012) 
Table B-44 are the number of transistors in a single integrated circuit CPU available 
from Intel which is used as a reasonable measure of available computing power from 
(Intel, 2008). 
y = 3352.4x9.0884
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Table B-44 – Modern computer power statistics (1971 to 2012). 
 Dateê Device Transistors 
1971 4004 2,300 
1972 8008 2,500 
1974 8080 4,500 
1978 8086 29,000 
1982 Intel286 134,000 
1985 Intel386 275,000 
1989 Intel486 1,200,000 
1993 Intel Pentium 3,100,000 
1997 Intel Pentium II 7,500,000 
1999 Intel Pentium III 9,500,000 
2000 Intel Pentium 4 42,000,000 
2003 Intel Itanium 2 220,000,000 
2004 Intel Itanium+ 592,000,000 
2011 Intel six core 2,270,000,000 
2012 Intel eight core 3,100,000,000 
B.30 Modern computer storage statistics (1980-2009) 
Table B-45 are figures from (Komorowski, 2009) that calculate the USD cost per Gb 
of storage over the period.  The table presented is simplified for ease of presentation; 
note there are no figures for 1990 to 1995. 
Table B-45 – Modern computer storage statistics (1971 to 2012). 
Dateê Size (Mb) Cost (USD) Calc. $/Gb 
1980 18 4,199 233,000 
1981 26 3,599 138,000 
1982 - - - 
1983 21 2,495 270,000 
1984 23 1,845 80,000 
1985 10 710 71,000 
1986 - - - 
1987 40 1,199 60,000 
1988 250 3,995 16,000 
1989 40 1,199 36,000 
1995 1,200 680 686 
1996 3,200 469 173 
1997 8,400 679 93 
1998 6,400 - 43 
1999 17,300 248 17 
2000 80,000 479 7 
2001 40,000 158 5 
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Dateê Size (Mb) Cost (USD) Calc. $/Gb 
2002 60,000 139 3 
2003 120,000 158 2 
2004 400,000 300 1 
2005 200,000 140 1 
2006 80,000 35 0.44 
2007 250,000 100 0.40 
2008 1,000,000 270 0.27 
2009 1,000,000 75 0.07 
B.31 Fraud detection operational costs (1971 to 2013) 
Table B-46 are the values of hardware typically required at that time to provide 
fraud detection and are used to provide a comparison for the cost of detecting fraud. 
Table B-46 – Fraud detection operational costs (1971 to 2013). 
Yearê Model Cost  Value in 2015 
MIPS Source 
1971 IBM S/360-5362 $5.5m $60m 1 (IBM-Archives, 
1964) 
1982 IBM 3084-QX $8.7m $33.0m 31 (IBM-Archives, 
1982) 
1993 3xIBM RS/6000 
930 
$187k $4m 63 (Longbottom, 
2015) 
2013 8xBlade (Intel i7) $150k $150k 1,018,184 (Dell, 2008) 
Table B-47 are the values of computing storage estimated to be required: 
Table B-47 – Values of computing storage. 
Yearê Required Cost  Value in 2015 
1971 0.2Mb $2.5m $24m 
1982 64Mb $11k $44k 
1993 23Gb $7.5k $15k 
2013 2.6Tb $18k $19k 
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Table B-48 are the assumptions made to calculate the yearly software and support 
costs for the above hardware. 
Table B-48 – Software and support costs. 
Yearê Model Support/OS Licences Value in 2015 p.a. 
1971 IBM S/360-
5362 
10 of hardware $6.0m 
1982 IBM 3084-
QX 
10 of hardware $3.3m 
1993 3xIBM 
RS/6000 
930 
Approximated based on licencing Microsoft 
Servers, Microsoft Database, plus 10 of 
hardware 
$750k 
2013 8xBlade 
(Intel i7) 
Approximated based on licencing Microsoft 
Servers and Microsoft Database on a per core 
basis, plus 10 of hardware 
$1.5m 
Table B-49 is the assumption made to calculate the operational cost to the business 
for the hardware expenditure depreciated in a straight line in line with accounting 
practice at that time. 
Table B-49 – Operational cost. 
Yearê Depreciation period (Years) Hardware p.a.,  value in 2015  
Storage p.a.,  
value in 2015 
1971 10 $6.0m $2.4m 
1982 10 $3.3m $4.4k 
1993 3 $1.3m $5.1k 
2013 3 $50k $6.4k 
Table B-50 is calculated from the hardware MIPS and full initial cost of the 
hardware. 
Table B-50 – Hardware cost. 
Yearê Cost per MIPS value in 2015 
Multiple 
previous  
1971 $60m  
1982 $1m 56 
1993 $60k 17 
2013 $0.15 431,000 
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Table B-51 is the assumption made to calculate the operational cost to the business 
for the fraud review team. 
Table B-51 – Per person cost. 
Per person, per year, 
 value in 2015 
$100,000 
Table B-52 is calculated based on the review time size calculated from the alerts per 
day in the confusion matrix and the per person, per year value in 2015 described 
above. 
Table B-52 – Review time size. 
Yearê Team Size  Review Team Cost p.a. 
1971 15 $1.4m 
1982 85 $8.5m 
1993 60 $6.0m 
2013 57 $5.7m 
Table B-53 is the assumed licence cost from a vendor for their FMS per year value 
in 2015 based on payments industry knowledge. 
Table B-53 – FMS software licence cost. 
Yearê FMS Licence Cost p.a. 
1971 - 
1982 $100k 
1993 $1m 
2013 $1.5m 
Table B-54 is calculated using the figures above to give the fraud detection 
operational cost in 2015 value per year. 
Table B-54 – Fraud detection operational cost in 2015 value. 
Cost per year 
(2015 value) 1971 1982 1993 2013 
Hardware $6.0m $3.3m $1.3m $50k 
Storage $2.4m $4.4k $5.1k $6.4k 
Support/OS Licences $6.0m $3.3m $750k $1.5m 
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Cost per year 
(2015 value) 1971 1982 1993 2013 
FMS Licence - $100k $1m $1.5m 
Review Team $1.4m $8.5m $6.0m $5.7m 
Total in 2015 value $15.9m $15.2m $9.1m $8.8m 
Table B-55 is calculated on a per transaction basis for the fraud detection 
operational cost BP in each period in 2015 value for a Tier-1 issuer. 
Table B-55 – Summary fraud detection operational cost in 2015 value. 
Tier-1 Issuer  
Year 
ê 
Operational 
cost 
p.a. 
Transaction 
volume p.a. 
BP op cost 
per 
transaction 
$CEV 
p.a. 
BP op cost 
per 
$CEV 
Multiple 
1971 $15.9m 2.3m 689¢ $239m 665¢ 22.18 
1982 $15.2m 14.3m 106¢ $1.7bn 89¢ 0.41 
1993 $9.1m 202.9m 4¢ $17.6bn 5.2¢ 0.72 
2013 $8.8m 1.8bn 0.5¢ $160bn 0.6¢ 0.06 
Table B-56 is calculated to give average total operations costs for all merchants in 
2013 along with the listed source. 
Table B-56 – Average total operations costs for all merchants in 2013. 
Merchants   2013 Source 
Calc. merchant direct fraud  37% of $13.9bn $5.1bn  (Gupta & Roy, 2013) 
Calc. merchant lost fees $3.08 x $5.1bn  $15.9bn (LexisNexis, 2012) 
Calc. merchant operations CNP 5% $38.6bn (Khan, 2013) 
Calc. merchant operations CP 1% $78bn Assumption 
Total merchant operational cost $132bn  
Calc. operational costs BP  81¢  
Table B-57 is calculated to give average total costs for all issuers in 2013. 
Table B-57 – Average total costs for all issuers in 2013. 
Issuers  2013 Source 
Cost to re-issue cards  $1.9bn B.12 
Calc. issuer operations  0.6¢ x $16.3tn $896m BP op cost per 
$CEV 
Total issuer operational cost $2.8bn  
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B.32 Data breach statistics  
Table B-58 are figures from (Information-is-beautiful, 2015) and (Risk-Based-
Security, 2015) that detail data news worthy data breaches. 
Table B-58 – News worthy data breaches. 
ê Entity #Records stolen 
20
10
 
Federal Bank of Cleveland 400,000 
20
11
 
City Group 360,083 
Sega 1,290,755 
Sony Online Entertainment 24,600,000 
Steam 35,000,000 
Sony PSN 77,000,000 
20
12
 
Global Payments 1,500,000 
Three Iranian Banks (names undisclosed) 3,000,000 
7-Eleven, JC Penney, Hannaford, Heartland, 
JetBlue, Dow Jones, Euronet, Visa Jordan, 
Global Payment, Diners Singapore and 
Ingenicard 
160,000,000 
20
13
 Ubuntu 2,000,000 
Vodafone 2,000,000 
Dun & Bradstreet (Shanghai) 150,000,000 
20
14
 
LexisNexis 1,000,000 
UPS 4,000,000 
Sony Pictures 10,000,000 
Sony Pictures II 10,000,000 
Home Depot 56,000,000 
JP Morgan Chase 76,000,000 
Target 110,000,000 
e-bay 145,000,000 
Adobe 152,000,000 
NYC Taxi 173,000,000 
Korea Credit Bureau 220,000,000 
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Table B-59 are figures from (Information-is-beautiful, 2015) that give the 
approximate price paid for validated stolen data by the criminal underground 
market. 
Table B-59 – Price paid for validated stolen data. 
Data Element USD 
CVV $2 
Full details of an individual $3 
Bank account details $5 
Magnetic stripe card details $5 
Credit card $10 
PayPal/eBay account $27 
EMV Credit Card or wallet $32 
Table B-60are figures from (Risk-Based-Security, 2015) that summarise data breach 
incidents and volumes. 
Table B-60 – Summary data breach incidents and volumes. 
Yearê Total 
incidents 
Records 
stolen 
Payment 
incidents 
Payment 
incidents 
2010 953 96,000,000 130 14 
2011 1,241 413,000,000 180 15 
2012 3,220 265,000,000 160 5 
2013 2,345 873,000,000 213 9 
2014 3,014 1,068,191,345 274 9 
Table B-61 are figures from (Risk-Based-Security, 2015) that list data breaches by 
types in 2014. 
Table B-61 – Data breach incidents by types in 2014. 
Type Incidents Records 
stolen 
Records per 
Incident 
Records 
Fraud 130 152,878,190 1,175,986 14.31 
Seizure 2 2,097,000 1,048,500 0.20 
Hacking 2,040 889,833,759 436,193 83.30 
Phishing 48 5,036,467 104,926 0.47 
Stolen 
computer 73 6,044,790 82,805 0.57 
New types 89 6,243,309 70,150 0.58 
Web 116 3,317,593 28,600 0.31 
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Type Incidents Records 
stolen 
Records per 
Incident 
Records 
Email 78 351,709 4,509 0.03 
Unknown 59 232,010 3,932 0.02 
Snooping 49 188,060 3,828 0.02 
Lost/stolen 141 249,008 1,766 0.02 
Not known - 1,719,450 - - 
Total 2,825 1,068,191,345   
Table B-62 are published figures for large data breaches that have resulted in 
payment card information being stolen (Information-is-beautiful, 2015). 
Table B-62 – Published figures for large data breaches. 
Entity Records Stolen (m) 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Fed bank of Cleveland 0.4    
Sony PSN 77   20 
Steam 35    
Sony Online 25    
Sega 1.3    
City Group 0.4    
US Businesses  160   
Iranian Banks  3   
Global Payments  2   
Ubuntu   2  
Vodafone   2  
Dun & Bradstreet   1  
Adobe    152 
JP Morgan Chase    76 
Target    70 
Home Depot    56 
Korea credit bureau    20 
UPS    4 
LexisNexis    1 
Total 139 165 5 400 
The graph in Figure B-8 is used to forecast number of payment card detail records 
stolen from 2015 based on the figures in (Risk-Based-Security, 2015) given above. 
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Figure B-8  – Chart forecast number of payment card detail records stolen. 
Table B-63 forecasts the CHD records stolen, the number of issued cards using the 
CAGR in B.6 and then calculates the percentage of cards compromised.  This 
forecast would have a large variability. 
Table B-63 – Cards compromised. 
 2015 2020 2025 2029 
CHD stolen records  130m 1.1bn 9.5bn 53bn 
Issued Cards 14.4bn 29.5bn 60.6bn 107.8bn 
Cards compromised % 0.9 3.8 15.7 49 
B.33 EMV uptake statistics  
Table B-64 are published figures for the uptake on EMV cards measured by 
transactions for the year ending June 2013 (EMVCo, 2015b). 
y = 1E+07e0.426x
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Table B-64 – EMV uptake statistics. 
Country ê  Uptake Region 
Andorra 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Austria 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Belgium 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Bulgaria 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Cyprus 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Czech Republic 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Denmark 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Estonia 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Finland 0.963 Europe zone 1 
France 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Germany 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Gibraltar 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Greece 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Greenland 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Hungary 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Iceland 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Ireland 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Israel 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Italy 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Latvia 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Liechtenstein 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Lithuania 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Luxembourg 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Malta 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Netherlands 0.963 Europe zone 1 
New Caledonia 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Norway 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Poland 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Portugal 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Romania 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Slovak Republic 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Slovenia 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Spain 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Sweden 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Switzerland 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Turkey 0.963 Europe zone 1 
United Kingdom 0.963 Europe zone 1 
Canada 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Mexico 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Anguilla 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Aruba 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
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Country ê  Uptake Region 
Bahamas 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Barbados 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
British Virgin Islands 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Cayman Islands 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Cuba 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Curacao 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Dominica 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Dominican Republic 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Grenada 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Guadeloupe 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Haiti 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Jamaica 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Martinique 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Montserrat 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Puerto Rico 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Saint-BarthŽlemy 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Saint Lucia 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Saint Martin (French part) 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Saint Maarten 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Virgin Islands (US) 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Argentina 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Bolivia 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Brazil 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Chile 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Colombia 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Ecuador 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
French Guiana 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Guyana 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Paraguay 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Peru 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Suriname 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Uruguay 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Venezuela 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Belize 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Costa Rica 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
El Salvador 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Guatemala 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Honduras 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
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Country ê  Uptake Region 
Mexico 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Nicaragua 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Panama 0.833 Canada, Latin America, Caribbean 
Bahrain 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Iraq 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Iran 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Jordan 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Kuwait 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Lebanon 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Oman 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Palestine 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Qatar 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Saudi Arabia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Syria 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
United Arab Emirates 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Burundi 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Comoros 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Djibouti 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Eritrea 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Ethiopia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Kenya 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Madagascar 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Malawi 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Mauritius 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Afghanistan 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Mozambique 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Rwanda 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Seychelles 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Somalia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Tanzania 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Uganda 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Zambia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Zimbabwe 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Angola 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Cameroon 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Central African Republic 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Chad 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Congo 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Equatorial Guinea 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Gabon 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Algeria 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Egypt 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
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Country ê  Uptake Region 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Morocco 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
South Sudan 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Sudan 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Tunisia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Western Sahara 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Botswana 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Lesotho 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Namibia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
South Africa 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Swaziland 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Benin 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Burkina Faso 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Cape Verde 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Ivory Coast 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Gambia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Ghana 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Guinea 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Guinea-Bissau 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Liberia 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Mali 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Mauritania 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Niger 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Nigeria 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Saint Helena 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Senegal 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Sierra Leone 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Togo 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Afghanistan 0.795 Africa and Middle East 
Albania 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Armenia 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Azerbaijan 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Belarus 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Georgia 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Kazakhstan 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Kyrgyzstan 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Macedonia 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Moldova 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Russia 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Serbia 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Tajikistan 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Turkmenistan 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Ukraine 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
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Country ê  Uptake Region 
Uzbekistan 0.505 Europe Zone 2 
Australia 0.194 Asia 
Bangladesh 0.194 Asia 
Bhutan 0.194 Asia 
China 0.194 Asia 
India 0.194 Asia 
Japan 0.194 Asia 
Nepal 0.194 Asia 
New Zealand 0.194 Asia 
Korea south 0.194 Asia 
Sri Lanka 0.194 Asia 
Armenia 0.194 Asia 
Azerbaijan 0.194 Asia 
Brunei 0.194 Asia 
Cambodia 0.194 Asia 
Indonesia 0.194 Asia 
Malaysia 0.194 Asia 
Maldives 0.194 Asia 
Mongolia 0.194 Asia 
Myanmar 0.194 Asia 
Nepal 0.194 Asia 
Pakistan 0.194 Asia 
Philippines 0.194 Asia 
Singapore 0.194 Asia 
Taiwan 0.194 Asia 
Thailand 0.194 Asia 
Timor-Leste 0.194 Asia 
Vietnam 0.194 Asia 
United States 0.03 USA 
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Appendix C Example Data 
The data typically available from an issuer to a FMS is given in Table C-1 (this data 
is also referred to as the authorisation feed). 
Table C-1 – Issuer data. 
Field Name Description 
Issuer ID A unique code to identify the issuer 
Card Account ID Unique identifier for a Card Account 
Card Scheme ID User defined card scheme identifier 
Card Product ID User defined card product identifier 
Transaction Date GMT Date of transaction expressed in GMT 
Transaction Time GMT Time of transaction expressed in GMT  
MID Unique identifier for merchant 
Amount Actual CCY Transaction amount expressed in the currency the 
transaction was actually conducted in. 
Transaction Actual CCY The currency the transaction occurred in. 
Amount Account CCY Transaction amount expressed in the currency account 
is billed in. 
Amount Issuer CCY Transaction amount expressed in a currency that is 
consistent for all authorisations as well as transactions, 
such as Issuer's local currency MCC Merchant Category Code 
Card Acceptor Country The country code of the card acceptor 
CVV/CVC Results 
Code 
Code indicating the result of verifying the CVV/CVC 
CVV2/CVC2 Result 
Code 
Code indicating the result of verifying the CVV2/CVC2 
Merchant Group 
Indicator 
Code indicating general category of card acceptor and 
transaction 
Floor Limit Indicator Indicates whether the transaction was above or below 
floor limit 
Chip Transaction Flag Indicates whether transaction was carried out using a 
chip card. 
Card Presence Indicator Code indicating card presence during transaction 
Cardholder 
Authentication 
Code indicating cardholder authentication method 
Card Data Input mode Code indicating actual method used to capture account 
number and expiration date 
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Field Name Description 
Mail/Telephone or 
Electronic Commerce 
Indicator 
Code indicating type of Mail/Telephone or Electronic 
Commerce transaction 
Terminal Entry 
Capability 
Code indicating terminal capability to electronically 
read account numbers and expiration dates from cards 
The data typically available from an acquirer is given below. 
Field Name Description 
Acquirer ID A unique code to identify the acquirer 
Authorisation Date  Date of transaction in time zone where 
transaction occurred 
Authorisation Time Time of transaction in time zone where 
transaction occurred. 
Merchant 5 Unique identifier for merchant 
Transaction Type Code to indicate type of transaction. Used to 
distinguish between transaction purchases, refunds 
and cash 
Authorisation Actual Currency 
Code 
The currency the authorisation was performed in. 
Authorisation Amount Acquirer Authorisation amount expressed in a currency 
that is consistent for all authorisations as well as 
transactions, such as acquirer’s local currency 
POS Entry Mode Acquirer-defined code indicating the method used 
to input the transaction. 
Card Expiry Date Card expiry date 
Floor Limit The floor limit against which the transaction 
amount was compared 
Terminal Type Acquirer-defined code indicating the 
authorisation terminal type 
Country Code ISO Code for Country the transaction was made 
in 
POS Condition Code Describes the conditions at the point of sale at the 
time of the transaction 
CVV1/CVC1Verified Indicator to denote whether the Issuer has verified 
the CVV or CVC 
CVV2/CVC2Verified Indicator to denote whether the Issuer has verified 
the CVV2 or CVC2 
Cardholder Verification 
Method 
Acquirer-defined code to verify how the customer 
was verified at the point of sale 
Card Authentication Method Acquirer-defined code to verify how the customers 
card was authenticated at the point of sale 
CNP Type Indicate if merchant undertakes CNP transactions 
E-commerce Indicator Acquirer-defined code indicating type of 
Mail/Telephone or Electronic Commerce 
transaction 
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The data typically available on a merchant that is stored at the acquirer is given 
below. 
Field Name Description 
Merchant ID Unique identifier for merchant 
Open Date Date that the merchant, company, or group had their account 
opened MCC Merchant Category Code – code designating the principal 
trade, profession, or line of business in which a Merchant is 
engaged 
City City 
Outer Post Code Outer post code 
Inner Post Code Inner post code 
Telephone1 Telephone Number 1 
Telephone2 Telephone Number 2 
Telephone3 Telephone Number 3 
Web Address Web address 
CNP Type The type of business profile 
Floor Limit The floor limit above which a transaction will require 
authorisation 
Business Group Specific business hierarchy code or trade classification to which 
the merchant belongs 
Business Type Type of business.   
Settlement 
Method Indicates how the acquirer settles with the merchant 
Reason 
Settlement 
Stopped 
Any indicator pertaining to why the settlement was withheld 
from the merchant 
Retailer POS 
Type Type or make of POS terminal at merchant 
Business Category Business category ID of merchant if assigned 
Deferred Supply 
Merchant 
Indicates whether the merchant engages with deferred supply of 
goods and supplies the consumer a period after the order has 
been placed.   
Trading Start 
Date Date sales turnover commenced at the merchant business 
Business 
Turnover Total volume of sales turnover at the merchant (if known) 
Card Turnover Total volume of card sales turnover at the merchant (if known) 
Average Card 
Transaction Merchants overall average card transaction in this merchant 
Collateral 
Amount Held Total value of funds held on suspense in lieu of settlement risk 
Security Details Details of any specific collateral held 
Type Of Goods Description of the goods sold by the business 
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Field Name Description 
Sold 
Control Area ID A grouping code for use by the acquirer to segregate by 
geographic area or MCC 
The acquirer will have data available on any chargebacks as detailed in Table C-2. 
Table C-2 – Acquirer data. 
Field Name Description 
Acquirer Id A unique code to identify the acquirer  
Merchant Id Unique ID for the merchant 
Transaction Date 
Actual 
Date of transaction in time zone where transaction 
occurred 
Transaction Time 
Actual 
Time of transaction in time zone where transaction 
occurred 
Transaction Type User-defined code to indicate type of transaction.  Used 
to distinguish between sales draft chargeback, credit 
voucher chargeback, retrieval request  
Chargeback Reason 
Code 
Code used by the issuer to describe why the chargeback 
is being made or why the copy of the sales 
voucher/credit voucher is requested 
Chargeback Processing 
Date 
Date the chargeback was processed or raised by the 
issuer (for example, Chargeback Processing Date using 
Visa Resolve Online or MasterCard Online) 
Retrieval Date Date of Retrieval Request 
Chargeback Amount Chargeback amount in local currency 
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Appendix D R Implementation 
R is a stastical programming language that is in common use within the machine 
learning community (R-Development-Core-Team, 2008).  An implementation of the 
SOAR Extraction algorithm is written in R based on the pseudo code that described 
the algorithms in 3.5.  It is not necessary for this thesis for the implementation to be 
optomised in terms of speed or use of memory and it is publically provided for 
experimental purposes for the emperical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
The R source code can be found at: 
https://github.com/nickrymantubb/Rule-Extraction-SOAR 
http://www/surrey.ac.uk/cs/people/nicholas_ryman_tubb 
The following sections are details on how the run the SOAR R code.  An up to date 
“readme” file is provided at the above link. 
D.1 Environment 
The R code was written using RStudio Version 0.99.491 (https://www.rstudio.com) 
on a Mac OS X El Capitan. 
D.2 Code conventions 
The following conventions are used throughout the code: 
§ All constants are prefixed by const 
§ Any global variables (apologises) are prefixed by global_ 
§ Core SOAR algorithm code name is prefixed by SOAR_ 
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D.3 Libraries 
Extensive use of existing libraries has been made.  These are all here acknowledged 
and have their own licences/restrictions.  All libraries are loaded at the start of 
execution that can be found at the end of the SOAR.R file. 
D.4 Datasets 
The small datasets were obtained from the UCI Machine Learning Repository 
(UCI, 2010).  They are made available along with the code as a convenience and are 
subject to licensing/copyright from the above.  The datasets have been converted to 
CSV files and all contain two classes. 
D.5 Directories 
The following constants within the code need to be set to reflect the file system on 
which the code is running: 
§ const_dataset_directory –  set to the local directory that contains 
the UCI CSV files 
§ const_results_directory - set to the local directory to store results 
files that are formatted as CSV files 
D.6 Experimental Setup 
The following constants within the code need to be set to determine the experiments 
that are executed: 
§ const_datasetid – set to 0 to run all datasets, set to the dataset ID 
listed above to select just that dataset.  e.g. 2=UCI-B , Wisconsin Breast 
Cancer 
§ const_folds – set to the number of cross-validation folds.  Default is 10 
§ const_run_SOAR – set to TRUE execute the SOAR rule extraction 
algorithm otherwise just the classifier training occurs 
§ const_run_ANALYSIS – set to TRUE to produce charts and analysis 
on data otherwise none are produced and execution is swifter 
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D.7 Classifier Selection 
Four classifiers are supported.  When selected these are trained and then used as the 
black-box classifier for the SOAR algorithm: 
§ const_classifier_type – set to “DeepMLP”, “MLP”, “SVM”, “DT”, 
“RBF” 
D.8 SOAR Cluster Selection 
Three cluster methods are supported.  When selected these are used in the SOAR 
extraction algorithm: 
§ const_cluster_type – set to “Gaussian”, “ART2”, “SOM” 
These algorithms can be forced to produce a fixed range of clusters by changing the 
following values: 
§ const_min_clusters – set to minimum number of clusters to form 
§ const_max_clusters – set to 0 to allow the algorithm to determine 
the best in-cluster .v. out-cluster or set to a maximum.  Some algorithms 
ignore this. 
§ const_SOM – if selected SOM this defines the size of n x n grid 
D.9 SOAR Algorithm Control 
The SOAR algorithm supports variants.  These are selected by adding the following 
values together in const_SOAR_type: 
§ 0 = Choose all discreet symbol literals to create a list of OR 
§ 1 = Choose the single discreet symbol literal in the prototype as SOAR 
§ 2 = Choose any of 1-of-n Literals cause the classifier to score. This 
creates a list of literals 
§ 4 = Limit number of fields using strength detection to 
'const_strength_cutoff' 
§ 8 = Discretise all numeric fields as SOAR 
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§ 16 = SOAR, extract rules of genuine class and trim the fraud rules 
So that const_SOAR_type=1+8 is the SOAR algorithm and  
const_SOAR_type=8+16 is the SOAR algorithm. 
D.10 Classifier Assumptions 
The following constants are used: 
§ const_output_max<-1.0 – maximum output from classifier 
§ const_output_min<-0.0 – minimum output from classifier 
§ const_MLP_train_error<-0.01		– Error rate in learning 
§ const_MLP_act_fct	<-	'logistic' – activation function choice 
§ const_MLP_algorithm<-"rprop+"  –  training algorithm for the 
MLP, this can be rprop+ or slr 
D.11 Results 
Results are output as CSV files and the filename is reflects the setup: 
§ <resultsname> = SOARResults 
§ <dataset> = “UCI-A”,… as DATASETS above 
§ <clustering> = “Gaussian”, “ART2”, “SOM” 
§ <min clusters> = e.g. 5 (const_min_clusters) 
§ <max clusters> = e.g. 35 (const_max_clusters) 
§ <classifier> = “Deep-MLP”, “SVM”, “DT”, “RBF” 
§ <optimision> = any combination of: “m”=MCC optimisation, “t”=TN 
optimisation, “o”=remove overlap rules 
§ <SOAR type> = e.g. 8 (const_SOAR_type) 
§ “-” 
§ <folds> = e.g. 10, number of cross folds 
§ extension=“.csv” 
 
 
| Appendix E - Additional Results | 
 | 585 |  
Appendix E Additional Results 
The following sections provide additional detail of some results from the experiments 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
E.1 SOAR Extracted rules 
The following sections are the rules generated by the SOAR algorithm as discussed 
in in Chapter 4 for each of the UCI datasets.  Only the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 with the highest MCC out of all folds is given.  The rules are given in Table E-11 to Table E-20 
below. 
E.1.1 UCI-A Credit card applications 
Table E-1 – Credit card applications rules. 
UCI-A. MCC  = 0.597, Fold=10 
IF A1=0 AND A8=1 AND A11=0 AND A12=2 AND A3>4.21 AND A14>255.48 
IF A1={0,1} AND A8=1 AND A11=0 AND A12=2 AND A7>1.19 AND A13=>99.5 
IF A1={0,1} AND A8=1 AND A12=2 AND A7>1.19 AND A13=>99.5 
IF A1=0 AND A8=1 AND A12=2 AND A3>4.21 AND A7>1.19 
IF A4=1 AND A8=1 AND A11=0 AND A12=2 AND A3>4.21 AND A7=>1.19 
E.1.2 UCI-B Aspirate of a breast mass 
Table E-2 – Aspirate of a breast mass rules. 
UCI-B. MCC  = 0.962, Fold=1 
IF Radius>15.04 AND Area>696.25 AND Smooth=[0.05-0.11] 
IF Area>696.25 AND Concavity>0.09 AND Concave>0.05 
IF Radius=[6.98-15.04] AND Perimeter=[43.79-98.75] AND Compact>0.12 AND 
Concavity>0.09 AND Concave>0.05 
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E.1.3 UCI-G Credit scoring for German personal loans 
Table E-3 – Credit scoring for German personal loans rules. 
UCI-G. MCC  = 0.450, Fold=7 
IF Checking=A11 AND Savings={A61,A62,A63,A65,A64} AND 
Employment={A72,A73,A75,A74} AND PerCentIncome=4 AND Debtors=A101 AND 
ResidentYears=4 AND Plans={A141,A143} AND Job={A173,A172,A174} AND 
Telephone={A191,A192} AND Foreign=A201 
IF Checking=A11 AND Savings={A61,A62,A63,A65,A64} AND 
Employment={A72,A73,A75,A74} AND PerCentIncome=4 AND Debtors=A101 AND 
ResidentYears={3,4} AND Property={A122,A123} AND Plans={A141,A143} AND 
Job={A173,A172,A174} AND Telephone={A191,A192} AND Foreign=A201 
E.1.4 UCI-H Diagnosis of liver hepatitis 
Table E-4 – Diagnosis of liver hepatitis rules. 
UCI-H. MCC  = 0.628, Fold=1 
IF Sex=1 AND Steroid=2 AND LiverBig=2 AND Spiders=1 AND Varices=1 AND Histology=2 
AND Age>40.5 AND Albumin>2.85 
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND Spiders=1 AND Histology=2 
AND Age>40.5 AND Albumin>2.85 
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND Anorexia=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND 
SpleenPalpable=1 AND Protime=1 AND Histology=2 
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND Anorexia=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND Protime=1 
AND Histology=2 AND Age>40.5 
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Anorexia=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND SpleenPalpable=1 AND 
Spiders=1 AND Protime=1 AND Histology={1,2} AND Age>40.5 
IF Sex=1 AND Steroid=2 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND Anorexia=1 AND LiverBig=2 
AND Spiders=1 AND Ascites=1 AND Histology={1,2} AND Age>40.5  
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND Ascites=1 AND Histology=2 
AND AlkPhosphate=[1-85.5] AND Albumin>2.85 
IF Sex=1 AND Steroid=2 AND Fatigue=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND SpleenPalpable=1 AND 
Spiders=1 AND Ascites=1 AND Histology=2 AND Age>40.5 AND AlkPhosphate>85.5 AND 
Albumin>2.85 
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND LiverFirm=1 AND Spiders=1 
AND Ascites=1 AND Varices=1 AND Histology=2 AND Age>40.5 AND AlkPhosphate>85.5 
IF Sex=1 AND Steroid=2 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND LiverFirm=1 
AND Ascites=1 AND Varices=1 AND Histology=2 AND Age>40.5 AND AlkPhosphate>85.5 
IF Sex=1 AND Fatigue=1 AND Malaise=1 AND Anorexia=1 AND LiverBig=2 AND 
LiverFirm=1 AND Spiders=1 AND Ascites=1 AND Varices=1 AND Protime=1 AND 
Histology=2 AND AlkPhosphate>85.5 AND Albumin=[1-2.85] 
E.1.5 UCI-I Features of an Iris flower type 
Table E-5 – Features of an Iris flower type rules. 
UCI-I. MCC  = 1.000, Fold=1 
IF petallength>2.48 AND petalwidth>0.8 
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E.1.6 UCI-L Lung cancer diagnosis 
Table E-6 – Lung cancer diagnosis rules. 
UCI-L. MCC  = 1.000 Fold=1 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att2={3} AND att7={3} AND att10={2} AND att18={2} AND 
att20=(x et al.) AND att21={2} AND att27={3} AND att30={1} AND att33={3} AND 
att36={2} AND att37={2,3} AND att39={1,2} AND att40={2} AND att43={2} AND 
att44={2} AND att45={2} AND att46={2} AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND att49={2} 
AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND att52={2} AND att53={2} AND att54={1} AND 
att55={1,2} AND att56={2} AND att3>0 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att7={3} AND att10={2} AND att11={1} AND att15={1} AND 
att16={1} AND att17={2} AND att18={2} AND att20=(x et al.) AND att21={2} AND 
att30={1} AND att31={2,3} AND att32={2,3} AND att33={3} AND att37={1,2,3} AND 
att38={2} AND att39={2} AND att40={2} AND att43={2} AND att44={2} AND att45={2} 
AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND 
att52={2} AND att53={2} AND att55={2} AND att56={2} AND att3>0 AND att13>2 AND 
att26>2 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att2={3} AND att5=(x et al.) AND att7={3} AND att10={2} 
AND att15={1,3} AND att20=(x et al.) AND att27={3} AND att28={1} AND att31={2,3} 
AND att32={2,3} AND att33={3} AND att36={2} AND att37={2,3} AND att39={1,2} AND 
att40={2} AND att43={2} AND att44={2} AND att45={2} AND att46={2} AND att47={2} 
AND att48={2} AND att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND att52={2} AND 
att53={2} AND att55={1} AND att56={1,2} AND att3>0 AND att13>2 AND att26>2 
att1=(x et al.) AND att2={3} AND att5=(x et al.) AND att11={1} AND att15={1,3} 
AND att16={1} AND att18={2} AND att20=(x et al.) AND att21={2} AND att27={3} AND 
att30={1} AND att33={3} AND att34={3} AND att35={2,3} AND att36={2} AND 
att37={2,3} AND att39={1,2} AND att40={2} AND att43={2} AND att44={2} AND 
att46={2} AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} 
AND att52={2} AND att53={2} AND att54={1} AND att55={1,2} AND att56={1,2} AND 
att3>0 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att5=(x et al.) AND att15={1,3} AND att16={1} AND 
att18={2} AND att20=(x et al.) AND att22={1} AND att27={3} AND att29={1} AND 
att30={1} AND att31={2,3} AND att32={2,3} AND att33={3} AND att35={2,3} AND 
att37={2,3} AND att39={1,2} AND att40={2} AND att41={1} AND att42={2} AND 
att43={2} AND att44={2} AND att46={2} AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND att50={2} 
AND att51={1,2} AND att52={2} AND att53={2} AND att54={1} AND att55={1,2} AND 
att56={1,2} AND att3>0 AND att12>1 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att2={3} AND att5=(x et al.) AND att7={2,3} AND att11={1} 
AND att16={1} AND att18={2} AND att20={0,2} AND att21={2} AND att30={1} AND 
att33={3} AND att34={3} AND att35={2,3} AND att36={2} AND att37={1,2,3} AND 
att38={2} AND att39={1,2} AND att40={2} AND att41={1} AND att42={2} AND att43={2} 
AND att44={2} AND att45={2} AND att46={2} AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND 
att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND att52={1,2} AND att53={1,2} AND 
att54={1} AND att55={1,2} AND att56={2} AND att3>0 AND att13>2 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att2={3} AND att5=(x et al.) AND att7={3} AND att11={1} 
AND att15={3} AND att16={1} AND att17={2} AND att20=(x et al.) AND att21={2} AND 
att27={3} AND att30={1} AND att31={2,3} AND att32={2,3} AND att33={3} AND 
att35={2} AND att36={2} AND att37={1,2,3} AND att38={2} AND att39={2} AND 
att40={2} AND att41={1} AND att42={2} AND att43={2} AND att45={2} AND att46={2} 
AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND 
att52={2} AND att53={2} AND att55={1} AND att56={1,2} AND att3>0 AND att13>2 
IF att1=(x et al.) AND att2={3} AND att5=(x et al.) AND att11={1} AND att15={1,3} 
AND att16={1} AND att18={2} AND att20=(x et al.) AND att21={2} AND att28={1} AND 
att29={1} AND att30={1} AND att31={2,3} AND att32={3} AND att33={3} AND att34={3} 
AND att35={2,3} AND att36={2} AND att37={1,2,3} AND att38={2} AND att39={1,2} AND 
att40={2} AND att41={1} AND att42={2} AND att43={2} AND att45={2} AND att46={2} 
AND att47={2} AND att48={2} AND att49={2} AND att50={2} AND att51={1,2} AND 
att52={2} AND att53={2} AND att54={1} AND att55={1,2} AND att56={1,2} AND att3>0 
AND att12>1 
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E.1.7 UCI-M Species of gilled mushrooms (Agaricus and Lepiota 
Family) 
Table E-7 – Species of gilled mushrooms rules. 
UCI-M MCC  = 0.722, Fold=1 
IF CapColour={c,w,g,n,e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p,n} AND 
GillSpace={c} AND StalkShape={e,t} AND StalkRoot={b,u} AND StalkSurfaceAbove={k} 
AND RingType={l,n} AND SporePrintColour={h,r,w} AND Population={v} AND 
Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
IF CapSurface={y} AND CapColour={c,w,g,n,e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND 
Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p,n} AND GillSpace={c} AND StalkShape={t} AND StalkRoot={u} AND 
StalkSurfaceAbove={k} AND StalkColourAbove={p} AND RingType={e,l,n} AND 
SporePrintColour={h,r,w} AND Population={v} AND Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
IF CapColour={c,w,g,n,e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p,n} AND 
GillSpace={c} AND StalkShape={t} AND StalkRoot={u} AND StalkSurfaceAbove={k} AND 
StalkSurfaceBelow={s} AND StalkColourAbove={p,w} AND RingType={e,l,n} AND 
SporePrintColour={h,r,w} AND Population={v} AND Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
IF CapColour={e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p,n} AND GillSpace={c} 
AND StalkShape={t} AND StalkRoot={u} AND StalkSurfaceAbove={k} AND 
StalkColourAbove={p,w} AND StalkColorBelow={w} AND RingType={e,l,n} AND 
SporePrintColour={h,r,w} AND Population={v} AND Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
IF CapSurface={y} AND CapColour={c,w,g,n,e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND 
Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p} AND GillSpace={c} AND StalkShape={t} AND StalkRoot={u} AND 
StalkSurfaceAbove={k,s} AND StalkColourAbove={p,w} AND RingType={e,l,n} AND 
SporePrintColour={h,r,w} AND Population={v} AND Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
IF CapColour={c,w,g,n,e,p,y} AND Bruises={f} AND Odor={c,f,s,m,y,p} AND 
GillSpace={c} AND StalkShape={e,t} AND StalkRoot={b,u} AND 
StalkSurfaceAbove={k,s} AND StalkSurfaceBelow={s} AND StalkColourAbove={p,w} AND 
StalkColorBelow={w} AND RingType={e,f,p,l,n} AND SporePrintColour={h,r,w,k,n} AND 
Population={v} AND Habitat={d,u,p,g,l} 
E.1.8 UCI-O Radar data 
Table E-8 – Radar data rules. 
UCI-O. MCC  = 0.224, Fold=1 
IF P1=1 AND P3>0.19 AND P4>-0.5 AND P5<0.23 AND P6>-0.22 AND P8>0.63 AND P12>-
0.56 AND P14>-0.55 AND P16>-0.63 AND P17>-0.96 AND P18>-0.81 AND P19>0.99 AND 
P20>-0.91 AND P24>0.99 AND P26>-0.98 AND P28>-0.94 AND P30>-0.91 
IF P1=1 AND P3>0.19 AND P4>-0.5 AND P5<0.23 AND P6<-0.22 AND P7>0.03 AND P8>0.63 
AND P9>0.06 AND P12>-0.56 AND P14>-0.55 AND P15>0.24 AND P16>-0.63 AND P17>-0.96 
AND P18>-0.81 AND P19>0.99 AND P20>-0.91 AND P21>0.07 AND P24>0.99 AND P26>-0.98 
AND P28>-0.94 AND P29>0.07 AND P30>-0.91 AND P31<-0.13 AND P33=[0-1] 
IF P1=1 AND P3>0.19 AND P4>-0.5 AND P5>0.23 AND P6>-0.22 AND P7>0.03 AND P8>0.63 
AND P9>0.06 AND P11>0.09 AND P12>-0.56 AND P13>0.53 AND P14<-0.55 AND P15>0.24 
AND P16>-0.63 AND P17>-0.96 AND P18>-0.81 AND P19>0.99 AND P20>-0.91 AND P21>0.07 
AND P23>0.19 AND P24>0.99 AND P25>0.09 AND P26>-0.98 AND P28>-0.94 AND P29>0.07 
AND P30>-0.91 AND P31>0.13 AND P33=[0-1] 
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E.1.9 UCI-P Diabetes diagnosis 
Table E-9 – Diabetes diagnosis rules. 
UCI-P MCC  = 0.510, Fold=10 
IF Triceps>31.5 
IF Pregnant>6.5 AND Age>30.49 
IF BMI=[0-40.85] AND Age>30.49 
E.1.10 UCI-U Insurance data with risk and car value 
Table E-10 – Insurance data with risk and car value. 
UCI-U. MCC  = 0.793, Fold=4 
IF Aspiration={std+turbo} AND Doors=(Correia et al.) AND 
EngineType={dohcv+rotor+l+ohcf,ohc} AND FuelSystem={idi+mpfi} AND 
EngineSize>121.5 AND Stroke=[3.53-3.9] AND Price>8882.95 
IF Aspiration={std+turbo} AND Doors=(Correia et al.) AND BodyStyle={sedan+wagon} 
AND EngineType={dohcv+rotor+l+ohcf,ohc} AND Width=[60.3-66.45] AND Height>59.45 
AND EngineSize>121.5 AND PeakRPM>4375.11 AND Price>8882.95 
IF Aspiration={std+turbo} AND Doors={four,two} AND 
EngineType={dohcv+rotor+l+ohcf,ohc} AND FuelSystem={idi+mpfi} AND 
EngineSize>121.5 AND Bore=[3.77-3.8] AND Horsepower>113 AND PeakRPM>4375.11 AND 
Price>8882.95 
IF Aspiration={std+turbo} AND Doors=(Correia et al.) AND BodyStyle={sedan+wagon} 
AND EngineType={ohc} AND FuelSystem={idi+mpfi} AND Length>187.65 AND 
CurbWeight>2911 AND EngineSize>121.5 AND PeakRPM>4375.11 AND Price>8882.95 
IF Aspiration={std+turbo} AND Doors=(Correia et al.) AND BodyStyle={sedan+wagon} 
AND FuelSystem={idi+mpfi} AND Losses=[0-103.5] AND WheelBase>102.2 AND 
Length>187.65 AND Width=[66.45-72.3] AND CurbWeight>2911 AND EngineSize>121.5 AND 
Horsepower>113 AND PeakRPM>4375.11 AND CityMPG=[13-30.5] AND Price>8882.95 
E.2 Decision tree C5.0 rules 
The following sections are the rules generated by the C5.0 DT algorithm discussed 
in 4.2.8 for each of the UCI datasets.  As ten folds were used, only the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 with 
the highest stated MCC is given below.  The decision tree was created with the same 
datasets as with all other experiments in Chapter 4.  Pre-processing was applied to 
the data but numeric values were not discretised.  The rules generated by the C5.0 
DT algorithm are given in Table E-11 to Table E-20 below. 
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Key: #=Rule number, Class=rule indicates membership either to class 0 (minority class) or class 1, 
Anti=number of antecedents in each rule. 
E.2.1 UCI-A Credit card applications 
Table E-11 – Credit card applications rules. 
# Rules for UCI-A with MCC  = 0.803 Class Anti 
1 A4 IS NOT 2 AND A5 IS NOT 9 AND A6 IS NOT 8 AND A9 IS 0 AND A12 IS 2 AND A13 <= 340 AND A14 <= 445 0 7 
2 A4 IS NOT 2 AND A5 IS NOT 9 AND A9 IS 0 AND A11 IS 1 AND A12 IS 2 AND A13 <= 340 0 6 
3 A8 IS NOT 1 0 1 
4 A2 > 25 AND A2 <= 47 AND A5 IS NOT 11 AND A5 IS NOT 9 AND A6 IS NOT 8 AND A9 IS 0 AND A13 > 112 AND A14 <= 13 0 8 
5 A5 IS NOT 11 AND A9 IS 0 AND A13 <= 112 AND A14 > 34 AND A14 <= 445 0 5 
6  A8 IS 1 1 1 
E.2.2 UCI-B Aspirate of a breast mass 
Table E-12 – Aspirate of a breast mass rules. 
# Rules for UCI-B with MCC  = 0.944 Class Anti 
1	 Texture <= 16 AND Concave <= 0 0 2 
2	 Texture <= 16 AND Area <= 788 AND Concave <= 0 0 3 
3	 Texture <= 21 AND Perimeter <= 87 AND Concavity <= 0 0 3 
4	  Area <= 694 AND Concave <= 0 0 2 
5	 Texture > 16 AND Smooth > 0 AND Concavity > 0 AND Concave > 0 1 4 
6	 Texture > 21 AND Concavity > 0 AND Concave > 0 1 3 
7	 Texture > 16 AND Perimeter > 87 AND Smooth > 0 AND Concavity > 0 1 4 
8	 Area > 694 1 1 
9	 Concave > 0 AND Concave <= 0 1 2 
E.2.3 UCI-G Credit scoring for German personal loans 
Table E-13 – Credit scoring for German personal loans rules. 
# Rules for UCI-G, with MCC  = 0.382 Class Anti 
1 Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS A34 AND Savings IS A65 0 3 
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# Rules for UCI-G, with MCC  = 0.382 Class Anti 
2 
PerCentIncome IS 1 AND ResidentYears IS NOT 4 AND Property 
IS A121 AND Job IS A172 0 4 
3 Checking IS A12 AND Savings IS A65 AND Property IS A123 0 3 
4 
Checking IS A14 AND Purpose IS NOT A40 AND Amount > 1169 
AND Employment IS NOT A71 AND ResidentYears IS NOT 2 0 5 
5 Checking IS A14 AND Plans IS NOT A141 0 2 
6 Checking IS NOT A14 AND History IS A33 AND Savings IS A65 0 3 
7 Checking IS A12 AND Savings IS A65 AND ResidentYears IS 4 0 3 
8 Duration <= 42 0 1 
9 
Checking IS NOT A12 AND Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking 
IS NOT A13 AND History IS NOT A34 AND Savings IS A61 AND 
Employment IS NOT A72 AND PerCentIncome IS NOT 1 AND 
PerCentIncome IS NOT 2 AND Status IS NOT A92 AND Debtors 
IS A101 AND ResidentYears IS NOT 2 AND Property IS NOT 
A122 AND Property IS NOT A121 AND Job IS NOT A172 
1 14 
10 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS 
NOT A34 AND Savings IS NOT A61 AND Savings IS NOT A65 AND 
PerCentIncome IS NOT 1 AND Status IS NOT A93 AND Property 
IS NOT A121 AND Telephone IS NOT A192 
1 9 
11 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS 
NOT A34 AND Savings IS NOT A65 AND Employment IS A72 AND 
Property IS NOT A121 AND Job IS NOT A174 AND Telephone IS 
A192 
1 8 
12 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND Duration 
<= 42 AND History IS NOT A34 AND History IS NOT A32 AND 
Savings IS NOT A65 AND Employment IS A72 AND Debtors IS 
A101 
1 8 
13 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS 
NOT A34 AND Purpose IS A40 AND Savings IS A61 AND 
PerCentIncome IS NOT 1 AND PerCentIncome IS NOT 2 AND 
Debtors IS A101 AND Property IS NOT A121 
1 9 
14 
Checking IS A12 AND History IS NOT A34 AND Purpose IS NOT 
A40 AND Savings IS A61 AND PerCentIncome IS NOT 1 AND 
ResidentYears IS NOT 2 AND Property IS NOT A122 AND 
Property IS NOT A121 AND Age > 32 AND Job IS NOT A172 
1 10 
15 
Checking IS NOT A12 AND Checking IS NOT A14 AND Duration > 
22 AND History IS NOT A34 AND Savings IS A65 AND 
Employment IS NOT A72 AND Plans IS NOT A141 
1 7 
16 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS 
NOT A34 AND Savings IS A61 AND PerCentIncome IS NOT 1 AND 
PerCentIncome IS NOT 2 AND ResidentYears IS 2 AND Property 
IS NOT A121 AND Job IS NOT A172 
1 9 
17 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND Purpose IS 
A43 AND Amount <= 2384 AND Savings IS NOT A65 AND 
Employment IS A72 AND Debtors IS A101 AND Property IS NOT 
A121 AND Job IS NOT A174 
1 9 
18 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND Duration 
<= 27 AND Employment IS A75 AND Status IS NOT A94 AND 
ResidentYears IS 3 AND Property IS NOT A121 
1 7 
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# Rules for UCI-G, with MCC  = 0.382 Class Anti 
19 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND Duration > 
11 AND Employment IS NOT A74 AND PerCentIncome IS NOT 1 
AND Status IS A92 AND Property IS A121 AND Job IS NOT A172 
AND Job IS NOT A174 
1 9 
20 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS 
NOT A33 AND History IS NOT A34 AND Savings IS NOT A65 AND 
PerCentIncome IS 2 AND Debtors IS A101 AND Property IS 
A122 
1 8 
21 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking IS NOT A13 AND Purpose IS 
A46 AND Savings IS NOT A65 AND Employment IS NOT A74 1 5 
22 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Savings IS A61 AND Property IS 
A121 AND Plans IS NOT A143 AND Job IS NOT A172 AND Job IS 
NOT A174 
1 6 
23 
Checking IS NOT A12 AND Checking IS NOT A14 AND Checking 
IS NOT A13 AND History IS NOT A33 AND Savings IS A65 AND 
Employment IS NOT A72 AND ResidentYears IS 2 AND Property 
IS NOT A121 
1 8 
24 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Duration > 11 AND Savings IS A61 
AND PerCentIncome IS 1 AND Property IS A121 AND Job IS NOT 
A172 AND Job IS NOT A174 
1 7 
25 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND History IS NOT A34 AND Savings IS 
NOT A65 AND PerCentIncome IS 4 AND Debtors IS NOT A101 AND 
Property IS NOT A122 AND Property IS NOT A121 
1 7 
26 
Checking IS A12 AND History IS NOT A33 AND History IS NOT 
A34 AND Employment IS NOT A72 AND ResidentYears IS NOT 4 
AND Property IS NOT A123 AND Property IS NOT A121 
1 7 
27 ResidentYears IS 2 AND Plans IS A141 AND Job IS NOT A174 1 3 
28 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Duration <= 24 AND PerCentIncome 
IS 1 AND Property IS NOT A121 AND Job IS A174 1 5 
29 
Checking IS NOT A13 AND History IS A34 AND Debtors IS NOT 
A101 AND Property IS NOT A121 AND Housing IS NOT A152 1 5 
30 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND History IS A34 AND Status IS A94 
AND Property IS NOT A121 AND Telephone IS NOT A192 1 5 
31 
History IS NOT A33 AND History IS NOT A34 AND Savings IS 
NOT A65 AND PerCentIncome IS 2 AND Property IS NOT A122 
AND Property IS NOT A121 AND Age <= 25 
1 7 
32 Purpose IS A40 AND Plans IS A141 AND Housing IS A152 1 3 
33 
Checking IS NOT A14 AND Duration > 11 AND History IS NOT 
A33 AND Savings IS A61 AND Employment IS NOT A74 AND 
Debtors IS A101 AND ResidentYears IS 4 AND Job IS A172 
1 8 
34 
Checking IS A13 AND Property IS NOT A122 AND Property IS 
NOT A123 AND Job IS A172 1 4 
35 Checking IS NOT A14 1 1 
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E.2.4 UCI-H Diagnosis of liver hepatitis 
Table E-14 – Diagnosis of liver hepatitis rules. 
# Rules for UCI-H, with MCC  = 0.916 Class Anti 
1 Spiders IS 2 AND Albumin > 4 0 2 
2 Bilirubin> 1 AND Bilirubin <= 2 AND Albumin > 4 0 3 
3 Malaise IS NOT 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Bilirubin > 1 AND Bilirubin <= 2 AND Sgot > 48 0 5 
4 Steroid IS 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Sgot > 1 AND Sgot <= 48 0 4 
5 Age <= 25 0 1 
6 Steroid IS NOT 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin <= 2 AND Albumin <= 4 0 4 
7 AlkPhosphate > 168 AND Albumin <= 4 0 2 
8 Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 2 AND Billirubin <= 3 AND Albumin <= 4 AND Histology IS 2 0 5 
9 Age <= 47 AND AlkPhosphate <= 168 AND Histology IS NOT 2 0 3 
10 Albumin <= 4 AND Protime > 58 AND Histology IS 2 0 3 
11 Antivirals IS 2 AND Fatigue IS 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 2 AND Protime > 1 0 5 
12 Steroid IS 1 AND Malaise IS 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Sgot > 48 AND Albumin <= 4 AND Protime > 1 1 6 
13 Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 3 AND Protime <= 1 1 3 
14 Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin <= 1 AND Sgot > 48 1 3 
15 Age > 56 AND Steroid IS 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Sgot > 48 1 4 
16 Steroid IS 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Sgot <= 1 1 3 
17 Sex IS 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 2 AND Protime <= 1 AND Histology IS NOT 2 1 5 
18 Fatigue IS NOT 1 AND Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 2 1 3 
19 Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 2 AND Albumin > 4 AND Protime <= 1 1 4 
20 Ascites IS NOT 2 1 1 
21 Ascites IS 2 AND Billirubin > 2 AND Protime <= 1 AND Histology IS NOT 2 1 4 
E.2.5 UCI-I Features of an Iris flower type 
Table E-15 – Features of an Iris flower type rules. 
# Rules for UCI-I, with MCC  = 1.0 Class Anti 
1  petallength <= 2 0 1 
2  petallength > 2 1 1 
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E.2.6 UCI-L Lung cancer diagnosis 
Table E-16 – Lung cancer diagnosis rules. 
# Rules for UCI-L, with MCC  = 1.0 Class Anti 
1  att6 <= 2 0 1 
2  att20 > 1 0 1 
3  att6 > 2 AND att20 <= 1 1 2 
E.2.7 UCI-M Species of gilled mushrooms (Agaricus and Lepiota 
Family) 
Table E-17 – Species of gilled mushrooms rules. 
# Rules for UCI-M, with MCC  = 1.0 Class Anti 
1 Odor IS NOT f AND GillSize IS NOT n AND RingNumber IS o 0 3 
2 GillSpace IS NOT c AND StalkShape IS t 0 2 
3 GillSize IS NOT n AND StalkRoot IS NOT c AND SporePrintColour IS w 0 3 
4 CapSurface IS f AND StalkRoot IS e 0 2 
5 Odor IS NOT f AND StalkSurfaceBelow IS f 0 2 
6 GillSpace IS NOT c AND StalkColorBelow IS n 0 2 
7 CapSurface IS NOT f AND GillSpace IS c AND GillSize IS n AND StalkSurfaceBelow IS NOT f 1 4 
8 GillSpace IS c AND GillSize IS n AND StalkRoot IS NOT e AND StalkSurfaceBelow IS NOT f 1 4 
9 Odor IS f 1 1 
10 GillSpace IS NOT c AND GillSize IS n AND StalkShape IS NOT t AND StalkColorBelow IS NOT n 1 4 
11 RingNumber IS NOT o AND SporePrintColour IS NOT w 1 2 
12 StalkRoot IS c AND RingNumber IS NOT o 1 2 
E.2.8 UCI-O Radar data 
Table E-18 – Radar data rules. 
# Rules for UCI-O, with MCC  = 0.755 Class Anti 
1  P5 > 0 0 1 
2  P5 <= 0 1 1 
3  P3 <= 1 AND P27 > 1 1 2 
4  P7 <= 1 AND P27 > 1 1 2 
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# Rules for UCI-O, with MCC  = 0.755 Class Anti 
5  P1 IS NOT 1 1 1 
6  P3 <= 1 AND P27 > 0 AND P29 <= 0 1 3 
7  P6 <= -1 1 1 
8  P8 <= -1 AND P28 > 0 1 2 
9  P3 <= 1 AND P7 > 1 1 2 
E.2.9 UCI-P Diabetes diagnosis 
Table E-19 – Diabetes diagnosis rules. 
# Rules for UCI-P, with MCC  = 0.685 Class Anti 
1 BMI <= 30 AND Age <= 25 0 2 
2 Plasma > 123 AND BMI <= 30 AND Age > 60 0 3 
3 Plasma <= 154 0 1 
4 
Pregnant IS NOT 7 AND Pregnant IS NOT 6 AND Plasma > 123 AND 
Plasma <= 154 AND BMI > 28 AND Pedigree > 0 AND Pedigree <= 
1 AND Age > 30 
1 8 
5 
Pregnant IS NOT 2 AND Pregnant IS NOT 3 AND Pregnant IS NOT 
6 AND Pregnant IS NOT 0 AND Plasma > 99 AND Plasma <= 123 
AND Triceps <= 47 AND BMI > 26 AND Pedigree > 1 AND Age > 28 1 
10 
6 Pregnant IS 0 AND Plasma > 123 AND Diastolic <= 72 AND BMI > 28 1 4 
7 
Pregnant IS NOT 4 AND Pregnant IS NOT 7 AND Pregnant IS NOT 
2 AND Pregnant IS NOT 3 AND Pregnant IS NOT 6 AND Triceps <= 
47 AND Insulin > 125 AND Age > 28 1 
8 
8 Plasma > 123 AND Diastolic <= 40 1 2 
9 Pregnant IS NOT 0 AND Plasma > 123 AND Diastolic > 68 AND Diastolic <= 72 AND BMI > 28 AND Age <= 30 1 6 
10 Pregnant IS 7 AND Plasma > 123 AND BMI > 35 1 3 
11 Plasma > 123 AND Diastolic <= 72 AND Triceps > 25 AND BMI > 28 AND Age > 23 AND Age <= 30 1 6 
12 Pregnant IS 7 AND Plasma > 99 AND Plasma <= 123 AND BMI > 26 1 4 
13 Plasma > 123 AND BMI > 43 1 2 
14 Plasma > 99 1 1 
E.2.10 UCI-U Insurance data with risk and car value 
Table E-20 – Insurance data with risk and car value. 
# Rules for UCI-U, with MCC  = 0.840 Class Anti 
1 WheelBase <= 102 0 1 
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# Rules for UCI-U, with MCC  = 0.840 Class Anti 
2 Make IS NOT volvo AND Height <= 56 AND Price > 15750 0 3 
3 Make IS volvo 1 1 
4 Make IS NOT peugot AND WheelBase > 102 AND Price <= 15750 1 3 
5 Make IS NOT peugot AND WheelBase > 102 AND Height > 56 1 3 
E.3 Cited work results 
E.3.1 UCI-H Diagnosis of liver hepatitis 
From (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a), here class 1 indicates live and class 0 
die.  The rules in the cited work for UCI-H are given Table E-21. 
Table E-21 – Diagnosis of liver hepatitis rules. 
# Rules for UCI-H Class Anti 
1  AlkPhosphate <=230 AND sgot IS 14 to 420 1 2 
E.3.2 UCI-I Features of an Iris flower type 
From (Augasta & Kathirvalavakumar, 2012a), here class 0 indicates versicolor, class 
1 virginica and class 2 setosa. For the experiments, class 1 and 2 were combined.  
The rules in the cited work for UCI-I are given Table E-22. 
Table E-22 – Features of an Iris flower type rules. 
# Rules for UCI-I Class Anti 
1 Sepalwidth IS 2.0 to 3.4 AND petallength <=5.0 AND petalwidth is 1.0 to 1.7 0 3 
2 petallength <=6.9 AND petalwidth >=1.4 1 1 
E.3.3 UCI-M Species of gilled mushrooms (Agaricus and Lepiota 
Family) 
From (Tsukimoto, 2000), here class 0 indicated poisonous and class 1 edible.  The 
rules in the cited work for UCI-M are given Table E-23. 
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Table E-23 – Species of gilled mushrooms rules. 
# Rules for UCI-M Class Anti 
1 GillSize IS b AND Odor is (a OR l OR n) 1 2 
2 GillSize IS n  0 2 
3 Odor is NOT a AND Odor is NOT l AND Odor is NOT n 0 3 
E.3.4 UCI-O Radar data 
From (Tsukimoto, 2000), here class 0 indicated good and class 1 bad.  The rules in 
the cited work for UCI-O are given Table E-24. 
Table E-24 – Radar data rules. 
# Rules for UCI-O Class Anti 
1 P1 = 1 AND P3>=0.19 AND P5>0 AND P8>-1 AND A7>=-0.23 0 5 
E.3.5 UCI-P Diabetes diagnosis 
From (Tsukimoto, 2000), here class 0 indicated no diabetes and class 1 likely 
diabetes.  The rules in the cited work for UCI-P are given Table E-25. 
Table E-25 – Diabetes diagnosis rules. 
# Rules for UCI-P Class Anti 
1  Plasma<=139 0 1 
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Appendix F Further 
Experiments 
F.1 Rule optimisation using a genetic algorithm 
The rule depth results indicated that SOAR 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 could be optimised to improve 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 further while having a small impact on the fraud detection 
precision.  A further method was then investigated to improve the efficiently optimise 
the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 based on multiple performance measures.  Genetic algorithms have 
been used to create classifiers for fraud detection and were reviewed in 2.5.5, page 
99.  To further optimise the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 a genetic algorithm was briefly investigated 
(Everson & Fieldsend, 2006; Jin & Sendhoff, 2008).  The population consisted of a 
number of parents and children each of whom contained 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠.  Each rule can 
be considered a gene and the antecedents of a gene are viewed as chromosomes.  
This fitness of each rule is calculated as in Eq. (8-20). 
𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑀𝐶𝐶. 𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 𝑐𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑐𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + #𝐿! (8-20) 
𝑐𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 is a fixed weighting given to the importance of comprehensibility so that 
the smaller the value the more important this measure.  𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 is a fixed weighting 
given to the importantce of the rule precision.  The population is generated with the 
one parent initially containing the SOAR extracted rules and the other parent 
randomly generated as per a child discussed below.  Children are generated through 
breeding of the parents.  Random selection is used to alternately pick a particular 
rule from each parent and place this in the child and repeat for entire ruleset.  The ruleset in the child is then mutated by a random combination of (1) swapping rules, 
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(2) removing entire rule, (3) removing chromosomes, (4) random small perturbation 
of the value of a chromosome.  The children are then sorted by their fitness so that 
each can be ranked among its peers within the entire population.  A 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 distance 
is calculated as the distance between each child within the population that indicates 
the density of the neighbourhood.  All children are given a 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 from 1 to 
#children.  Those that are assigned 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 1 are temporarily removed from the 
population as the first nondominated front.  The next nondominated front is then 
identified among the remaining individuals in the population and this process is 
repeated.  To create the next generation tournament selection is used.  Two children 
from the population are randomly selected for this tournament and their 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 and 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 measures compared to select the winner.  The largest 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 and lowest 
nondominated 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 wins.  If the children have the same 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 then the child with 
the larger 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 is selected and if the children have both the same measures then 
one is randomly selected.  This process is completed for all children.   These children 
then become parents themselves of the next generation.  The original parent and this 
offspring population are combined.   This process then continues as above crating 
the next generation.  The performance of each child per generation is evaluated 
using the 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 measure and an ‘elite’ child choosen as the best performing of that 
generation.  This elite child is saved for each generation.  The process continues until 
a fixed number of generations are exceeded.  Each of the saved elite children are 
then evaluated and the highest performing chosen.  It is the 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡 of this elite of 
elite child that is then used.  The initial population was set at 64 children with 𝑓𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 2, 𝑐𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 20.  These values were choosen after a number of 
experiments and it is suggested that removing such constants is an area of future 
research (see 7.2.4, page 321).  A bias was given to reducing the number of 
antecedents in the rules over that of MCC.  For the mutations there was a 1 in 5 
probability to remove an entire rule and a 1 in 30 probability to remove or change 
an antecedent.  The initial number of iterations was set at 20.  The 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 dataset 
was used to calculate the 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 by evaluating all the rules in each child and 
calculating the measures.  The algorithm was implemented in C++ and tested on 
Real-E dataset.  The highest performing elite child was found at generation 5 with 
26 rules and a comprehensibility of 204.  Here the MCC was improved to 0.416.  
These results are interesting as they indicate that SOAR could usefully be extended 
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to include such a rule optimisation as part of the algorithm and this is an area of 
suggested future research.  As with any optimisation approach the rules may become 
less general and more specific as they are optimised.  It may be that optimising the 
rules could reduce their effectiveness when tested on further unseen data. 
 
[A] – #Rules and MCC performance. 
 
[B] – Generations and MCC performance.   
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[C] – #Rules and 𝑃! performance. 
 
[D] – Optimised real-world performance. 
Generates 1/4 the number of alerts per day with half the number of rules and 
6xMCC compared to SOAR.   
Key: Real-E=Large European issuer, Genetic= genetic algorithm, Standard=results as previously.   
Setup: Clustering: ART.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  Dataset: 𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻. 𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000. 
Figure F-1  – Summary charts and results for rule optimisation genetic algorithm. 
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Appendix G Real-world 
performance 
analysis 
Additional charts and tables commonly used within the payments industry are 
provided in this Appendix. 
Figure G-1 plots the operating point (𝜃) against the number of alerts generated by 
the rules per day – an import performance measure in the payments industry. 
 
Figure G-1 – 𝜃 and card alerts for Real-E. 
A trade-off table is plotted in Figure G-2 where 96.5% of the card frauds are 
correctly identified by the neural model at 𝜃.   
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Figure G-2 – Selection of 𝜃 for Real-E. 
Figure G-3 shows the percentage of possible transaction value saved at the 𝜃 is 
approximately 92%. 
 
Figure G-3 – Money saved chart for Real-E. 
In Figure G-4 the model exhibits a card false positive ratio of approximately 600:1 
giving 1,000 #𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝐷/600=1.7 cards correctly alerted at the 𝜃 as also shown in 
Figure G-5. 
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Figure G-4 – Card false positive ratio for Real-E. 
The graph in Figure G-5 shows the number of correctly identified fraud cards within 
the card alerts generated each day where an average of 1.7 of these is an actual 
fraudulent card. 
 
Figure G-5 – Fraud cards correctly alerted and card alerts for Real-E. 
The card false positive ratio in Figure G-6 is independent of sample size and at the 
point where 96.5% of the card frauds that are correctly identified by the neural 
model, the FPR is 613. 
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Figure G-6 – Card false positive ratio and card alerts for Real-E. 
The performance of the Deep-MLP neural network created is not the key aim of this 
thesis.  It outperforms the benchmark figures given for the existing FMS in Table 
5-19 summarised in Table G-1. 
Table G-1 – Deep-MLP performance measures on test dataset for transactions in 
Real-E dataset with selected 𝜃 on underlying classifier. 
 
Key: Real-E=Large European issuer. 
Setup: Dataset: test.  Classifier: Deep-MLP.  𝜃 set at 750 out of 1,000.  Projected figures. 
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The Deep-MLP neural classifier can be seen to have a reasonable performance when 
applied to the real-world dataset.  Despite the low 𝑀𝐶𝐶 of 0.03, 63% 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 and 𝐹𝑃𝑅 of 11.60% by selecting θ at 750 out of 1,000, for a review team size of 10 with 
1,000 alerts per day so that 96.5% of the card frauds are correctly identified which is 
an average of 1.7 cards a day being alerted as an actual fraudulent card. 
 
